Journal of Philosophical Research

Volume 41, 2016

In Defense of Tracing

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) claim that reflection on tracing cases partially motivates the idea that moral responsibility is essentially historical. Fischer and Ravizza contend that in cases in which an agent is morally responsible for an action despite lacking the right kind of control, we must appeal to tracing. In a pair of recent papers, Andrew Khoury (2012) and Matt King (2014) have argued that tracing is not a necessary feature of moral responsibility. King argues that in tracing cases, the agent’s responsibility can be fully explained either by appeal to recklessness or by negligence. Khoury notes that the agent in a tracing case is claimed to be responsible for the consequences of his action even though he does not satisfy the control condition at the time of action. But he argues that agents cannot be responsible for the consequences of their actions. If no one is morally responsible for consequences, then tracing is unnecessary. In this paper, I will argue that both Khoury and King’s respective arguments fail to show that tracing is not a necessary part of a successful theory of moral responsibility.