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The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 105, Issue 10, October 2008

Special Issue: Epistemic Norms

John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley
Pages 571-590

Knowledge and Action

Cited by

  • Anna-Maria A. Eder. Synthese. Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality 2021. [CrossRef]
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  • Anthony Robert Booth. Synthese. Advice for Infallibilists: DIVORCE and RETREAT! 2018. [CrossRef]
  • A. K. Flowerree. Episteme. Reasoning Through Narrative 2024. [CrossRef]
  • Michael Hannon. Philosophical Studies. Why purists should be infallibilists 2020. [CrossRef]
  • BENJAMIN S. YOST. Utilitas. What's Wrong with Differential Punishment? 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Alex Worsnip. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Can Pragmatists Be Moderate? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Moritz Schulz. Noûs. Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Jungbu Kim, Seong Soo Oh. Journal of Risk Research. Confidence, knowledge, and compliance with emergency evacuation 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Paul Silva. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Jonathan E. Adler. Synthese. Contextualism and fallibility: pragmatic encroachment, possibility, and strength of epistemic position 2012. [CrossRef]
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  • Kim Pedersen Phillips. En forskningsbasert skole? 2023: 47. [CrossRef]
  • DON FALLIS. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. WHAT LIARS CAN TELL US ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Benjamin Lennertz. Erkenntnis. Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality 2024. [CrossRef]
  • Declan Smithies. Noûs. The Normative Role of Knowledge 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Jeremy Fantl. Philosophical Studies. Guidance and mainstream epistemology 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Moritz Schulz. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Partial Reliance 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Knowledge Norms and Acting Well 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Julia Staffel. Noûs. How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning? 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Melanie Sarzano. Les ateliers de l'éthique. COSTLY FALSE BELIEFS: WHAT SELF-DECEPTION AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT CAN TELL US ABOUT THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEFS 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Carlotta Pavese. Analysis. Probabilistic Knowledge in Action 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin Dorst. Mind. Abominable KK Failures 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Daniel Immerman. Episteme. The Threshold Problem, the Cluster Account, and the Significance of Knowledge 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Jessica Brown. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Wesley Buckwalter, Jonathan Schaffer. Noûs. Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Igal Kvart. Synthese. The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics 2021. [CrossRef]
  • James Fritz. Episteme. Encroachment on Emotion 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Davide Fassio, Jie Gao. Synthese. Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Artūrs Logins. European Journal of Philosophy. Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated 2022. [CrossRef]
  • John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Juan Comesaña. Res Philosophica. Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation 2013. [CrossRef]
  • D. Justin Coates. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. The Epistemic Norm of Blame 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Florencia Rimoldi. Trans/Form/Ação. Epistemología del desempeño e intrusión pragmática: algunas conexiones generales aplicadas a la teoría de Sosa 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Jumbly Grindrod. Inquiry. Computational beliefs 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Michael Hannon. Synthese. The universal core of knowledge 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Mark Schroeder. Ethics. Getting Perspective on Objective Reasons 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Carolina Flores, Elise Woodard. Philosophical Studies. Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Alexander Jackson. Synthese. Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Harvey Lederman. Noûs. Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Doraci Engel. Veritas (Porto Alegre). O que é agência epistêmica, afinal? 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Can Başķent, Loes Olde Loohuis, Rohit Parikh. Episteme. ON KNOWLEDGE AND OBLIGATION 2012. [CrossRef]
  • BARON REED. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Resisting Encroachment 2012. [CrossRef]
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  • Karl Schafer. Synthese. Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Jessica Brown. Philosophical Issues. COGNITIVE DIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC NORMS 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Jennifer Lackey. Philosophical Issues. SOCIALLY EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE 2014. [CrossRef]
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  • Martin Montminy. Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy 2013: 35. [CrossRef]
  • Carlotta Pavese. Synthese. Know-how, action, and luck 2021. [CrossRef]
  • The Philosophy of Philosophy 2022: 598. [CrossRef]
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  • Georgi Gardiner. Synthese. Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Matt Lutz. Synthese. The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Laura Frances Callahan. Synthese. (Joint) achievements and the value problem 2023. [CrossRef]
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  • Jason Marsh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Joshua Habgood‐Coote. European Journal of Philosophy. What's the point of knowing how? 2019. [CrossRef]
  • David Storrs-Fox. Philosophical Studies. Explanation and the A-theory 2021. [CrossRef]
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  • Bob Beddor. The Philosophical Quarterly. Certainty in Action 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Julius Schönherr, Javiera Perez Gomez. Philosophical Studies. Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Richard Brock, Wonyong Park. Science & Education. Distinguishing Nature of Science Beliefs, Knowledge and Understandings 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Kieran Setiya. Philosophical Studies. What is a reason to act? 2014. [CrossRef]
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  • Andy Mueller, Jacob Ross. Analytic Philosophy. Knowledge Dethroned 2017. [CrossRef]
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  • DENNIS WHITCOMB. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Curiosity was Framed* 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Kenneth Boyd. Philosophical Studies. Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Simon Langford. Erkenntnis. Pragmatic Encroachment and the Threshold Problem 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Jesper Kallestrup. Episteme. Nonreductive Group Knowledge Revisited 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Wesley Buckwalter. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Anthony Robert Booth. Islamic Philosophy and the Ethics of Belief 2016: 41. [CrossRef]
  • Moritz Schulz. Synthese. Strong knowledge, weak belief? 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Jakob Koscholke. Episteme. Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Sai Leung Ng. The Social Science Journal. Knowledge–intention–behavior associations and spillovers of domestic and workplace recycling 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Jennifer Lackey. The Philosophical Review. What Is Justified Group Belief? 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Timothy Williamson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Hyman on Knowledge and Ability 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini. Episteme. No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Allan Hazlett. The Philosophical Quarterly. Desire That Amounts to Knowledge 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Martin Smith. Noûs. Some Thoughts on the JK‐Rule1 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Nick Hughes. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Patricia Rich. Asian Journal of Philosophy. Knowledge in real-world contexts: not glamorous, but indispensable 2023. [CrossRef]
  • William Conner. Synthese. Radical epistemology, theory choice, and the priority of the epistemic 2024. [CrossRef]
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  • Berislav Marušić. Philosophy Compass. The Ethics of Belief 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Clayton Littlejohn. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Dan Baras, Oded Na’aman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. What Makes Something Surprising? 2022. [CrossRef]
  • J. Adam Carter. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Trust and trustworthiness 2023. [CrossRef]
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  • How to Know 2011: 241. [CrossRef]
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  • Conor MCHUGH. Dialectica. What Do We Aim At When We Believe? 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Daniel Whiting. Erkenntnis. Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion 2013. [CrossRef]
  • S. R. Grimm. Mind. On Intellectualism in Epistemology 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Nate Charlow. Synthese. What we know and what to do 2013. [CrossRef]
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  • Daniel Munro. Episteme. Cults, Conspiracies, and Fantasies of Knowledge 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Michael Fink, Beate Ratter. Frontiers in Climate. Blurring societal acceptance by lack of knowledge—insights from a German coastal population study on blue carbon 2024. [CrossRef]
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  • Martin Montminy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm 2013. [CrossRef]
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  • Elise Woodard. Episteme. Why Double-Check? 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Daniel Whiting. Noûs. Against Second‐Order Reasons* 2017. [CrossRef]
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  • Bernhard Salow. Mind. The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments 2018. [CrossRef]
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