

29. THE EXISTENTIAL DIALECTIC OF MARX AND MERLEAU-PONTY

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ABSTRACT. Our work represents the culmination of a study that is a search for a method. It is a search that has led us away from the remnants of Cartesianism that are found in Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, which we do not deal with here, and toward a comparative study of Karl Marx and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which we do take up in detail. The present manuscript argues, in fact, that both Marx and Merleau-Ponty operate with a method that may be called an existential dialectic.

By means of careful and extended analysis of *The Structure of Behavior* we attempt to uncover Merleau-Ponty's method, calling special attention to its sometimes ignored dialectical character. We then proceed to argue that Marx is operating with a type of phenomenological/existential method, and this is true not only of the young Marx but also of the mature Marx of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. Finally, with the assistance of Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness*, we point up the dialectical character of Marx's method. Thus, it is by uncovering this approach in the text of each of these thinkers and by comparing the method of each man with that of the other that we show that both Marx and Merleau-Ponty operate with an existential dialectical method.

This in depth methodological comparison of Marx and Merleau-Ponty represents the first study of its kind. It is hoped that "The Existential Dialectic of Marx and Merleau-Ponty" will contribute to the on-going and important dialogue between Marxists and existentialists.

The profound philosophical works of both Karl Marx and Maurice Merleau-Ponty deserve and enjoy a wide and respectful readership. However, even one hundred years after the death of Marx and some twenty years after Merleau-Ponty's tragic and untimely departure, we still find their works shrouded with mystery and dogged by conflicting interpretations. Does Marx finally free himself from the influence of Hegel and dialectics? Is Marx a scientist or a philosophical humanist? And what precisely is Merleau-Ponty's method? Is his method exclusively existential, or does he incorporate dialectics into his approach? Furthermore, if a dialectic is present, is it more than an incidental afterthought? Is it a *fundamental* part of his existential methodology?

This paper will attempt to show that Karl Marx and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are operating with a similar method, that both of these great thinkers operate with a method that may be called an existential dialectic.¹ Interpreters of Merleau-Ponty immediately recognize and emphasize the existential aspects of his method but many overlook or underemphasize its dialectical character. Of course we find just the opposite in Marxist literature. While Marx's dialectic is acknowledged by many (but by no means *most*), the existential elements of his position are touched upon only by a few.

We will therefore begin by stating Merleau-Ponty's method, calling special attention to its dialectical character, while only briefly touching upon its existential elements. We will then proceed to argue that Marx is operating with a type of phenomenological/existential method, and this is true not only of the young Marx but also of his mature work, i.e., *Capital*.² Finally, with the help of Lukacs, we will point up the dialectical character of Marx's method. Thus, it is by uncovering this approach in the text of each of these thinkers and by comparing the method of each man with that of the other that we will show that both Marx and Merleau-Ponty operate with an existential dialectical method.

MERLEAU-PONTY'S EXISTENTIAL DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

What is Merleau-Ponty's method for approaching the study of man and society? We shall now attempt to give a precise answer to this question.

THE EXISTENTIAL ASPECTS OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S METHOD

Merleau-Ponty employs an existential/dialectical method that is uniquely his own. A study of the respective methodologies of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Sartre will inform the careful reader of this. However, in spite of the differences that exist between them, differences that we cannot deal with here, Merleau-Ponty's works must still be characterized as existential. This is so because he begins his methodology with the individual's lived experience. Merleau-Ponty claims that all the structures and universals of thought and experience flow out of the subject's concrete, lived contact with the world. This is a decidedly existential claim. We must remember, however, that the existentialist in making this claim, the claim that all knowledge necessarily begins with the subject's immediate experience, does not wish to argue for a subjectivism that is closed in on itself. This is especially true for Merleau-Ponty. What Merleau-Ponty finds in his subject's experience is a lived experience which includes subjective and objective elements melded together; we have a subject who is inexorably bound to the world and other subjects, i.e., a subject who is always with other subjects and always in a certain time and place in social and natural history. Thus, Merleau-Ponty begins his methodology with the subject's own experience, yet this experience opens immediately to a world of objects and other people. The structures that are formed in experience thus involve contributions by the world and others as well as by an active, interested subject.

THE DIALECTICAL ASPECTS OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S METHOD

Since the existential character of Merleau-Ponty's methodology is well known, we will spend little time with it and proceed immediately to a discussion of the dialectical elements of his method. We will do this by pointing out three ways in which Merleau-Ponty characterizes his dialectic. We will discuss the dialectic as a connectedness of all things with each other, as the co-penetration of the subject and object, and as a hierarchy in which the various levels are internally related.

I.

By opening this section with a general discussion of internal connectedness, we will begin to grasp the notion of dialectics as it is employed by Merleau-Ponty. This general discussion will then be followed by particular examples drawn from Merleau-Ponty's own work.

Many thinkers would admit that there are such things as complementary concepts, i.e., concepts that must include their complement in order for us to grasp their meaning. Left and right, parent and child provide us with obvious examples of such concepts. The meaning of one of these concepts, it is claimed, includes and implies the meaning of the other. The meaning of parent includes and relies on the meaning of child, and vice versa. Furthermore, these concepts involve an internal relationship of meaning and not contingent or merely accidental external relationships. The fact that one parent may meet another is a contingent event. Yet the meaning of parent includes the complimentary meaning of child.

What Hegel, as the originator of modern dialectics, seems to do is extend this notion of complementary concepts to all of experience and reality. In his *Logic*, for example, he argues that when we consider the law of identity, that A is A, we observe that A refers not only to what it is but also what it is not. To see that a thing possesses an identity of its own, we must see that it is different from other things. This is what allows us to distinguish A. Thus even when stating the law of identity and individuality, Hegel argues that a thing's identity must be complemented and defined by references to what it is not. We find a similar discussion in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the section on Sense Certainty. Here Hegel argues that the reference to a particular here and now necessarily includes the reference to other heres and nows. When I point and say "here", I am in part saying "not there". The concept "here" simply cannot be formed without making this reference to other areas of space. Thus, even the simple act of pointing to a certain place and time immediately opens us to the places and times that surround it.

