PDC Homepage

Home » Products » Purchase

Grazer Philosophische Studien

Volume 60, 2000

Mylan Engel, Jr.
Pages 99-117

Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism

When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone possessing second-order internalistic knowledge.

Usage and Metrics
Dimensions
PDC