

17. THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY: HUSSERL'S DEVELOPMENT FROM THE BRENTANO PERIOD TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS*

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ABSTRACT: In this paper an attempt is made to reconstruct the development of Husserl's conception of intentionality from 1891 up to 1900/01. It is argued that Husserl's concept of intentionality in the *Logical Investigations* took shape under the influence of problems originating in two different fields: the philosophy of perception and philosophical semantics. This multiple origin of the concept of intentionality of 1900/01 is then adduced as an explanation of tensions within the text of the *Investigations*, tensions which account for the fact that various contradictory interpretations of Husserl's concept of intentionality are supported by the texts.

The paper starts with a brief and schematic interpretation of Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Next, the theory of perception of the 'Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic' is compared with that contained in the *Investigations*.

On the basis of an analysis of Husserl's early theory of reference to non-existing referents ('Intentional Objects', 1894) and of his criticism of Twardowski, it is concluded that his concept of intentionality of 1900/01 is not free from ambiguities: Husserl wavers between a non-relational and a relational concept. Finally, it is shown why Husserl's "official" concept in the *Investigations* was the non-relational version.

I.

It is not easy to overestimate the influence Franz Brentano had on the young Husserl.¹ In his *Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano*, Husserl says that Brentano gave him the courage to choose philosophy as a profession for life, by showing that it is a field of serious work which can be treated in the spirit of the most rigorous science.² From Brentano Husserl inherited his high conception of the vocation of the philosopher, who has the task of transforming human culture by providing it with a philosophical foundation.³ On the more concrete level of philosophical methods and instruments Husserl was greatly indebted to Brentano as

well. In the *Philosophie der Arithmetik*,⁴ Husserl adopted the view of the later Brentano that descriptive psychology would elucidate the basic concepts and render self-evident the truth of the axioms of *a priori* sciences like arithmetic. One of the pivotal concepts of descriptive psychology, the concept of intentionality, proved to be the most fruitful idea he ever came across.

Husserl never lost his admiration for the religious zeal which Brentano displayed in his philosophical activity. Brentano's conceptions of descriptive psychology and of intentionality, however, were merely a starting-point, from which Husserl proceeded to positions which were often far removed from the original convictions of Brentano. It is of great importance to analyze carefully the development of Husserl's thought on these and other points.⁵ In the interpretation of his work, too often different stages of his philosophy are conflated. This not only has the result that Husserl unnecessarily appears to be a muddled and unclear thinker; it also blinds us to the motives he had for adopting the main stances of his later philosophy, motives which often stem from difficulties in an earlier stage of his career.

In this paper, I shall trace the development of the concept of intentionality from Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*⁶ to Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*.⁷ Like all similar projects, this will have a fragmentary character. The development of Husserl's philosophy was a complex process in which many issues played a role, reciprocally influencing each other. By isolating one thread from the rest of the fabric one necessarily loses sight of factors which might have been important in some respects. Nevertheless, an analysis of single lines of development is an indispensable prerequisite for the construction of a comprehensive interpretation of Husserl's thought.

The evolution of the concept of intentionality is an apt illustration of the fact that in Husserl's development not one but various motives and problems played a role, factors which were not always easy to reconcile with each other. The main thesis of this paper is that apart from the discovery of the constitutive, interpretative or objectifying function of intentional acts, the problem of objectless presentations was responsible for the genesis of Husserl's new concept of intentionality in the *Logical Investigations*.⁸ It will further be argued that this multiple origin causes insoluble tensions in the conception of intentionality as it is expounded in the *Investigations*, a point which equally could be made in respect to Husserl's later work.

II.

Brentano's Concept of Intentionality in the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*

Brentano introduced the concept of intentionality in the second book of the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874) in an attempt to define the subject-matter of psychology. In the first book he argued that psychology had to be defined not as the science of the soul but rather as the science of mental phenomena. The latter definition seemed, at least at first sight, to have the advantage that it is metaphysically neutral, in contrast to the former one which presupposes the existence of a mental substance. As there was much unclarity and dis-

agreement about the distinction between physical and mental phenomena in contemporary treatises on psychology, Brentano went on to discuss several criteria of the mental in the second book of his *Psychology*. Of these criteria he considered the criterion of intentionality to be the most important one,⁹ and he incorporated it in his definition of mental phenomena.

His account of intentionality will be familiar:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.¹⁰

One might discern in this definition two kinds of expression.¹¹ The expressions of the first kind seem to relate to the *object* of consciousness ('Gegenstand', 'Gegenständlichkeit'), and to characterize it as 'intentionally or mentally inexistent' or as 'immanent'. Expressions of the second type stress the "directedness" or referential aspect of consciousness. There is a major problem of interpretation regarding both kinds of expression. The phrases of the first type raise the question (1) whether the description of the object of consciousness as 'intentionally or mentally inexistent' and the like, implies that objects of consciousness are objects of a special kind and cannot exist apart from consciousness, or whether these terms rather indicate a particular *mode of existence*, which objects existing independently of consciousness acquire as soon as someone is conscious of them, and which is, consequently, extrinsic to these objects or, perhaps, whether 'the intentional inexistence of an object' is a characterization of mental acts rather than of objects. Concerning the "directedness" of consciousness, on the other hand, one might ask (2) whether it is a proper relation, the existence of which presupposes the existence of both terms and in general, what this directedness consists in.¹²

The two problems are mutually connected and the answer to the one might depend in various ways on the answer to the other. According to some, Brentano thought in 1874 that intentionality is a relation. But certainly he later found that such a conception is untenable,¹³ and in 1911 he denied the relationality of intentionality on the grounds that it would rule out the truth of a negative judgment of existence.¹⁴ The term 'object' in expressions like 'to be directed to an object' would be used synsemantically and not autosemantically (or syncategorematically, that is: it does not refer to or denote anything). Accordingly, the first problem I stated seems to be the more basic one, and I shall briefly comment on it.

Brentano's reference (in a footnote to the passage quoted) to the scholastic notions of *esse intentionale* and *esse objective* is not of much help in interpreting his own doctrine, for the Scholastics were divided amongst themselves on the point in question.¹⁵ If one takes a *veridical* act of perception or conception as an example, the most economical view is the one according to which *esse objective* and *esse reale* are two *modes of existence* of one and the same thing. Considering the thing as something in the world we say that it has *esse reale*; considered as a

thing perceived or known it has *esse objective* (or *esse intentionale*). Let us label this view the *modus essendi theory*. Such a theory runs into difficulties, so it seems, as soon as we take false conceptions or hallucinations into consideration. Here one might be tempted to say that the thing has *esse objective* only, and lacks *esse reale*.¹⁶ But now the question arises what the ontological nature is of this thing which has *esse objective* but does not exist in reality. On this point we can discern two tendencies. One is to minimize the ontological importance of the *terminus intrinsecus*, the thing in so far as it has *esse objective*. This tendency leads naturally to the conclusion that, from an ontological point of view, only the mental act exists; a view which is usually called the *mental-act theory*.¹⁷ On the other hand one might confer some traditional ontological dignity upon the *terminus intrinsecus*. According to the Thomists, for instance, it is the (more or less purified) *form* which can either have both real (or material) existence (if it is combined with matter in reality) and intentional existence in the mind, or intentional existence only.¹⁸

Notwithstanding these and other more subtle distinctions, the scholastic theories had one trait in common, a trait which will appeal to common sense: even the theorists who conferred the greatest ontological dignity upon the *terminus intrinsecus* never allowed it to become a kind of reduplication of the world. If words like 'image' are used for the *terminus intrinsecus*, this *terminus* is not conceived of as an object of knowledge or perception (*objectum quod*), but only as a means by which (or as a form according to which) the mental act aims at a certain object in the world (i.e., as an *objectum quo*).¹⁹ In contradistinction to the case of a real image like a portrait, there are not two objects of knowledge. We do not perceive a mental image which suggests to us the presence of a similar object in the world; we simply perceive the object in the world.

But this point of agreement between the Scholastics, so plausible to common sense, was endangered by the new corpuscular philosophy of Descartes or the neo-atomists in the seventeenth century. According to the new philosophy certain qualities which are the object of consciousness in perception, like colors and heat and cold, do not really exist in the material world. As soon as one resolved the ensuing ontological embarrassment concerning these qualities by saying that they were *really* mental images, one created a temptation to conceive of mental images, sensations or ideas as *objects* (*objectum quod*) of consciousness. And if one maintained the common-sense assumption that in perception, for instance, we apprehend objects in the world, one had to admit that there are two objects of perception: the mental image as the immediate object, which intimates to us the existence of an extra-mental object in the world, the ultimate object. So the modern ontology had a revolutionary influence on the concept of intentionality: it created a strong tendency towards considering the intentional, immanent or mental object as the *objectum quod* of consciousness, the object of which we are conscious in mental acts,²⁰ a tendency which found its most extreme expression in the works of Berkeley. His philosophy might be considered as a *reductio ad absurdum* of such a tendency.

There is no doubt that Brentano accepted this modern view of the world. In the first book of the *Psychology* he refers with approval to Locke, who is supposed to have proved (by putting one warm and one cold hand in a bowl of water) that qualities like warm and cold do not

exist apart from our sensations (they are "nicht ausser unserer Empfindung wahrhaft und wirklich bestehend").²¹ The same would hold for colors, sounds, smells, all the other traditional secondary qualities and even for shapes.²² Brentano summarizes his view by saying that the proper objects of so-called external perception (that is, according to him, the sensed *qualities*) do not exist outside us, as empirical proofs are supposed to have shown: they exist merely "phenomenally or intentionally".²³

One might be tempted to think (as many of Brentano's pupils did) that Brentano was also a follower of the British Empiricists in that he interpreted the "phenomenal", "immanent" or "intentional" inexistence of the perceived qualities as the existence of real elements of the stream of consciousness, of inner mental "images", functioning as signs of objects in the outer world. In the case of perception, the "directedness" of the mental act toward its object would then include a real relation between two mental entities, the act and the impression. One might even generalize this interpretation, assuming that for Brentano the "mentally in-existent" objects of consciousness are always real parts of the stream of consciousness.²⁴

But in fact Brentano uses the jargon of the *modus essendi* theories. Regarding perceptual qualities he even seems to be nearer to the *mental-act* view than to Thomism. He never uses terms like 'impression' (*Empfindung*) in the manner of the Empiricists for sensed qualities, but consistently reserves them for the act of sensation. In acts of sensation consciousness is "directed" towards sensed qualities. These qualities do not exist in physical reality, they exist merely mentally or intentionally. This does not necessarily mean that they are themselves mental entities like a feeling of pain and that they have a real existence as a part of mental life. Rather, what Brentano seems to mean is that they do not exist, neither in physical reality nor in the stream of consciousness.²⁵ If so "intentionality" is not a relation between two mental entities, the act and the mentally in-existent object (nor, in the case of sensation, a relation between a mental act and a material object in the "outer" world). It is rather a characteristic of mental phenomena, which might be described equally by saying that mental acts have 'mentally in-existent objects' or that they 'aim at an object',²⁶ regardless whether an object corresponding to the act exists or not. Such a conception of intentionality would not require the existence of a special kind of "objects of consciousness".

Brentano does not make a clear distinction between sensation and perception. Like the British Empiricists he thinks that the objects of perception are sensible qualities, but unlike them he does not consider these qualities to be existing in the mind: they do not exist at all. He therefore used to say that outer perception is not really *Wahrnehmung*; it is rather *Falschnehmung*, for in perception we blindly believe that its non-existent objects exist.²⁷ Only inner perception is said to be real *Wahrnehmung*: doubt as to the existence of its objects is excluded.²⁸ The sensed qualities or *physical phenomena*,²⁹ although non-existent, nevertheless have a function for science. Color- and sound-phenomena are said to be signs which indicate the presence of certain material causes of our sensations in the outer world. The same would hold for phenomena of shape and space. However, the difference between primary and secondary qualities is not abolished. While there is nothing *like* colors and sounds in the material world, physics shows it to be probable

that material objects have shapes similar to our shape-phenomena (which function as a consequence as pictures rather than as signs) and the material world is said to be space-like (*raumähnlich*).³⁰ In all this, Brentano follows closely the Cartesian tradition. But Brentano's God does not guarantee the existence of a material world, which is rather an assumption of physics. Accordingly, the physical sciences are defined as

those sciences which seek to explain the succession of physical phenomena connected with normal and pure sensations (that is, sensations which are not influenced by special mental conditions and processes) on the basis of the assumption of a world which resembles one which has three dimensional extension in space and flows in one direction in time, and which influences our sense organs.³¹

As a consequence, physics is in a peculiar position for such a renowned science. The physical phenomena it endeavors to explain do not exist, and the physical objects which would cause our sensations are merely assumed to exist: the idea of their existence is doomed forever to be a hypothesis for us (or a metaphysical assumption, as Brentano says), for physical objects can never be the "direct objects" of sense perception.