For Hegel, then, it appears that all concepts and things possess this characteristic of relatedness. As soon as we attempt to define or categorize something, as soon as we try to place it in a species and genus, we are relating it to other things and categories. Part of what it is to be a dog is to be a warm-blooded animal just like other mammals. In addition, part of what it means to be a dog is to be different from other mammals, from cats, horses and so on. Thus the definition of dog is arrived at not in isolation from other things and concepts but in intimate relationship to them. The definition of dog is embedded in a whole re-

gion of interlocking categories. Thus all concepts and things rely on their connectedness with all other things for their meaning. Furthermore, this connectedness is not a manifestation of a merely external, accidental relation. Rather, it is a relationship that involves the internal link of meaning. The respective meanings of left, A, and dog are intimately related to the respective meanings of right, not-A, and cat.

Merleau-Ponty argues for something very similar when he claims that we must see all things in relation to each other and that these relations or connections do not exist between things in a merely external fashion. The staunch empiricist defines a thing independently of all other things, arguing that things only interact with each other by the contact of external, linear causality. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, things or parts must be thought of as parts of a gestalt or structured whole. A thing is what it is *because* of its relation to the whole and varies with that whole. The structure of the whole is therefore not composed by adding up independent, self-defined parts that are in external relations to each other. Rather, it is the relationship of the parts to each other that determine what they are. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty we must see all things and parts in relation to each other and as related to each other internally.

Now that we have stated in general terms what Merleau-Ponty means when he defines the dialectic in terms of relations, let us turn to some more specific arguments and examples. Merleau-Ponty argues explicitly that our analysis of the world and human behavior must begin with *relations*, with the various *forms* or *gestalt* structures that are given in our experience and not with things, parts or atoms. Merleau-Ponty claims, for instance, that there is no isolated sense datum in human perception, i.e., that the simplest element of perception is the gestalt structure of a figure on a background. By appealing to studies in psychology and physiology, he shows that perception cannot be defined by a correspondence between isolated sense data and local nerve responses. Research shows that the perception of a ". . . colored area appears the same while the threshold of the different parts of the retina ought to make it red, orange, or colorless". If this is true, the perception of this sensible quality cannot be defined as a result of isolated sense data impinging on the retina. Furthermore, since the perceptual experience is not constructed out of simple, isolated elements, we must conclude that the apprehension of a quality is bound up with a whole perceptual context. We must return to the phenomenal experience as a whole.³ Merleau-Ponty also claims that the living organism, even if it is a lower form of animal life, responds to forms of perception and not some isolated datum. For example, ". . . five different reflex responses can be obtained by stimulating the ear of a cat depending on the structure of the excitant employed. The pinna of the ear flattens out when it is bent but responds to tickling with a few rapid twitches. The character of the response is completely modified depending on the form of electrical excitation (faradic or galvanic) or its strength; for example, weak strengths evoke rhythmic responses, strong ones evoke tonic reflexes".⁴ In addition, Merleau-Ponty argues that to understand a living organism properly, we must see it as an ensemble of relations. The organism is not built up out of isolated parts in a linear fashion. Nor is it merely a product of external events. For instance, when we consider the nerve functioning of the organism, we see that researchers have discovered that the chronaxie ". . . depend on each other without term and without break; and each one at each moment considered presupposes

all the others which in turn presuppose it". Thus the parts of a living organism must be understood as parts of a whole, a whole which defines them and makes them what they are.⁵ Likewise, even to understand the physical laws of gravity, we must see them as structures composed of the relations of the earth to the sun and the other planets. Gravity is not some absolute property of the earth considered in isolation from other influences and forces. Gravity must be understood as the expression of an ensemble of forces in the neighborhood of earth; "it represents a state of equilibrium of forces which determine the history of the solar system".⁶ Thus, Merleau-Ponty claims, it is only by using the notion of gestalt forms or wholes, with its quality of internal relations and connectedness, that we are able to understand these different experiences and the different levels of being.

II.

A second reason why Merleau-Ponty's existentialist methodology may be recognized as dialectical is because of the interpenetration of the subject and object, and we find him spelling this out in detail.⁷ The human organism and the environment are involved in a relationship of circular causality, a causality in which each element affects the other at the same time that it is being affected. This is not just a case of reciprocal causality, where, for example, the temperature of a room would affect the thermostat, and the thermostat, in turn, would influence the temperature. In a dialectical relation, both elements influence and affect each other at the same time that they are being influenced and affected.

In order to observe this interpenetration of the subject and object, let us take a slightly more detailed look at one of Merleau-Ponty's discussions of this topic. The organism, even though it is part of nature, does not just passively receive information from the natural and social environment. By once again using a wealth of research information, Merleau-Ponty argues that the sensory apparatus cannot be thought of as a passive linear transmitter. First of all, this is so because we can see that partial stimuli work together to form figures. And secondly, this is so because we can see that the sensory and motor systems work together, and they do so with variable physiological constellations. Thus, the sensory apparatus could not possibly be a passive linear transmission of isolated stimuli. By referring to another research example, Merleau-Ponty informs us that a beetle which has lost half of one of its limbs does not use the limb on smooth surfaces but does so when crossing a rugged terrain. The beetle's response to the environment is not one of a passive fixed reaction to given stimuli. Rather, the beetle's responses vary with the vital significance of the situation. By referring to this experiment and others, Merleau-Ponty is able to conclude that the damaged areas or functions of the organism are replaced by others for the purpose of maintaining a favored equilibrium. The replacement of the original function with a substitute is a variable process, a process that varies with the vital significance of the situation. This fact makes the classical thesis that behavior is built up out of private, pre-established, and passive circuits extremely implausible. Rather, we may conclude that there is a dialectical relation between the parts of the organism with each other and the organism with the environment. Information is received by the organism, yet the organism acts on this information in a variable way. This is especially true of the higher human organism. The human organism thus influences the information it receives at the same time it is being influenced. The

human organism and the environment, the subject and the object, are thus clearly involved in a relationship of circular causality. The subject and object are co-penetrating.⁸

Merleau-Ponty further shows that there is another way that the subject and object co-penetrate. He argues that the *conscious subject* must also be included in the attempts to understand the functioning of the *objective organism*, that the organism cannot be understood as a mere product of physical and physiological processes. An appeal must be made to the phenomenal object, as it is present to the subject, if we expect to grasp properly research on nerve functioning.

