ABSTRACTS of Papers to be read at the Annual Meeting

A   Thelma Lavine, "Pragmatists and the Constitution in Modernism"

          The social philosophy of American pragmatism
          in its consideration of the American Consti-
          tution reflects the conflicting viewpoints of
          modernist culture, of which American pragma-
          tism is an early and important expression.

B   John Ryder, "Class Relations and the State in Madison's
      Federalist 10"

          Madison's political theory, especially as de-
          veloped in Federalist 10, offers in the final
          analysis a class biased position. Such a
          claim has been made in the past by Beard,
          Parrington and others, but their respective
          analyses are open to serious objections. In
          short, Madison recognized that those who hold
          property and those who do not represent"dis-
          tinct interests in society." Since justice
          and the common good are best served, on his
          view, by the protection of property rights,
          and thereby the perpetuation of the interests
          of the propertied, an adequate government must
          both embrace popular sovereignty and at the
          same time be so structured as to guarantee
          that the interests of the propertied class
          prevail. Madison is a historically important
          figure precisely because of the astuteness of
          his observations and the success of his pre-
          scriptions.

C   William W. Clohesy, "Faction and Discourse in The
      Federalist"

          The Federalist Papers hold forth a vision of
          political participation through a ceaseless
          and many-leveled discourse engaging local
          citizens and their representatives throughout
          a vast land of varied peoples. The Federalist
          argues that the United States is an ideal site
          for an attempt at self-government, because the
          dangers of faction inherent in all popular
          governments -- tyranny and anarchy -- can best
          be avoided here. First, the extensive terri-
          tory and growing population make it unlikely
          that any faction can become strong enough to
          force all others into submission and dissolu-
          tion. Second, the irreducible variety of
          citizens and their opinions requires a
          ceaseless discourse towards establish-
          ing a coalition for concerted action
          on specific purposes. These coalitions

are always unstable as new interest
groups form and seek to gather the power
of consensus for themselves.

D.   John Underwood Lewis, "Revolutionary Jurisprudence:
     An Exposition and Application of the Legal Theory
     of James Wilson, 1742-1798"

         James Wilson, a founding father of the
         United States of America was unique in
         that he was not only a signer of the
         United States Declaration of Independence,
         but also of the United States Federal Con-
         stitution, and in addition he was a
         justice of the First United States
         Supreme Court. Justice Wilson's career
         included a period as an academician be-
         ing responsible for developing and teach-
         ing the first systematic jurisprudence
         course in an American law school. Until
         the founders of the United States in be-
         ing without a biography and only in 1967
         did his lectures in law become available
         in critical edition. It is these lectures
         which form the basis for this paper.

     E.   Robert S. Corrington, "Ordinal Metaphysics and the
          Eclipse of Foundationalism"

          The ordinal metaphysics of Justus Buchler,
          with its recasting not only of our cate-
          gories but of our very understanding of
          metaphysics, provides a way out of the
          foundationalist prison. The categorial
          framework does not stipulate some primi-
          tive form of 'whatness' nor isolate a
          privileged region of inquiry but provides
          a conceptual clearing through which com-
          plexes and orders can become rendered or
          renderable in human proception. By
          rejecting such notions as ontological simples,
          strict internal relation, an order of orders,
          static spatio-temporal identity, and essence,
          the ordinal framework brings us into the region
          where the multiple orders of Nature and World
          can be exhibited in a non-foundationalist manner.
          By radicalizing our understanding of ordinality
          (as the Providingness of orders) we can participate
          in the full eclipse of foundationalism.

     F.   V. Tejera, "Buchler's Modes of Judgement and Aristotle's
          Kinds of Knowing"

          A comparison between B's three modes of judgment and
          A's kinds of knowledge requires that misconceptions
          about the latter's distinctions be first dispelled.
          Just as judgments in the active, exhibitive or
          assertive modes are NOT reducible to one another, so
          A's practical, theoretical and productive knowledges
          are different in kind and NOT reducible to, or

degrees of, one another. B's distinctions apply to
all discriminanda or complexes whatsoever, whether
things done (dromena) things said (legomena) or things
made (poiēmata); while A's apply only to knowledgeable
activities and are narrower in scope, being gnoseological
rather than metaphysical distinctions, and not cate-
gorically comprehensive like B's distinctions between
the modes of judgment. But re-examination of A's
view of reflective doing and making vis-a-vis theori-
zing, in the light of B's analysis of judgment, re-
stores practical and poetic nous (intelligence) to
equal dignity and effectiveness with theoretical nous,
thus correcting the bias inherited by our time from
the Hellenistic age.

