PDC Homepage

Home » Products » Purchase

Grazer Philosophische Studien

Volume 31, 1988

Michael Losonsky
Pages 165-177

An Ontological Argument for Modal Realism

I argue for modal realism from the following principles: (R1) p just in case there are truth-makers for the proposition that p. (R2) If there are truth-makers for the proposition that p and the proposition that p relevantly entails the proposition that q, then there are truthrmakers for the proposition that q. (M) The proposition that p relevantly entails the proposition that possibly p. (R3) I f there are truth-makers for the proposition that q, then necessarily, if q, there are truth-makers for the proposition that q. All of the above principles are to be read as necessary truths. Also, the propositional variable 'p' is restricted to propositions that necessarily satisfy R1. 'q' is not so restricted. The argument is ontological because I argue that the possibility of modal reaUsm together with R3 entails that modal realism is true. The possibility of modal realism follows from R1, R2 and M.

Usage and Metrics
Dimensions
PDC