Merleau-Ponty cites a scientific/physiological experiment and reaches the following conclusion. When the eye is damaged in such a way that the functional center is moved to the peripheral edge, we cannot explain this shift by examining local devices of physiological function. This approach tries unsuccessfully to relate the perceptual functions of each of the retina to its anatomical structure. If it is the case that certain perceptual functions correspond to certain anatomical structures, then we could not possibly describe the shifts of the functional center to the edge of the eye. According to this thesis, the perceptual function would disappear altogether, since the corresponding anatomical structure is damaged. This is clearly not the case.

If, however, ". . . the properties of each point are assigned to it, not according to established local devices, but according to a flexible process of distribution . . .", and this distribution is determined by the phenomenal field, then we can explain this shift. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that the experimental results show ". . . that the quality of space of the zones of clear vision in the phenomenal field express certain modes of organization of the sensory field related to the characteristics of the object presented to the eye much more than the geometrical projection of objects on the retina, and depend upon certain laws of equilibrium proper to the nervous system much more than upon anatomical structure".⁹

In order for us to understand the shift of these physiological functional centers to the edge of the eye, we must make references to the phenomenal field as it is presented to the perceiver. We cannot account for nerve functioning by appealing only to local physical and physiological devices that are arrayed in geometrical space. An appeal must be made to phenomenal consciousness.

It must be stated, however, that Merleau-Ponty argues that the functioning of phenomenological consciousness does rely on nerve functioning. Nothing takes place in consciousness without the corresponding firing of neurons. On the other hand, we have just seen that nerve functioning itself cannot be properly understood without making an appeal to phenomenal consciousness. Once again, we find Merleau-Ponty appealing to the dialectical relation of mutual influence in order to explain the interaction of the subject and the object. Consciousness relies on nerve functioning and is thus obviously affected by the body, but in order to grasp the functioning of the nervous system, we must appeal to consciousness, which in turn affects the nervous system. Thus, we can now clearly see that the subject (consciousness) and the object (the body) co-determine each other. They each influence the other at the same time that they are being influenced.

Now that we have seen how Merleau-Ponty established that consciousness and the body mutually (dialectically) influence each other, that consciousness must be appealed to in order to describe physiological events, let us return to the relation between consciousness and the natural environment. We can show that once again the phenomenal must be appealed to in order to properly understand this relation. Merleau-Ponty argues that we cannot understand consciousness as a mere result of physical and physiological processes, as a mere sum of external relations. Internal relations of meaning must be introduced to grasp what is visually present to the subject. An experiment Merleau-Ponty cites to confirm this point states that when we center a gray ring on a piece of paper that is half green and half red, the ring appears gray. However, if we place a narrow strip over the middle of the ring, we find that the ring appears half reddish and half greenish. Merleau-Ponty concludes from this that there is no possible way to construct this perceptual experience from a one-to-one correspondence between the visual excitation and the points of color in the environment. If this correspondence did exist, then we would not see the dramatic change in the visual field that is produced by a small change in the points of color. This perceptual experience is explained however if we confirm the fact that perception is a product of the function that its parts play in the whole visual field. The only way we have of making sense out of this experiment is by making an appeal to the object as it appears to the perceptual subject. Of course, just as Merleau-Ponty has argued that physiological events influence conscious experience, he here argues that no perceptual meaning could take place without the obvious contribution made by the object. However, as we have just seen, perception cannot be constructed simply out of objective, external events. An appeal must be made to the original order of the visual field itself. Thus, the subject and object are truly co-penetrating and therefore involved in a dialectical relationship. The object obviously supplies information and structure to a perception, yet the original synthesis of the subject's visual field must also be taken into account. The object influences the subject at the same time that the subject influences it.

III.

A third characteristic of Merleau-Ponty's dialectical method is that of *hierarchy*, and this, we must stress, is a hierarchy of structure or forms integration, *not of substances*, as the dualists would claim.¹⁰ Merleau-Ponty argues that when we gaze out at the world, we clearly perceive a hierarchy of forms of integration. We see the physical, which integrates its elements by rather mechanical means; we see the vital or living, which integrates its elements more freely; and we see conscious forms of behavior, where integration can be controlled to an even greater degree by a conscious subject. Of course, the notion of hierarchy, by itself, is not dialectical. The dialectical character is added when Merleau-Ponty argues that the higher form of integration evolves out of the lower structure, that it presupposes the lower structure at the same time that it surpasses it and absorbs it into its own structure. The physical evolution of man, for example, has given rise to consciousness, and conscious integration absorbs the lower physical structures in it. Man's physical needs are fulfilled by a *conscious* human being. Man no longer eats or performs sexual acts as a mere animal. He may eat to appreciate the tastes and flavor of food, and his sexuality is generally expressed in the context of human emotions and feelings of connectedness. These

lower structures do not disappear however, for they are not completely absorbed into higher structures. Even though consciousness carries the physical to a higher level of integration, the physical is, nevertheless, still present. It must be *constantly* integrated into the higher form; otherwise, the higher form itself can be reabsorbed into the lower. For the psychologically damaged, both food and sexuality may become compulsions that are satisfied with little or no self-conscious awareness. Thus, this hierarchy of forms of integration clearly represents *dialectical* relations, where elements co-determine and affect each other, where the low levels influence the higher at the same time that the higher influence them.

These, then, are the essential elements of Merleau-Ponty's dialectic: connectedness, co-penetration, and a hierarchy in which the levels mutually influence each other. We must not see things as isolated and abstracted from other things but must grasp them as connected and related. We must see things as elements of a structure, a structure in which these elements are related to each other internally. In this way, a thing's place in the whole, its relationship to other things, defines its meaning, a meaning that may change with changing relations. Furthermore, we must not see things as simply in reciprocal relation to each other but as mutually defining. They must influence the other at the *same time* that they are being influenced. Finally, we must see the world arranged in three orders or dialectics: the physical order, the order of life and the order of consciousness. These orders are arranged in a hierarchical fashion and mutually influence each other, as we have seen.