I have so much stressed the role of sense-perception in the interpretation of Brentano's concept of intentionality because it shows that in the case in which we are most tempted to conceive intentionality as a relation between a conscious subject and a thing in the world, viz. perception, Brentano's ontology excludes it being such a relation. This ontology is incomprehensible without the background of the Cartesian and "corpuscular" philosophy.³² If my interpretation is correct, expressions like 'mentally inexistent' are highly misleading. They suggest that physical phenomena like colors and sounds do exist in the mind as parts of the stream of consciousness, whereas according to Brentano these phenomena do not exist. And they suggest that the intentionality of outer perception is a relation between two mental entities, the act of sensation and the sensed quality. But the tendency to misinterpret Brentano on this point is not only due to his terminology, it is also encouraged by the urge to maintain certain common-sense convictions in the face of the corpuscular philosophy. According to common-sense we perceive sounds, colored objects, hot and cold substances, etc., as existing in the world. For common-sense, there is no reason to assume that sounds are "less real" than waves in water. The corpuscular philosophy, however, denies that the material world can have any other qualities than a limited number of measurable explanatory properties which play a central role in certain basic physical theories. If common-sense accepts the corpuscular philosophy, but wants to maintain the conviction that sounds and colors have a "real existence", it will be tempted to locate such a real existence "in the mind". Brentano, in resisting this temptation, was more consistent than Descartes, who now seems to conceive of the "ideas" or "sentiments" of things as pictures which can be objects of consciousness,³³ now uses the jargon of the *modus essendi* or *mental act* theory.

Husserl, in his interpretation of Brentano, succumbed to the temptation. In his critique on Brentano in the appendix to the sixth *Investigation*, he overlooks the distinction Brentano makes between the mental act of sensation (*Empfindung*) and the sensed quality (a distinction Husserl himself rejects in the *Investigations*).³⁴

As a consequence he identifies Brentano's "physical phenomena" with his own "sensations", and reproaches Brentano for calling these phenomena 'physical': if they are in reality sensations, they are real parts of the stream of consciousness, and an act of perception having them as objects would be trustworthy inner perception and not, as Brentano is said to maintain, a deceptive outer one (section 6 and 7 of the appendix).³⁵ It is plausible to conclude from this (unjustified) criticism that also in his earliest work Husserl interpreted Brentano's "mental inexistence" of sensed qualities as the real existence of a mental entity within the stream of consciousness and not in the sense of the *mental act* theory.³⁶ The critique on Brentano in the *Investigations* can then be seen as directed against Husserl's own earlier position in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, in which Husserl adopted what he considered to be Brentano's conception of intentionality.

III.

Intentionality and Perception in the Early Husserl

As I suggested, it was the peculiar mixture of modern corpuscular philosophy and common-sense which induced philosophers to think that a red and warm thing which we perceive is in fact an idea or sensation in the mind, or, at least, is something which exists only mentally or intentionally. As I said, it is plausible to assume that Husserl in the early years of the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* accepted the more vulgar version of this theory, according to which the red-sensation (or the sensed red-phenomenon) is a real mental element to which we are intentionally related in perception.³⁷ As a consequence of such a view, there will be at first sight two possible ways of analyzing perception. We might in the first place investigate the physical causes of perception and the relevant physiological processes in our body. Or we might describe the way in which physical phenomena, which are in reality a kind of mental entity, appear to us.³⁸ In this second type of analysis one can entirely abstract from the physical reality which is supposed to cause the "physical phenomena". What is more, one might use the language the common man uses to portray his perceived world, in thus describing perception and its objects. For the world of colors and smells--according to the average corpuscular philosopher nought but a film of impressions in the inner theatre of the mind--is precisely what the common man calls 'the world'.³⁹ It was within the frame work of such a descriptive analysis that Husserl developed his new concept of intentionality.

We find the first important innovation in an article of 1894, *Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik*.⁴⁰ In the second part of this article, Husserl makes a distinction between observation (*Anschauung*) and representation (*Repräsentation*) which is meant to be a distinction between two species of the wider class of presentations or *Vorstellungen*. *Vorstellungen* played a crucial role in Brentano's conception of intentionality. For all mental acts according to his conception are either *Vorstellungen* or have *Vorstellungen* as a basis which provide them with a meant object.⁴¹ So it is in the inherent *Vorstellung* that the intentionality of mental acts really resides; in a mental act our consciousness is "directed" towards a certain object because that object is represented (*vorgestellt*) in the act. Now Brentano, like the British Empiricists, had a tendency to reduce all differences between *Vorstellungen* to differences between the presented objects or mental contents.⁴² In the *Psychologis-*

che *Studien* Husserl contends that such a tendency is fundamentally mistaken.

It is clear from the opening paragraphs of the *Psychologische Studien* that Husserl in 1894 accepted Brentano's conception of the world. The causal relations between objective things, so he says, determine relations of dependence between the perceived phenomena and their observed contents (*anschaulichen Gehalten*).⁴³ But in the descriptive analysis of perception we can abstract from the objective things: objective things, in the sense of things which transcend consciousness and which exist independently of it, cannot be perceived or observed, for "that would be a contradiction".⁴⁴ Consequently, this concept of objective things is according to Husserl not at home in common-sense; it is the product of scientific reflection on perception, reflection in which "animals and the majority of mankind will never engage". What the common man takes as the "objective thing" or "thing in itself" is a series of mutually coherent immanent contents, which we 'have' (*erleben*) when we "observe the thing from all sides".⁴⁵ Only the objective thing in this last sense is relevant to the descriptive analysis of perception.

Husserl's important innovation in the *Psychologische Studien* consists in his claim that we can be intentionally related to immanent contents in two different ways. In perceiving a building, our consciousness is "intentionally directed" to the building as a whole. But it would be a mistake to think (so Husserl says) that the building as a whole is the mental or immanent content of perception at any given moment. Rather it is only the facade, for instance, which is really present in perception. Of course we could concentrate on the facade only. In that case Husserl says that we "observe" (*anschauen*) the facade.⁴⁶ In perceiving the building as a whole, however, consciousness is, on the basis of a certain immanent content (the facade), "intentionally directed" towards something which is not an immanent content at all: the building as a whole. Husserl calls this second function of consciousness 'representation' (*Repräsentation*).⁴⁷ In observation (*Anschauung*) consciousness is said to be "intentionally directed" towards an immanent content of consciousness. In *representation*, however, it is directed, on the basis of such a content, toward something which transcends the content and which is not immanent in the mental act. The expression 'immanent content', as it is used in this context, is apparently restricted to intuitive contents, just like the world 'idea' in Berkeley and Hume.

Husserl's discovery of representations in this restricted sense was crucial for several reasons. A first, and minor reason, is the extraordinary range of the phenomenon. Although Husserl's initial examples concern the role of representations in perception (PSL, pp. 168-170), he goes on to show that the same function of consciousness is present in imagination (pp. 170-171), conceptual thought (pp. 171-173) and in our consciousness of signs (pp. 173-174). As a consequence, a thorough study of the phenomenon will be of great importance to epistemology, psychology and logic (pp. 186-191).⁴⁸

More important from our point of view are the two other reasons. The one is, that Husserl's discovery destroys the theory of intentionality he probably adhered to in the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* and which, in the eyes of many pupils of Brentano, had been Brentano's theory in the *Psychology*. According to this theory the intentional "directedness" of mental acts is a relation between the act and an immanent mental

content. What Husserl now claimed is that, although in the case of representations there is an immanent content in the act, our attention is not "directed" towards this content, but towards something transcendent which is not immanent in the act or, as in the case of perception, partly immanent only. As a consequence intentionality in these cases cannot be understood as a real relation between two mental entities, the act and the content, a conclusion which Husserl forcefully stresses in the *Investigations*.⁴⁹

Finally, this conception of representation draws Husserl's attention to the great variety of functions of consciousness. In section II.5 of the *Psychologische Studien* he argues that the difference between observation and representation cannot be explained by postulating differences in the immanent content of consciousness. If we first observe an arabesque, deriving a purely aesthetic pleasure from it, and then suddenly realize that it is a sign which refers to some mythological figure, there is a distinction between two modes of consciousness which cannot be due to change in the perceived content. Perhaps the shift of attention from the given perceptual content to the mythological figure could be explained by acquired dispositions or other mental mechanisms. But from the descriptive point of view this is irrelevant: the distinction between the two functions of consciousness, which might alternate without any modification of the immanent content, is a raw datum, which is presupposed in any attempt at a causal explanation.⁵⁰ Accordingly we must not conceive of consciousness as a kind of neutral container enclosing various immanent contents (British Empiricism), or as a neutral beam "directed" towards varying images. The differences between states of consciousness not only reside in the immanent contents, they are also due to differences between *functions* of consciousness in which, as Husserl says in the *Investigations*, these contents are *apprehended* or *interpreted* in various ways. The representations are the most remarkable family of these functions, because in their case we are intentionally directed to objects which are not immanent contents of consciousness at all, something which was excluded by the naive theory of intentionality I ascribed to the early Husserl.⁵¹ As De Boer correctly observes, the introduction of the concept of representation in 1894 was the germ of Husserl's later concept of constitution and of the idea that the analysis of intentionality coincides with the analysis of the various kinds of constitution.⁵²

IV.

The Theory of Perception of the *Logical Investigations*

Husserl's analysis of perception in the *Psychologische Studien* of 1894 presupposed, so I argued, an ontology similar to the "corpuscular" philosophy which came into fashion in the seventeenth century. But it is a consequence of this same philosophical framework that in describing the mental acts of perception and the way in which the objects of these acts appear to us, we can abstract from the underlying ontology, and use the language of the common man. This explains why Husserl in his early work does not pay much attention to the ontological assumptions underlying his descriptive psychology. But there remains a certain tension between the "intuitions" of the corpuscular philosopher and those of common sense, a tension which results in a systematic ambiguity of the central notion of the 'immanent content' of mental acts. It will be

useful to consider this point briefly because this notion of the immanent content of mental acts played an ever more central role in the development of Husserl's thought, as he became gradually aware of the difficulties and paradoxes implied by the "corpuscular" view.

