Human subjects in the developing world historically have been, and continue to be, treated like expendable commodities in clinical research. This paper will explore some of the factors that make those in the third world prime targets for exploitation. It will also challenge a deeply-entrenched view that has permitted this unethical conduct to persist—namely, the belief that the standard of medical care should vary depending upon where a research subject lives. The paper will also discuss the Food and Drug Administration’s 2008 decision to disavow the Declaration of Helsinki, to the further detriment of research subjects in developing countries. Finally, the paper will suggest a possible solution to help address this ethical crisis.

This paper argues that it can be morally wrong to be friendly to strangers. More specifically, the paper argues there is a salient pro tanto moral reason against being friendly to strangers in virtue of the structure of interaction. By ‘a salient pro tanto reason’ I mean a reason that is not always decisive, but it is often significant enough that it ought to factor in moral deliberation. My argument is perfectly general, but it is presented to shed light on one specific practical problem. By considering this issue I think we will be able to see what is distinctly wrong with street harassment. I hope to explain why this sort of behavior is morally problematic. Basically, even in its most benign cases, street harassment attempts to place a moral burden on a stranger to respond in kind. The stranger may not wish to bear this burden and that is why there are reasons against creating this burden. It is wrong because it involves treating others as if they owe you attention and acknowledgment, which is to treat strangers as friends.

Asian romantic preference is not wrong because it does not infringe on someone’s moral right. Nor is it unjust in some other way. It is not intrinsically bad because it is neither false nor does it consist of the love of evil or hatred of the good. It is not clear if it is instrumentally bad because it is not clear whether it is good for Asian women and, if it is, whether the good for them is outweighed by the bad for others. People have many preferences when it comes to marriage, dating, and sex. Consider heterosexual men’s preferences for women who are thin, feminine, normal height, symmetrical, and so on. The preference to marry, date, or have sex with Asian women is morally similar to these preferences.

Medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States, and there is growing consensus that medical errors should be discussed after they occur. This essay argues that potential errors should be discussed with patients as well in the informed consent process prior to treatment. While physicians don’t have the obligation to tell patients to go to physicians and hospitals that would present less potential for error, patients should be told of increased risks compared to other options, and be guided through the data on physician and hospital rankings. Suggestions are given to improve this informed consent process.

Just over seventy years ago, three trials took place in Nuremberg, Germany. At the time, they seemed a turning point in international relations—and, indeed, proved to be. The trials involved the prosecution of prominent members of the political, military, economic, and judicial leadership of Nazi Germany, those who planned, oversaw, or otherwise participated in the Holocaust and other large crimes. At the time, the Trials were widely condemned for using retroactive criminal statutes. The most famous discussion is what became known as the Hart-Fuller Debate. This paper argues that Locke provides the best account of the lawfulness of the Trials—at least when compared to the accounts offered by Fuller, Hart, and Ronald Dworkin.

In this essay, at the epistemological level I focus on groups, and not merely individuals, when examining medical errors on behalf of both the medical industry and patients who engage in medical conspiracy theories. Specifically, I use the work in virtue and vice epistemology by Quassim Cassam and Miranda Fricker to diagnose some of the problems that arise with medical conspiracism. Cassam identifies the vice conspiracist mentality to help explain the preponderance of conspiracy theorizing. Fricker provides a framework for thinking about group errors by identifying the vices of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice. I argue that medical conspiracists present a warped version of Fricker’s vices by acting as if they are the victims of these injustices instead of the purveyors of them. In addition, I argue that errors on behalf of various medical groups, such as hospitals and health organizations, reinforce many conspiracy theories.

Feminists continue to express concerns over the legalization of physician-assisted death (PAD). Some worry that women are more likely than men to request PAD due to societal stereotypes and the pressures put on women to be self-sacrificing. Others worry that women will have their requests ignored more often than men because women’s voices are traditionally silenced or disregarded in western culture. Rather than join in the above argument of speculating which way women may be marginalized, I accept PAD as potentially dangerous and offer a solution in order to avoid the risks of injustice associated with PAD. I reframe the concerns as epistemological worries, and ultimately, I turn to Benjamin McMyler’s virtue epistemology as a way to avoid testimonial injustice in requests for life hastening medication, suggesting that the injustice comes from a narrow and individualistic perception of knowledge, and injustice can be avoided if we understand testimonial knowledge to be both cognitive and social.

In this brief paper, a case is made for the moral permissibility of assisted dying. The paper proceeds by highlighting a common critique from within disability rights scholarship and advocacy that emphasizes the vulnerability of people with disabilities and the risks associated with permitting assisted dying. The paper suggests that because medicine necessarily involves risk, primarily through the high likelihood of medical error, that the risk and harm being utilized as a justification to prohibit assisted dying by disability rights scholars is in fact, not conceptually or morally unique. Finally, it is argued that because all medicine involves a risk of harm, and assisted dying is not unique in this respect, that one cannot effectively launch a critique of assisted dying on this basis.

In the mid-nineteenth century, healthcare delivery began transitioning from an individual, private payment model to a third-party payment model, dominated by the insurance industry. During the same time, productivity shifted from a transformational model, centered on the provider-patient relationship, to a transactional model, based on the distribution of services. The emergence of medical insurance and other third-party payers removed providers and patients from discussions about treatment plans, payment, and risk. This resulted in a weakening, if not fracturing, of the provider-patient relationship. All healthcare providers enter their profession to care for people, yet what has most frequently been lost in the transformed relationship over the past century is context, communication, and trust—all elements of a relational ethic, or what ethicist and psychologist Carol Gilligan first described as, “the ethics of care.” This loss of relationality has led to a model of healthcare delivery that is fractured, isolated, and uncoordinated, with an epidemic of medical errors that by some estimates results in the death of approximately 400,000 individuals per year. Thus far, isolated foci on patient quality, outcomes, and safety have been feckless and unimpressive. However, new advanced payment models, such as value-based purchasing and patient-centered medical homes, have the potential to reduce medical error by addressing its root cause. In linking payment to factors such as context, communication, and trust, they bring relationality back into the healthcare system. This essay traces the historic devolution of the provider-patient relationship and the promise of new payment models to restore it.