We should deal with one more point regarding Merleau-Ponty's dialectic, for it will help us distinguish both Merleau-Ponty's and Marx's dialectic from that which is used by the scientific Marxists. Of course many scientists and some scientific Marxists reject dialectics altogether. For them the world is broken down into discrete elements with absolute properties, and all relations are confined to the interaction of external cause and effect. Both Merleau-Ponty and the so-called dialectical, scientific Marxists reject this position. In fact, we see Maurice Cornforth, a scientific Marxist who follows the epistemology of Engels and Lenin, accepting dialectics and defining it as the study of interconnections. He argues that instead of seeing things in abstract isolation from each other, we must see them as related and as going through processes of development. True to his materialist presuppositions, Cornforth does argue that these interconnections are only in the world; the mind simply mirrors or traces these interconnections between things. Cornforth, in fact, is quite explicit about this materialism and his opposition to idealism. He reminds us that Kant, as an idealist, moves from concepts (*a priori*s of the mind) to things. He likewise mentions that Hegel's dialectic moves from concepts and their interconnection to things and the way they are connected. Cornforth explicitly rejects this and argues that we must move from nature to ideas, from the way things are interconnected to the way ideas are connected. For Cornforth, then, dialectical process occurs in nature and is only traced or reflected by the mind.¹¹

Merleau-Ponty, of course, would accept the claim that we should not see things in abstract isolation from other things. Rather, we must see all things as interconnected and in a process of development. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty clearly rejects the argument that interconnections or structures exist only in the world and that the mind simply mirrors them. This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty accepts the

Hegelian idealistic dialectic which moves from the interconnections between concepts to the interconnection between things. For Merleau-Ponty, structure or interconnections are rooted in nature. Yet he insists that we need a consciousness to recognize these structures. For Merleau-Ponty, the interconnections of a structure are grasped in lived perceptions, where both the world and consciousness are ambiguously present, where both make a contribution to the structure that is finally formed.

Let us briefly reconsider a few of Merleau-Ponty's arguments for how structure is grasped, and we should remember that these arguments must be seen in the light of his opposition to the Gestalt theorists who claim, just as Cornforth does, that structure exists only in nature, that the mind only traces what is in the world in itself.

First, Merleau-Ponty argues that the Gestaltist's claim that there are forms in-themselves must be rejected for the same reasons that the positivist's conception of law must be rejected. Positivists cannot formulate laws by referring only to facts. Laws refer to the common characteristics of phenomena and facts. These characteristics are necessarily abstracted by a reflective consciousness.¹²

Second, it is obvious that laws are possible only with *de facto* situations, for they must express the actually existent. However, this does not mean that structures exist like some fixed, opaque layer of being, upon which the laws rest. Structure is not an independent opaque layer of reality; it is a set of relations grasped by consciousness. Thus, law, which is also the grasping of relations by consciousness, must be included in structure, just as structure must be included in any law.¹³

Third, Merleau-Ponty argues that forms do not exist merely in themselves because consciousness is needed to pull together what is happening at several different places in order to recognize them as a unity. When an object or a structure of some sort is spread out in space, even if its elements mutually determine each other, the structure is still necessarily dispersed in several places. To say that it does not suffer this division is to say that it is grasped by a *consciousness* which unifies the dispersed elements. This unity, Merleau-Ponty adds, is the unity of perceived objects.¹⁴

Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, structure does not exist in the world merely in itself, and consciousness is not simply constructed from the connections that purportedly exist in the world. Consciousness is required to grasp structure, and yet this is certainly not Hegel's idealistic move from concepts to things. Structure and its interconnections are not just the interconnections of consciousness. Structure and interconnections are always found in *de facto* situations. Thus, Merleau-Ponty not only argues against those who claim that structure and interconnections exist in the world by themselves, he also argues against the idealist's claim that the interconnections of the world are really those of consciousness and reason. In each of the above arguments we have seen a *de facto* situation and a *conscious* unification of this situation. Merleau-Ponty's position on the grasping of structure, his position on where dialectical connections can be found, is itself dialectical. He argues that they can neither be found in nature in-itself nor only in consciousness for-itself. The dialectic is found in the synthesis of the in-itself and for-itself. Merleau-Ponty takes these mutually exclusive positions, one

which reduces all to nature and one which reduces all of nature to a meaning for consciousness, and synthesizes them. For Merleau-Ponty, structures and dialectical interconnections are formed in perception, where the in-itself and for-itself co-mingle. It is in lived perception that the dialectical synthesis of the subject and object takes place. It is here that the opposites, the in-itself and for-itself, are synthesized, with each contributing to the structure that we grasp in perception. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's dialectic is clearly different from Cornforth's and Hegel's. It is a dialectic that has its roots in nature yet which requires the conscious contribution of the concrete subject. Merleau-Ponty's dialectic is rooted in the subject's concrete lived experience of the real world. It is an existential dialectic.

We may conclude from these preceding sections that Merleau-Ponty, the existentialist, is also a thoroughgoing dialectician.

MARX'S EXISTENTIAL DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY

Now that we have seen that Merleau-Ponty's existentialism is dialectical, we will attempt to show the marked similarity between his method and that of Karl Marx. We will now turn to Marx and what we believe is his existential dialectical method. We begin with an investigation of the existential aspect of this dyad and show that Marx uses elements of an existential analysis in his early, middle and mature works.¹⁵

THE EXISTENTIAL ASPECTS OF MARX'S METHOD

Marx begins the *1844 Manuscripts* with the "bourgeois" empirical study of private property.¹⁶ Marx, however, criticizes the "bourgeois science" for not seeing the origins and historical development of private property. It does not do the proper historical analysis of private property as a social relation, and it does not consider private property in relation to man.¹⁷ It is here that Marx launches into a detailed analysis of the process of alienation.¹⁸

According to Marx, man is alienated from: (1) his own activity--he does not feel that his actions are self-directed; (2) the object of his labors--he feels no identification with the object; he does not see himself in it because the object, and his action, belong to another, to the capitalist; (3) other people--it is through his externalization in his product, and the recognition by others of this accomplishment, that the individual feels a connectedness with others. If this product is not his, if his actions are not even his own, then the individual will have no way of feeling a genuine connectedness with others; he sees himself and others as empty things; (4) his species-being--man's species-being is to act as a self-conscious, self-directed being. If an individual's actions are not his own and if they are not in some sense self-directed, he will be alienated from his own essential nature.

This brief outline of Marx's theory of alienation provides us with a sketch of what we believe is Marx's theory of human nature. Contrary to what some thinkers believe, we are asserting that Marx does indeed have a theory of human nature.¹⁹ We may uncover this theory of human nature, as it is stated in the *1844 Manuscripts*, simply by drawing out the implied elements of Marx's theory of alienation. When Marx says, for

example, that man is alienated from his species-being, he is saying that a fundamental characteristic of being human, i.e., of human nature, is to be self-conscious. When he says, for example, that man is alienated from his own actions, he is saying that part of what it means to be human is to direct one's action according to one's own desires and intentions. This same kind of statement for a theory of human nature can also be drawn from the remaining comments on alienation, and this shows that Marx does indeed operate with a concept of what it is to be human.

