

Richard Rorty's Postmodern Philosophy. Angela Botez, Institute of Philosophy, Bucharest. Section 34. History of Contemporary Philosophy.

Abstract: The postmodernist philosophical thought is represented by the rediscovery of pragmatism in the Rorty's conception. In post-philosophical culture, as Rorty puts it, philosophy should become a comparative study of the advantages and disadvantages offered by the different ways of speaking that the human races have discovered; it should become the criticism of culture. In his opinion, the European kind of intellectual life does not offer safe metaphysical or epistemological warranties for success. Rorty admits that philosophy starts from certain intuition. Yet these are preconditioned by a certain intellectual background. I find with Rorty a kind of postmodernist relativism asserting that truth, being contingent, is neither immutable, nor devoid of history. Objectivity can be attained through arguments in dialogue and not through reference to a "so-called datum", whose existence he refutes.

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F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet on the Nature and Value of the Individual.

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The two central figures of British "Absolute Idealism", F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet, are generally held to have similar metaphysical views--particularly, on the nature of the individual and the Absolute. I wish to argue that there are, in fact, important differences in emphasis, if not in doctrine, in their accounts, and that these differences are not accidental, but reflect a fundamental divergence over the value of the individual human person. This distinction is not only important to an understanding of their respective philosophical views and their role in the history of British idealist thought, but opens the possibility that there may well be grounds for preferring Bosanquet's account to that of Bradley.

A History of Language Philosophy and Historiography

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Abstract

Diverse accounts have been given of the history of Language Philosophy. Hacking (*Why Does Language Matter To Philosophy?*) and his reviewers illustrate this. Two reviewers (Rorty and Hattiangadi) are surprised at Hacking's failure to answer the question of his book's title. Hattiangadi claims that this failure is due to Hacking's historiography. He refutes Hacking's historiography (which follows Foucault's i.e., all history is a narrative displaying structures) and replaces it with none. Rorty does not answer the question while Hattiangadi does endeavour to answer; his answer is, I claim, defective. Using my improved historiography, history is a narrative tracing out questions and answers, one may construct another answer-- philosophers of different ages find different reasons for the fact that language matters to philosophy.

Summary of 'Comment on Some Interpretations on Materialism of Practice'

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Social Sciences)

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Philosophy

The Scientific and Technological Revolution creates a new existential environment for mankind, but its negative effect had constituted the so-called global problematic and human predicament. In order to solve these problems, we must combine the materialism with practice.

Our epoch is calling Marx's practical Materialism, but it has often been misunderstood, deviated from and distorted in the history of Marxist philosophy.

While Russian philosopher G. Plekhanov reduced Marx's practical materialism to a problem of the outlook of history or epistemology, the founders of Western Marxism, especially A. Gramsci, explained and developed Marx's idea in the direction of the philosophy of practice, and inescapably relapsed into idealism of action. Contemporary Italian philosopher S. Timpanaro intended to correct this over-extension and over-valuation of the concept of practice, but he inclined to conceive the relation between man and nature unilaterally, and to neglect the influence of man's activity on nature.

Then, my conclusion is, to combine the materialism with practice, means to grasp firmly two indispensable points of Marx's practical materialism: one, emphasis the great historical role of practice in the sense of conceiving sensuousness as practice, and the other, adhered to the materialist point of view, conceiving sensuousness in the form of the object simultaneously, stressed the priority of the external nature remains unassailed.

Western Philosophy and China
at Turning Point of Centuries

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Summary

The communication between Chinese and western philosophy at the last turning point of 19th-20th centuries took the positive role in promoting the evolution of Chinese modern society, and afforded us certain historical experiences and lessons. At the present turning point of 20th-21st centuries, both China and western philosophy are in profound changes. As for the western philosophy, what Chinese philosophers need to pay more attention to studying as following: (1) systematic studies in the history of western philosophy tradition and synthesizing its quintessence; (2) surveying the newest variations of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophy of science and humanist philosophy of European continent; (3) comparative studies in the theories of social development including its philosophical thinking; (4) absorbing in achievements of some new philosophical interdisciplines closely connecting with developments of sciences, economy and society. Chinese cultural construction is aiming at assimilating all positive results of world civilization including western philosophy, so as to make Chinese philosophy tradition and culture converge into modernity and to increase the communication between oriental and western philosophy.

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THE CONCEPT OF SCIENCE IN "TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS"

It could be inferred from "Tractatus" (6.342), (6.343), (4.11), (2.221) that the theoretical propositions of science don't satisfy the conditions of sense: they are neither true nor false. Hence, they are pseudopropositions.