One limitation of medical ethics modeled on ideal moral theory is its relative silence on the aftermath of medical error: not just on the recognition and avoidance of malpractice, wrongdoing, or other such failures of medical ethics, but on how to respond given medical wrongdoing. Ideally, we would never do each other wrong; but given that inevitably we do, as fallible, imperfect agents we require non-ideal ethical guidance. For such non-ideal contexts, Nancy Berlinger’s analysis of medical error and Margaret Walker’s account of moral repair present powerful hermeneutical and practical tools toward understanding and enacting what is needed to restore relationships, trust, and moral standing in the aftermath of medical error and wrongdoing. Where restitutive justice aims to make injured parties whole and retributive justice to mete out punishment, reparative justice, as Walker describes it, “involves the restoration or reconstruction of confidence, trust, and hope in the reality of shared moral standards and of our reliability in meeting and enforcing them.” Medical moral repair is not without its challenges, however, in both theory and practice; the standard ways of holding medical professionals and institutions responsible for medical mistakes or malpractice function retributively and restitutively, either impeding or giving benign inattention to patient-practitioner relationship repair. This paper argues for the value of medical moral repair, while considering some complications of extending and synthesizing Berlinger’s and Walker’s respective accounts on medical error and moral repair.

Should the use of performance-enhancing drugs (PED) be banned in sport? A proper response to this question depends upon ideas of the meaning and value of sport. To a certain extent, sport is associated with ideal values such as equality of opportunity, fair play, performance and progress. PED use is considered contrary to these values. On the other hand, critics see sport as an expression of non-sustainable and competitive individualism that threatens human welfare and development. PED use is considered a logical consequence of these values. I challenge both views as simplistic and inadequate. I develop what I refer to as the normative structure of sport consisting of self-imposed constraints at three levels: in the formal rules, in norms for fair play, and in the interpretation of athletic excellence as a morally relevant instantiation of human excellence. I argue that the question of a ban on PED should be discussed at the third level and depends upon interpretations of athletic excellence as a form of human excellence. I conclude that, in the current situation of elite sport, proponents of a ban on PED seem to have the strongest arguments.

I argue that bureaucracies, as described by Max Weber, have essential characteristics that clash with basic educational values. On the one hand, bureaucracies, because of their divisions of labor, inevitably narrow all those who participate. Bureaucracies also, because of the need for impartiality, inevitably dehumanize all who participate. On the other hand, education aims to broaden and humanize those who participate in it. This tension between bureaucracy and education makes bureaucracy an unsuitable mechanism for delivering an education. Bureaucracies are often the best ways to accomplish large tasks involving many people; however, the task of educating all humanity is not one of those tasks. Problems in education can only be exacerbated by “fixing” the bureaucracy, because efficiency, the greatest bureaucratic virtue, is harmful to education. While I offer no solution, I share some thoughts about how a humanizing, broadening, and suitably inefficient education might look.

In a recent paper entitled “The Case for Colonialism” Bruce Gilley argued that Western colonialism was “as a general rule” both beneficial to those subject to it and considered by them to be legitimate. He then advocated for a return to the Western colonization of the Third World. Gilley’s article provoked a furious response, with calls for its retraction being followed by the resignation of much of the publishing journal’s editorial board. In this paper I note that Gilley’s article meets none of the criteria required to justify its retraction, and that instead of retracting it it should be rebutted. I then argue that his arguments against those who oppose colonialism are all fatally flawed, and that he has provided no justification for his claims that colonialism was either beneficial to those who lived under it, or considered by them to be legitimate.

Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases (like the two above) that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere (second Enquiry) he speaks about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction . . . in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position.

The rise of fake news, climate change denial, and the anti-vaccination movement all pose important challenges to contemporary views about freedom of expression. This paper attempts to delineate the limits of freedom of expression, specifically with regard to truth, lies, and harm. My strategy is to offer a critical reading of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty to demonstrate its enduring relevance to contemporary issues in the freedom of expression. My critical reading of Mill provides guidance on when state interference is justified, the role of education, the nature of harm in the age of mass media and globalisation, and the relevance of truth and lies in the freedom of expression. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Millian account I present can deal adequately with contemporary issues in the freedom of expression in line with the current social context, relevant empirical facts, and our considered judgements.

The play on words in the title is used to illustrate a problem facing the United States government, United States citizens, and illegal immigrants. Recent estimates describe the number of illegal immigrants living in the United States at between eleven and twelve million individuals. To address issues with some of our illegal immigrants, on June 15, 2012, President Obama initiated the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. This is an Executive Order easing the burdens of immigration law on some illegal immigrants living in the United Stated. In what follows, I will explain how in spite of there being a right on the part of the United States and nations in general to exclude immigrants and to deport illegal immigrants, the DACA program is actually morally good if not a right on the part of the people in question insofar as they are captives of the will of their parents/guardians who brought them here originally and captives of a system of laws from which they cannot escape without help. In a sense, the DACA program liberates captives and rescues said captives from a legal and moral prison created by all those around them. Rescinding it involves moral turpitude.

Historically, the concept of androgyny has been as problematic as it has been appealing to (especially white) Western progressives. The appeal clearly includes, inter alia, the opportunity to abandon or ameliorate certain identities (including essentialized femininity and toxic masculinity). As for the problematic dimension, the central problem seems to be the reduction of otherness (often unconscious and unwitting) to the norms of straight white middle/upper-class Western cismen, particularly because of the consequent worsening of actual others’ marginalization and exclusion from social institutions. Despite these problems, I wish to suggest that androgyny—as evidenced by the enthusiasm felt for it by many Westerners—bespeaks something larger and more important than the concept itself, and that modified conception of it might be helpful in pursuit of social justice.

The case of the reintroduction efforts made on behalf of the California condor is examined, with a view toward discussing both the environmental difficulties and the overall cost. The work of Singer, Snyder, and others is cited, and it is concluded that the work was worthy, but that a full articulation of the problems has seldom been made.

The role of trust in financial investment has been a matter of some contention, one often obscured by two misconceptions: (1) that financial relationships are fit only for wary predictive reliance where trust has no rational basis, and (2) that in those relationships where trust is operative it must be worth preserving. Following Baier’s contention that trust, like air, is more easily seen when polluted, here I consider Ponzi schemes as exemplars of corrupt and polluted trust. Without attending to the role of trust in financial relationships, I argue, we can not make sense of how Ponzi schemes work, why investors are fooled, what it is that makes Ponzi schemes distinctively wrong, and what differentiates them from structurally similar yet legitimate financial practices.

We rely on doctors, accountants, engineers, and other professionals to be committed to the basic values of their professions and to exercise their ex­pertise in competent, reliable ways, even when no one is watching them do their work. That is, we expect them to have professional integrity. Children obviously do not yet have professional integrity, even if someday they will become professionals. Nevertheless, the moral development of children who will become professionals plays an important role in the eventual emergence of their professional integrity. We will discuss both what this integrity involves and how the basic moral development of children contributes to its emergence in professional life.

