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Philosophia Christi

Volume 14, Issue 2, 2012

Symposium on Paul Moser's Religious Epistemology

Eric LaRock
Pages 409-426
DOI: 10.5840/pc201214233

An Empirical Case against Central State Materialism

I argue on empirical grounds (1) that consciousness is not nothing but a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system; (2) that consciousness is not reducible to an epistemic ability, such as the ability to recognize an object; (3) that mind could not merely be a (material) cause that is apt to bring about a certain range of behaviors; and (4) that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort defended by David Armstrong and David Lewis) to reconsider the feasibility of their account of mind.

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