As long as we interpret the expression 'immanent content of consciousness' from the point of view of the "corpuscular" philosophy (or any other ontology which distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities in a Lockean way), the immanent content will be an element of the stream of consciousness, a non-physical entity which has no spatial extension, called 'impression' or 'idea' by the British Empiricists. If, however, we adopt the point of view of common-sense and read the description of perception from this standpoint, the expression 'immanent content' acquires the meaning of 'what is attentively perceived' (i.e., what is observed in Husserl's technical sense) in contradistinction to 'what is merely meant' (*bloss intendirt*). So, as Husserl says, in visual perception the observed side (say, the front) of a thing is the immanent content of the act of perception, whereas the other sides are said to be "merely meant by a representation on the basis of the observed side". If we define the objective thing or the thing itself as that multisided object which is a so-and-so, then we cannot observe (in Husserl's technical sense of the word) the thing itself, for there is no singular instant at which all its sides can be immanent contents of perception. Nevertheless, at each moment of the on-going perception a part or side of the thing itself becomes an immanent content, for at any moment some side of the thing is observed. As a consequence Husserl is willing to say that the thing in itself as a whole becomes an immanent content of consciousness if we take into account the entire series of perceptions in which the different sides of the object are observed consecutively. In each phase of the process, part of the object becomes an immanent content; in a complete series of perceptions (if such a thing is possible), the objective thing as a whole would become an immanent content, although not all the sides of it at the same instant.⁵³

Now all this may sound plausible as long as one sticks consistently to the standpoint of common-sense, and interprets the expression 'immanent content' in the sense of what is attentively perceived (observed) or what is intuitively given to us. A naive reader of the *Psychologische Studien* might even think that Husserl does not presuppose any philosophical theories in his analysis of (visual) perception, although to such a reader Husserl's terminology ('immanent content', which is 'really contained in the act of observation', for observed side of an object) will have a peculiar ring and although he will not be able to make sense of the two passages where Husserl speaks about objective and transcendent things which cannot be perceived in principle, of which common sense has never heard, and which cause our immanent contents.⁵⁴ But as soon as one tries to reconcile this common-sense interpretation of the expression 'immanent content' with the interpretation forced upon us by the "corpuscular" philosophy, one gets into absurdities and paradoxes. The immanent contents in the interpretation of common-sense are extended (in the case of sense-perception) and at a distance from us. In the interpretation of the 'corpuscular' philosopher, however, they are mental, non-extended, and without distance. Even the genius of Berkeley was not able to persuade us that these two interpretations can be merged into one. For common-sense will not allow that in visually (say) perceiving we are in fact aware of something which is in our mind, instead of the thing which exists at a distance from our body.

Husserl's theory of perception in the *Logical Investigations* (first edition) is a major improvement upon the theory of the *Psychologische Studien*. Seen from the point of view of common-sense, the analysis of perception is more subtle. Husserl tries to do justice to phenomena which he only touched on in the earlier work, such as the phenomenon of perspective, and he now rejects his earlier identification of *Anschauung* and the function of paying attention to something. From a more philosophical stance, the later analysis has the "advantage" that it tries to harmonize common-sense with the implications of the "corpuscular" philosophy in a more refined way, avoiding obvious ambiguities like that of the expression 'immanent content' in the *Studien*. Finally, the development of the theory of perception in the *Investigations* has a considerable impact on the concept of intentionality, as was the case in the *Studien* as well.

Let me begin with Husserl's analysis of perspective and related phenomena. In the majority of the descriptions of the visual perception of an extended thing in the *Studien*, Husserl writes as if the "immanent content" of the act of perception, which in the interpretation of common-sense is "what is really perceived", is identical with a *side* of the perceived thing.⁵⁵ But he also claims that in some cases this is incorrect. If we say for instance, on the basis of an instantaneous perception of a dice, that its sides have the same shape, the "immanent content" of perception corresponding to each of the three sides we perceive is said to be not identical in shape.⁵⁶ Consequently, even the side of the object we "really see" is not perceived or observed "as it is in reality", so it is now claimed. In order to do justice to this fact, Husserl introduces in the *Investigations* a complication into the theory of perception. According to the *Psychologische Studien* we may find within the framework of an instantaneous act of perception three different but interwoven functions of consciousness: the function of observation (*Anschauung*) by which we simply concentrate on the immanent content which is "present in consciousness" (a content which is identified, as said before, with the observed side of the object) and two representations: we might apprehend the immanent content as an *image* or as a *sign* of other, not observed sides of the object.⁵⁷ In the *Investigations*, Husserl holds on to his views concerning the latter two functions, but he changes his opinion about what he called 'Anschauung' in the *Psychologische Studien*. He now says that in ("outer") perception we never pay attention to immanent contents of consciousness at all. Even if we concentrate on the "really" perceived side of an object there is a function of consciousness in operation which is very much like the ones Husserl called representations in the *Studien*. For the immanent content of consciousness is now said not only to be not identical with the perceived side of the object, but also to be not exactly similar to it. In perceiving the side of a dice, the immanent content (so Husserl would say) will not have the shape of a square, but, normally, the shape of a trapezium or a diamond. Even in the perceptual act in the narrower sense, excluding the representations by sign or image always interwoven with it, we would "transcend" the immanent content. We apprehend it in a certain way which Husserl now calls 'presentation' (*Präsentation*), and due to this apprehension we perceive the corresponding side of the object.⁵⁸ Husserl gives a similar analysis for the perception of colors. Here too, the immanent color often is not identical with the perceived color as it "really" is (the white house looks reddish at sunset). We apprehend the immanent color content in such a way, that we perceive the "real" color which, neverthe-

less, is not exactly like it. Husserl introduces the term *Abschattung*, which literally means something like range of shades or adumbration, as a *terminus technicus* to refer to these immanent contents which we apprehend in perception.⁵⁹

Did Husserl then succeed, in the *Investigations*, in working out a theory of perception along these lines which satisfied the postulates of the "corpuscular" philosophy, avoided ambiguities of key-terms, and was more "agreeable to common-sense" than the theory of the *Studien*? On a first inspection, this might appear to be the case. The new theory seems to have the advantage that it assumes that consciousness in perception is "directed" towards things which are *transcendent* in relation to the immanent contents, that is, which are not real parts of our stream of consciousness. The distinction between the perceived side of the object which is transcendent to consciousness and the *Abschattung* which is an immanent content of consciousness allows Husserl to combine the implications of the "corpuscular" philosophy and the intuitions of common-sense in a new manner. He now identifies the traditional immanent impression (*Empfindung*) with the immanent content, which turns out to be identical with the *Abschattung*. And he affirms unambiguously that the impression is a real element of consciousness (in the sense in which unintentional feelings like pain are real elements of consciousness), which can be found in reflection or inner perception.⁶⁰ Thus, the equivocation which existed in the *Studien* concerning the expression 'immanent content' is removed. The immanent content or impression is a real part of our stream of consciousness, in contradistinction to the perceived side of the extended object, which is not immanent but extramental or "intentional".

Nevertheless, absurdities remain, absurdities which all spring from the identification of the *Abschattungen* with impressions which are real and immanent elements of consciousness.⁶¹ To give one example: although we normally in perception do not concentrate on the *Abschattung* but on the side of the object which appears to us "in" this *Abschattung*, we might very well concentrate on the *Abschattung*. The painter, who wants to capture the shade of light on a cathedral, tries to render an *Abschattung* of the cathedral in his painting. But is he, in concentrating on the *Abschattung* or the way something appears to us, directed towards an immanent element of his mental life, as Husserl's identification of *Abschattung* and *Empfindung* implies? Such a conclusion is certainly not easy to square with common-sense!

Let me state this new theory of perception in a more elaborate manner, before going somewhat deeper into its consequences. According to Husserl in the *Investigations*, perception (if analyzed from the point of view of descriptive psychology or phenomenology) essentially implies

that we undergo a certain sequence of experiences of the class of sensations, sensuously unified in a peculiar serial pattern, and informed by a certain act-character of "interpretation" (*Auffassung*), which endows it with an objective sense. This act-character is responsible for the fact that an object, i.e., this inkpot is perceptually apparent to us.⁶²

Husserl often calls this act of apprehension by which immanent impressions are interpreted, an objectivating apperception. The subjective impressions are "objectivated" by the apprehension, and because of

this objectivation an object is "constituted" for us out of the subjective stuff of the impressions.⁶³ This theory of perception fits well with the fashionable projective theories of perception, which were introduced by philosopher-physiologists like Von Helmholtz. According to the projective theory, material stimuli from the outer world cause impressions in our consciousness via the sense-organs, nerves and brain. At first we simply have these impressions passively, but in the course of our childhood we learn to interpret them and to project them in such a manner that we seem to be conscious of something that exists independently of us, the phenomenal world.⁶⁴ Accordingly, we have to make a sharp distinction between impressions on the one hand and phenomenal properties on the other.⁶⁵

The consequences of this new theory of perception for the development of the concept of intentionality were far-reaching. For the perceptual phenomenon is, as it were, a tangible entity which has a certain kind of existence even if we might discover that the object of which we thought that it appeared as this phenomenon does not exist after all. In perception, consciousness undoubtedly is "intentionally directed" towards this phenomenon. On the other hand, the phenomenon is not, like the impression, an immanent and real element of the stream of consciousness.

Thus, Husserl's novel idea of perception induced him to develop a new *relational* theory of intentionality. In the *Investigations* he rejected the more primitive relational view of intentionality according to which it is a relation between two really existing mental entities, the mental act on the one hand and the impression, idea or immanent content on the other. From 1907 onwards he substituted for this primitive view the more sophisticated correlative theory of intentionality, which says that intentionality is a relation between the mental act and a phenomenon or *noema* which is transcendent to this act, although it is essentially dependent on it. This *noetic-noematic* conception of consciousness was at least in part a generalization of Husserl's theory of perception of the *Investigations*, and it was to remain his view for the rest of his career.⁶⁶

V.

The Problem of "Objectless Presentations" and the Concept of Intentionality

Apart from the development of Husserl's theory of perception a second factor deeply influenced his conception of intentionality in the *Investigations*: the so-called problem of objectless presentations (*gegenstandslose Vorstellungen*). Although the problem is as old as philosophy—Plato, for instance, already discussed the issue whether we can have any beliefs about a non-existent thing (*Theaetetus* 189a)—it is not surprising that it received much attention in the school of Brentano. Twardowski, Marty and Meinong all wrote extensively on the subject and Russell, who thoroughly studied and reviewed the work of Meinong, made it into a central topic of the analytic tradition.⁶⁷ Husserl wrote in 1894 a long essay about the problem entitled *Intentional Objects* (*Intentionale Gegenstände*), which was published in 1979.⁶⁸ In the present section I shall trace the influence of this essay on the conception of intentionality in the *Investigations*.

Within the context of the philosophy of Brentano, the problem of objectless presentations originated from a conflict between his concept of intentionality and the thesis that there are presentations without an object, a thesis strongly argued by Bolzano in his *Wissenschaftslehre*.⁶⁹ According to Brentano, all mental acts are "directed towards" an object. So, one would conclude, there are no objectless presentations. On the other hand there is no object in reality which corresponds to contradictory presentations like "round square" or to presentations of fiction like "Pegasus". Consequently, there are objectless presentations. How can one reconcile these two tenets, which are at the same time plausible and nevertheless contradictory?⁷⁰

After due complaint that this old problem has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, Husserl in the paper *Intentional Objects* discusses a first solution which he ascribes to "the broad mass of people" (*die breite Masse*, p. 304). To present an object would consist in having a mental image (*geistiges Abbild*) corresponding to it. Even if the object does not exist in reality, we nevertheless are, in presenting it, conscious of the image. Consequently, even a presentation to which no object in reality corresponds, has, in a sense, an object: the mental image. Brentano's conception of intentionality would thus be preserved.

