asunder (cf. Hickman's review, p. 449).

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of Ralph Sleeper's *The Necessity of Pragmatism*. Quite simply, it itself is a necessity in precisely Dewey's reconstructed, pragmatic sense of this term: it needed to be written and it needs to be read and discussed—not only to enhance our understanding of Dewey's reconstruction of pragmatism but also to carry on his project in a manner informed by his spirit. For Prof. Sleeper writes about this philosopher in a way which is, at once, scholarly and philosophical—a way which exhibits painstaking respect for Dewey's writings and yet also issues formidable challenges to the way we think about the problems of persons, as these problems emerge out of the evolved and evolving forms of transaction between persons and their world (see, e.g., p. 186; pp. 194-5; pp. 206-210).

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This book presents in a detailed and systematic way the views of seminal thinkers and then uses some of these views as the materials from which to construct or, at least, sketch a comprehensive theory of semiotic processes. Central to this theory is the formulation of a conception of metaphor (Chapter VIII, esp. pp. 126-134). (In this respect, *Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes* contributes to a growing body of literature, having its roots in Peirce's "sumeiotic" [or general theory of signs], on the nature and function of metaphor. The work of Carl Hausman, Douglas Anderson, and Michael Heley especially deserves mention in this connection.) In addition, there is an attempt to show the value of a comprehensive theory of semiotic processes by using this theory as a perspective from which to examine various kinds of semiotic phenomena (e.g., a U.S. postage stamp commemorating the First Amendment, political mottoes, artistic works). Thus, the aim of this book is both exegetical and constructive.

This study is divided into ten chapters. Six of these are devoted to the sign theories of philosophers from the United States: Chapters I, II, and III present Peirce's theory; IV examines "The Theory of Meaning of G.H. Mead," V "Language and Meaning in J. Dewey and J.H. Randall," and VII "Community, Communication, and Meaning in Buchler's Philosophy of the Human Process." However, it is (as the "Preface" makes explicit) the perspective of Peirce that most deeply informs the course of the inquiry. As the author himself notes in the "Preface," the unifying themes of the study are "(i) the triadic nature of semiotic processes as uncovered by Charles S. Peirce, (ii) the completely general scope of his theory of signs, and (iii) its applicability both to scientific discourse and forms of artistic
Despite this focus, Prof. Tejera does not limit his attention to the view of Peirce or even other North American philosophers. He makes reference to the positions of Freud, Saussure, Jakabson and examines in detail the views of Habermas, Barthes and Eco. Chapter VI is entitled "Communicative Interaction, Rationality and Meaning: A Critique of Habermas's Semiotic." That is, this study is, at once, a confrontation between two distinct traditions of sign theory and an attempt to appropriate from a Peircean perspective what is of value in some of the leading contemporary Continental European "semiologists."

One virtue of this study is that this discourse itself is an instance of mediation in its most pragmatic form. For this study attempts to bring together in a vital way what would otherwise be disparate. In particular, it strives to bring together, on the one hand, various thinkers within American philosophy and, on the other, two distinctive traditions of semiotic investigation. In addition, it articulates a theory deliberately designed to show the deep affinities among scientific inquiry, artistic creation, aesthetic "criticism," and social interaction.

Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes is nothing less than bold in its conception and never less than competent in its execution. Nonetheless, I find it necessary to challenge certain aspects of both its conception and execution. An introduction as well as summary would have enhanced this work. Moreover, there are times when the author rests content with presenting a collage of texts from the thinkers he is presenting. More important, one of Prof. Tejera's central convictions (namely, that "G. H. Mead's social theory of meaning and Justus Buchler's coordinative analysis of communication . . . translate easily into Peirce's terms" ["Preface"]) is far more controversial than he seems to suppose. For most Peirceans, Headeans, and Buchlereans, there are, despite important similarities, differences here which truly make a difference. Thus, the virtue of this work noted above is, in way, its vice; for while it is legitimate to try establishing vital connections among what would otherwise be disparate, it is imperative to respect the integrity of the views of thinkers one is endeavoring to unify. In general, Prof. Tejera does respect this integrity; however, in a few cases (e.g., Mead and Buchler), he purchases unity at too high a price.

This point provides an occasion to note two contrasting tendencies exhibited by interpreters of American philosophers. We witness, on the one hand, the efforts of (for example) Prof. Tejera in the work under review and Sandra Rosenthal in Spectulative Pragmatism, and, on the other, those of Ralph Sleeper in The Necessity of Pragmatism. The former two interpreters are concerned with exhibiting the underlying unity among various thinkers, whereas the latter is interested in revealing the uniqueness of Dewey vis-a-vis other pragmatists (especially Peirce and James).

Let us allow William James the last or, more precisely, the
penultimate word here. In "The Sentiment of Rationality," he identifies two sister passions underlying the cognitive endeavors of human inquirers, namely, the passion for unity and the passion for acquaintance with particulars. Then he notes: "A man's philosophic attitude is determined by the balance in him of these two cravings. No system of philosophy can hope to be universally accepted among men which grossly violates either need, or entirely subordinates the one to the other." So it is with interpreters of philosophers. Nonetheless, if this balance is too quickly and easily achieved, interpretation is not well served. Indeed, advances in interpretation are possible only because widely and deeply read interpreters are animated by conflicting intellectual passions. Hence, despite my reservations about the extent and depth of the unity and affinities Prof. Tejera claims, I feel we need to have interpreters, like the author of Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes, who are animated by the passion for unity—if only to challenge us to sharpen our sense of difference. But, in truth, Prof. Tejera does more than this: he presents a wealth of information in a short space and, in addition, offers valuable suggestions about how a comprehensive theory of semiotic processes might be developed and applied.

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This study examines "Peirce's philosophy with respect to his ideas about creativity, in general in the evolution of scientific thought, and specifically in art" (p. 2). The strategy used to bring forward "the implicit theory of artistic creativity in Peirce's system" is twofold. First, Prof. Anderson sketches Peirce's account of scientific creativity (Chapter 2) and then uses this account to do what Peirce himself did not do—articulate an account of artistic creativity (Chapter 3). Second, the author presents Peirce's vision of crative evolution (chapter 4) and then uses this doctrine to develop even more fully a Peircean approach to artistic creativity (Chapter 5). The sixth and concluding chapter presents a brief summary (pp. 148-151) and a longer but still brief consideration of "General Points of Import" (pp. 151-161). In the "General Points of Import," Prof. Anderson compares Peirce to Susanne Langer and John Dewey.

Chapters 2 ("Scientific Creativity") and 3 ("Art and Science") constitute the first step to fill out a neglected corner of Peirce's esthetics (cf. p. 4) and, thereby, to flesh out an undeveloped part of Peirce's system. What Peirce scholars are most likely to find especially interesting here is the exploration of metaphor from the perspective of Peirce's "semeiotic" (or general theory of signs) pp. 67-77). What any reader will encounter in these two chapters is a first-rate discussion of what