They do have a relation to reality (6.3431). But we shouldn't think that they picture reality (6.342). Wittgenstein doesn't care about verification of theories or elimination of theoretical terms because he doesn't believe scientific theories need any foundation or justification. He rejects traditional epistemological problems. This rejection is closely related with "Tractatus" conception of subject as a limit, not a part of a world (5.62), (5.63), (5.632).

For Wittgenstein, philosophical propositions are not the only ones that are devoid of sense. The theoretical statements of science are not propositions and so have no sense. The propositions of mathematics are pseudopropositions (6.2), and the propositions of logic "are without sense" (4.461). We discover therefore that a number of important and respectable intellectual activities generate pseudopropositions. No wonder that Wittgenstein writes a treatise on philosophy confessing that its propositions are senseless. For him, more important is the fact that they lead to some insight. But philosophical propositions and questions lead to nothing if philosophy isn't aware of the fact that they are senseless and tries to be a true description of reality, only a deeper reality than that described by natural sciences.

THE INTRODUCTION OF 'SENSE-DATA' IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY ON
DECEMBER THE 6TH 1909

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Many authors believe that the concept of 'sense-data' was introduced by Moore in his second lecture on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (p. 30) in the autumn of 1910.¹ In fact, however, it was introduced an year earlier in his "Aristotelian Society Adress" on "The Subject Matter of Psychology", read in London on December the 6th 1909.

Moore's definition of it in 1909 is: "By sense-data I understand a class of entities of which we are very often directly conscious, and with many of which we are extremely familiar," such as colours, shades, pain, sounds. All these are entities which are "given by the senses" (SMP 57). An year later he wrote: "I propose to call these things, the colour and size and shape, sense-data, things given or presented by the senses - given, in this case, by my sense of sight" (SMPP 30). Some four years later (1914), however, in "The Status of Sense-Data," he accepts the representationism according to which sense-data are not the colours themselves, but only the colour patches.

¹ See Alan White, G.E. Moore: A Critical Exposition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969 (first ed. 1958), p. 153. A.J. Ayer, Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage, L.: Macmillan, 1971, p. 233. Thomas Baldwin, G.E. Moore, L.: Routledge, 1990, p. 234.

1. The history of "post-modern" philosophy is showing both the loss of "philosophy's subject-matter" and the struggle for the selfdependence of philosophy.

2. Analytical philosophy refuses from understanding of the whole and privileged truth. Phenomenology turned from philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of ontological self-dependence language, discrediting the Reason. The philosophy of early Marx's traditions continues to emphasize primacy of practice (first of all a labour) to the theory. It is only beginning to realize the sense of discourse, communicative acts and the world of existence structured through symbols.

3. Concrete creation takes place in the diapason of intersection of creation of the reality and of being, subjective and objective. Certainly the subjective (all the products of internal and external creation of humanity) is "sinking" into the all the objective which "conteract's" and sometimes "promotes" man's creation quite surprisingly. And vice versa.

4. The "postmodern" philosophy is not so much a science and ideology, as the confedence implanted first of all in the personal contacts between "I" and "Others". The philosophy is a love not so much to the "dialectics" (to the reciprocal transition) as a Being, to the "United Objective", which is repeated in the "dialectics" of the subjective and the objective. Philosophy, do not be afraid of "metaphysics" leaned on "physics", be afraid of scientification and transforming into the world outlook, "pure science" and "ideology" of mass-media, culture logic and literary-art critics.

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CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

Philosophical discourse of our days is marked by three interconnected particularities : a fear before the totalitarian kind of thinking is now transformed in a sort of a negation of the category "totality", the later being tied with a becoming of the dialectical thinking; the different forms of an overcoming of the relation "subject - object" is in fact connected with a sacralisation of the only type of this multifomed relation, namely that which was seen in the critical situation in the development of the contemporary sciences; excluding by this way the problem of a relation between life and thinking - at first sight by the way of its organic connection - philosophy of our days has lost essentially its critical potential, becoming a land for linguistical exercises.