G.   Mark Mendell, "James on the One and the Many"

James writes over and over again that he considers
the problem of the one and the many to be "the
most central of all philosophic problems, central
because so pregnant." It is an overarching problem.
Is the world and our experience of the world and
its relations one, many, or both one and many?
Is either more fundamental than the other? I
argue that James thought that the world is both
one and many; that despite his emphasis on the
"pluralistic universe," he believed that the one is
necessary in order to make sense out of the many.
Both explicitly and implictly, order, regularity,
unity, and oneness do not drop out of James'
epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological
worldview. More specifically, I want to show that
James viewed the one and the many as two fully
coordinate hypotheses, even though the evidence
for each of them was not equal. James' characteri-
zation of the problem invariably crops up as an un-
ceasing polemic against the twin evils of associa-
tionism or sensationalism and intellectualism and
absolute idealism, especially the latter. After a
brief sketch of these two evils, I show how James'
view developed in a positive way, from his early
position in the Principles of Psychology on the
unity and continuity of consciousness, to his
mature application of the pragmatic method, where
he displays his characteristic concern for the
practical consequences of any belief, experience,
activity, hypothesis, or theory.

H.   Konstantin Kolenda, "Rorty's Dewey"

Pragmatism has received a considerable boost from
Richard Rorty's recent writings. According to
Rorty, John Dewey was right in turning away from
the futile effort to construct a general theory of
representation and championed a more realistic
conception of knowledge "as what we are justified
in believing." But Rorty misrepresents Dewey's
recommended procedure for solving social and moral
problems. He does not acknowledge that Dewey
wanted such problems to be solved by a proper
inquiry employing scientific method, a procedure

quite at odds with Rorty's own preference for "conversation" and "edifying discourse." Furthermore, both Dewey and Rorty fail to see that moral discourse does not reach its limit in appealing to the "norms of the day."

I.   James Campbell, "Dewey and the Democratic Faith"

John Dewey is often thought to be an overly-optimistic thinker. This paper defends Dewey against this charge by exploring the nature of his meliorism and its grounding in faith in the democratic community, and re-assesses the value of such a faith for our present political situation.

J.   Donald S. Lee, "A Pragmatic Theory of Natural Value"

The situations in which value predominate are not different in kind from any distinctively human action: present behavior is guided and modified by anticipations of future effects. G. H. Mead's analysis of the act provides a framework for grounding a general position on value common to John Dewey and C. I. Lewis. For them positive value is ultimately prized satisfaction, where the prizing involves conceptual recognition of the situation as consummatory and as falling within approach-accept-perpetuate behavior. This is intrinsic value, and value as inherent or instrumental or as the subject of evaluation is derivative. Goodness and desire are understood in relation to intrinsic value as thus characterized.

K.   D. S. Clarke, Jr., "Resolving an Apparent Inconsistency in Dewey's Account of Deliberation"

This paper attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency between 1) Dewey's insistence on distinguishing a person's desiring a certain state of affairs and the desirability of this state and 2) his rejection of a rational standard by which to evaluate what is desired. It does so by examining Dewey's account of practical deliberation considered as the use of a practical inference. I argue that Dewey's discussions of desirability are intended to be directed towards actions as means, not towards ends as "limits of judgment." It is because of the defeasibility of the conclusions of practical inferences that the desirability of performing a means can be questioned, but this is invariably done relative to other desires and aversions, not some rational standard. In the process of criticizing a means the end to which it is relative may also be criticized and eventually modified.

L.   Christopher Gowans , "C. I. Lewis' Critique of Foundationalism
      in Mind and the World Order"

      It is commonly believed that C. I. Lewis was an epistemo-
      logical foundationalist. This belief is partly true and
      partly false, depending on which stage of Lewis' career
      is being discussed. In the second book of his later work,
      An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV), Lewis does
      defend a version of epistemological foundationalism. But
      the situation in his earlier book, Mind and the World
      Order (MWO), is less clear. There are enough similarities
      between the two books, and enough ambiguities within them,
      to make plausible the claim that that MWO is simply an
      earlier and less sophisticated version of .the foundationalism
      of AKV. Nonetheless, if we read MWO closely, what we find
      is, in effect, a critique of foundationalism, not a defense
      of it. My purpose in this paper is to establish this claim.

M.   Robert L. Greenwood, "Can C. I. Lewis Uphold Realism?"

      In his contribution to the Schilpp volume dedicated to C.
      I. Lewis, E. M. Adams claims that Lewis cannot consistently
      state his realism while also maintaining "subjectivism" and
      "verifiability." I attempt to show that Adams' criticisms
      are based on three misinterpretations of Lewis. First,
      Adams claims that Lewis asserts an intentional equivalence
      between objective statements and terminating judgments. I
      deny this claim and characterize the relationship as "Lewis
      implication." Second, Adams interprets Lewis as claiming
      that realism is "necessarily involved in considering con-
      trary-to-fact conditional terminating statements meaningful
      and some of them true..." I maintain that Lewis believes
      realism is a sufficient condition for this. Third, Adams
      thinks Lewis is arguing for decisive verification of
      terminating judgments upon finding their consequent true.
      I believe Lewis intends only that such judgments be cer-
      tainly true as probable on the evidence. If I am correct,
      Lewis can consistently uphold realism.