Husserl discharges a salvo of arguments against this conception, some of which we will find again in the *Investigations*. In the first place it is a mere theoretical fiction that in presenting an object we "intend" it via a mental image. Not only do we not find anything like a mental image in reflecting upon, say, perception; even in presentations of a more indirect kind, like the conceptual presentations which accompany the use of language, there are often no mental images and in many cases, for instance in the use of complicated mathematical formulae, they are impossible.⁷¹ Secondly, the mental-image theory does not really solve the problem of objectless presentations. The mental image would be the object at which all presentations aim. The original of the image, on the other hand, would be the object of which we sometimes correctly say that it does not exist. But if we deny the existence of an object, we certainly mean the very object at which we aim intentionally! If this object is a mental image, all negative existential judgments would be false, for the mental image does always exist, so the theory proclaims. The reduplication of the world into real objects and intentional objects or images, instead of explaining the possibility of negative existential judgments, makes them incomprehensible. The "intended" or "intentional" object must therefore be identical with the real object. If the real object does not exist, there is no intentional object either.⁷²

Another fatal weakness of the mental-image theory consists in the fact that it is not based on an adequate analysis of what an image is. The British Empiricists often conceived of presentations as the simple presence of images in the mind. But how would the mind "know" that the images are *images of something*? Being an image is, as Husserl says in the *Investigations*, not a real property of an object, like being red or being round. Do we know that the immanent object is an image by establishing in an act of reflection that it is similar to the real object in the world? But this is absurd: according to the mental-image theory the act of reflection would be a presentation by image itself, and an infinite regress would ensue.⁷³ Moreover, if the consciousness of the real object in the world is essentially mediated by the mental image, such a compar-

ison between the object and the image is *a priori* excluded.⁷⁴ Finally, as Husserl observes in the second edition of the *Investigations*, the mental-image theory leads to an infinite regress in yet another way. For to interpret something as an image of something else presupposes that this something is already given to us in some way, for instance in perception. If perception in its turn consisted in interpreting something as an image of the perceived object, each act of perception would presuppose another act of perception, the perception of the mediating image.⁷⁵ According to Husserl, an object is an image if it is apperceived or interpreted in a particular way by a mental act. And the apperception of an object as an image (picture) of something else (the original) presupposes that we are able (or that someone will be or has been able), in principle, to "fulfil" this apperception by a perception of the original and by comparing the image with it. This, however, is excluded by the mental-image theory of consciousness.⁷⁶

A fourth and last objection against the vulgar theory rests on the assumed complete generality of the laws of logic. If we are conscious of a mental image in denying the existence of a round square, this image would be relevant to the judgment (in the way required by the image theory) only if it was itself round and square. Consequently the realm of mental images would not be covered by the laws of logic, which exclude something being round and square (not round) at the same time. But the laws of logic do not acknowledge this kind of exception. A similar argument, so Husserl observes in the margin, anticipating Russell on this point, refutes Meinong's theory of *objectives*.⁷⁷

Husserl discusses next a much more sophisticated theory of objectless presentations, the one which Twardowski put forward in his essay *On the Content and Object of Presentations*.⁷⁸ Twardowski's starting point is the naive interpretation of Brentano's doctrine of the immanent object which was adopted by most of his pupils, whereby every mental phenomenon aims at an immanent object, and the existence of such a relation is a characteristic of mental phenomena by which they are distinguished from physical phenomena. Accordingly, we have to distinguish between the mental act and its "presented content". But this content lies just as completely within the subject as the act of presentation itself, according to the naive interpretation which Twardowski adopts, following in this respect the *Logik* of Hoefler and Meinong.⁷⁹ One has to distinguish, accordingly, between the independently existing object in the world at which our presentation aims, as it were, and the immanent object or the content, a "quasi-picture" (more accurately: sign) of the object in the first sense.⁸⁰ This distinction between the object and the content of a presentation, however, is endangered by the fact that we say both of the content and of the object that it is presented (*vorge-stellt*) in the act. Twardowski tries to avert confusion by introducing the distinction Brentano made between attributive and modifying uses of an adjective. An adjective is used attributively if it adds in any sense to the meaning of the expression to which it is attached. It is used in a modifying manner, by contrast, if it completely changes the original meaning of that expression. The difference might be illustrated by an example which is, so Twardowski thinks, "completely analogous" to mental presentations of an object. If a painter paints a landscape, "one and the same activity of the painter is directed towards two objects": the landscape he tries to depict and the painting. If we now talk about a 'painted landscape', this expression is ambiguous, for the adjective 'painted' can be taken attributively or in the modifying sense. Used at-

tributively, it says of the real landscape that it has a certain relation to the picture the painter made. In the modifying sense, however, it entirely changes the meaning of the word 'landscape', which now comes to designate a certain kind of picture. The painter painted a landscape, in contradistinction, say, to a portrait or a still-life. According to Twardowski, the very same distinction holds *mutatis mutandis* for the expression 'presented object'. In the attributive use it means that a certain object in the world has the relation of being present to a certain mental act or to the conscious subject; in the modifying use, however, the expression refers to the *content* of the act. So the act of mentally presenting "moves in two directions", exactly like the activity of painting a landscape. The object in the world, which is presented to us in the attributive sense of the term, is the primary object of the act, the object *at which* the act of presentation aims. The content, on the other hand, is the secondary object, the object *through which* the primary object is presented. Twardowski even says that (if a horse is present to us) "the content is the copy of the horse in a sense similar to that in which the picture is a copy of the landscape". He terminologically distinguishes the attributive and the modifying use of 'presented' (*vorge stellt*) by saying that the content is presented *in* the act, whereas the object is presented *through* (the content of) the act of presenting.⁸¹

If Twardowski, by thus re-introducing the medieval distinction between the *objectum quod* or *terminus extrinsecus* and the *objectum a quo* or *terminus intrinsecus* moves considerably nearer to the Scholastics than Brentano had done, he does so even more by providing a new solution to the problem of objectless presentations within the adopted framework. In the case of objectless presentations it might be tempting, Twardowski says,⁸² to identify the object and the content of the act. This was in fact the very core of the vulgar theory which Husserl discussed earlier. Twardowski forcefully contests this theory, using in part the same arguments as Husserl: firstly the content of an objectless presentation, which he identifies with the meaning of the corresponding expression, certainly exists, whereas the object does not, for (so he contends) an expression like 'round square' is not meaningless. Secondly, we do not ascribe the properties of being round and being square to the content of the act: if the content had these contradictory properties, it would not exist. Consequently, there are presentations, like "round square" or "golden mountain", corresponding to which there exists no object. Nevertheless, Twardowski wants to maintain his general theory of consciousness, according to which every mental act presents an object through an immanent content. Consequently, he is forced to make a distinction between the *existence* of the object and its *being presented*:

The confusion of the proponents of objectless presentations consists in that they mistook the nonexistence of an object for its not being presented. But every presentation presents an object, whether it exists or not, . . .⁸³

To the objection that the object of an objectless presentation would in this case exist after all, namely as a presented object, Twardowski replies by resurrecting a second scholastic distinction. The additional clause 'as a presented object' modifies the meaning of 'to exist', so he says. 'To exist as a presented object' does not mean that the object exists in reality; it only means that it is presented in a mental act. The Scholastics expressed this by saying that the object, in case of an ob-

jectless presentation, had a mere objective, intentional, or phenomenal existence.⁸⁴

It is reasonable to conceive of the "directedness" of consciousness towards the object, at least in case of a perception of an object which exists in reality, as a *relation*. Twardowski generalizes this conception of intentionality and holds that it covers objectless presentations as well. He resolves the dilemma evoked by this generalization, namely that we either have to admit relations which can exist although one of the relata does not exist, or have to accept that the object of objectless presentations after all exists in some way, in the first sense. "The relationship between the object of an act and its contents is, in these cases, a relation such that one of its terms exists, while the other does not".⁸⁵

Husserl's criticisms of Twardowski are partly concerned with the general theory of content and object, and partly with the solution of the problem of objectless presentations in terms of real and intentional existence. In a review of Twardowski's book Husserl wrote in 1896,⁸⁶ he rejects Twardowski's identification of meaning with the subjective content or mental image, arguing, as he does later in the first *Logical Investigation*, that mental images may vary while the meaning remains the same, that one mental image might embody different meanings and that several different images might embody one and the same meaning, and, finally, that one and the same meaning might be "in" many separate mental acts, a relation Husserl equates in the *Investigations* with the relation of a universal's being "in" its corresponding particulars.⁸⁷ The other main objection against Twardowski's general framework concerns the thesis that the activity of mentally presenting would "move in two directions". This conception gives rise to the implausible reduplication of the world which Husserl rightly condemned in his treatment of the vulgar view.

In the essay on *Intentional Objects* of 1894 Husserl confines himself to a critique of Twardowski's solution of the problem of objectless presentations which makes use of the scholastic distinction between "real" and "intentional" existence. His considerations, however, have a much wider import: they bear not only on Twardowski, but on Brentano and many Scholastics as well, and in general on all philosophers who use the distinction between real and intentional existence. Husserl's general complaint is that the expression 'intentional existence' is unclear and ambiguous. If, for instance, the thesis that objectless presentations are directed towards objects which *exist merely intentionally* means *nothing more* than that in these presentations an object is presented, which is what Twardowski affirms, the introduction of the expression 'intentional existence' does not solve the problem of objectless presentations: it only restates the problem in a new terminology.⁸⁸ The original contradiction is perhaps resolved on a purely verbal level.⁸⁹ 'There is an object corresponding to each presentation' is now said to mean: in each presentation an object *intentionally* exists (or: is presented), whereas the thesis that not all presentations have a corresponding object would refer to *real* existence. But the question is what this distinction boils down to.

We seem to be forced by some examples, so Husserl says, to interpret 'merely intentional existence' after all as a mode of *real* existence. If we observe (in the sense of Husserl's *Psychologische Studien*) a color-patch, this color-patch certainly exists. According to Brentano and

other corpuscular philosophers, however, the color-patch does not exist in physical reality: it would exist merely mentally or intentionally. But Husserl, maintaining the common-sense conviction that the color-patch has as real an existence as anything else, concludes that in this case 'mental existence' can mean nothing but 'existence as a real part of a mental act'. And there would be no reason to degrade this existence by saying that it has a modified sense. For the perceived color is not at all like a color which is merely represented, say, in imagination.⁹⁰ As soon as we generalize this interpretation of 'to exist intentionally', we get again the reduplication of the world Husserl properly rejected in the case of the vulgar theory.

Husserl proposes his own solution to the problem of objectless presentations as an alternative interpretation of expressions like 'immanent object' and 'intentional existence', an interpretation which avoids the danger of hypostatizing them into special kinds of objects in the mind. Just as the distinction between a *lion* and *this lion* is not a distinction between two kinds of lion, indeterminate and determinate ones, but a distinction between two kinds of presentation, so the distinction between real and intentional objects is according to Husserl a distinction not between kinds of object but between kinds of presentation in the objective sense of meanings. Husserl introduces his theory on the basis of a study of nominal expressions, but it can, so he says, easily be accommodated to cover propositions as well. The central idea of the theory is that the distinction between objectless presentations and presentations having a real object concerns the possible logical relations of these presentations to other meanings, or "the forms of the possible valid connections, into which these meanings . . . might enter".⁹¹

An objectless presentation simply is a presentation which might fulfil the subject-function in a true negative existential proposition, and a presentation to which a real object corresponds might fulfil a similar function in an affirmative existential proposition.⁹²

Of course, these considerations do not yet touch the core of the problem of objectless presentations, viz. the question in what sense, if any, we might say that all presentations have an object. Fundamental to Husserl's interpretation of this *dictum* is the idea that to be an object is to be a subject of possible true identifications or predications. Accordingly, we have to explain how it is possible that objectless presentations can fulfil the subject-function in true predications or true propositions of identity. Now we do say that the proposition 'Zeus is the highest of the Olympic gods' is true, even if we do not believe that Zeus exists. And according to Husserl we do so because of the fact that we unwittingly interpret this sentence as an elliptical expression of the hypothetical proposition that if Greek mythology were true, Zeus would be the highest of the Olympic gods, or: if the name 'Zeus', as the Greeks thought, really refers to a god, this god would be the highest of the Olympic gods.

Husserl in his paper on *Intentional Objects* (1894) generalizes from this example to all objectless presentations. Of all these presentations we say that they "have an object", are "directed towards an object which exists merely intentionally" and so on, because these presentations can fulfil the same role as presentations to which an object corresponds in reality, if only under some existential assumption. And the fact that we normally do not state this assumption explicitly might be explained by

the Machian idea of the economy of thought: it is not necessary to decide upon the truth of the assumption in order, for instance, to evaluate from a logical point of view the deductions in which objectless presentations play a role. The mathematician states his theorems as if they were apodictically true, whereas in fact they are true only under the assumption that there are objects corresponding to his initial definitions. Consequently he runs the risk of forgetting about the original assumptions and misinterpreting his results. But this detracts not at all from the validity of his deductions.⁹³

As I already suggested, Husserl's "solution" to the problem of objectless presentations has important consequences for his conception of intentionality, the "directedness" of mental acts toward an object. In the first place, he rejects the conception that there is, in the absence of an object existing in reality, some kind of internal object immanent in the act. From this he concludes, in sharp contrast to Twardowski, that in the case of objectless presentations intentionality cannot be a relation, for "the existence of a relation includes the existence of the relata".⁹⁴ And this conclusion is implicitly generalized to all mental acts.

