Volume 31, 1988
Direct Realism, Skepticism and Truth
If (1) a person's knowing a proposition P implies that P is true and if (2) facts are unidentical with true propositions then in knowing P a person does not know a fact. Unless the correspondence view of truth is abandoned, this skepticism as regards facts cannot be answered by denying (2). If facts are identical with true propositions then facts are (trivially) true. But if truth consists in a correspondence to fact then every fact, being true, corresponds to a fact and the latter fact to another fact and so ad infinitum leaving the truth of any fact groundless. But the skepticism can be answered by construing the dictum that knowledge implies truth not as (1) above but as (1')» a person's knowing a fact F implies that the statement of that fact is true. On this solution of direct realism facts are substituted for propositions as the objects of knowledge and statements instead of propositions are made the bearers of 'true'.