Mark Cherry’s Kidney for Sale by Owner is a book that illustrates how to do applied ethics right. Mark Cherry recognizes the important role of empirical facts in bridging a gap between our moral prescriptions, and our public policy or institutional prescriptions. In Kidney for Sale by Owner this method is on full display. While there is nothing the matter with Ideal Theory, we stand in need of what might be called bridge principles between the ideals of justice and some specific set of institutions that, we intend and hope, will actually realize those ideals. The bridge between Ideal and Actual will consist of empirical facts that require the tools of the social scientists.

A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion (AfC). AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy.

There is a libertarian argument for live donor organ markets, according to which live donor organ markets would be permitted if we simply refrained from imposing any substantive and controversial moral assumptions on people who reasonably disagree about morality and justice. I argue that, to the contrary, this endorsement of live donor organ markets depends upon the libertarians’ adoption of a substantive and deeply controversial conception of strong, extensive property rights. This is shown by the fact that these rights would prevent states intervening in cases of preventable and intuitively impermissible wronging of others that can arise when free individuals engage in voluntary offers and exchanges. I outline two forms of such wronging: discrimination and disrespectful demands. I argue that although these types of acts are morally impermissible, the policy question of whether and how they should be regulated by states is non-trivial. I then argue that there is good reason to think that organ markets would rely on disrespectful demands. This may help explain the widespread moral repugnance people feel toward organ trading. It also provides a , though not decisive, case for states to prohibit such markets.

Kidney for Sale by Owner discusses a range of different arguments that can be offered in defence of live donor kidney markets. Although Cherry’s case for establishing such markets does not rest on consequentialist considerations, Cherry nonetheless suggests that allowing the sale of organs would have net positive consequences. He argues that both renal failure patients and people living in poverty could benefit from participating in the market, and further claims that a legal trade in organs would not shape society in harmful ways. This paper argues that the likely consequences of establishing an open market in kidneys are less benign than Cherry suggests. Specifically, I argue that a live donor kidney market could plausibly harm sellers, give rise to harmful pressures to participate in the market, and reinforce unjust political and social structures. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for the organ market debate.

This paper defends an in principle understanding of the authority of persons over themselves and, in consequence, argues for significant limits on morally permissible state authority. It also defends an account of the limits of permissible state action that distinguishes between (a) the ability of persons to convey authority to common projects and (b) what may be judged virtuous, good, safe, or proper to do. In terms of organ transplantation policy, it concludes that it is morally acceptable, and should be legally permissible, for individuals to sell one of their kidneys while living, pocketing the cash to use as that person sees fit to advance their own understanding of their own best interests. Morally objectionable policy proposals, I argue, are not those that encourage individuals to sell a redundant kidney while living or families to sell the organs of a recently deceased loved one, but those that seek coercively to confiscate the organs of the recently deceased. Recognizing the authority of persons over themselves, and their ability to convey moral authority to common projects, including the sale of human organs for transplantation, would shed light on the medical marketplace and clarify public policy, while increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of procuring human organs for transplantation.

Psychiatrists working with war veterans have, in recent years, constructed ‘moral injury’ as a separate manifestation of war trauma that is distinct from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This paper argues that for moral degradation to occur, it necessarily involves one’s commissions or omissions that transgresses one’s personal morality, and hence, distinguishes sufferers of moral injury from PTSD sufferers who were witnesses to traumatic and morally abhorrent events. To this end, it clarifies how some of the situations surrounding moral injury are misunderstood, by discussing the process of moral reasoning in the context of moral dilemmas, dirty hands, and moral blind alleys. Finally, it concludes that when we conceptualise moral injury as being caused by one’s commissions and omissions in moral dilemmas, we find that shame and guilt are situation-appropriate responses with a role to play in what ethics mean.

This paper gives a brief history of the idea of an age of majority and argues that no age of majority should exceed the fighting age, i.e., the age at which a person becomes eligible to serve in (or liable to conscription into) a military unit. Several objections to the proposed constraint on ages of majority are raised and answered.

Let us suppose that we accept that humans can be correctly characterized as agents (and hence held responsible for their actions). Let us further presume that this capacity contrasts with most non-human animals. Thus, since agency is what uniquely constitutes what it is to be human, it must be of supreme importance. If these claims have any merit, it would seem to follow that, if agency can be nurtured through education, then it is an overarching moral imperative that educational initiatives be undertaken to do that. In this paper, it will be argued that agency can indeed be enhanced, and that the worldwide educational initiative called Philosophy for Children (P 4C), and others like it, are in a unique position to do just that, and, therefore, that P4C deserves our praise and support; while denigrations of such efforts for not being “real philosophy” ought to be thoroughly renounced.

Many of U.S. President Donald Trump’s business interests—and those of his family and close associates—either conflict or could conflict with his position as the country’s top elected official. Despite concerns about the vitality of the journalism industry, these actual or potential conflicts have been reported in great detail across a number of journalism platforms. More concerning, however, are the partisan news organizations on both the right and left that deliberately sow social discord by exciting deeply polarized political tensions among the U.S. populous. Often described as “fake” news, these organizations produce reports that seem designed to create outrage among audiences instead of enlightenment. This paper draws upon social epistemology and information ethics to offer a truth-based ethos for journalism to help overcome this pernicious form of exploitation.

As President, Donald Trumps faces two sorts of conflict of interest. The first are conflicts of interest other Presidents also faced, though Trump’s are “writ large.” These seem—as a practical matter—unavoidable now, hard to escape, not to be much changed by disclosure, and not even much subject to management. The other sort of conflict of interest seems to be without resolution even in principle while Trump remains both President and the person he is. These conflicts of interest are the product of the same life that made him President He cannot be both chief executive of a republic (as his oath of office requires him to be) and the royal autocratic central to his business brand.

On relativism, it has been argued, certain comparative moral judgments are impossible. Judgments which compare two moral codes, judgments which compare one’s own moral code with another, judgments which, on the basis of a comparison with one’s own code, condemn specific moral practices permitted or required by other codes, judgments which speak of moral progress or reform—all are nonsensical or impossible, the argument alleges. Although commonly conflated, arguments for these distinct but related theses are first distinguished, then exposed, and last subjected to critical scrutiny. While seemingly powerful, all are found wanting.

The past presidential election reinvigorated interest in the applicability of conflict of interest legislation to the executive branch. In § 2, we survey various approaches to conflicts of interest, paying particular attention to 18 U.S.C. § 208. Under 18 U.S.C. § 202, this conflict of interest statute is straightforwardly inapplicable to the President. We then explore the normative foundations of such an exemption in § 3. While these sections are ultimately lenient, we go on to consider the Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution in § 4. In §§ 5–6, we apply the Emoluments Clause to the presidency, arguing that it complements conflict-of-interest regimes with regards to foreign affairs, but with more substantial restrictions.

