concept of the midworld is a welcomed component to this collection for two reasons. First, he is more critical (although a sympathetic critic) of this important concept as he locates its proper place in relation to nature while calling for a wider metaphysical view. Second, Corrington is more explicit about the obvious parallels between Miller's thought and John Dewey's philosophy; however, like his compatriots (with the exception of Gary Stahl) in this volume, his view of Dewey's thought suffers from the long established oversimplification of Dewey's view of instrumentalism and the habitual aspect of the human self. A more thorough investigation of the similarities between these two American thinkers would form the basis of a fruitful essay.

Stephen Tyman locates the crux of Miller's moral theory within the Kantian tension between the absolute as well as abstract moral law and the natural, contextual drive of desire. Miller steers a middle course between Scylla and Charybdis by placing reason and good in the perpetuation of those conditions which render the interconnected and integral activities of the self as possible. Evil exists in the choice to follow those desires that inhibit the conditions required for the maintenance of life-promoting values. Thus, as Tyman points out, Miller's moral philosophy bears as much resemblance to Aristotle as to Kant and represents the best of both traditions.

Gary Stahl tells us that Miller objects to the fundamental sundering of inner agent from outer fact in all its forms (mind/body, subject/object, organism/environment, etc.), arguing instead for process as the fundamental category of metaphysics. Neither self nor world are intelligible when separated from one another. The central tenet of Miller's moral theory is the incomplete and finite character of both self and world which arise together inseparably interlocked.

Brockway's intriguing essay on the no man's land between philosophy and economics into which Miller ventured is followed by two highly readable and personal accounts given by Elias and Strout of Miller as teacher, friend and lifelong interlocutor. Strout relays a vignette in which Miller prophesies about the clearing up Vico's legacy in around twenty-five years which later proved to be the case. This book serves a similar role for Miller's own work. Read it now and stay ahead of the game!

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Twas in this book, the Truth got told,
With Ancient Lies a 'fallin'.

One man perceives, how we've been conned:
That man is Barry Allen . . .
This book contains articles on Nietzsche, William James, Heideger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, and Foucault. Only one of these figures is American. Is this book concerned with "American Philosophy"? (Its author teaches at a Canadian university.) The book is dedicated to Richard Rorty, and though the author is no "slavish disciple" of Rorty, these figures are part of the Rorty "canon". The question then is whether Rorty belongs to "American Philosophy," or to the "American Sophistic." Those who find Rorty a bit of a sophist will not learn much from this volume, for all its trappings of serious scholarship. The dedication to Rorty contains a quotation from Heraclitus in Greek: "One man is 10,000 to me, if he be noble." (Such an undemocratic, elitist remark is, perhaps, better left in the original Greek). Although this volume is beautifully produced, it is a rather uneven "pastiche" of articles (see page 225), some very well written (such as the account of Heidigger), and others less so (such as the "rough draft" of remarks on Derrida). Part One (9-37), a hasty survey of Classical and Modern Philosophy, seemed to me an almost unintelligible catalog of names and quotations ("out of context"). It is also rather uneven in tone. There is some very sophisticated, and perceptive, discussion of the views of these six figures. But often he seems more like a debunking, "cracker barrel" atheist on theology, clever yet incredibly shallow. He claims to be "calling in question" the entire Western Tradition on "Truth." His resounding conclusion is that the Truth shall not make us free. The Divine Logos is mere verbiage. On page 186, he cites the claim of the American Banker A.B. Johnson that truth is but a "contrivance of language." It is not clear whether he is merely denying some esoteric tradition in Western Metaphysics ("onto-logic"), or whether he is denying our "Common Sense" realism.

Although, as we have noted, Professor Allen is capable of relatively sophisticated (as well as sophistical) analysis, his picture of "onto-logic" (the fatal flaw of Western Philosophy) is such a caricature, it is difficult to take his discussion seriously. What is "onto-logic?" "To be entails a determinate identity which a being owns . . . a being has to be 'identical to itself'" (11). According to Professor Allen, for both Nietzsche and William James, "what passes for true, has nothing to do with adequation to a transcendent order of Being, fixed and closed forever" (3). The word 'fixed' is crucial here. On page 45, for example, we are told that Nietzsche in his "re-evaluation" reverses the traditional valuation of "Being" and "Becoming." Is "Being" the "changeless"? Does not 'changeless' have at least two senses? There is the empirically "changeless," or static (or "fixed"). Is "Being" merely stagnant? That which is logically "changeless" is not so. As in the river of Heraclitus, it is "flowing", and yet it remains (logically) the same river. (It is Logos which gives this unity). Nietzsche, like Hume, tends to see "identity"as a "fiction" (for a "myth" which falsifies). Yet Reid's answer to Hume on "identity" does not merely reiterate the "onto-logic" fallacy. If Nietzsche equivocates on 'changeless', then there is no reversal of "values" on "Being" and "Becoming."
For Professor Allen, language is merely historically contingent. (There is no "eternal Logos." But then there are also no words in which our disagreement can be stated. The debate can not even get off the ground.) For us, the book must seem a sort of igno-ratio elenchoi. Most of the specific disagreements turn on this point: Is language, in some sense, "transparent?" Is there truth? If so, then those who speak of "adequation" are on the right path, even if the term is not without its difficulties. What Professor Allen calls 'onto-logic' is not so much one giant assumption, to be debunked, as a series of gropings, in the right direction. The other Western assumption Professor Allen sets out to destroy is that Truth is a good thing. He supposes that Nietzsche was the very first to raise this question of the value of Truth. Is this historically correct? Why should a critical philosopher accept Nietzsche's megalomania as truth? (There is much of value in Nietzsche, if taken cum grano salis.) If Truth is that which measures (without being itself "measured"), then Nietzsche's "question" about Truth may be absurd. Not all questions are good questions. Our doubts can be as fallible as our certainties. If Professor Allen gave one tenth the effort to understanding Aristotle, he gives to Heidigger, this book would not have been written. (If truth is "political," why does Professor Allen ignore Heidegger Nazi connections?) One could point out specific flaws. For example, on page 21, he suggests that lovers of Truth approve of torture. Reading this book is a sort of "torture" for those of us who see it as mainly "sophistry and illusion," even though it is interesting at times (if only as a "know your enemy" guide).

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Richard Rorty is arguably the most controversial voice in American philosophy. In his wonderfully lucid and trenchant assessment of Rorty's work, David L. Hall achieves an excellent balance between a sympathetic and critical perspective of Rorty's overall vision. Hall not only carefully and clearly analyzes central tenets in Rorty's philosophy, he compares and contrasts Rorty's work with both modern and postmodern philosophical movements. This analysis includes major figures in America and Europe such as Davidson, Quine, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, to name a few. Having read every one of Hall's and Rorty's books, it is interesting to see both points of departure and decisive overlaps between their philosophies. In short, both Hall and Rorty offer fascinating, yet controversial, critical studies in the history of ideas and in the culture of contemporary philosophy.

The major themes in Rorty's work that Hall focuses on are: (1) nominalist historicism, (2) the new version of pragmatism, (3) the radical distinction between private and public life, (4)