Let us list, then, the characteristics of Marx's theory of human nature and attempt to show what we believe are the existential/phenomenological elements in Marx's thinking.

- a. Part of what it means to be human is to feel a connectedness with the world and the objects of one's labor. Due to his nature, that is, through the process of the externalization of subjective intentions, man is able and has a need to identify with the products of his labor. If this identification is successfully carried out, the worker who subsequently perceives the objects of his labor will see himself reflected in them. On the other hand, if man is not able to experience this connectedness, if he is not able to identify and see himself in the products of his labor, he will feel separate from the world. The world will appear alien, as if it were standing against him.

Now, the only way that Marx could possibly make such claims is from the point of view of the experiencing subject. How could anyone talk about the subject seeing his own subjective intentions in the object if he did not take up the point of view of the subject, if he himself, as an experiencing subject, did not live through a similar experience? He could not. Thus, what Marx is stating necessarily involves a consideration of the subjective feeling of connectedness to the world. Or, to see this in the negative, he is describing the subjective feeling of alienation, of separateness, of emptiness, that occurs when the individual is not able to identify with the products of his labor. The content of this negative description, i.e., meaninglessness and emptiness, is very similar to that which is described by the existentialist. The similarity, however, extends further, since Marx is describing experience from the point of view of the experiencing subject, which is the primary mode of analysis of the existentialists.

- b. Part of man's nature is for him to act in accordance with his own desires and intentions. If he does not do this, he will feel alienated or separate from himself. Man's actions should therefore be self-directed. His actions should represent his own intentions, not someone else's.

Surely the only way to grasp whether one's actions represent one's intentions is from the point of view of the concrete experiencing subject. Only I, as an experiencing subject, know that my actions represent my intentions. Thus, once again, Marx is describing the concrete feelings of the experiencing subject. Once again, we see Marx taking up the

mode of analysis which describes the concrete experience of the subject.

- c. Part of man's nature as a human being is to feel connected with others. For Marx, this connectedness is established by externalizing one's subjectivity, by externalizing one's intentions, in some object of labor. The products of our action are then in an arena in which they may be recognized and confirmed by others. It is this social, external recognition of subjective intentions that allows for the feeling of connectedness with others. In addition, the subject will be recognized *truly* by others only if his intentions are externalized in this world and only if his actions *truly* represent his own intentions. Thus, for Marx, we see that social recognition and the subsequent feeling of connection with others are based on the previously listed characteristics of human nature. If man acts according to his own desires, and if, by doing so, he feels a connectedness with the external objects of his labor, then his own subjective intentions may be confirmed by others. Thus, the feeling of connectedness with others is ultimately based on a reflective description of the subject's lived experience, since this first characteristic is based on such a description.

Furthermore, another person will not genuinely recognize my subjective externalization unless he himself has had an experience based on a genuine fulfillment (externalization) of his own intentions. The other person could not recognize my subjective intentions unless he were truly in contact with his own. Or to cast this in the negative form, a person who feels empty and disconnected from his own intentions and the objects of his labor surely will not recognize self-fulfillment and subjectivity in another person's work. There will be a genuine connectedness between us, we will each genuinely recognize the humanness in the products of the other, only if we both act into the world, and only if we do so in a way that truly represents our own intentions. Each individual is able to see the subjective intentions that are worked into the world because they are similar to his own, because he also has had the experience of a genuine externalization of his own subjective intentions. Thus, the recognition of subjective intentions, even though they may not be the subject's own, is still based on the subject's own self-awareness. Once again, even the connectedness with others necessarily involves the point of view of the experiencing subject. The point of the view of the experiencing subject is needed to grasp the subjective intentions, whether one's own or another's.

- d. Part of the very nature of the human species is to act as a self-conscious being, and here we can clearly see that Marx is referring to the point of view of the experiencing subject, for how could we possibly be self-conscious without taking up this point of view? A very part of what it means to be an experiencing subject is to be aware that one is having an experience, i.e., is to be self-conscious. Conversely, a very part of what it means to be self-

conscious is to be an experiencing subject. Thus, in order to understand self-consciousness at all, it is necessary to take up the point of view of an experiencing subject. If we were not experiencing subjects, we could not possibly understand what it means to be self-conscious.

Therefore, each of the characteristics of Marx's theory of human nature, as it appears in the *1844 Manuscripts*, relies on the point of view of the experiencing subject, in one way or another. None of these characteristics could possibly be understood without reference to a subjective description of one's own lived experience. Now we can also understand what Marx means when he says that the science of nature becomes the science of man, and the science of man becomes the science of nature.²⁰ When we look at nature, we see man's purposes worked into it. When we look at man, we necessarily see nature, for man is real only insofar as he is in nature and only insofar as he is related to it. We can now see that the early Marx is clearly operating with more than a crude empirical method. At least part of what Marx is doing is a reflective description of the subject's lived experience. He is describing, from the point of view of the subject, how the subject feels empty as well as how the subject identifies himself with others and with the product of his own labor. This description of human experience is not a description from a point of view outside the subject's own experience. It is a reflective description of a pre-reflective, lived action of a subject who is in the world and with others. This is very similar to the method used in both phenomenology and existentialism, and particularly in Merleau-Ponty's existentialism.

Again, we can clearly see the existential side of Marx's method if we look at the statements Marx directs against Feuerbach in *The German Ideology*, which comes from the middle period of Marx's development. Marx says that science is based on sense and sensuous need, not just sense certainty as Feuerbach claims. In other words, there is no pure sense-datum, there is no bare sensation of the world. When we perceive the world, we must also take into account the sensuous and human needs of the perceiver.²¹ Marx goes on to say that Feuerbach sees objects purely as objects of the senses, when, in fact, they have been formed by man's labor, a labor that is attempting to fulfill man's needs and interest. Marx states that Feuerbach sees man as an object of the senses and not as sensuous activity.²² In addition, ". . . he never manages to conceive the world as the total *living* sensuous activity of the individuals composing it".²³

After reading these statements, how can anyone doubt that Marx is operating with other than a crude empirical method? It is clear from the above that science relies on sense and sensuous need, on sense and "living sensuous activity", and that living activity requires the method of reflective description of one's lived experience.