In this article, I argue that with regard to the President, the Emoluments Clause (EC) is not law. I argue for this on the basis of two premises. First, if something is a law, then it has a legal remedy. Second, EC does not have a legal remedy. This premise rests on one or more of the following assumptions: EC does not apply to the President; if EC were to apply to the President, it does not provide a remedy; or, if EC were to apply to the President and have a remedy, it is not law because it is vague. The conclusion that EC does not apply to the President has a practical upshot. As a practical matter, President Trump’s worldwide business tentacles and his refusal to put his business assets into a blind trust does not violate EC and, arguably, does not violate federal conflict-of-interest law.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the criminal’s constitutional right of confrontation is not abridged when the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine each and every witness offering evidence for the government. This rather surprising contention is investigated through an analysis of the Court’s arguments in light of certain philosophical principles.

The last fifteen years has seen an increasing social science scholarship into the nature and pervasiveness of hooking up amongst college students,1 but research on the philosophical and ethical issues within hookup culture and practice has not kept pace. To the extent that hooking up has been taken up by philosophers, it has been as part of a larger conversation about the ethics of casual sex, broadly construed; a conversation which is dominated by questions of objectification. As such, investigations into the ethics of hookup sex have been limited to questions of whether someone was used in the encounter.2 This essay aims to change this by utilizing Ann Cahill’s recent book, Overcoming Objectification, to argue that the ethical problems with hookup sex in Guyland are not rooted in women’s objectification but rather their derivatization.

In this paper I defend the view that conscience exemption clauses for medical practitioners (doctors, nurses, technicians, pharmacists) should be limited by patient protection clauses. This view was also defended by Mark Wicclair, in his book on conscience exemptions in medicine (2011). In this article, I defend Wicclair’s view by supplementing it with Hegelian ethical theory and feminist critical theory. Conscience exemptions are important to support as a matter of human rights. They support an individual’s right to protect their deepest value-commitments. A true understanding of conscience is dialectical, however, and it requires patient protection clauses because they too protect individuals in their deepest value-commitments. I show that the defense of patient protection clauses is historically supported by the theory of “conscience [Gewissen]” developed by G. W. F. Hegel in the nineteenth century (mostly in the Phenomenology of Spirit [1807]).

Standard representative democracy is criticised on democratic grounds and the case is made for an alternative system of democratic governance. The paper discusses ways in which representative democracy falls short of the democratic ideal of self-governance. Referendum and initiative are examined as mechanisms that further self-governance, but are argued not to go far enough. Direct democracy is considered as an alternative to representative democracy, but the case is made that even on democratic grounds direct democracy is unnecessarily demanding. It is argued that this is also the case with regard to Budge’s proposal for direct democratic governance, which retains a place for representation and for political parties. Real-time democracy is defended as a superior alternative. In real-time democracy, a voter’s vote is attached to an elected representative’s weighed parliamentary vote. The voter, however, is able to withdraw that vote and vote independently of her representative in parliamentary votes.

Many social trends are conspiring to drive the adoption of greater automation in society, and we will certainly see a greater offloading of human decisionmaking to robots in the future. Many of these decisions are morally salient, including decisions about how benefits and burdens are distributed. Roboticists and ethicists have begun to think carefully about the moral decision making apparatus for machines. Their concerns often center around the plausible claim that robots will lack many of the mental capacities that are indispensable in human moral decision making, such as empathy. To the extent that robots may be robustly artificially intelligent, these concerns subside, but they give way to new worries about creating artificial agents to do our bidding, if those artificial agents have moral standing. We suggest that the question of AI consciousness poses a dilemma. Whether artificially intelligent agents will be conscious or not, we will face serious difficulties in programming them to reliably make moral decisions.

Intergenerational justice gives present citizens obligations to past as well as future generations. Present members of a political society have an obligation to respect the contributions of their predecessors. But respect for past generations also means taking their intergenerational objectives into account in political decision-making—giving them weight in determining intergenerational policies—and thus treating past generations as participants in intergenerational policymaking. Neither the inability of the dead to have experiences, nor epistemological difficulties in determining their interests, nor the entitlement of present citizens to make political decisions are reasons for ignoring or discounting the intergenerational concerns of past generations.

One popular sort of argument for the death penalty depends on the idea of possibly saving innocent lives through added deterrent value. Defenders of such arguments generally concede that: a) we do not know whether or not the death penalty actually adds marginal deterrent value beyond life in prison, and b) any actual death penalty regime is likely to include the execution of some innocent people. Use of the death penalty might save some innocent people, but it is also likely that it will lead us to kill some innocent people. In the present paper, I attempt to give consideration to both sorts of innocents. I argue that it is morally more serious to intentionally kill people who are innocent than it is to fail to save innocent people whose death is in no way intended. Thus, in the absence of compelling evidence that our use of the death penalty would save significantly more innocent people than it would kill, we should err on the side of not using the death penalty as a means to try to achieve added deterrent value.

Habits and habitudes are peculiar in that they are both a condition of human agency, as well as one of its most significant hurdles. They open up the world by providing us with ways of being within it (e.g., how we perceive, move about, and generally orient ourselves in space). However, they also confine our worldly behavior given their repetitive and often predictable nature. This tension between spontaneity and repetition arises out of the two-fold temporal structure of habits—i.e., the habitual body simultaneously directs us toward the future and the past. An understanding of this tension is generally important for thinking about how individuals can do things differently. More urgently, this work has applications in the treatment of addictions and other compulsive behaviors where the difficulties of disrupting habitual repetition are much more pronounced.

Recent studies indicate that adapting common components of universal healing practices increases the effectiveness of multicultural therapies, especially incorporating initial and reformulated myths. The Socratic method, part of an original philosophical process directed toward therapeutic goals, has long been instrumental to many psychotherapies, but limited in application to dialectical discourse. Through a rediscovery and clarification of the original integrated Socratic-Platonic method inclusive of mythmaking as well as systematic questioning, the authors argue that this new, more comprehensive model provides a foundation for increasing the effectiveness of multicultural psychotherapies.

It is often claimed that adultery can be morally permissible in cases where those engaged in adulterous behavior are part of an open marriage. Yet this only follows if the institution of open marriage itself can be justified. This problem has been generally overlooked, but it deserves attention, as it is far from evident that open marriage has sterling moral credentials. I argue that the most promising general justification of the institution of open marriage is not based on consequentialist or aretaic principles, but rather on the principle of respect for autonomy. Yet while this principle justifies the institution of open marriage in the most general sense, it does not justify every case of adultery involving an open marriage. Whether a given case of adultery is rendered morally permissible by the presence of an open marriage will depend on whether the open marriage in question satisfies several other moral desiderata.

