there is little in his account to suggest any systematic criticism of technology or technological society. In part, I think this follows from his contention (see Ch. 6) that Dewey would reject any attempt to treat "technology" as a single unitary phenomenon, and thus as the subject for the "totalizing critique." This said, however, I believe that more might be done to apply Dewey's thought in criticizing certain pervasive tendencies in modern technology. On the other hand, some will feel that Dewey's own "technological" philosophy stands in need of further criticism. Hickman's view of Dewey seems to be uniformly positive; when he discusses Dewey's critics, it is almost always to argue that they misunderstood or distorted his thought. Yet it is surely possible to raise some concerns from a perspective which is both understanding of and basically sympathetic to Dewey's approach. Was Dewey too preoccupied with the need for control? Was he too ready to see all problems as amenable to a "technological fix?" Was he insufficiently sensitive to some of the dangers of modern technology and "technological" modes of thinking? To raise such questions is not in any way intended to detract from either Dewey's accomplishments or those of Hickman's book, but to suggest some further possibilities of discussion for those interested in the significance of Dewey's thought for the understanding and critique of technology.

Christian Brothers University

Peter Limper


Mark Noll, a professor of intellectual and religious history at Wheaton College in Illinois, weaves a three-generation story of creating a "Republican Christian Enlightenment" at the College of New Jersey. Noll intertwines intellectual biographies of three presidents with the institutional history of Princeton. He begins with the introduction of a Scottish synthesis of science and religion and ends with a renewed emphasis on religion over science in the college which led to the creation of Princeton Seminary to specifically train ministers. For the political context of the rise and fall of this synthesis of science and religion, Noll follows Gordon Wood's thesis in The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 of an initial whig optimism for social unity which crumbles when Federalists faced rebellions by a non-deferential populace who took the ideals of 1776 to heart. At Princeton, Noll recounts how the student riots of 1806-07 signaled, for the Federalist leaders, the failure of the educational program which united science and religion in support of social order. After the riots, religion was emphasized over science in Princeton's continuing "attempt to master the chaos through intellectual effort" (p. 4).

Such is the outline of the book; taken at full length,
Noll’s account is rich with insightful analysis on this crucial period of American intellectual history which is receiving an increasing amount of attention from religious and intellectual historians. Noll’s book contributes to a revisionist trend against the progressive historians of the twentieth century who saw an educational retrogression in the early nineteenth century caused by religion, an interpretation that self-servingly bolstered the reputation of progressive education at the turn of the next century. Although, religion came to be emphasized over science at Princeton, Noll tells readers that science was not hamstrung and the old ideal of a synthesis continued. With more lasting influence, the founding of Princeton Seminary relieved the undergraduate curriculum of the duty of training ministers. From a larger perspective, in separating a seminary out of the college, the Princeton trustees followed a contemporary trend that succeeded in creating America’s first graduate professional schools.

For all the political and institutional history in the book, members of our society will probably be more interested in the intellectual analysis of Samuel Stanhope Smith who was educated at Princeton, became a professor and the “college’s intellectual heart” in 1779, and served as president from 1795 to 1812. Noll, disappointingly, does not analyze Smith as much and as deeply as I hoped—the commitments of institutional history draw him quickly away—however, Noll does illuminate important themes in Smith’s confident synthesis of the Scottish common sense philosophy and Presbyterianism.

Noll’s most extended intellectual analysis is of Smith’s Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species which Smith first published in 1787 then elongated in 1810. Noll notes that the Essay was “a pioneering effort in physical anthropology” which argued that “climate and social conditions are fully adequate to explain both the current differences between human races as well as the historical process by which the different races descended from one human pair” (p. 116). Against those who presented an “arbitrary hypothesis that men are originally sprung from different stocks, and are therefore divided by nature into different species,” Smith insisted that “proper investigation” by “the ordinary laws of nature” led to a less arbitrary explanation (p. 177, 177n). Noll clearly shows that Smith’s primary purpose was to verify “the doctrine of one race” (p. 120) and not to establish the reliability of the Genesis account of creation; however, Smith’s believed that proper science would always support divine revelation.

In summing up “the shape of Smith’s Enlightenment,” Noll explains that Smith was motivated by the “potential of science.” In published lectures on moral and political philosophy, Smith told his students that “a diligent and attentive observation of the course of nature, and of the actions of mankind in every variety of situation...is the only legitimate means of attaining a competent knowledge of the laws of either the material or the moral world.” God, of course, was the author of the laws, but it
was the scientist’s duty to investigate them "as far as the powers of the human mind, unaided by the lights of revelation" (p. 193). The optimism of Smith is most clear when Noll shows that when conflicts between religion and science did appear in Smith’s writings, he resolved them on the basis of science not religion. Noll further points out that “Smith found it difficult to admit an intellectual conundrum” (p. 287). Religious mystery seems to have had little place in his thought.

Noll’s book concludes with Stanhope’s optimistic unity of science and religion diminishing in influence at the college as religion was re-emphasized. Broadly understood, this is an old story that can be told of many different individuals in many different contexts. Noll, though, has contributed an insightful and interesting new study of this old problem as it took place in a provincial college under the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment and American Republicanism.

Indiana University Southeast


Over the last few years the fate of American higher learning has again been called into question with the critical mass needed to set off universal debate. The Moral Collapse of the University is a significant contribution, deepening a discussion already of first importance. For Bruce Wilshire speaks in a profoundly introspective voice, striving through intimate evaluation of his experiences to elucidate the qualities of the educational system.

In a chapter seeking the root of our educational ideals, the author asks "What is an Educating Act?" He explains how true education, opposed to mere instruction, breaks through reified categories, generating meaning. The investigation then turns to the ideals grounding our universities. "If we would know what the university is, we must know whence it has come and . . . developed. What did those who built it want to become by building and using it?" (33) The answer centers on its historical role of "authorization." Deepening this inquiry, he examines the appropriateness of the ideals themselves, impelling us to realize that some of these are archaic and motivated by concealed drives.

Framing all his subsequent considerations, is the deterioration of the university ideal into the estranged confusion of a research multiversity. Wilshire tempers Cardinal Newman's "totalizing rhetoric" (82f.), but agrees that the university needs a visionary philosophical underpinning. As Whitehead realized, the 'modern' university is governed by a Cartesian framework. Wilshire explores the consequences of Descartes' rigid mind/body dualism. Lost to this impoverished metaphysic imbuing