ONLINE FIRST
published on May 20, 2014
Brian Besong
The Prudent Conscience View
Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings confer justification, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is less plausible than other versions of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and defense of a non-standard account of moral intuitionism that I dub the “Prudent Conscience View.” According to this view, phenomenal credentials only partially determine the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming, for the power of a seeming to confer justification is also determined by its etiology. In brief, a moral seeming confers justification to the degree that the conscience that gave rise to it is functioning properly, and a person’s conscience functions properly to the degree that the person is prudent.