What then, is intentionality on the level of mental acts, if it is not a relation between the act and the object? On this point Husserl makes the most interesting move of the essay on *Intentional Objects*. In a first part of the paper, which is lost and consequently not published in the *Husserliana* Vol. XXII, he had argued that the "objective content" of mental acts, or their essence, is what we normally call the meaning of expressions. In contrast to the psychological content of mental acts, which is individuated in time, the meaning or objective content would be "ideal", i.e., atemporal and a unity in contrast to the plurality of mental acts which would somehow embody the meaning.⁹⁵ Probably this lost manuscript was a sketch for what later became the first *Logical Investigation*, where Husserl defends the view that meanings are Platonic ideas or "ideal species" which are instantiated by mental acts. The essential ingredient or moment of mental acts, called the intentional essence, would be an individualized meaning, sharply distinguished from intuitive contents like mental images (phantasmata).⁹⁶

On the basis of such a view it will be possible to transfer a conception of intentionality which is inspired by an analysis of meanings, especially the meanings of vacuously referring names, to the realm of mental acts. This is precisely what Husserl does. From his analysis of objectless presentations in the objective sense (i.e. the sense of *meanings*) he draws the conclusion that the "directedness towards an object" is nothing other than a certain property of meanings, i.e. the ability to perform certain logical functions or to enter as a part into certain complex meanings. The *gegenständliche Intention* is not a relation, as Twardowski thought, but an *Eigenschaft des Inhalts, die eben das einen Gegenstand Vorstellen oder Meinen heisst*.⁹⁷ In order to interpret the expressions 'merely intended object' or 'intentional object', or to analyze the nature of the presented object, we need not transcend the realm of meanings in any way.⁹⁸ And if the meaning is the essence of mental acts, we might interpret the "intentional directedness of mental acts toward an object" in the very same way, as a property of their objective content. As a consequence, we need not assume, aside from the meaning-contents of mental acts, a distinct intentional relation. The intentional relation is in fact not a relation at all; it entirely consists in the possi-

bility of objective meanings of entering into complex meanings of some kind. Husserl calls this a main result of his investigation:

The insight that indeed, as we expected, the meaning alone is the intrinsic and essential characteristic of presentations, whereas relatedness with the object merely indicates certain connections of truths or judgments of which the meaning can be a part, might be called a main result of the considerations of the last chapter.⁹⁹

And with regard to the concrete mental acts he writes:

the relation to the object is conveyed, in the case of a (subjective) presentation, by its 'content', i.e., its meaning. (. . .) And thus it becomes clear to us, that the objective content of a mental act of presenting is not, for instance, an intimate unity consisting of the meaning and the relation to the object as two 'aspects' or components. It is rather, primarily and in itself nothing but the meaning, whereas the relatedness of the presentation to its object indicates certain characteristics of its meaning, certain objectively valid connections, of which the aforesaid meaning might be a part.¹⁰⁰

Some of the main theses of the *Investigations* on intentionality, presented in the text as if they were the upshot of a purely descriptive analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, conform in fact to these "main results" of Husserl's analysis of the problem of objectless presentations. Thus Husserl stresses at several places that intentionality is not a *relation* but a *characteristic* of mental acts,¹⁰¹ and he affirms that the reference to the object is constituted in the meaning or objective content.¹⁰² The essay of 1894 on *Intentional Objects* appears to be an indispensable background for a correct understanding of these propositions.

VI.

The Ambiguous Nature of Intentionality

In the *Investigations* and, again, in *Ideas I*, Husserl for epistemological reasons proclaimed that phenomenology is a purely descriptive science which does not presuppose any hypothesis or problem.¹⁰³ However, even if such a conception were tenable in principle,¹⁰⁴ I hope to have shown, at least regarding the formation of the concept of intentionality, that it is not a correct description of what Husserl was in fact doing. The genesis of the concept of intentionality was largely determined by philosophical issues such as the problem of perception or the problem of objectless presentations, issues which were to a certain extent based on philosophical speculations like the corpuscular philosophy of the 17th century. Consequently, Husserl's presentation of his philosophy as a presuppositionless science is misleading and mystifying: it prevents the reader from understanding many of his assertions, for which purpose they should be interpreted as solutions to certain philosophical problems, and from criticizing them as such.¹⁰⁵

As was often the case regarding Husserl's conceptions and theories, the concept of intentionality was constructed under the influence of more than one problem. I argued that two problems played the leading role in this connection: the problem of perception and the problem of objectless presentations. To a certain extent, the influences of these two problems on the concept of intentionality coincided. Both led to the conclusion that we should not assume the existence of an "immanent" object of any kind, apart from the object in the "outside" world. Accordingly, the arguments Husserl uses in his famous critique of the image- and the sign-theory of consciousness derive from both sources.¹⁰⁶ The "intended" object of an objectless presentation is the very object which does not exist, and in perception our consciousness for a number of reasons cannot be "directed towards" an internal image or sign of the outer object.¹⁰⁷

But there is also a serious tension, even an incompatibility, between Husserl's solution to the problem of perception and his solution to the problem of objectless presentations. The problem of perception lies at the root of Husserl's later correlative theory of intentionality. Intentionality was supposed to be a relation between the mental act or *noesis* and an intentional correlate, the *noema*.

Husserl's solution to the problem of objectless presentations, on the other hand, implies that intentionality is not a relation but a certain property of the objective content or meaning-aspect of mental acts. The correlative conception is more suitable for a description of perception. It seems plain that in perception we are related to the perceived object. It might be that the other conception of intentionality, as the possibility to fulfil certain logical functions, is more adequate for an analysis of the meanings of expressions. But since Husserl took over from Brentano the idea that intentionality is a defining characteristic of consciousness, and that it consequently must be one and the same thing in all mental acts, he had a tendency to generalize from a conception of intentionality which suits only specific examples to a general theory of intentionality. The effect of this craving for generality was inconsistency.

The tension between the two conceptions of intentionality in the *Investigations* most clearly comes to the surface where Husserl discusses the method of phenomenological description. If one accepts the correlative theory of intentionality, a description of mental acts will not be possible without taking into account the object of the act as such; it will be a "correlative analysis". In fact, Husserl's descriptions of mental acts in the *Investigations* often conform to this rule. Where he analyses for instance the verification of meaning-intentions by acts of perception (*Erfüllung*) he now describes the situation from the point of view of the mental acts and then from the point of view of the intended object.¹⁰⁸ The same holds for his characterization of the difference between signs and images or pictures. Husserl first describes the difference between the relation of sign and referent on the one hand and the relation of image or picture and its original on the other, and then goes on to analyze the corresponding internal differences between the mental acts.¹⁰⁹ Finally the description of perception and the description of the perceptual phenomenon constituted by the act of perception are most intimately connected with each other.¹¹⁰

In the first edition of the *Investigations*, however, the non-relational conception of intentionality, which was the outcome of the analysis

of the problem of objectless presentations, was Husserl's "official" view. He stresses at several places that the intended object need not exist, and that, consequently, intentionality is (not a relation but) a property of mental acts. Phenomenological description, therefore, should be restricted to the mental acts, and not take in account the object at all:

In phenomenological treatment, objectivity counts as nothing: in general, it transcends the act If one now asks how something nonexistent or transcendent can be the intentional object in an act in which it has no being, one can only give the answer we gave above, which is also a wholly sufficient one, . . . : the object is an intentional object: this means there is an act having a determinate intention, and determinate in a way which makes it an intention towards this object. This 'reference to an object' belongs intrinsically to an act-experience, and the experiences manifesting it are (by definition) intentional experiences or acts. *All differences in mode of objective reference are descriptive differences in the relevant intentional experiences.*¹¹¹

The difficulty which now arises in the first edition of the *Investigations* is to reconcile the factual descriptions of mental acts, in which Husserl all too often refers to the intended objects as such, with his official doctrine that intentionality is a characteristic of mental acts and not a relation, and that a phenomenological description of mental acts should be restricted to the acts themselves. Husserl does so, in the *Introduction* to the second volume of the *Investigations*, by reducing the necessity of referring to the intended objects to a purely terminological difficulty:

In addition to this difficulty of reaching firm results, capable of being self-evidently reidentified on many occasions, we have the further difficulty of *stating such results, of communicating them to others*. Completely self-evident truths, established by the most exact analysis, must be expounded by way of expressions whose rich variety does not compensate for the fact that they only fit familiar natural objects, while the subjective experiences can be directly referred to only by way of a few highly ambiguous words such as 'sensation', 'perception', 'presentation' etc. One has, further, to employ expressions which stand for what is intended in such acts, for the object to which they are directed, since it is, in fact, impossible to describe intentional acts without using expressions which denote the objects intended in these acts. We need the expressions we are accustomed to use for the intended object in order to coin artificial expressions by means of which we very indirectly characterize the correlated acts and their descriptive differences.¹¹²

In the second edition, however, Husserl adhered to the relational view of consciousness which he adopted from 1907 onwards. He therefore changed the last part of this text as follows:

. . . it is, in fact, impossible to describe intentional acts without using expressions which recur to the things to which such acts refer. One then readily forgets that such

subsidiarily described objectivity, which is necessarily introduced into almost all phenomenological description, has undergone a change of sense, in virtue of which it now belongs to the sphere of phenomenology.¹¹³

He now clearly acknowledges, as the relational view of intentionality implies, that the phenomenological description should "move in two directions": apart from the description of the mental acts (noetic phenomenology), a description of the intended objects as such (noematic phenomenology) is needed. But as Husserl adapted only a part of the texts in the *Investigations* to his new conception, the second edition is incoherent on this point.¹¹⁴

I want to conclude this essay by raising a question which is of central importance for the understanding of Husserl's philosophical development. Why did Husserl, in the first edition of the *Investigations*, prefer the *non-relational* conception of intentionality? And why did nevertheless the *correlative* conception prevail from 1907 onward, a fact which makes the text of the second edition so ambiguous? As I have treated this problem elsewhere at greater length,¹¹⁵ I shall merely sketch the outlines of an answer here. Central to this answer is Husserl's Cartesian notion of epistemology, a notion which once again became popular towards the end of the last century and was adhered to by many of Husserl's contemporaries. Husserl carefully distinguishes epistemology from both psychology as an explanatory science and metaphysics. Whereas psychology might try to explain the genesis of our knowledge, epistemology tries to answer the *quaestio iuris* of how and under which conditions valid science is possible.¹¹⁶ Metaphysics, on the other hand, has the task of determining, on the basis of the results of the empirical sciences, the factual nature of reality: whether it exists independently of our sensations, whether it consists of atoms only or of mental substances as well, etc.¹¹⁷

Epistemology, interpreted as a discipline which investigates the possibility of knowledge in general, cannot, so one argued, presuppose this very possibility. It should be a presuppositionless science, or else it would suffer from a vicious circularity. But this principle of presuppositionlessness for epistemological research, Husserl argued in section seven of the *Introduction* to Vol. II of the *Investigations*, can only mean that one should not presuppose *doubtful* knowledge. The inner perception of our own mental life is, however, not doubtful in any way, just as Brentano had taught, renewing the Cartesian tradition.¹¹⁸ So epistemological research ought not to make any assumptions which cannot be confirmed by inner perception of mental events, or by "phenomenological reflection".¹¹⁹

One might ask, however, how epistemology practiced on this Cartesian basis will be able to answer the very question which demands an answer from a theory of knowledge, namely: how is objectively valid knowledge possible? For the validity of knowledge seems to consist in a certain relation between propositions or mental acts on the one hand and objects or states of affairs on the other, a relation which, at least in part, seems to have an intentional nature. If the basis of the study of epistemology ought to be restricted to inner perception of mental acts, it seems to be impossible to investigate the intentional relationship between mental acts and their objects. It is on this point that Husserl's analysis of objectless presentations provides a solution. Husserl conclud-

ed from this analysis that intentionality is not a relation. "Intentional directedness towards an object" is nothing but a certain characteristic of the objective meaning-contents of mental acts, a property which can be studied by inner perception. Accordingly, Husserl preferred the non-relational conception of intentionality in the *Investigations*, because it seemed to show how epistemological research on the basis of the principle of presuppositionlessness is possible. This connection between the non-relational view of intentionality and the project of a presuppositionless epistemology appears clearly in the following text from the *Introduction* to Vol. II of the *Investigations* (first edition):

