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Philosophia Christi

Volume 20, Issue 1, 2018

Symposium on Dualism and Physicalism

Jonathan J. Loose
Pages 73-81
DOI: 10.5840/pc201820110

The Constitution View
Not So Simple

Lynne Rudder Baker’s work was driven by commitments to quasi-naturalist materialism and the ontological distinctiveness of human persons. The incompatibility of these commitments is apparent in her constitution view (CV). Baker's “Not-so-simple Simple View” of personal identity is inferior to the Simple View traditionally associated with substance dualism since CV’s underlying account of persons is vacuous. It also entails a dilemma: either indeterminate identity or the problem of the many. Finally, CV also fails to support Baker’s view that human persons do not begin to exist prior to the acquisition of a capacity for conscious, intentional thought.