It is usually taken for granted that romantic relationships will be sexual, but it seems that there is no necessary reason for this, as it is possible for romantic relationships to not include sex. Indeed, sometimes sex is a part of a romantic relationship for only a relatively short period of it. Furthermore, scientific explanations of the link between sex and love don’t seem fully satisfying because they tell us only about the mechanics of sex, rather than its meaning or phenomenology. Therefore, the question of why it is that the archetypal romantic relationship includes sex, calls for philosophical analysis, yet it has been under-explored in philosophy. In this paper, I attempt to remedy this. I argue that sex is important to romantic love because it partly constitutes, builds, and expresses four of the central goods of a romantic relationship: 1) pleasure, 2) union, 3) intimacy, and 4) vulnerability and care. Thus, sex can be, and often is, an important vehicle for romantic love, though it is not essential for it.

This article engages with H. P. P. Lötter’s account of democracy, liberty, and poverty in this IJAP symposium devoted to his book, Poverty, Ethics, and Justice. For Lötter liberty and democracy are intrinsically part of what is meant by poverty eradication and necessary instrumentally to secure whatever else it means. Lötter insists that liberty rights and socio-economic rights are interdependent and that neither has moral priority. This account is pitched at a level of generality, and contains ambiguities, that evade certain hard but necessary questions, the main one being whether Lötter’s theory of the ‘co-originality’ of liberty and social rights is opposed to all reasonable constructions and entailments of the thesis of the priority of liberties. I suggest that he must accept a ‘weak’ priority thesis in order to insulate his overall argument from an authoritarian reading. Yet it is not clear whether Lötter’s would accept that politics enjoys a necessary centrality in adjudicating uncertainties within economic theory and policy-making, that democracy is irreducibly procedural in ways that licence particular voting and governing actions that are not necessarily pro-poor, and that political liberties plus a range of ‘negative’ civil liberties ought to be protected from trade-offs with prospective welfare and equality gains. Several aspects of Lötter’s account seem to block such moves, but I contend that the struggle against poverty and inequality is necessarily undertaken on a terrain of political and epistemic uncertainty, and that a democratic polity premised on institutionalised respect for uncertainty offers the best bet for realising welfare and social justice at an acceptable cost while respecting autonomy.

Stewart and Korol (“De-Signing Fat,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23.2 [2009]) contend that obesity is benign. In support of their position they have focussed on selected papers that do not take into consideration key realities. Their attempt to minimise the impact of obesity appears to centre on how difficult it can be to lose weight by diet alone (and its risks) and problems with measurements of obesity, while failing to acknowledge the specific and well-documented impact of deleterious biochemical alterations arising from central obesity. Stewart and Korol also do not point out the considerable controversy with the fat but fit (metabolically healthy obesity [MHO]) concept. Whether looping from above or below, nothing changes the biochemical realities of central obesity. Above all, Stewart and Korol never once mention the benefits of obesity prevention, rather focussing on the difficulties of losing weight. Thus, respectfully, a word of caution is put forward on the views of Stewart and Korol regarding obesity.

This paper develops some foundations for an Aristotelian ethics of the built environment by combining the formal elements of Aristotelian justice with the design theory of Christopher Alexander. The resulting ordered set of human actions and their corresponding built environments require social deliberation about the integration of activities. This deliberation is required at all levels of human action, is characterized by local and step-wise decision making, and in important ways makes it possible for us to know if and how we are harming others. On the political level this is embodied in the “public square,” whose essential purpose as integrative and moral-epistemological has deep and provocative implications for our built environment. For example, walkable human communities should be the default ethical choice for our built environment. I conclude by discussing a two-fold challenge to the New Urbanism movement for the light this sheds on the overall argument.

The present symposium, which I have organized on behalf of the International Journal of Applied Philosophy, is devoted to Hennie Lötter’s Poverty, Ethics and Justice. The first three articles in the symposium attempt to show that Lotter’s view on the eradication of poverty is inherently flawed, either in light of what a liberal state conceivably could do, or what respect for democracy requires, or what the environment can sustain. In this opening article, I draw out an interesting implication of Hennie Lötter’s original and compelling conception of the nature of poverty as essentially inhuman. After motivating this view, I argue that it, like the capabilities approach and other views that invoke a conception of good and bad lives, is inconsistent with a standard understanding of a liberal account of the state’s role, one that is independently supported and even readily accepted by liberal egalitarians. I argue that one must choose between a compelling conception of an impoverished life as not good or even bad and a liberal theory of the state’s function, roughly by which conceptions of good and bad must not ground policy, where many redistributivist liberals have not recognized this inconsistency. Although there are activities similar to fighting poverty that a liberal state can undertake, I contend that it cannot, by definition, aim to eradicate poverty as such, in the way that Lötter and others plausibly conceive of it.

This paper is about the implications of a common view on global justice. The view can be called the Minimalist View, and it says that we have no positive duties to help the poor in foreign countries, or that if we do, they are very minimal. It might seem as if, by definition, the Minimalist View cannot require that we do very much about global poverty. However, in his book World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge pointed out that this conclusion is at least up for debate. Although Minimalism countenances very few positive duties to the global poor, it certainly countenances negative duties not to harm. Perhaps one can argue that these negative duties are somehow being violated, and thus even a Minimalist must make substantial compensation to the global poor. However, in this paper I argue that Pogge’s argument about Minimalism does not succeed. The second half of the paper offers ways to revise and improve the argument in order to make the case for assistance to the global poor.

Men often allow their eyes to linger over the least bit of exposed cleavage or uncovered knee. This paper considers the harm done by such looks. Taken individually, male looks may not seem that bad. They need not cause direct harm and need not be done with malicious intent. Like environmental degradation, however, the accumulation of individually imperceptible harms pollutes the moral environment, especially given a long history of gender discrimination. Given the complexity of the gendered environment, I appeal to the virtue ethics tradition and suggest that men should seek to do the right thing at the right time in the right way given the setting and relationship with the particular individuals in question (e.g., friends, co-workers, lovers).

The subject of this paper is the ethics of the use of attack drones by a state. My concern is not the moral acceptability of drones as such, but rather that of current drone policy insofar as it involves the targeted killing of individuals in the “war on terror.” I seek to clarify and extend some of the arguments offered regarding the policy. Though this will involve some appeal to just war theory, my moral argument is broader than this. I conclude that there is a reasonably strong case that current drone policy is morally unacceptable.

