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The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 100, Issue 3, March 2003

David Braddon-Mitchell
Pages 111-135
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2003100321

Qualia and Analytical Conditionals

Cited by

  • Raamy Majeed. Erkenntnis. Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Jens Kipper. Analysis. On what is a priori about necessities 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Daniel Lim, Ju Chen. Philosophical Psychology. Is compatibilism intuitive? 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Jussi Haukioja. Philosophical Studies. A defence of the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Torin Alter. Philosophical Studies. On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts 2007. [CrossRef]
  • Guy Dove, Andreas Elpidorou. Mind & Language. Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Kristie Miller. Erkenntnis. The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Gabriel Oak Rabin. Synthese. Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism 2019. [CrossRef]
  • David Braddon-Mitchell. Biology & Philosophy. Conceptual stability and the meaning of natural kind terms 2005. [CrossRef]
  • David Plunkett. Inquiry. Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Pär Sundström. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. How Physicalists Can-and Cannot-Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism 2018. [CrossRef]
  • David Plunkett. Philosophical Studies. Expressivism, representation, and the nature of conceptual analysis 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Elizabeth Schier, John Sutton. History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand 2014: 773. [CrossRef]
  • Philip Goff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. A PosterioriPhysicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Raamy Majeed. Synthese. Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Robert D. Rupert. Nous. Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects1 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Samuel Baron, Kristie Miller. Philosophy and Psychology of Time 2016: 29. [CrossRef]
  • D. Gene Witmer. Philosophical Studies. How to be a (sort of) a priori physicalist 2006. [CrossRef]
  • ANDREW BAILEY. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Raamy Majeed. Philosophical Papers. A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Frederick Kroon, Denis Robinson. History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand 2014: 413. [CrossRef]
  • Neil Mehta. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Phenomenal, Normative, and Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Jesper Kallestrup. Synthese. Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Pär Sundström. Philosophy Compass. Phenomenal Concepts 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Helen Yetter-Chappell. Philosophical Studies. Circularity in the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts 2013. [CrossRef]
  • BRENDAN O'SULLIVAN. Theoria. Taking Referentialism Seriously: A Response to the Modal Argument 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Robert Kirk. Synthese. Physicalism and strict implication 2006. [CrossRef]
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