An epistemological investigation that can seriously claim to be scientific must, it has often been emphasized, satisfy the *principle of freedom from presuppositions*. This principle, we think, only seeks to express the strict exclusion of all assumptions not permitting of a comprehensive phenomenological realization. Every epistemological investigation that we carry out must have its pure foundation in phenomenology. The 'theory' that it aspires to is no more than a thinking over, a coming to an evident understanding of, thinking and knowing as such and of the question in what consists its claim to be objectively valid. . . . If such a 'thinking over' of the meaning of knowledge is itself to yield, not mere opinion, but the evident knowledge it strictly demands, it must be purely founded on an actual *given* basis of experiences of thinking and knowing. That acts of thought at times refer to transcendent, even to non-existent and impossible objects, is not to the case. For such direction to objects, such presentation and meaning of an object which is not phenomenologically realized, is of cause a descriptive feature of the experiences in question, whose sense it should be possible to fix and clarify by considering the experiences themselves. In no other way would it be possible.¹²⁰

The idea that we might investigate the epistemological problem (what exactly is the claim of correctness that knowledge intrinsically has) by a mere descriptive analysis of mental acts (phenomenology, or, what is according to the first edition identical with it: descriptive psychology) has a crucial influence on this descriptive analysis itself. For according to Husserl the claim of correctness of a statement is in fact the same as the claim that certain meaning-intentions might be "fulfilled" by a perception of the object to which the statement refers. Consequently, epistemology has to analyze this process of "fulfilment" and of perceiving objects without studying these objects themselves, by a mere description of mental acts. But this will be impossible in principle unless the object, with all the properties and characteristics we perceive or ascribe to it, is somehow reflected in the act, so that we could discover what the perceived object is like by describing these mental reflections. Thus, Husserl's solution of the paradox of how a Cartesian epistemology is possible, suggests a methodological principle for the description of mental acts, a principle which he nowhere in the *Investigations* formulates *expressis verbis*, but which we might call the *principle of methodological correlativity*.¹²¹ It is the principle that, corresponding to all characteristics and properties we perceive or otherwise "intend" when our consciousness is directed towards an object, there must be immanent characteristics of the mental act. Consequently, we should be able, by

describing these immanent characteristics, to determine exactly the nature of the object which is intended by the act. Thus Husserl assumes that the immanent "matter" of a mental act not only determines which object is intended, but also "in what sense", "with which properties, relations and categorial forms" it is intended.¹²² Similarly, he assumes that all sensible qualities of a perceived object have an "immanent" counterpart in the mental act of perception: the corresponding "sensations" (*Empfindungen*).¹²³

We may conclude that Husserl's Cartesian conception of epistemology forced him in the *Investigations* to adopt a generalized non-relational notion of intentionality, a notion which was developed as a solution to the problem of objectless presentations. This conception in its turn implies a methodological principle for the analysis of mental acts, a principle which functions as an implicit guiding presupposition of the phenomenology of the *Logical Investigations*. In 1907 Husserl abandoned the strictly Cartesian conception of epistemology.¹²⁴ He then realized that the "intended object as such" is as undoubtedly given as the mental act itself, and that the restriction of epistemological analysis to the domain of the "really immanent" was a "fatal mistake".¹²⁵ Epistemology should study the noetic-noematic correlation. In 1907 the correlative conception of intentionality, which Husserl had developed on the occasion of his analysis of perception, gained a final victory and was generalized to all mental acts. It transformed Husserl's conception of epistemology and its victory was one of the many steps on Husserl's "long and thorny" road towards transcendental idealism.¹²⁶

ENDNOTES

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¹ Cf. Theodore de Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), 3-121; especially 97-114.

² In O. Kraus, *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1919), 153-54.

³ Cf. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", *Logos* 1 (1911), 289 and *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), part one.

⁴ *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Logische und psychologische Untersuchungen*, erster Band (Halle a.d. Saale: C.E.M. Pfeffer, 1891; re-edited as vol. XII of the *Husserliana*-edition, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

⁵ Cf. the impressive study of De Boer, to which I am greatly indebted (note 1).

⁶ Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874) (ed. by O. Kraus, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1924 and 1925; translat-

ed by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister as *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, London: Routledge, 1973). I shall refer to the German edition as PES and to the translation as *Psychology*.

⁷ *Logische Untersuchungen* (Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1900, 1901; second and later editions: Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1913, 1921; translated by J.N. Findlay from the text of the second edition as *Logical Investigations*, London: Routledge, 1970). Since Husserl tried in the second edition to adapt the *Logical Investigations* to the stage of his philosophy reached in 1913, it is necessary to distinguish between the first and the later editions of the book. I shall refer to the first German edition as LU A, to the second (and later) German editions as LU B, and to Findlay's translation as LI.

⁸ De Boer stresses the importance of the conception of consciousness as "interpretative" or "meaning-giving" in relation to the development of the concept of intentionality. Cf. *Op. Cit.* (note 1), 13-17, 130-41, 166-70.

⁹ The other criteria are: mental phenomena are said to be presentations (*Vorstellungen*) or to be founded upon presentations; they appear to be without spatial extension; they are objects of inner perception, that is, the only kind of perception which is really trustworthy, so that we know that mental phenomena really exist (in contradistinction to physical phenomena, of which this knowledge is *strictu sensu* impossible) and all mental phenomena we perceive have a characteristic unity, the "unity of consciousness" (PES, 2. Buch, 1. Kap.).

¹⁰ *Psychology*, 88. The German text reads: "Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden." (PES, 1. Band, 124-25).

¹¹ Cf. De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 6.

¹² Cf. for a recent discussion of similar questions: Robert Richardson, "Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65 (1983), 250-82.

¹³ Cf. PES, Einleitung des Herausgebens, xxiv-xxv.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, xxv-xxvi and PES, 2. Band, 134 (*Psychology*, 271-72).

¹⁵ Cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Judgement and Proposition, From Descartes to Kant* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983), 9-35. Richardson (cf. note 12) does not take into account these differences between the various Scholastic positions.

¹⁶ Thus, for instance, Petrus Aureolus. Cf. Nuchelmans, *Op. Cit.*, 22-23.

¹⁷ Cf. Nuchelmans, *Op. Cit.*, 26-28.

¹⁸ One might think that there is no difference between the mental-act theory and the Thomistic position, for what else is a mental act than the actualization of a Form? But the Scholastics themselves made a distinction between the two positions.

¹⁹ Nuchelmans, *Op. Cit.*, 12-13; De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 40-46.

²⁰ This tendency is already apparent in the work of Descartes, but it is counterbalanced by an attempt to retain the *modus essendi* theory. The British Empiricists dropped the Cartesian distinction between the (intellectual) *idea* and a mental image (Descartes himself sometimes uses 'idea' for mental image, for instance in the third *Meditation*, AT, IX, 27-28, 29, 30, 31, 32 &c.) and considered impressions and ideas to be the objects of perception and thought. But even in Berkeley we find sometimes reminiscences of the *modi essendi* theory, for instance in the Third *Dialogue*, ed. Luce and Jessop, 237. I shall use the expression 'corpuscular philosophy', common in the 17th century, throughout this paper in a wide sense, to denote any theory which makes a distinction between "real" or "primary" qualities of matter, and secondary qualities which are merely apparent properties of material objects.

²¹ PES, 1. Buch 1. Kap., Section 2 (Band I, 13).

²² *Ibid.*, 13-14. Cf. 2. Buch, 1.Kap., section 7 and section 9.

²³ PES, 2. Buch, 1.Kap., section 7, 129; *Psychology*, 92.

²⁴ This seems to be the interpretation of De Boer, Cf. *Op. Cit.*, 40-46.

²⁵ PES, 2. Buch, 1.Kap., section 7. Cf. the introduction by Kraus to PES, section v.

²⁶ PES, *Einl.*, lxxv-lxxvii, lxxv-lxxvi.

²⁷ Cf. PES, 2. Buch, 1.Kap., section 6 and *Einl.*, lxiv-lxv, lxxii-lxxiii, lxxiv.

²⁸ PES, 2. Buch, 1. Kap., sections 6-7, 9; 2. Buch, 3. Kap., section 2; 1. Buch, 1. Kap., sections 2, 3.

²⁹ Brentano generally uses the expression *Phänomen* as equivalent to 'states', 'processes' and 'events' (PES, lxxviii and 15). But the sensed physical qualities, being non-existent, are phenomena in quite another sense: they are *merely* phenomenal (*blosse Phänomene*) and often the expression 'physical phenomenon' is used in the sense of what only appears to exist. Given this ambiguity, the heated debate about what is "really" meant by the term 'physical phenomena' (cf. for instance the article by Richardson referred to in note 12) is somewhat spurious. What is denoted by the term depends on the context, as Kraus wisely observes. Cf. PES, *Einl.* section vi and 1. Buch, 1. Kap., sections 2, 3.

³⁰ PES, 1. Buch, 1. Kap., section 3; 2. Buch, 1. Kap., section 9.

³¹ *Psychology*, 98-99. The German text reads: "jene Wissenschaft, welche die Aufeinanderfolge der physischen Phänomene normaler und reiner (durch keine besonderen psychischen Zustände und Vorgänge mit beeinflusster) Sensationen auf Grund der Annahme der Einwirkung einer

raumähnlich in drei Dimensionen ausgebreiteten und zeitähnlich in einer Richtung verlaufenden Welt auf unsere Sinnesorgane zu erklären suche." (PES, 1. Band, 138)

- ³² This background is neglected by Richardson (cf. note 12).
- ³³ Cf. *Meditations*, A.T. IX, 28-32, cf. A.T. VII, 181 and letter to Gibieuf, 19-1-1642, A.T. III, 476; 369, cf. also A.T. IX, 81-4.
- ³⁴ LU B II/1, 348-52, 369, 374, 383, 392-94, 507; II/2, 77-79, 234.
- ³⁵ Cf. PES, the introduction by Kraus, section v.
- ³⁶ De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 18-21 adduces other arguments for this interpretation of Husserl's doctrine.
- ³⁷ The textual evidence in the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* is rather weak. In Chapter 3, section 3, Husserl seems to subscribe to the view of J.S. Mill that the objects of consciousness "form parts" of states of consciousness (HUA XII, 66, 73 n. 1) and he often says that the objects are "in" consciousness (cf. HUA XII, 22-23, 24, 27, 39, 69, 72 and *passim*). The general term for objects of consciousness is the ambiguous 'Inhalt' (*passim*). But Husserl never clearly states in the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* what these expressions are supposed to mean. The most explicit textual evidence is to be found in the paper on *Intentionale Gegenstände* (1894), HUA XXII, 326: "Es verhielte sich ähnlich wie bei den Begriffen sinnlicher Qualitäten: Im Phantasma eines roten Gegenstandes existiert rote Farbe wahrhaft, auch wenn in äusserer Wirklichkeit ein rotes Ding und somit auch die individuell ihm einwohnende Röte nicht existierte." Cf. Also note 55.
- ³⁸ At first sight, for if we want to be consistent, we have to admit that the first kind of analysis is a special case of the latter: the physiologist, in analyzing the bodily processes of another human being, would in reality be analyzing his own sensations, if only under the hypothesis that these sensations are "signs" of an independently existing reality.
- ³⁹ The corpuscular philosopher (Boyle, Locke, Hume) would complain that the common man confuses impressions with real things. But on the basis of this very "confusion" Berkeley could argue that the impressions are all there is to physical reality, and that his "idealism" is more agreeable to common-sense than the corpuscular philosophy.
- ⁴⁰ E. Husserl, "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik", *Philosophische Monatshefte* 30 (1894), 159-91, re-edited in *Husserliana* XXII, 92-123, and translated into English by P. McCormick and R. Hudson, "Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic" in P. McCormick and F. Elliston, *Husserl, Shorter Works* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). All references are to the first German edition, indicated by PSL.
- ⁴¹ Brentano, PES, 2. Buch, 9. Kap., section 2.
- ⁴² Cf. PES, *Einl.* Kraus, Band 1, xlvii. Brentano acknowledged various differences between modes of presentation, like presentations *recto* and presentations *obliquo*. But he never allowed that a new mode of con-

consciousness is able to "constitute" a new kind of object, as Husserl contended in the *Investigations*.