In this article, I reply to three discussions of Poverty, Ethics and Justice that are published in this symposium of the Journal. In my book I argued for a moral obligation on the part of the state and an array of other agents to eradicate poverty, but critics maintain that doing so would be impossible, either because it would logically contradict the liberal ends of the state (Thaddeus Metz), or because it would undermine a robust commitment to democratic choice (Daryl Glaser), or because it would be inconsistent with the attempt to control climate change (Tristen Taylor). Here I provide a comprehensive reply to all three in light of a political philosophy of the state as fundamentally obligated to respect human dignity, where the latter is not reducible to autonomy, but is instead grounded on a much broader conception of human nature.

Future technology may dramatically extend the human lifespan. Peter Singer (1991) argues that we should reject life extension because developing it would result in a world with lower total and average happiness. Singer’s argument depends on the claim that we should maximise average happiness per moment. I will argue that developing the life-extending drug would not be impermissible because doing so will maximise average happiness per person. I offer an independent argument for why we should adopt a consequentialist principle which says to maximise average happiness per person.

While we’re inclined to think that a person is (as Kant put it) “above all price,” we in fact make a lot of decisions that seem to set a price on persons—or, at least, on their life. For example, I was recently involved with setting standards for buildings in areas susceptible to earthquakes. The consensus seemed to be $3/sq. ft. increase in construction cost was reasonable, more than that was not, even though lives could be saved if the standard were higher, assuring the survival of more buildings. Though the Ford Pinto remains the classic case of unjustifiably putting a price on persons, it is at once not such a clear case and also useful for thinking about when putting a price on life can be justified.

Hennie Lötter, in his book Poverty, Ethics, and Justice, contends that we have a moral obligation to eradicate global poverty, but does so under the assumption that eradicating poverty is possible under current political and economic policy. Roughly 1.8 billion people (the consuming class) currently consume the majority of the world’s economic production. About 5.2 billion poor people (the non-consuming class) would like to consume at similar levels. Is it possible for the non-consuming class to approach levels of material welfare similar to that of the consuming class? What would be the impact on the global environment if the billions of the non-consuming class started to consume at a reasonable standard? The answers to these questions are rather bleak for the cause of eradicating poverty: discussions on global poverty like Lötter’s fail to cohere with data on the environment and regarding resources constraints. Without radical transformation of current economic and political philosophy, the assumption that the eradication of poverty is possible is a false assumption.

In this paper I argue that members of Oaxacan Indigenous “transborder communities” of Mexico and the United States are entitled to a freedom of movement right between these two countries. First, I explore the vital role that migration across the U.S.-Mexico border plays in maintaining Oaxacan transborder societal culture. Second, I explore the implications of Will Kymlicka’s views on collective rights for this phenomenon. On the one hand, Kymlicka’s argument that just states must protect the societal cultures of minority groups within their territories would seem to support such a right for Oaxacan “transmigrants.” On the other hand, his categorical distinction between “national minorities” and “voluntary migrants” cannot, as it stands, capture the lived experiences of Oaxacan transborder communities and similar transnational groups. However, I argue that there is a reasonable extension of Kymlicka’s view that can, indeed, account for the phenomenon of Oaxacan transborder communities by allowing for this freedom of movement right.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” Although treasured as a statement of fundamental rights, the Amendment’s terms and relations are not uniformly read. This is amply illustrated by the various positions on the Amendment’s correct meaning expressed in the various majority, plurality, and dissenting opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court (U.S.S.C.). This is not to suggest that a more or less uniform interpretation fails to obtain with all of the phrases of the Amendment. The clauses covering excessive bail and excessive fines do enjoy some level of agreed meaning among the Court’s members. This, however, does not pertain to the Cruel and Unusual Clause. An apparent majority of the Court holds that the extent of application of an otherwise acceptable punitive sanction may nevertheless constitute cruel and unusual punishment. A minority of the Court denies this. This essay will critically examine the two major positions concerning the questioned Clause. Additionally, it will offer an argument which especially favors one of the noted positions.

Should those who get dirty hands (DH) always be punished in the same way? Must their punishment be regardless of the background elements that determined the DH dilemma, which has polluted their morality? This paper holds that common arguments in favour of punishing DH overlook the important difference between classic DH dilemmas that are structurally inescapable and those that are caused by a collective action problem. My thesis emphasizes that in talking about DH, our analysis should go beyond the structure of the dilemma. We should also take into serious consideration the background dynamics that made the choice between two evils inevitable.

An often-suggested way of giving content to the view that adolescent offenders should be punished more leniently than adult offenders has been to advocate the idea of a general youth discount for adolescents. Several theorists hold that a youth discount can be justified on a retributivist ground. But is the idea of a general youth discount consistent with the basic idea of giving individual offenders their just deserts? This article examines three arguments that have been presented to this effect. It is argued that the arguments are implausible and that the idea of a retributively justified general youth discount for adolescent offenders is unpersuasive.

Iris Marion Young has written a compelling account of individuals’ normative responsibilities for structural justice. While I agree with much of Young’s account, in this article I argue that there is an underexplored aspect of Young’s account regarding the link between individuals’ shared responsibility for justice and the normative demand that individuals engage in collective action towards just structural reform. I argue that Young has neglected an important aspect of individual responsibility for justice that links the aforementioned responsibilities together—namely, the responsibility to organize. Recognizing this responsibility is crucial for understanding the real work of structural justice efforts in the nonideal world.

The status of polygamy as a cultural artifact is investigated across a number of societies, and it is concluded that polygamy is extremely violative of the rights of a number of individuals in the societies in which it occurs, and not simply women. Extensive citation is made to the work of Elissa Wall on American polygamous groups in the Southwest.

Hong Kong’s adherence to the rule of law has been widely understood as one of its “core values.” As such, it has been understood as an institution necessary for good governance and a check against the abuse of governmental power as well as a feature that differentiates Hong Kong’s system of governance from other parts of China. At the same time, intervening issues of immigration and of constitutional interpretation have begun to challenge this perception. This paper argues that a recent landmark decision involving the right to permanent residence has served to weaken the rule of law in Hong Kong. It has further highlighted a lack of commitment by the judiciary to either human rights claims or equal treatment under the law.

In this paper, I make the case that metaphysical doctrines about the nature and existence of God, and a rationally governed cosmos, are rather cleanly separable from Stoic practical counsel, and its conductivity to a well-lived, eudaimonistic life. Stoicism may have developed within a worldview infused with presuppositions of a divinely-ordered universe, and, indeed, there may be a Creator or Designer of some type (I take no position, in this paper, regarding the existence of God), but the efficacy of Stoic counsel is not dependent upon creation, design, or any form of intelligent cosmological guidance. The Stoic practitioner does not require a divine stamp of approval to legitimize his pursuit of equanimity, excellence, and wise self-governance.

