The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 104, Issue 9, September 2007

Carlos J. Moya
Pages 475-486

Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?

Cited by

  • Nadine Elzein. Acta Analytica. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Robert Lockie. Philosophia. Three Recent Frankfurt Cases 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Manuel Pérez Otero. Manuscrito. Dos versiones de la contraposición entre naturaleza y libre albedrío 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Nadine Elzein. Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics 2020: 3. [CrossRef]
  • David Widerker. Philosophical Explorations. A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Ira M. Schnall. Philosophical Studies. Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Nadine Elzein. Philosophical Studies. Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Greg Janzen. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. ‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP 2016. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.