43 PSL, 159.

44 PSL, 178.

45 *Ibid.*

46 Husserl in PSL identifies *Anschauung* with paying attention to an immanent content. In the *Investigations* he sees that one cannot define a class of mental acts by the mental function of paying attention, for most mental acts admit of both attentive and inattentive modes. Cf. 4th *Investigation*, Section 1g.

47 PSL, 168-71, 174.

48 It is misleading to say that Husserl noticed the occurrence of representations mainly in connection with understanding, language, or consciousness of signs in general (cf. De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 13-7). In PSL, Husserl's first examples are taken from perception. And elsewhere (*Husserliana* XXII, 452) he says that the analysis of perception forced him to elaborate the distinction between "proper presentations" (*eigentliche Vorstellungen* or *Anschauungen*) and "improper presentations" (*Repräsentationen*). It is true, however, that in the *Investigations* Husserl uses expressions like 'interpretation', borrowed from the description of language, in his general characterization of the representative function of consciousness. (Cf. first *Investigation*, section 23; in the second edition Husserl often substituted 'Apperzeption' or 'Auffassung' for 'Interpretation' or 'Deutung' in the first edition: cf. LU A II, 704-5).

49 5th *Investigation*, section 11.

50 PSL, 182. Cf. 5th *Investigation*, section 14, LU B II/1, 384.

51 PSL II, section 7.

52 De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 13-17, 130-41 and 166-70.

53 PSL II, section 3.

54 PSL, 159-60, 178.

55 e.g., PSL, 169 and 170. The ambiguity of the expression 'immanent content' (*immanenter* or *repräsentierender Inhalt*) is obvious in a footnote to Husserl's review of Twardowski's *On the Content and Object of Presentations* (1894), *Husserliana* XXII, 350 (1898): "Der repräsentierende Inhalt kann zum repräsentierten Gegenstand in mannigfachen Beziehungen stehen. Er kann ihm innerlich fremd sein (z.B. Wortzeichen), er kann ein Teil, eine 'Seite' des Gegenstandes sein (so bei der äusseren Wahrnehmung im gemeinen Sinn) oder auch ihm ganz oder einer Seite nach ähnlich sein (äussere Phantasie). . . . Der Inhalt als solcher ist ein individuelles, psychisches Datum, ein jetzt und hier Seiendes . . . Der Inhalt wohnt der Vorstellung real ein, . . . Wir haben danach bei einer Vorstellung, und zwar bei jeder, zu unterscheiden: I. den *realen, psychologischen Gehalt*, und zwar a) den repräsentierenden Akt, b) den

repräsentierenden Inhalt, II. den idealen, logischen Gehalt, und zwar a) die Bedeutung, b) den Gegenstand." Cf. also LU A II, 197, 337, 706-7.

⁵⁶ PSL, 168.

⁵⁷ PSL, 184; cf. *Husserliana* XXII, footnote 350.

⁵⁸ Cf. 5th *Investigation*, sections 2 and 14; 6th *Investigation* (B), sections 14b, 21, 22; cf. also *Ideas* I, sections 41, 44, 68, 84, 86, 97, 98, 135.

⁵⁹ See especially 6th *Investigation* (B) sections 14b, 22 and 37. Also LU B II/1, 76, 194-5, 197, 199 and 349.

⁶⁰ The impression (*Empfindung*) is said to be *reell-immanent* in contradistinction to the perceived object which is the *intentional* content of consciousness. Cf. LU B II/1, 348-52, 369, 374, 383, 392-94, 507 and II/2, 77-9, 234. Impressions are mental phenomena similar to non-intentional feelings. Cf. 5th *Investigation*, section 15b. See for Husserl's identification of *Empfindung* and *Abschattung* LU B II/2, 57, 59, 78-9, 117; and note 59.

⁶¹ Cf. for an extensive analysis of the theory of perception in the *Investigations* and the paradoxes it contains: H. Philipse, *De fundering van de logica in Husserl's 'Logische Untersuchungen'* (Leiden; Labor Vincit, 1983), 162-84.

⁶² LI II, 688. The German text reads: "dass wir einen gewissen Belauf von Erlebnissen aus der Klasse Empfindung haben, sinnlich vereinheitlicht in ihrer so und so bestimmten Aneinanderreihung und durchgeistigt von einem gewissen, ihnen objectiven Sinn verleihenden Aktcharakter der 'Auffassung'. Dieser Aktcharakter macht es, dass uns ein *Gegenstand*, eben dieses Tintenfass, in der Weise der Wahrnehmung erscheint." (LU B II/2, 24-5).

⁶³ Husserl uses the term 'constitution' or 'to constitute' in the *Investigations* on LU B II/1, 145, 165, 247, 423-4, 473 and II/2, 25, 145-6, 158, 160, 175, 176-7, 179, 180, 181, 183 and 200. For the interpretation of the term see H. Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, (note 61), 221-4.

⁶⁴ Cf. A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la Philosophie* (12th ed., Paris, 1976), 840; H. von Helmholtz, *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik*, (2. Aufl., 1896), 586; E. von Hartmann, *Grundriss der Erkenntnislehre, System der Philosophie im Grundriss*, Bd. I (Bad Sachsa im Harz, 1907), 64, 72-5.

⁶⁵ LU B II/1, 75-6, 128, 129, 194-5, 197, 199, 220, 247, 248-9, 369, 374, 381, 382, 385; II/2, 234 ff.

⁶⁶ David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre have argued, in *Husserl and Intentionality* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982), that Husserl's *noema* is an abstract meaning entity like Frege's *Sinne*, and that it is not on the object side of intention (153-94). This interpretation is difficult to reconcile with texts like section 88 of *Ideas I* and the argument is inconclusive for other reasons as well, as L.J. Carr observed (*Husserl Studies* I (1984), 118-120). Nevertheless, one might ask why there are so many texts which seem to support their interpretation. I suggest that

the answer is the same as the one given in section VI of this paper in connection with the *Investigations*: phenomenological key-concepts like intentionality and *noema* have an ambivalent nature, due to the fact that Husserl used them in solving problems in fields as different as perception and semantics. Consequently, each interpretation which overlooks this ambiguity and its genetic roots will be open to the objection that it does not fit all the texts. Cf. Also J. Hintikka and Ch.W. Harvey in *Husserl Studies I* (1984), 207-11.

⁶⁷ Russell wrote reviews of works of Meinong in *Mind* between 1899 (*Mind* VIII (1899), 251-6) and 1907 (*Mind* XVI (1907), 436-9). Especially the analysis of Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions (*Mind* XIII (1904), 204-19, 336-54 and 509-24) is important as a background to 'On Denoting' (*Mind* XIV (1905), 479-93).

⁶⁸ *Husserliana* Bd. XXII, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen*, edited by Bernhard Rang (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 303-38. References are to HUA XXII.

⁶⁹ B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre, Versuch einer ausführlichen und grösstenteils neuen Darstellung der Logik* (Sulzbach: 1837), I. Band, 304ff. (section 67).

⁷⁰ HUA XXII, xxxi, 303, 420.

⁷¹ HUA XXII, 305. Husserl gave a devastating criticism of the view that the meaning of an expression consists in a mental image in Chapter 2 of the first *Logical Investigation*.

⁷² HUA XXII, 305-06, 330, 353 (footnote), 420. In the *Investigations* Husserl forcefully states that the "real" and the "intentional" object are identical: LU B II/1, 425, 372-73.

⁷³ HUA XXII, 306.

⁷⁴ Cf. LU BII/1, 422 (appendix to sections 11 and 20 of the fifth *Investigation*).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, LU B II/1, 423

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, LU BII/1, 422-23. Similar objections can be raised against the view that the mental entity is not a picture but a sign of an outer reality, a view corpuscular philosophers like Descartes and Brentano were compelled to adopt.

⁷⁷ HUA XXII, 310-11, 457-58. Cf. Russell, 'On Denoting', *Mind* XIV (1905), 483.

⁷⁸ Kasimir Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, eine psychologische Untersuchung* (Wien: A. Hölder, 1894). Translated into English by R. Grossmann as *On the Content and Object of Presentations* (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1977). References are to the translation.

⁷⁹ A. Hoefler and A. Meinong, *Logik* (Wien: 1890), section 6. Cf. Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, 1-2.

- ⁸⁰ Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, sections 1 and 12.
- ⁸¹ Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, section 4.
- ⁸² Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, 27.
- ⁸³ Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, 22.
- ⁸⁴ Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, 22-23.
- ⁸⁵ Twardowski, *Op. Cit.*, 24. Cf. the introduction of Grossmann to the translation, section 2.
- ⁸⁶ Posthumously published in *Husserliana* XXII (1979, cf. note 68), 349-56. The review was intended for publication in the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, but was not published because another review of Twardowski's book by Natorp was already type-set when Natorp received Husserl's contribution. Cf. B. Rang, introduction to HUA XXII, xxix.
- ⁸⁷ HUA XXII, 349-50 (footnote); cf. first *Investigation*, Chapter 2. If one compares what Husserl wrote in 1896 with the text of the first *Investigation*, one cannot but doubt the trustworthiness of "inner perception" which, according to Husserl, excludes any uncertainty as to the correctness of phenomenological descriptions. For one reads in the footnote on 350 of HUA XXII (1896): "Dass jeder bedeutsame Ausdruck in normaler Funktion gewisse überall bleibende Inhalte (neben jenen wechselnden) mit sich führen müsse, ohne welche kein Verständnis möglich sei, und die daher als 'Inhalt' der bez. Vorstellung in einem prägnanteren Sinne gefasst werden können--halte ich für eine psychologische Fiktion". But the conception he rejected in 1896 is the very conception he defends in the *Logical Investigations*, also appealing to the "self-evidence" of what is given in "inner perception". Husserl in 1896 assumed the existence of "ideal" meanings, but he did not yet conceive of the relation between these meanings and the corresponding mental acts as the relation between a universal and its corresponding particulars (*Logical Investigations*). This conforms to Husserl's later description of his development in his review of M. Palagyi, *Der Streit der Psychologen und Formalisten in der modernen Logik*, in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 31 (1903), 290 (= HUA XXII, 156-57; translated into English by D. Willard, "A Reply to a Critic of My Refutation of Logical Psychologism", in P. McCormick and F. Elliston, Husserl: *Shorter Works* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)).
- ⁸⁸ HU XXII, 308: "eine blosse Wiederholung der Schwierigkeiten . . . , nur mit anderen Worten". Moreover, Twardowski's conception does not admit of an answer to the natural question whether an object which "merely intentionally" exists is "presented" in the attributive or in the modifying sense of the term. Cf. Rang, HUA XXII, xxxiv-v.
- ⁸⁹ Husserl does not even admit this: "Wie aber der scheinbare Widerstreit der beiden Wahrheiten aufzulösen ist, davon merken wir nichts" (HUA XXII, 308).
- ⁹⁰ HUA XXII, 309-10, 330; cf. 352, footnote. Here again, Ryle's dictum is confirmed that "The human mind . . . is traditionally the 'Pending' tray for theorists' unanswered letters" (*Dilemmas*, Cambridge: 1954, 83). Note that to say of an object that it is "merely intentional" (*bloss in-*

tendiert) may mean two different things in the early Husserl and in the *Investigations*. If used in contrast to an object of which we are aware by *Anschaung*, it means that the object is *merely represented*. If used, however, in comparison with an object which "really exists", it means that we refer to a non-existent entity. Examples of the first usage are to be found on HUA XXII, 334 and LU B II/1, 314, 425; for examples of the second usage see HUA XXII, 315 and LU B II/1, 56 and 378. Husserl compares the two senses on HUA XXII, 333-35; cf. Rang, HUA XXII, xlix-li. (NB: the two senses of intentionality Rang here discusses are *not* the two concepts of intentionality distinguished in this paper!).