Myofascial Pain Syndrome (MFPS) is somatic pain due to muscular tension associated with muscular-skeletal imbalance. The pain and discomfort of the patient is not simply due to some isolated tension, but in the dynamic relationships between related structures. As the body adjusts to reestablish balance and symmetry, the tension and pain in one area “diagonalizes,” creating a tense correlate along a diagonal axis. This diagonalization of tension exacerbates and perpetuates the initial condition of pain and dysfunction. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there are moral and social analogues to MFPS with their own forms of diagonalized asymmetry. Following the Aristotelian model of virtue and vice, whereby moral traits and dispositions become vice as a result of a loss of balance in conduct, and George Herbert Mead’s social psychology, which describes the self in terms of dynamic interrelation and co-operation of multiple sub-selves, I maintain that otherwise positive strengths in personal character, when overemphasized or exaggerated, can be juxtaposed to analogous weaknesses in related areas of personal health and conduct. I will argue that the descriptive analogy of MFPS has a corollary set of prescriptions for restoring balance in a moral subject.

Torture-lite has been advanced as a new form of interrogation that raises the prospect of offering a more ethical way of colleting the intelligence needed to protect the state. However, this paper will argue that there can be no such thing as torture-lite as this misunderstands what interrogational torture is in the first place. Interrogational torture is a form of behavioural modification that relies on breaking the individual and conditioning their responses. Torture-lite would never be able to create the self-betraying effect necessary for cases such as the ticking time bomb scenario without crossing over into the higher harms caused by full torture, and is unable to force the individual to provide the required information to serve as the good in the consequentialist argument.

The US has conducted or routinely conducts personality and signature drone strikes into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and most likely other states as well. The US does this in order to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist organizations (Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani, al-Shabaab, ISIL, and their affiliates). In some of these attacks, states have given their expressed (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen) or tacit (e.g., Pakistan) consent to the US to conduct these drone strikes. However, some states do not consent to the US conducting kinetic drone strikes within their territory. In these cases, it seems prima facie reasonable to suggest that these acts or use of force are unjustified because they violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of a non-consenting state. Furthermore, the US is not at war with these other states so there is no leeway in suggesting that a state has a right to conduct these operations against another state. As it currently stands, attempting to use jus ad bellum (justice of war) criteria to discern a state’s moral justification for implementing force short of war (drone strikes) is not only unhelpful but fails to provide a reasonable framework. The use of armed drones is a recent phenomena that will continue to evolve, and with this comes a need for establishing a set of moral guidelines on a state’s implementation of them. In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming, we need to look at drone strikes not as an act of war but as an act or force short of war. I want to make the case that drone strikes can be morally justified using the Responsibility to Protect norms. That is, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norms should be the guiding norms with regard to jus ad vim (the just use of force short of war). Incorporating the R2P norms into a jus ad vim account provides a framework of when states can morally resort to the use of force.

The paper is a response to Russell Daylight’s “In the Name of Democracy” (International Journal of Applied Philosophy 29.1 [Spring 2015]). I argue that Daylight’s postmodernist approach to the question of democracy is flawed in several respects. First, he interprets the claim that the meaning of democracy is open to entail that there can be no closure when democratic norms are in dispute. I argue that normative closure is not only essential but also necessary to democratic practice, in particular for democratic legitimacy. I reject the claim that normative closure requires transcendental truths or dubious metaphysical commitments. Second, I critically examine Daylight’s positive proposal for “language-citizens.” I end by offering a sketch of a theory of democratic legitimacy that I believe evades the charges that Daylight and postmodernists offer against normative democratic theory.

The question of whether democracy is a human right or not has received increased attention in recent years from philosophers, and in the light of recent world events, from the general public. Tom Campbell provides a minimalist strategy to support the human rights status of democracy, one linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) and subsequent developments in International Law and global institutions. I suggest that we need to consider the question at a more philosophical level and argue that Campbell’s minimalist strategy for understanding the right to democracy is inadequate to both the normative and symbolic claims associated with the idea. I develop my argument by considering two themes also engaged by Campbell: the demandingness of democracy, and the relationship between rights and interventions.

What do people mean when they use the word “democracy”? From a survey of usage, we discover that democracy is a highly contestable notion. It is spoken of simultaneously as a moral principle, a state of being, and a system of government. But if democracy is a vigorously contested notion, it is not a hopelessly contested notion. Certain regular distinctions begin to emerge, with the most important being that between “liberal democracy” and “popular democracy.” Democracy today exists as a concept at war with itself. The resultant crisis for democrats is that they are forced to defend liberal values against popular reform. My own view is that democracy is best understood as pharmakon—as both poison and cure. My overall ambition in this paper, however, is not necessarily to defend one definition against another, but only to ask how we might proceed. In this sense, I want to address Jacques Derrida’s question of : “can one and/or must one speak democratically of democracy?”

After dealing with some methodological (Part 1) and definitional (Part 2) questions aimed at justifying its focus on bringing out the practical consequences of adopting democracy as a human right, in Part 3 the paper outlines and criticises arguments commonly made against having such a human right. It distinguishes between those arguments that deal with: (a) alleged conceptual inadequacies, such as that democracy does not satisfy defining criteria for human rights, such as universality, importance and intrinsic worth, (b) political doubts relating to the practicality of ‘self-determination’ and the acceptability of international intervention on the grounds of democratic deficits, and (c) weaknesses and inconsistencies relating to the legal implementation of democracy, such as the problem of having democracy as a human right when a function of human rights is to limit democracy and, in international law, the reluctance to adopt measures against non-democratic regimes. The paper questions these arguments individually, and points out that, if sound, they would exclude several generally accepted human rights. This exposes a pattern of unjustified discrimination against the idea that democracy is or ought to be a human right.

Professionals have a role obligation to satisfy certain standards when performing their work. However, as professionals, can they perform morally praiseworthy acts that are not within the scope of duty? According to applied professional ethics, the answer is yes, whereas some theoretical accounts of supererogation deny this possibility. I examine and ultimately reject two very different theoretical accounts that deny professional supererogation. First, a recent interpretation of Aristotle uses examples from the professional context to illustrate that the moral category of supererogation is not needed to describe heroic acts. Second, David Heyd’s account of supererogation argues that the category applies to natural duties alone and not to professional as professionals. Contrary to these claims, I argue that it is not only conceptually coherent to allow for the possibility of going beyond the call of duty but also morally important for assessments of responsibility and blame in professional life.

