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The Journal of Philosophy

Volume 89, Issue 4, April 1992

Crispin Sartwell
Pages 167-180
DOI: 10.2307/2026639

Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief

Cited by

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  • Don Fallis, Dennis Whitcomb. The Information Society. Epistemic Values and Information Management 2009. [CrossRef]
  • J. Adam Carter. Synthese. Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Igor Douven, Sylvia Wenmackers. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting 2015. [CrossRef]
  • Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij. Acta Analytica. What’s so Good about a Wise and Knowledgeable Public? 2012. [CrossRef]
  • James R. Beebe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Reliabilism and deflationism 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Stewart Cohen. Inquiry. Theorizing about the epistemic 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Giovanni Tuzet. Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger. La justification pragmatique des croyances 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Stephen Hetherington. Synthese. The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Andrew Latus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Our epistemic goal 2000. [CrossRef]
  • ERIK J. OLSSON. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Christian H. Poth, Werner X. Schneider, Mathias Gutmann, Benjamin Rathgeber, Tareq Syed, Niels Birbaumer, Tamara Matuz, Michael Pauen, Rainer Reisenzein, Robert C. Roberts, Giorgio Coricelli, Mateus Joffily, Jonathan Gratch, Amadeus Magrabi, Joscha Bach, Hans Markowitsch, Eva-Maria Engelen, Marko Tscherepanow, Harald Welzer, Geert Keil, Frank Jäkel, Uwe Meyer, Manuela Lenzen, Ute Schmid, Joachim Funke, Tarek R. Besold, Nicole Becker, Christine Dimroth, Roland Grabner, Katharina Scheiter, Kristin Völk, Ipke Wachsmuth, Martin V. Butz, Constantin A. Rothkopf, Gottfried Vosgerau, Alois Knoll, Tobias Meilinger, Kai Vogeley, Helmar Gust, Thomas Metzinger, Saskia K. Nagel, Nikola Kompa, Henrike Moll, Regine Eckardt, Susanne Grassmann, Frank Esken, Hannes Rakoczy, Jennifer M. Windt, Michael Schredl, J. Allan Hobson, Thomas Goschke, Henrik Walter, Tobias Schlicht, Petra Vetter, Lore Thaler, Cynthia F. Moss, Thomas Grundmann, Christoph Beierle, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Niki Pfeifer. Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft 2013: 221. [CrossRef]
  • B. J. C. Madison. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology 2011. [CrossRef]
  • STEVEN L. REYNOLDS. Midwest Studies In Philosophy. Why We Should Prefer Knowledge 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Polycarp Ikuenobe. Metaphilosophy. Logical Positivism, Analytic Method, and Criticisms of Ethnophilosophy 2004. [CrossRef]
  • Brian Weatherson. Philosophical Studies. Centrality and marginalisation 2014. [CrossRef]
  • John Turri. Philosophical Psychology. Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Scott Hendrigks. The Philosophical Quarterly. DEMONS AND THE ISOLATION ARGUMENT 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Pierre Le Morvan. Synthese. Epistemic means and ends: a reply to Hofmann 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Darrell P. Rowbottom. Synthese. Scientific realism: what it is, the contemporary debate, and new directions 2019. [CrossRef]
  • JOHN TURRI. Theoria. Does Perceiving Entail Knowing? 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Lucy Campbell. Philosophical Explorations. Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?) 2018. [CrossRef]
  • Eric T. Kerr, J. Adam Carter. Social Epistemology. Richard Rorty and Epistemic Normativity 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Pierre Le Morvan. Erkenntnis. Goldman On Knowledge As True Belief 2005. [CrossRef]
  • David B. Martens. Erkenntnis. Confidence in unwarranted knowledge 2006. [CrossRef]
  • Joseph M. Kramp. Journal of Religion and Health. The Sacrifice of Knowledge: Vain Debates in the Social Scientific Study of Religion 2013. [CrossRef]
  • Duncan Pritchard. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Epistemic Deflationism 2004. [CrossRef]
  • Duncan Pritchard. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Anthony Robert Booth. Erkenntnis. The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce 2011. [CrossRef]
  • A Brief History of the Soul 2011: 241. [CrossRef]
  • PIERRE LE MORVAN. Theoria. Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism 2013. [CrossRef]
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  • Darrell P. Rowbottom. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird’s Epistemic View 2010. [CrossRef]
  • Jeremy Fantl. Philosophy Compass. Knowing-How and Knowing-That 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Pedro Schmechtig. Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie 2019: 286. [CrossRef]
  • STEPHEN HETHERINGTON. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification? 2007. [CrossRef]
  • Darrell P. Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. N-rays and the semantic view of scientific progress 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Wolfgang Spohn. The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer 2003: 129. [CrossRef]
  • IGOR DOUVEN, DIEDERIK OLDERS. Theoria. Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited 2008. [CrossRef]
  • PATRICK RYSIEW. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach 2006. [CrossRef]
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  • Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp, Sylvia Wenmackers. Erkenntnis. Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge 2014. [CrossRef]
  • James R. Beebe. A Companion to Experimental Philosophy 2016: 359. [CrossRef]
  • John Turri. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion 2011. [CrossRef]
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