ПРОБЛЕМА ТВОРЧЕСТВА В ФИЛОСОФИИ СЕРЕБРЯНОГО ВЕКА

В докладе В.Савельева и С.Повторевой "Проблема творчества в философии Серебряного века" сравниваются концептуальные положения ряда работ В.Соловьева и Н.Бердяева. Показаны онтологические и гносеологические основания творчества, как они понимались обоими мыслителями. Указывается, что различие во взглядах на творчество состоит прежде всего в том, что В.Соловьев обосновывает взаимосвязь онтологической и гносеологической осоставляющей как условие возникновения и развития творческого процесса, а Н.Бердяев склонен онтологизировать творчество, придавать ему основополагающее бытийственное значение, отбрасывать гносеологический компонент творчества, либо считать его симптомом болезни, пороком в развитии творческой способности человека. Рассматриваются и сравниваются взгляды обоих мыслителей на любовь как творчество. Отмечаются различные позиции, вытекающие из общифилософских воззрений В.Соловьева и Н.Бердяева, вместе с тем любовь обоими понимается как преодоление мировой данности, творческий акт, созидающий иную реальность, не существующую ранее /по Н.Бердяеву/ или же отражающую образ Божий /по В.Соловьеву/. Показано, что каждый из философов склонен придавать любви всемирный, космический характер, рассматривать ее как необходимый компонент гармонии Вселенной, хотя для В.Соловьева любовь - сберегающий, охраняющий людей феномен, а для Н.Бердяева она изначально трагична.

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К ВОПРОСУ О ВОЗНИКНОВЕНИИ И РАСПРОСТРАНЕНИИ ПОЛЕМОЛОГИИ

В 1945 году во Франции возникла "новая наука о войне" – ПОЛЕМОЛОГИЯ /от греч. polemos – война и logos – наука, учение/. Основатель этой философско-социологической теории французский социолог Гастон Бутуль поставил своей целью создать в лице этой науки аксиологически нейтральный инструмент познания войны: причин ее возникновения, характера, периодичности и т.д. В анализе войны он стоял на феноменологических позициях. Будучи последовательным учеником Дюркгейма, в своих исследованиях Г.Бутуль широко использовал методы социологии.

В целях научных изысканий, относящихся к генезису, этиологии и функциям вооруженных конфликтов, их биологическим, психологическим, экономическим, демографическим, статистическим, техническим и социологическим факторам, а также для изучения явления мира: его аспектов, форм, состояния устойчивости, процессов перехода к войне и чередования с ней им был создан в 1945 году французский институт полемологии, а позднее и специализированный журнал, отражавший результаты исследований в данной области.

С конца 60-х годов полемология стала находить сторонников в других странах. В Италии, Нидерландах и Испании возникли свои институты полемологии. Идеи Г.Бутуля оказали определенное влияние на формирование научных взглядов по проблемам войны Ф.Форнари /Италия/, Ж.Фрёна /Франция/, Б.Ролинга /Нидерланды/, Бутроса Гали /Египет/, В.Секэреша /Румыния/ и др.

Несмотря на некоторые трудности в становлении этой науки попытка позитивного, не отягощенного идеологическими императивами исследования войны представляется заслуживающей внимания.

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Wittgenstein and The Problem of Mystical Experience.

The concept of the mystical plays an important part in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", as it shows the external limits of what may be sensibly said. On the contrary, his later analysis, having determined the logical impurity of language, needs to be tested against the problem of mystical experience (ME), which is supposed to be constituted with sensations that are, first, inexpressible, and, second, fusing together facts and their interpretations. As far as its inexpressibility is concerned, if extralinguistic criteria for psychological propositions don't include personal sensations, as Wittgenstein claims (Philosophical Investigations, §§ 243-262, 293), then latter are not expressible in language. Consequently, at this point there is no reason of identifying ME as something special. As for the identity of a fact and an interpretation, the essential point for ME is that here one can conclude from a sensation to the reality of a corresponding entity. But in "On Certainty" (§§ 392, 403-408, 477 e.a.) Wittgenstein shows that in everyday language a doubt is possible only as a local procedure and, therefore, we judge upon many things as doubtlessly real.

Thus, Wittgenstein's arguments are not sufficient to show that there is no ME, but they are strong enough to determine its irrelevance for a philosophy based on a sensible language.

Черты современного философствования

/ На основе идей Ю.Хабермаса /.

1. Формирование философской позиции как усвоение многих и различных философских направлений.

2. Наличие определенных тенденций в эволюции взглядов авторов в течение их жизни. Ход развития Ю.Хабермаса можно выразить триадой:

1/ приверженность идеям периода от Канта до Маркса,

2/ экзистенциальное направление,

3/ возврат к идеям немецкой классической философии / обратно – к Марксу/ на новом уровне.

3. Идея коммуникации у современных авторов. Идея коммуникативной рациональности Ю.Хабермаса как способ разрешения противоречий, идущих от Канта, Просвещения и романтиков, и сегодня выражающих отношения индивидуума и роля /общества/, свободы и разума.

4. философско- политическая концепция Ю.Хабермаса как осмысление современных кризисных ситуаций в мире в условиях различных типов общественного устройства. Предложения по разрешению таких ситуаций. Компромисс. Консенсус. Возможность демократического социализма. Актуальность данной концепции в условиях современного этапа России.