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International Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 56, Issue 4, December 2016

Gretchen Gusich
Pages 429-443

Three Aristotelian Moments in Husserl’s Phenomenological Account of Truth

Heidegger famously appeals to Aristotle because of substantive and methodological commonalities, particularly with regard to truth. But there are three respects in which Husserl’s account of truth is more in keeping with Aristotle than Heidegger’s own account is. (1) Husserl’s account acknowledges and preserves the value of pre-philosophical experience. (2) It is more natural and less violent. (3) It recognizes truth as a cognitive achievement. This paper presents the salient features of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological reworkings of the correspondence theory of truth, outlines the strengths of Husserl’s account vis-à-vis Aristotle, and shows how Husserl’s account safeguards against Heidegger’s concern with mere utterance, thus opening up a new line of inquiry for Husserlian phenomenologists.

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