Faith and Philosophy

Volume 12, Issue 1, January 1995

David Widerker
Pages 113-118

Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions

Cited by

  • Joseph Keim Campbell. The Journal of Ethics. New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Yishai Cohen. Erkenntnis. Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument 2017. [CrossRef]
  • Eric Funkhouser. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination 2009. [CrossRef]
  • Ken Levy. Philosophia. Blocking Blockage 2016. [CrossRef]
  • Ishtiyaque Haji. Philosophical Explorations. Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples 1999. [CrossRef]
  • Ishtiyaque Haji. Deontic Morality and Control 2002. [CrossRef]
  • Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers. Dialectica. Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Mark Balaguer. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis) 2009. [CrossRef]
  • STEWART GOETZ. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Charles Hermes, Joe Campbell. Acta Analytica. More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang 2012. [CrossRef]
  • Joseph Keim Campbell. Acta Analytica. Farewell to direct source incompatibilism 2006. [CrossRef]
  • John Martin Fischer. The Journal of Ethics. Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Alfred R. Mele. Social Philosophy and Policy. Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck 1999. [CrossRef]
  • Alfred R. Mele. Journal of Social Philosophy. Flickers of Freedom 1998. [CrossRef]
  • Randolph Clarke. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind 2003: 369. [CrossRef]
  • Vlad Beliavsky. Freedom, Responsibility, and Therapy 2020: 173. [CrossRef]
  • Seth Shabo. Philosophia. Flickers of Freedom and Modes of Action: A Reply to Timpe 2007. [CrossRef]
  • Gerald K. Harrison. Philosophical Studies. Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities 2006. [CrossRef]
There may be additional citations on Google Scholar.