With the help of David McLellen and Carol Gould,²⁴ it is quite easy to show that existential elements appear in Marx's *Grundrisse*, which are the working notes for *Capital* and thus must be considered as belonging to the mature period of Marx's development. Since the greatest contro-

versy regarding Marx's humanism (his existentialism) concerns the mature period, we will introduce the works of McLellen and Gould as a response to a contemporary writer who claims that the mature Marx takes up the scientific method and makes a sharp epistemological break with his early "subjectivist" work. Louis Althusser makes these claims in his extensive study of the writings of Marx, entitled *For Marx*.²⁵ In the first chapter of *For Marx* Althusser argues for the rejection of ideology by saying that Marx completely throws off the influence of Hegel and the German ideology within which he developed, that Marx is transformed by the facts (of France and England), that Marx's work can be divided into the ideological period before 1845, before the writing of *The German Ideology*, and the scientific period after 1845. Surely, this cannot be true. Are we to believe that Marx's theoretical development no longer takes place by means of theory, by means of a consciously developed thought, that Marx's theoretical genius was merely the result of empirical events? While it is certainly true that we must accept the influence of actual history on Marx, we must also accept, contrary to what Althusser says, the continuing influence of German ideology, of theory, and of Hegel.

We must insist on the continuing influence of Hegel and theory on Marx. But let us first consider Althusser's argument to the contrary. Althusser insists that Marx's only and last flirtation with Hegel (and dreaded ideology) can be found in the *1844 Manuscripts*. After the period of *The German Ideology*, where Marx is critical of both Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx takes on a new "problematic" or schema, that of historical materialism, through which to view the facts. As Marx matures, he becomes more and more scientific, distancing himself more and more from Hegel. Thus, Marx's mature work, *Capital*, is a completely scientific work presumably with no Hegelian traces. Marx has thrown off all ideology, all influence from his early master Hegel, and is transformed by the facts (not by any thought) that he meets face to face in France and England.

We can take issue with the consistency of Althusser's argument that we must consider Marx's development as a series of "problematics" or schemas through which Marx views the factual world. It seems inconsistent that someone so concerned about severing the influence of Hegel on Marx should take up a position that obviously tends toward the idealist camp. Even though Althusser admits that Marx's approach or schema was transformed by the facts, it nevertheless becomes a framework through which Marx views the world, through which all the facts may be ordered. It appears that Althusser is giving more credit to consciousness and interpretation than he should, based on his earlier comments about the rejection of idealism.

Secondly, we can take issue with the accuracy of Althusser's claim that Marx breaks with ideology, with Hegel and with his early works. The claim that Hegel does not influence Marx after the *1844 Manuscripts* is convincingly opposed by David McLellen. McLellen shows that the *Grundrisse* contains discussions which are actually much broader than those that finally do appear in *Capital*. The *Grundrisse* contains sections on the nature of labor, on the individual and society, on the nature of alienation at higher levels of capitalist societies, the influence of increasing leisure and the abolition of the division of labor, and also the revolutionary nature of capitalism and its inherent universality.²⁶ Many of these themes were explicitly addressed in the *1844 Manuscripts*.²⁷ Thus McLellen concludes that Marx's thought is best viewed as a contin-

uing meditation on central themes that are clearly present in both the early and mature work, themes that are much broader and much more humanistic than the narrow economics which finally appear in *Capital*.

The claim that the mature Marx continues to be affected by Hegel and theory is further supported by Carol Gould's noting that both the 1844 *Manuscripts* and the *Grundrisse* were texts that Marx wrote for self-clarification and not for publication. Since Marx was concerned about having his work appear on an equal ground with the "bourgeois scientific studies" of the day, and since references to Hegel and philosophy might be misunderstood or not grasped at all by the general public, Marx removes the philosophical thought that is fundamental to the development of his economic and "scientific" concepts.

Furthermore, in opposition to Althusser's claim that Hegel does not influence Marx after 1845, we may quote from a letter that Marx wrote to Engels in January 1858, during the time that the *Grundrisse* was being written, in which Marx makes the following statement concerning his economic studies, ". . . in the method, it has been of great use to me that by mere accident I have leafed through Hegel's *Logic* . . ." Here we have Marx's own words stating that in 1858 Hegel is still influencing his work. In addition, McLellen states that many of the most Hegelian elements of the *Grundrisse* were even written before this letter, and that it is no mere accident that Hegel's thought appears in the *Grundrisse*. Hegel's influence is ever present.²⁸ Furthermore, it is interesting, as McLellen notes, that Althusser makes no reference at all to the *Grundrisse*, which was nevertheless available to him.²⁹ After even a superficial reading of the *Grundrisse*, the claim that Hegel and philosophy no longer had an influence on Marx after 1845 makes no sense at all.

McLellen also makes the point that Marx used his notebooks of 1844-5 while writing *Capital*. We can see this clearly if we look at the beginning of the chapter on capital, which reproduces, almost word for word, the passages in the 1844 *Manuscripts* on human need, man as a species being, the individual as a social being, the idea of nature as, in a sense, man's body, the parallels between religious alienation and economic alienation, etc.³⁰

In addition, McLellen argues that the term alienation is used in *Capital* more than some writers appear to think and is central to most of the important passages of the *Grundrisse*.³¹ We will now take up this point, where McLellen leaves off, and show, with the help of Carol Gould, that alienation is central to the most important passages in the *Grundrisse*, that these statements in the *Grundrisse* are similar to or identical with those made in the 1844 *Manuscripts*, and that this proves incontrovertibly that Marx did not abandon his early works or the thought of Hegel. Consider the following quote:

The transformation of the material by living labor, by the realization of living labor in the material--a transformation which, as purpose, determines labor and is its purposeful activation . . . --thus reserves the material in a definite form and subjugates the transformation of the material to the purpose of labor.³²

We may simplify the above quote by saying that, for Marx, matter (or the primary condition of labor) is transformed according to the purposes of living, self-conscious subjects. But let us return to Marx's own words.

