Études Phénoménologiques

Volume 14, Issue 27/28, 1998

Husserl, lecteur de Brentano et de Frege

Dan Zahavi
Pages 127-168

Brentano and Husserl on Self-Awareness

Cited by

  • John J. Drummond. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality 2008. [CrossRef]
  • Michela Summa. Spatio-temporal Intertwining 2014: 111. [CrossRef]
  • Denis Seron. Franz Brentano’s Philosophy After One Hundred Years 2020: 41. [CrossRef]
  • Michela Summa, Martin Klein, Philipp Schmidt. Topoi. Introduction: Double Intentionality 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Andrea Marchesi. Dialectica. Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Uriah Kriegel. The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness 2007: 35. [CrossRef]
  • Corijn Van Mazijk. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness 2019. [CrossRef]
  • Agnieszka Sobolewska. Autoekonomie zapisu Juliana Ochorowicza. Codzienne praktyki piśmienne i badawcze psychologa 2021. [CrossRef]
  • URIAH KRIEGEL. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Naturalizing Subjective Character 2005. [CrossRef]
  • Dan Zahavi. The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry 2003: 56. [CrossRef]
  • Mauro Antonelli. Acta Analytica. Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano 2022. [CrossRef]
  • Chad Kidd. Philosophical Studies. Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation 2011. [CrossRef]
  • Uriah Kriegel. Philosophical Studies. Self-representationalism and phenomenology 2009. [CrossRef]
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