91 HUA XXII, 311. Cf. 313 and 350 (footnote).

92 HUA XXII, 314-15.

93 HUA XXII, 318-28, 336. Husserl's theory has its limitations. It is doubtful whether all "objectless presentations" may fulfill the role of the subject-expression in a true predication or identification. Predications of 'the present King of France' (anno 1905 or during another king-less period) are either held to be false (Russell) or to be neither true nor false (Strawson). Further, Husserl's theory seems to reduce false affirmative existential propositions to a peculiar kind of tautologies, which as a consequence would be *true!* According to Husserl, 'Zeus exists' would be equivalent to: 'If Greek mythology is true, Zeus exists'. Even if we might perhaps mean this by the assertion, Homer certainly would have given a different interpretation of it.

94 Cf. HUA XXII, 315.

95 Cf. HUA XXII, 303, 311-12, 333, 349-50 (footnote); cf. also note 87.

96 Cf. first *Investigation*, sections 11, 14, 17-23, 30-35; fifth *Investigation*, section 21 and sixth *Investigation*, section 28. This *noetic* theory of meaning is the predecessor of Husserl's later *noematic* theory.

97 'a property of the content, which is called the presentation of or reference to an object': HUA XXII, 317-18, 338.

98 HUA XXII, 332-33.

99 My translation. The German text reads: "Als ein Hauptergebnis der Betrachtungen des letzten Kapitels dürfen wir die Erkenntnis bezeichnen, dass in der Tat, so wie wir es vermutet hatten, die Bedeutung allein die innere und wesentliche Bestimmung der Vorstellung, ist, während die *gegenständliche Beziehung auf gewisse Wahrheits- bzw. Urteilszusammenhänge* hinweist, in die sich die Bedeutung eingliedert . . ." (HUA XXII, 336).

100 My translation. The German text reads: "die Beziehung auf den Gegenstand (wird) bei jeder (subjektiven) Vorstellung vermittelt durch ihren 'Inhalt', d.i. ihre Bedeutung. (. . .) und so werden wir darauf hingewiesen, dass der objective Gehalt eines Vorstellungserlebnisses nicht etwa eine innere Einheit ist, in welche Bedeutung und gegenständliche Beziehung als zwei 'Seiten' oder Komponenten eingehen, sondern dass der objective Gehalt primär, an und für sich, nichts anderes ist als die Bedeutung, während der gegenständliche Gehalt der Vorstellung auf gewisse Beschaffenheiten ihrer Bedeutung hindeutet, auf gewisse objec-

tiv geltende Zusammenhänge, in die sich die bezügliche Bedeutung eingliedert" (HUA XXII, 337-38).

¹⁰¹ Cf. fifth *Investigation*, sections 10, 11, 20 appendix.

¹⁰² Cf. first *Investigation*, sections 15.2 and 9. This holds even for perception; according to the *Investigations* (and Husserl's later work) the "interpretation", "apperception" or "apprehension" of sense-data constitutes for us (the reference to) the perceived object. Cf. first *Investigation*, section 23; fifth *Investigation*, sections 2, 14, 15b, appendix to sections 11 and 20; sixth *Investigation*, sections 6, 25-27 and appendix, section 4.

¹⁰³ Husserl calls this principle in the *Investigations* "the principle of presuppositionlessness of epistemological investigations" (Introduction to vol II, section 7). In *Ideas I* it is called "the principle of principles" (section 24).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, (note 61), 3-6.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. for the reasons Husserl had for presenting his philosophy in this misleading manner, Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, 153-84.

¹⁰⁶ Appendix to sections 11 and 20 of the fifth *Investigation*, LU B II/1, 421-25.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, cf. 5th *Investigation*, sections 2, 11, 14, 16. Nevertheless, Husserl's concept of *Empfindung* as a mental element is a relic of these rejected theories. Although Husserl stresses that the *Empfindung* is not the object meant in perception, he also contends that perception is an "interpretation" of these sense-data.

¹⁰⁸ LU B II/2, 33, 38, 52, 59, 64, 122-23; cf. De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 183-87.

¹⁰⁹ LU B II/2, 53-6, 92-3.

¹¹⁰ LU B II/1, *passim*; e.g., 372, 377, 473.

¹¹¹ LI II, 587, translation adapted to the text of A. The German text reads: "Für die phänomenologische Betrachtung ist die Gegenständlichkeit selbst nichts; sie ist ja, allgemein zu reden, dem Acte transscendent. . . . Fragt man nun, wie is zu verstehen sei, dass das Nichtseiende oder Transscendent in einem Acte, in welchem is garnicht ist, als intentionaler Gegenstand gelten könne, so giebt es darauf keine andere Antwort als diese eine und in der Tat voll ausreichende, . . . der Gegenstand ist in intentionaler, das heisst, es ist ein Act da mit einer bestimmt charakterisierten Intention, dir in dieser Bestimmtheit eben das ausmacht, was wir die Intention auf diesen Gegenstand nennen. Das sich auf den Gegenstand Beziehen ist eine erlebbare Eigenthümlichkeit, und die Erlebnisse, die sie zeigen, heissen (nach Definition) intentionale Erlebnisse oder Acte. Alle Unterschiede in der Weise der gegenständliche Beziehung sind descriptive Unterschiede der bezüglichen intentionalen Erlebnisse" (LU A II, 387-88, cf. B II/1, 412-13).

¹¹² LI I, 255-56, translation adapted to the text of A. The German text reads: Der Schwierigkeit der Gewinnung haltbarer, in wiederholter Identificirung evidenter Ergebnisse steht zur Seite die Schwierigkeit ihrer

Darstellung und ihrer *Uebermittlung an Andere*. Was nach genauester Analyse mit vollster Evidenz festgestellt worden ist, soll mit Ausdrücken dargestellt werden, die mit weitreichender Differenzierung nur der primären Objectivität angemessen sind, während die subjectiven Erlebnisse direct nur mittelst ein paar sehr vieldeutiger Worte wie Empfindung, Wahrnehmung, Vorstellung u. dgl. bezeichnet werden können. Und daneben muss man sich mit Ausdrücken behelfen, die das in diesen Acten Intentionale, die Gegenständlichkeit, worauf sie sich richten, benennen. Es ist schlechterdings nicht möglich, die meinenden Acte zu beschreiben, ohne im Ausdruck auf die gemeinten Sachen zu recurriren. Wir bedürfen der uns geläufigen Ausdrücke für das Gegenständliche zur Herstellung umschreibender Ausdrücke, in welchen wir sehr indirecte Hindeutungen auf die entsprechenden Acte und ihre descriptiven Unterschiede vollziehen" (LU A II, p. 11).

¹¹³ Adapted from LI, I, 256. The German text: "Es ist schlechterdings nicht möglich, die meinenden Akte zu beschreiben, ohne im Ausdruck auf die gemeinten Sachen zu recurriren. Und wie leicht wird dabei übersehen, dass diese mitbeschriebene und in fast allen phänomenologischen Deskriptionen notwendig mitheranzuziehende 'Gegenständigkeit' eine Sinnesmodifikation angenommen hat, in der sie eben selbst zur phänomenologischen Sphäre gehört" (LU B II/1, 11).

¹¹⁴ Cf. the following pages in B with the corresponding pages in A: B II/1, 198 (A II, 196); B II/1, 397 (note) (A II, 374); B II/2, 235-36 (A II, 707-08).

¹¹⁵ Cf. Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, (note 61), 153-230.

¹¹⁶ LU B I: 205-06 (*Prolegomena*, section 55); cf. Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, 155-56 and 162-84.

¹¹⁷ LU A I, 11; II, 20, 21; LU B II/1, 20-21; LU A II, 338-39; cf. also Husserl's "Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-1899, Erster Artikel", *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* 9 (1903), 120 (= HUA XXII, 168-69), and Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, 156-59.

¹¹⁸ Brentano, PES, 2. Buch, 1. Kapitel, section 6; Kapitel 3, section 2.

¹¹⁹ LU A II, 19. In the first edition, Husserl did not make a distinction between phenomenological reflection and inner perception. The trustworthiness of inner perception is said to be the basis of phenomenological descriptions. Cf. A II, 196-97, 374-75, 412, 711-12. Phenomenology is said to be identical with "descriptive psychology" (A II, 18). In 1903 Husserl saw that this identification is misleading, for psychology presupposes that mental phenomena are part of the world, whereas for epistemology the existence of the world is not self-evident ("Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-99, dritter Artikel", *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* 9 (1903), 398-400; HUA XXII, 205-08; cf. LU B I, xiii-xiv). But this was only a first step towards the re-interpretation of consciousness effected in transcendental idealism. Cf. Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, (note 61), 184-229).

¹²⁰ Adapted from LI I, 263, in order to render the text of A, which reads in German: "Eine erkenntnis-theoretische Untersuchung, die ernstlichen Anspruch auf Wissenschaftlichkeit erhebt, muss, wie man schon oft betont hat, dem *Princip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit* genügen. Das

Princip kann aber unseres Erachtens nicht mehr besagen wollen als den Ausschluss aller Annahmen, die nicht phänomenologisch voll und ganz realisiert werden können. Jede erkenntnis-theoretische Untersuchung muss sich auf rein phänomenologischem Grunde vollziehen. Die 'Theorie', die in ihr angestrebt wird, ist ja nichts Anderes, als Besinnung und evidente Verständigung darüber, was Denken und Erkennen überhaupt ist, worin sein Rechtsanspruch auf Gegenständlichkeit eigentlich besteht, . . . Soll diese Besinnung auf den Sinn der Erkenntnis kein blosses Meinen ergeben, sondern wie es hier strenge Forderung ist, einsichtiges Wissen, so muss sie sich rein auf dem Grunde *gegebener* Denk- und Erkenntnis-erlebnisse vollziehen. Dass sich die Denkacte gelegentlich auf transscendente oder gar auf nichtexistierende und unmögliche Objecte richten, thut dem keinen Eintrag. Denn diese gegenständliche Richtung, dies Vorstellen und Meinen eines phänomenologisch nicht realisierten Objects, ist natürlich ein *descriptiver* Charakterzug im betreffenden Erlebnis, und so muss sich der Sinn eines solchen Meinens rein auf Grund des Erlebnisses selbst klären und feststellen lassen; ja auf andere Weise wäre dergleichen auch nicht möglich" (LU A II, 19-20; cf. 196).

¹²¹ This "methodological correlativity" is to be sharply distinguished from the "noetic-noematic" correlativity Husserl asserts in *Ideas I*. In the *Investigations*, Husserl *tacitly* assumes that there is an internal characteristic of the mental act corresponding to each meant characteristic of the object of this act. He does *not* assume, like in *Ideas I*, that a specific *kind* of object is meant in each kind of act. Thus, in the *Investigations*, there is no proper object (*noema*) corresponding to meaning-intentions, apart from the referent, although Husserl distinguishes already between the referent as such and the referent-as-it-is-meant. There is a "noetic" meaning only; the "noematic" meaning is lacking. Objective meaning-entities are the "ideal species" of these noetic meanings.

¹²² Fifth *Investigation*, section 20; sixth *Investigation*, sections 25-9.

¹²³ LU B II/1, 75-6, 128, 129, 194-5, 197, 199, 220, 247 (cf. A II, 241), 248-9, 369, 374, 381 (cf. A II, 361), 382, 385; II/2, 234-44.

¹²⁴ In a sense, of course, Husserl remained a Cartesian, for he contended that consciousness is better known than the world. The ontological status of consciousness however is different from the status Descartes attributed to it. Cf. for the meaning of Husserl's "transcendental idealism": Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, (note 61), 195-229.

¹²⁵ *Husserliana* II, 10, 36, 56.

¹²⁶ Cf. Philipse, *Op. Cit.*, 195-229, where this long and thorny road is reconstructed. Cf. also De Boer, *Op. Cit.*, 111-14, 190-202, 222-33, 299-301, 315-21, 406-36.