The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the manner in which the Ticking Bomb Scenario (TBS), a thought experiment in philosophical enquiry, has been used in the discussion of the justifiability or otherwise of forward-looking interrogational torture (FLIT). The paper argues that criticisms commonly raised against the thought-experiment are often inappropriate or irrelevant. A great many critics misunderstand the way in which thought experiments in general, and the TBS in particular, are supposed to work in philosophical (and for that matter scientific) inquiry. The paper is not about the acceptability or otherwise of FLIT per se but rather an attempt to show that thought experiments such as the TBS are useful analytic tools and ought not to be rejected due to their inappropriate use by those engaged in the justifiability or otherwise of FLIT. By rescuing the TBS from its erroneous use the paper seeks to show its proper worth as part of an argumentative device in uncovering conflicting moral intuitions in our search for ethical truths.

When we encounter people with disabilities in our everyday lives, we may sincerely wonder how (if at all) we ought to help them. Our concern in these ordinary contexts is typically not about securing basic justice. We want to know instead, as a matter of interpersonal morality, when and how it is appropriate for us to open a door for a wheelchair user, to pick up a dropped napkin for her, or to engage her in conversation about her condition. When we do try to give help, we can be surprised and hurt by the cold reception we receive for our efforts. It is worth considering, therefore, how the attitudes of someone who is sincerely trying to help can nonetheless be less than ideal and what kinds of attitudes a disabled person should have toward herself and those who are trying to provide assistance to her. In this paper, I characterize some common attitudes about people with disabilities, explain how conscientious people of good will could come to have them, and then argue that these attitudes are less than ideal because they are incompatible with the virtues of respect, acceptance, and appreciation.

Since the World Summit endorsed the Responsibility to Protect document (R2P) in 2005, a growing number of governments have begun to shape their foreign policies with R2P in mind. This paper seeks to clarify the basis, the nature, and the extent of our duty-to-others in the situations specified by R2P by bringing together current concerns and discussions surrounding the conceptualization of R2P as an imperfect duty. I begin by demonstrating that our imperfect duties to others are not optional, that Kantian imperfect duty is relevant to the discussion on R2P if read correctly, and that R2P must not be converted to perfect duties for meritorious deeds and what it mean to be a virtuous person to remain meaningful. Next, I discuss the scope of our duty-to-others, primarily regarding the limitations that we ought to observe when framing specific R2P operational duties. I argue that Kantian ethics must guide political and military responses to human catastrophes in order to ensure humanitarian ends are achieved.

After distinguishing between moral and ethical expertise, I divide ethical expertise into five categories: knowledge of fact (propositions); knowledge of procedure (rules, commands, or guidelines); easily derivable knowledge of fact or procedure; skill (tacit knowledge or know-how); and judgment (the ability to evaluate a situation, design a reasonable course of action, and act accordingly more often than would an algorithm, computer, or clerk with a book of rules). Having explained the four categories of expertise so that each turns out to be relatively unmysterious, I describe how I would counsel a fellow faculty member who sought my help with an “ethics case” because she regarded me as an “ethics expert.” I make clear the part each of the four categories of expertise would have in my counseling. In this way, I show that ethical expertise is possible. I then consider stronger claims of ethical expertise, such as one finds in Gesang (2010), “Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts?” 24: 153–9. We may divide experts by the demands of the role they fill: The greater the demands, the less plausible (all else equal) the claim of expertise. There are experts who: 1) merely know something specific and testify about it (expert witnesses); 2) claim (like me) to counsel (help people think through what to do); 3) advise, that is, recommend courses of action (physicians or financial advisers, for example); 4) act as agents (such as surgeons or courtroom lawyers); and 5) rule over us or at least claim the right to (technocrats, Plato’s philosopher-kings).

German human rights campaigner Karl Heinrich Ulrichs advocated for same-sex marriage in the nineteenth century. Over a century later, we still have a long way to go. Arguing before his time, he took the Church, both Catholic and Protestant, head on. Ulrichs’s insights seem to have been all but forgotten. No one, to my knowledge, has invoked Ulrichs in contemporary debates about same-sex marriage, and yet he expertly diagnosed the problem and proposed a solution: start with the Church. In this paper, I resurrect his insights, and strengthen his case, for same-sex marriage.

Theories in both contemporary psychotherapy and ancient philosophy associate deprivation with wrongdoing and suffering, but operate with different understandings of deprivation. The article will focus on two concepts of deprivation, one psychological and the other one ontological, as advanced by Bowlby in attachment theory, and Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE). In attachment theory deprivation is something one suffers as a result of the others’ actions (receipt of insensitive caregiving in early childhood); it has neuropsychological effects, it relates to violent behaviour later in life, and it is therapeutically treated mainly by emotional sensory work directed at attaining self-regulation. Understanding deprivation as Augustine does (i.e., diminishment of a being’s inner unity and order caused by one’s exercise of will) introduces a distinctive philosophical view on formation and can inform a type of reflective-behavioural work centred on forming impaired volitional and emotional capacities, and on reclaiming agency and responsibility both for what can be called self-deprivation and for ways to counter deprivation in either offenders and victims.

Though there has been interest in philosophical counselling in South Africa since at least the 1990s little has been accomplished by way of formalizing and developing the practice into a profession. We ask what would be required for it to become a fully-fledged profession? We argue that in order to count as a profession, a practice must meet certain normative, cognitive, and organizational criteria, but that philosophical counselling in South Africa falls short both cognitively and organizationally. This has implications for individual philosophical practitioners, it would seem, who cannot any longer consider themselves professionals. We argue that being a professional is not contingent on belonging to an established profession, but rather that to claim to be a professional is to claim that one can be trusted because one has the client’s good at heart. Exploring the idea of trust highlights again, though this time from an ethical rather than from a sociological perspective, that there is an urgent need to fill the cognitive and organizational gap that exists in South Africa. We propose that in order to facilitate the professionalization of philosophical counselling in South Africa, we should adopt an approach that focuses on the training of philosophical counsellors in the hopes that an organizational component will grow out of this rather than following previous (failed) attempts to put organizations first.

In this paper I examine the relation of social justice and professional sports. I discuss two interrelated key ideas of social justice: equality of opportunity, and the just distribution of income and social status according to the principle of desert. I sketch what they both could mean in the context of professional sports and conclude that social justice should be implemented accordingly. This includes measures to equal the chances of becoming a professional athlete, the regulation of their incomes—especially those which are exceptionally high—and that they—again especially those who are superstars—are viewed and treated as equals among equals. Professional athletes might show exceptional talent and effort, but they nonetheless fall under the jurisdiction of social justice.