Heidegger Studies

Volume 39, 2023

In memoriam Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (1934-2022)

Günther Neumann
Pages 151-208

Phänomenologie der Zeit und der Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger

Since objective time cannot be presupposed in phenomenology, the question of the constitution and nature of time represents a central task of every phenomenological analysis. The purpose of this contribution is to offer a comparison of the phenomenological analyses of time and temporality in Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and thereby to set out the fundamental differences of their approaches. In addition to the foundational lectures and texts On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), Husserl’s Bernau Manuscripts on time-consciousness (1917/18) and the late texts on temporal constitution (1929–1934), the C-Manuscripts, are considered. In the case of Heidegger, besides Being and Time and the lecture series The Basic Problems of Phenomenology from summer semester 1927, attention is focused primarily on the early lecture series and texts in which the development of his thinking becomes evident. Thereby it becomes clear that Heidegger’s question concerning the nature (Wesen) of time and history, with its point if departure from factical-historical life, from the outset moved in a different direction to that of Husserl. In conclusion, the principal differences of the two phenomenological approaches to time are drawn out and clarified in relation to the phenomenon of death.