N.   William J. Gavin, "Regional Ontologies, Types of Meaning,
      and The Will to Believe in the Philosophy of William James"

      There are at least two passages in the Jamesian corpus
      where he seems to establish a topology of "regional
      ontologies," or to set up multiple "language games."
      The first of these is in The Principles of Psychology
      when he talks about "the many worlds," or "...sub-universes
      commonly discriminated from each other ...," the second is
      in Pragmatism, where he notes that there "are ... at least
      three well-characterized levels, stages, or types of
      thought about the world we live in ...."
      Two questions immediately come to mind about these levels.
      First, is each of these areas of equal importance,
      epistemologically and ontologically speaking? Second,
      how, if at all, are these regional areas related to
      each other? Each of these questions has a seemingly
      obvious answer. To wit, the world of perception is
      more important than any of the other areas; and second,
      the regional areas are related in terms of the dis-
      junctive and conjunctive transitions which James so

strenously upholds, resulting in an overall "concatenated" picture.

I argue that both of these responses are insufficient, and that the issue is more complicated than at first appears, for sometimes choice between two specific regional domains takes place partially for "extra-rational" reasons, a la the will to believe.

O.   Kenneth W. Stikkers, "Charles Sanders Peirce's Sociology of Knowledge and Critique of Capitalism"

In this paper I suggest that, although Charles Sanders Peirce was not, strictly speaking, a social philosopher, nevertheless a deep social concern permeates his thinking. articular, Peirce offers numerous important contributions to the sociology of knowledge, insights into the fundamentally social nature of human thinking and reality itself. On the one side, to be reasonable means to be social; on the other side, reality resides only in communal inquiry, in human intersubjectivity. Moreover, these insights formed the basis for Peirce's sharp criticisms of American capitalism, criticisms which are not peripheral to his thought but valid conclusions drawn from his metaphysical doctrines and logic.

P.   John E. Peterman, "Plato and Dewey: A Common Faith"

This paper seeks a rehabilitation of Dewey, a better understanding of his approach to doing philosophy, in order to recover the direction he affords but unfortunately expressed in such tortured and often uninspiring prose. To accomplish this rehabilitation, I propose the returning of one favor for another. Dewey well understood the need for drama, poetry and the religious in any complete experience, but could not incorporate these into his own writings. His emphasis on the dramatic element in life helps us to take seriously the dramatic element in Plato's works and thus prevent Plato from becoming an extra-terrestrial Being, while Plato's exemplification of the construction and reconstruction of ideals in his dialogues gives us the practice in philosophising that Dewey pushes us towards but does not actually provide.

Q.   Morris Grossman, "Interpreting Peirce"

This essay is an exploration of the bride simili at the end of Peirce's essay, "The Fixation of Belief." It presumes that the implications and reverberations of Peirce's literary figure are deeper and wider than might at first have been thought. Some of those implications and reverberations are explained and exhibited. Four interpretations of Peirce are proposed and one is selected.

R. William Woodward, "Some German Sources of American
    Philosophy: Apelt, Lotze, Peirce, James and Dewey"

    The coalescence of British, German, and American
    philosophical traditions around the problem of the
    evolution and function of mind is the topic of this
    paper. It is customary to accept Darwin in particular,
    and Darwinism in general, as the intellectual force
    behind the movement toward pragmatism and instru-
    mentalism in American philosophy. Yet on the basis
    of present evidence from the works of Charles Peirce,
    William James, and John Dewey, the conceptions of
    "abduction," "mental selection," and "instrumental
    logic" each have antecdents in the writings of Lotze,
    and through him in Apelt, Fries, Hegel, and Kant.

S. George W. Stickel, "George Herbert Mead's Applications
    of Relativity: An Unfinished Work"

    George Herbert Mead at the time of his death was work-
    ing on what could have been his most significant
    contribution to pragmatic philosophy: the appli-
    cation of the theory of relativity to his own theory
    of the human mind. The relativity theory provides
    the transformation of understanding the differing
    perceptions persons have within the bounds of their
    individual experiences. Selected details of Mead's
    theory and applications are provided but a complete
    systematic development of this aspect of his philosophy
    is non-existent. This task remains for several indivi-
    duals to extrapolate to provide different relative
    perceptions.