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The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 96, Issue 5, May 1999

Richard Holton
Pages 241-262
DOI: 10.2307/2564667

Intention and Weakness of Will

Cited by

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  • James R. Beebe. Synthese. Weakness of will, reasonability, and compulsion 2013. [CrossRef]
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  • Chrisoula Andreou. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. Moral psychology (ethics) 2010. [CrossRef]
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  • Jeffrey L. Crabtree. OTJR: Occupation, Participation, Health. No One Dresses Accidentally: A Research Synthesis on Intentional Occupational Performance 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Christine Tappolet. International Encyclopedia of Ethics 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Adam Rigoni. Legal Theory. COMMON-LAW JUDICIAL REASONING AND ANALOGY 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Natasza Szutta. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. The Virtues of Will-Power – from a Philosophical & Psychological Perspective 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Michael T. Michael. Philosophia. Passionate Akrasia 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Alec D. Walen. SSRN Electronic Journal. Choosing Your Reasons for an Action: Moral Permissibility, Willful Action, and the Doctrine of Double Effect 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Nora Heinzelmann. Philosophia. Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Joshua May, Richard Holton. Philosophical Studies. What in the world is weakness of will? 2012. [CrossRef]
  • D. Cohen, T. Handfield. Mind. Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Dorothee Horstkötter. Theory & Psychology. Self-control and normativity: Theories in social psychology revisited 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Sergio Tenenbaum. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action 2010: 274. [CrossRef]
  • Jeff Sebo. Philosophical Psychology. Multiplicity, self-narrative, and akrasia 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Simon Blackburn. Philosophy. The Majesty of Reason 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Mathieu Doucet, John Turri. Synthese. Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Yonatan Shemmer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring * 2020. [CrossRef]
  • Wilhelm Hofmann, Malte Friese, Jörn Müller, Fritz Strack. Psychologische Rundschau. Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust 2011. [CrossRef]
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  • David Owens. Dialogue. Knowing Your Own Mind 2003. [CrossRef]
  • Patrick Fessenbecker. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. The fragility of rationality: George Eliot on akrasia and the law of consequences 2020. [CrossRef]
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  • Paulo Sousa, Carlos Mauro. Philosophical Psychology. The evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Chandra Sekhar Sripada. Noûs. How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self-Control and the Divided Mind 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Jeffrey L. Crabtree. OTJR: Occupation, Participation, Health. No One Dresses Accidentally: A Research Synthesis on Intentional Occupational Performance 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Lubomira Radoilska, Keron D. Fletcher. BJPsych Advances. Lessons from akrasia in substance misuse: a clinicophilosophical discussion 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Nuraan Davids, Yusef Waghid. Tolerance and Dissent within Education 2017: 35. [CrossRef]
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  • David A. Fennell. Tourism Recreation Research. Akrasia and tourism: why we sometimes act against our better judgement? 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Stephen P. Schwartz. New Ideas in Psychology. Soritic thinking, vagueness, and weakness of will 2009. [CrossRef]
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  • Gabriel S. Mendlow. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Want of Care: An Essay on Wayward Action 2014. [CrossRef]
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  • Allen Coates. European Journal of Philosophy. The Enkratic Requirement 2013. [CrossRef]
  • NEIL LEVY. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Resisting ‘Weakness of the Will’ 2011. [CrossRef]
  • George E. Newman, Julian De Freitas, Joshua Knobe. Cognitive Science. Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Julia Haas. Synthese. An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Christa M. Johnson. Synthese. Resolutions, salient reasons, and weakness of will 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Santiago Amaya. Noûs. Slips* 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Kentaro Fujita, Jessica J. Carnevale, Yaacov Trope. Neuroethics. Understanding Self-Control as a Whole vs. Part Dynamic 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Eugene Marshall. European Journal of Philosophy. Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia 2010. [CrossRef]
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  • Alfred Mele. Philosophical Studies. Weakness of will and akrasia 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Ali Yousefi Heris. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. The ordinary concept of weakness of will 2020. [CrossRef]
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  • Naoyuki SHIONO. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science. Weakness of Will and Time Preference 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Alejandro Rosas, Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Antonio Gutiérrez. Philosophical Explorations. Is a bad will a weak will? Cognitive dispositions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Bruno Verbeek. Topoi. On the Normativity of Intentions 2014. [CrossRef]
  • Elise Woodard. Noûs. A puzzle about fickleness 2020. [CrossRef]
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There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.