Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

Volume 57, Issue 4, 2020

Otto Neurath’s Relevance for Science Policy Debates

Debates about the role of science in policy making have highlighted the uneasy relationship between knowledge and decision making. Recent high-profile examples include climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand there is an intertwinement between facts and values. On the other hand, there is a tension between the acknowledgement of scientific uncertainty and the justification of political action. This sometimes finds political solutions that are perceived as unsound and unsatisfactory. Some perceive the policies as too weak, some as too strong. Both appeal to fundamental values such as health, wealth, security, freedom, equality, or solidarity. In this article I will argue that we need a more open debate about these issues and a deeper understanding of what is at issue in science policy debates. I shall do so by referring to a Neurathian framework. Neurath’s legacy survives mainly in the history and philosophy of science but is largely forgotten in policy studies and sociology. This needs rectifying, especially in light of the fact that he anticipated central insights that have been attributed to later authors such as Fleck and Kuhn. The paper has the following structure. I first provide some historical and intellectual context by looking at the Vienna Circle and some biographical background about Neurath’s views, and his political engagement. I then examine his epistemology, especially his view of science and the social sciences, leading to his anti-foundationalism. Finally, I turn to the public policy literature which has produced results that partly overlap with, and partly contradict Neurath’s views.