The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 105, Issue 1, January 2008

Joseph B. Kadane, Mark Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld
Pages 5-36

Is Ignorance Bliss?

Cited by

  • Kevin Dorst. SSRN Electronic Journal . Rational Polarization 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Nilanjan Das. Noûs. Credal imprecision and the value of evidence 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin J.  S. Zollman. Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics 2022: 207. [CrossRef]
  • Michael Nielsen. Analysis. Only CDT values knowledge 2024. [CrossRef]
  • Ralph Hertwig, Christoph Engel. Perspectives on Psychological Science. Homo Ignorans 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Brian Hill. SSRN Electronic Journal. Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguity : A Reappraisal 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Seamus Bradley, Katie Steele. Philosophy of Science. Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Ruobin Gong, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld, Rafael B. Stern. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. Learning and total evidence with imprecise probabilities 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Charles F. Manski, John Mullahy, Atheendar S. Venkataramani. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Using measures of race to make clinical predictions: Decision making, patient health, and fairness 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic, Branden Fitelson. Philosophical Perspectives. Deference Done Better 2021. [CrossRef]
  • Hendrik Rommeswinkel, Hung-Chi Chang, Wen-Tai Hsu. Journal of Economic Theory. Preference for Knowledge 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Brian Hill. Games and Economic Behavior. Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Seamus Bradley. Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics 2022: 125. [CrossRef]
  • Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech. Management Science. Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Simon M. Huttegger. Philosophical Studies. Learning experiences and the value of knowledge 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Sven Neth. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Rational Aversion to Information 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Haim Gaifman. Journal of Applied Logic. The sure thing principle, dilations, and objective probabilities 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Nilanjan Das. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. The Value of Biased Information 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Charles F. Manski. Quantitative Economics. Credible ecological inference for medical decisions with personalized risk assessment 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Serena Doria. Annals of Operations Research. On the disintegration property of coherent upper conditional prevision defined by the Choquet integral with respect to its associated Hausdorff outer measure 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Katie Steele. Introduction to Formal Philosophy 2018: 657. [CrossRef]
  • Rush T. Stewart, Michael Nielsen. Philosophy of Science. Distention for Sets of Probabilities 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Gregory Wheeler. Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics 2022: 37. [CrossRef]
  • Carlos Santana. Episteme. WHY NOT ALL EVIDENCE IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Kevin Dorst. Philosophical Review. Rational Polarization 2023. [CrossRef]
  • Katie Steele. Erkenntnis. Persistent Experimenters, Stopping Rules, and Statistical Inference 2013. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.