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Grazer Philosophische Studien

Volume 10, 1980

Alan Zaitchik
Pages 149-165
DOI: 10.5840/gps19801014

Intentionalism and Computional Psychology

Intentionalism must be distinguished from computational psychology. The former is a mentalist-realist metatheoretical stance vis-a-vis the latter, which is a research programme devoted to the construction of informationally-characterized simulation models for human behavior, perception, cognition, etc. Intentionalism has its attractive aspects, but unfortunately it is plagued by severe conceptual difficulties. Recent attempts to justify the intentionalist interpretation of computational models, by J.A. Fodor and by C. Graves, J.J. Katz et al., fail to secure a conceptually adequate and genuinely intentional sense for the intentional idiom they employ.

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