The relations of capital, in its content, to labor, of objectified labor to living labor . . . can, in general, be nothing more than the relations of labor to its objectivity, its material . . . and in connection with labor as activity, the material, the objectified labor, has only two relations, that of *raw material*, i.e., of the formless matter, the mere material for form-positing, purposive activity of labor, and that of the *instrument of labor*, the objective means which subjective activity inserts between itself as an object, as its conductor.³³

It is quite clear here that for Marx matter provides the conditions for labor, and that man is, properly speaking, an active causal agent. Of course, matter can be a cause in the sense that purposes are only fulfilled in the material *conditions*; they limit and restrict one's action. Again, let us turn to Marx.

Objectified labor ceases to exist in a dead state as an external, indifferent form of substance, because it is itself again posited as a moment of living labor; as a relation of living labor to itself in an object material, as the objectivity of living labor (as means and end) (the objective conditions of living labor).³⁴

All of the above are key passages, for they show quite clearly that Marx is not simply a straightforward, staunch empiricist, as many claim. When his subject views the world, he sees an object, but this object is meaningful for him only insofar as it is viewed with purposes and needs in mind. When I just perceive the world, I see indifferent forms, if anything at all. When I see an object as part of my living labor, as something I want to transform according to my purposes, I see a meaningful object.

Obviously, Marx is again taking up the point of view of the experiencing subject, for this is the only way that we can describe the intentions, the lived-through labor and the meaningfulness of the object to the subject. Even in this mature work, Marx is clearly operating with a mode of analysis that is very similar to that used by the existentialist.

THE DIALECTICAL ASPECTS OF MARX'S METHOD

The dialectical side of Marx's method is also quite evident in his work. Marx clearly stresses process and development, wholes and structures, over isolated atoms as essential elements of his epistemology. We see this, to cite just one example, in the early pages of the *1844 Manuscripts*, where Marx is critical of the bourgeois economists because they start with the notion of private property as a given. Marx argues to the contrary that we must understand where property comes from, we must see it embedded in a network of social and historical relations.

Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness* makes the point quite well that Marx operates with a notion of totality. He cites the following passages from Marx's work to confirm his point. "The concrete is concrete because it is a synthesis of many particular determinates, i.e., a unity of diverse elements".³⁵ Marx also says that ". . . crudeness and conceptual nullity consists in the tendency to forge arbitrary unmediated connections between things that belong together in an organic union".³⁶ In addition, Marx has this to say about his political/economic studies. "The result we arrive at is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one totality, different aspects of a unit . . . Thus a definite form of production determines definite forms of consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these elements . . . A mutual interaction takes place between these various elements. This is the case with every organic body".³⁷ Lukacs further argues that the ". . . interaction we have in mind must be more than just an interaction of otherwise unchanging objects. It must go further in its relation to the whole: for this relation determines the objective form of every object in cognition. Marx has formulated this idea in countless places. I shall cite only the best known. 'A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain circumstances. A cotton-spinning Jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. Only in certain circumstances it is no more capital than gold is money or sugar is the price of sugar'".³⁸ "Thus, the objective forms of all social phenomena change constantly in the course of their ceaseless dialectical interactions with each other. The intelligibility of objects develop in proportion as we grasp their function in the totality to which they belong. This is why only the dialectical conception of totality can enable us to understand reality as a social process".³⁹

We might also add here that it is well known that Marx does not begin *Capital* with a set of definitions or clearly delineated concepts. He begins with the notion of commodity, traces its development through its many forms, and observes its many relations. It is only then, it is only with a picture of the totality, of the whole, that we understand one of the elements, a commodity. In fact, the commodity is defined by its relation to the whole; it is nothing in itself but an empty abstraction.

Thus, Marx clearly operates with a method that focuses on totality, on process, on relations and connections. We see this in the late work, in *Capital*, as well as in the earlier writings of the *1844 Manuscripts* and *The German Ideology*. The *1844 Manuscripts* has Marx saying that we must see property in its historical development; that we must see it as related to the whole. In the *1844 Manuscripts* no concept is developed by Marx without seeing it in relation to others. In the *German Ideology*, Marx says that there are no isolated sense data. There are no bare facts. What I see is seen in the context of society, industry and historical conditions. And Lukacs' quotation of Marx's later works are ample proof that Marx never abandoned these methodological devices.

We are now in a position to see the striking similarity between Merleau-Ponty and Marx, to see that the methodology of each may be characterized as an existential dialectic.

We first investigated the works of Merleau-Ponty and saw his methodological approach characterized in the following way. His method is existential because it relies on the reflective description of the lived experience of the concrete subject. His method however is different from

that used by other existentialists because it is thoroughly dialectical. Merleau-Ponty's experiencing subject is dialectically related to the world and to others. The experiencing subject influences the object and others at the same time he is being influenced by them.

Merleau-Ponty's dialectical methodology is characterized in the following way. (1) All things must be seen as connected in wholes. In fact, a thing is what it is because of its relations to other things, because of the function it plays in the whole, and it will change with changing relations. (2) A relationship of co-penetration exists between the subject and the object. The subject and object define each other, for as one influences the other, it is simultaneously being influenced. (3) Merleau-Ponty holds that the world is composed of three basic dialectics or structures, that of the physical, that of life and that of consciousness. These structures are themselves dialectical because they each contain co-penetrating elements. These elements are what they are because of the totality of their relations, because of their function within the whole. Furthermore, these different dialectics are related to each other dialectically and in a hierarchical fashion. The higher level of consciousness evolves out of the lower levels of life and matter, and yet consciousness is able to act back and influence these lower levels. (4) Finally, we saw that for Merleau-Ponty, the dialectic involved a synthesis between the subject and object, the inner and outer. Dialectical structure does not occur only in nature or only in consciousness. It requires a synthesis of both, synthesis which takes place in perception or lived, active experience.

After we completed our investigation of Merleau-Ponty, we moved to consider the works of Karl Marx, and we can now see that Marx's methodological approach parallels Merleau-Ponty's on a point-by-point basis. In each of the three periods of Marx's development, we have shown that at least part of what Marx is relying on is a reflective analysis of the lived experience of the concrete subject, that is, on an existential mode of analysis. In addition, it is not difficult to see that Marx's subject stands in a dialectical relation to others and the world. The subject, through his lived action, influences objects and others at the same time that he is being influenced by them. Thus, we must grasp the subject in a totality of social and material relations; we must grasp the individual's lived experience in relation to others and the world.

This leads us to the following characterization of Marx's dialectic. (1) Marx stresses the importance of seeing things in connection. We must see things in a process of development and as related to other things. In fact, a thing is what it is because of its relation to other things, because of its place in the process of development, because of its function in the totality, and it will change with changing relations. (2) The subject and object clearly co-penetrate and define each other. We see this with Marx's claim that the subject/object dichotomy is overcome in action, that the subject influences the world and places his intention on it at the same time that he is being influenced and conditioned by the world. (3) The fact that Marx holds a hierarchical view of nature is more difficult to establish. The limitations of time and space do not allow us to investigate this issue here. However, at least one convincing comment can be made. Marx is deeply influenced by both Hegel and Aristotle, thinkers that held a hierarchical view of nature. It would therefore not be outlandish to claim that Marx is operating with similar notions. (4) And finally, Marx's dialectic is clearly similar to Merleau-Ponty's in the

respect that his dialectic does not exist in nature in-itself nor in consciousness for-itself. Marx clearly opposes the Hegelian notion of following the connections between concepts to arrive at the connections between things in the world. Marx does not wish to start with consciousness and then proceed to nature; rather, he will proceed from nature to consciousness. However, we have also seen that Marx argues rather vigorously against Feuerbach and the staunch empiricists, for Marx claims that we do not see a bare sense datum but a world touched by man, a world that is imprinted with subjective forms. If this is the case, if there is not bare sense perception in the world, and if we see a world invested with human meaning and structure, then there is certainly no bare sense perception of structure in-itself. For Marx, thought, structure, and ideas are not produced by nature in-itself. Thought, structure, and ideas are at first directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of men. Consciousness is at first the consciousness of lived, practical activity, and it is out of this lived activity, in which the subject/object dichotomy is broken down, that we form the categories of thought and structure. Thus, Marx is here performing the same synthesis of the in-itself and the for-itself that we find Merleau-Ponty performing. The subject and object, consciousness and nature, are synthesized in the lived act of labor. Since nature is always perceived and unfolded according to human intentions, there is no bare sense experience of structure in the world. And since consciousness is always practically engaged in the world, since consciousness is an act in the world, there is no separate or pure consciousness. Thus, Marx's dialectical structure is not to be found in nature in-itself nor in consciousness for-itself. Dialectical structures must flow out of lived, practical experience, where both the world and the concrete subject make their respective contributions.

In the preceding pages we have attempted to show that the existential dialectical method is utilized by both Merleau-Ponty and Marx. Their methods are strikingly similar. Both thinkers focus on the lived, active experience of the concrete subject. Both stress the dialectical connection of organic wholes. The purpose of this paper has been to uncover this method in the writings of both men and to point out the similarities between them. We hope that our efforts here will promote more exchange between Marxists and existentialists, and in particular, will suggest to Marxists who are undertaking their own methodological studies that they can utilize one of the twentieth century's greatest methodologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

FOOTNOTES

¹ We are not, of course, the first to claim that there is a similarity between Marxism and existentialism. Others have also made this claim. For example: the young Herbert Marcuse in "Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism", reprinted in *Telos* 4, 1969; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith (London, NLB, 1975); Enzo Paci, *The Function of the Science and the Meaning of Man*, trans., P. Piccone and J. Hansen (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); and others. It is our contention that it is Merleau-Ponty's method that is most similar to Marx's and therefore most suited for an exchange between Marxist's and the phenomenological/existential school. Very little, however, has appeared in print concerning the methodological similarities between these two thinkers. This is the first at-

tempt to offer a detailed study of the methodological similarities between Marx and Merleau-Ponty. We thus believe we are making an advance on the effort to link Marxism and existentialism.

Numerous parallels can be drawn between the methodology of Merleau-Ponty and that of Marx. Both thinkers vigorously attack both idealism and crude empiricism, and both thinkers make an attempt to come between those two positions by focusing on active lived experience. In addition, both attempt to mediate the extremes of idealism and empiricism by using a dialectical method. In this paper, we will point out the existential dialectical elements in each of these thinkers and highlight Marx's critique of staunch empiricism, since many Marxists interpret Marx as a straight-forward empiricist and since this is the prevailing method of the day.

² We will investigate the *Grundrisse*, the working notes for *Capital*. Marx, Karl. *Grundrisse*, translated by M. Nicolaus (New York: Random House, 1973).

³ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 3-12.

⁴ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *The Structure of Behavior*, translated by Alden Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 11. Hereafter cited as SB.

⁵ SB, 50-51.

⁶ SB, 138.

⁷ SB, 46.

⁸ SB, 39-40, 50-51.

⁹ SB, 41-42, 91-93.

¹⁰ SB, see, for example, 180-81.

¹¹ Cornforth, Maurice. *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 61, 72.

¹² SB, 140-1.

¹³ SB, 141.

¹⁴ SB, 143-44.

¹⁵ The early, middle, and mature works refer respectively to *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, *The German Ideology*, and the *Grundrisse*.

¹⁶ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in Easton and Guddat, *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 287.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 287-89.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 289-96.

- ¹⁹ Ollman, Bertell. *Alienation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). Professor Ollman agrees with our assessment. See 73 ff. of his text for a summary of this topic.
- ²⁰ Karl Marx. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* in Easton and Guddat, *Writings of the Young Marx*, op. cit., 312.
- ²¹ Karl Marx. *The German Ideology*, in Easton and Guddat, *Writings of the Young Marx*, op. cit., 417-18. For the convenience of the reader we are here citing the Easton and Guddat sections of *The German Ideology*.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 418.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 419.
- ²⁴ McLellen, David, editor and translator of *The Grundrisse* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). Carol Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980).
- ²⁵ Althusser, Louis, *For Marx* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970).
- ²⁶ McLellen, David, editor and translator of *The Grundrisse*, op. cit., 8.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 12-13.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 13.
- ³² Karl Marx. *Grundrisse*, op. cit., 360-61, quoted by Carol Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1980), 77.
- ³³ Marx. *Grundrisse*, 389-99, quoted by Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*, 79.
- ³⁴ Marx. *Grundrisse*, 360, quoted by Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology*, 71.
- ³⁵ Marx, *Contribution to Political Economy*, translated by N.I. Stone (London, 1904), quoted by Gyorgy Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness*, translated by R. Livingston (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971), 9.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx 273; Lukacs, 9.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx 291-92; Lukacs, 13.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, *Wage and Labor Capital*, in SWI 83; quoted by Lukacs in *History and Class Consciousness Ibid.*, 13.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, Lukacs, 13.