

7. HOW AND WHY SEEING IS NOT BELIEVING

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ABSTRACT. In this paper I attempt to show, first, that doxastic theories of seeing must be rejected on at least two counts: paradoxically, they commit us on the one hand to Pyrrhonic skepticism and on the other they fail to account for cases of defeasibility that a theory of perceiving ought to account for. So much for the "why". As for the "how" I attempt to show that a non-doxastic conception of seeing can be formulated, with the aid of theoretic interpretations of the perceiving of brute animals, which succeeds in overcoming the above two failings of doxastic theories.

I have compressed within the following argument, in order to give them concrete form, the several considerations that, taken together, seem to immediately¹ and conclusively show, not that seeing merely makes for believing (which is how one ordinarily understands the adage, "Seeing is believing") but (how the doxastic theory of seeing understands it) that either all seeing is nothing but believing or that all seeing at least involves believing. Here is that argument:

I say that I see a tree. But I am aware that one condition that needs to be satisfied if I am truly to be said to see a tree and not merely that I thought I saw a tree but did not is that there exists a tree. Thus, should I claim to see a tree but later discovered there was no tree I should have to deny that I had seen a tree. But should I then be asked why I had said I saw a tree I should have to say, "because I believed there was a tree." Hence, when I originally claimed to see a tree I believed there was a tree; and if I wanted to speak the truth in now saying, "I see a tree," I should have to grant that I believe there is a tree. Indeed, if I said that I did not believe there was a tree, I could not coherently say, except by putting *see* in quotes, that I see a tree. Thus, if I see a tree I believe there is a tree; and if I do not believe there is a tree I am debarred from saying that I see a tree. But what holds for my seeing a tree holds for my seeing anything else. Hence, roughly speaking, all seeing is nothing but believing or all seeing at least involves believing.

Now, on even close inspection this argument, henceforth,² "argument A," and its doxastic conclusion certainly seem to command assent. Taken individually, each of its premises appears to state no more than a truism. Taken together, they appear to be related to the conclusion in a deductively valid manner. Therefore, the conclusion must be true! I have plainly announced in the title of this paper, however, that I reject A's conclusion. I have mentioned a "why" and a "how."

In my "why" I shall, for one thing, try to show that A's conclusion for all its appearance of being sound--that is, being validly deduced from true premises--contains implications that make its denial incumbent upon us; and, in spite of their appearance of being truisms, so do its premises. For another thing, I shall try to show that, given even its most plausible interpretation, A's doxastic conclusion fails to account for certain logical facts that a correct theory would have to account for. And finally I shall want to show that A's appearance of validity is also illusory. More particularly, I shall try to show that the sweeping generalization made in A's conclusion only seems to follow from A's premises because, in them, we have not instantiated or made reference to *seeing without believing*. Thus, A is not unlike a hasty generalization, proceeding from an inspection of some kinds of seeing to a stipulation regarding all seeing. Because A manages to slip this omission past our gaze, it can seem to obtain its conclusion with a clear title.

In my "how" I make the promise of showing that a conception of seeing without belief can be proposed and defended. I speak of a promise here because it is by no means self-evident that such a conception is available. As for my reference to a defense, I shall think it sufficient if, having formed such a conception, I can show that it at least surmounts the objections which force us to abandon the doxastic conception of seeing.

SOME PRESSING DIFFICULTIES IN A'S CONCLUSION

Let us consider first the strong form of the doxastic thesis, namely, that all seeing is nothing but believing: which is to say, that all that seeing is, is a set of beliefs.³ The standard doxastic version of this equation (taking Pitcher in *A Theory of Perception* as proposing the standard view) would be: seeing is merely non-conscious believing, where non-conscious believing = having a disposition to behave in certain ways.⁴ I shall call this the standard, strong thesis (or, SST, for short). The non-standard doxastic version of the same equation would be: seeing is merely conscious believing, where conscious believing = having an experienced belief or set of beliefs (or, NST, for short). I shall consider the claims of SST first and then those of NST.

The Inherent Absurdity of SST

Let us suppose that seeing is just a disposition or set of dispositions to behave in certain ways, however produced. Thus, seeing at time₁ a tree = having at time₁ a disposition or set of dispositions to behave in certain ways. Let us suppose that this behavior is to occur at time₁ + 1 minute. Aside from the behavior occurring under its name a disposition is nothing experiential. Thus, my seeing a tree at time₁ is, at time₁, an experiential blank. But an experiential blank in no way at

all resembles seeing. As an analysis of seeing, therefore, SST utterly fails.

The Inherent Absurdity of NST

Let us suppose that seeing is just a set of conscious or experienced beliefs. Thus, seeing at time₁ a tree = having at time₁ a set of conscious or experienced beliefs, that and nothing more. Counting black and white as colors, whatever else conscious beliefs are they are not colored, nor do we obtain an acquaintance of colors merely by believing. Thus, if seeing were merely sets of conscious or experienced beliefs, seeing at time₁ a tree would have to be a seeing which at time₁ was, with respect to color, a perfect blank. In short (still counting black and white as colors), we should, in seeing a tree, see nothing colored nor have any experience of color. But such a colorless blank in no way resembles seeing. As an analysis of seeing, therefore NST utterly fails.

The Weak Form of the Doxastic Thesis

We might read "All seeing is believing" in the way that we read most categorical A propositions, e.g., "All men are animals." In saying that all men are animals we do not mean that men are just that and nothing more. So in saying "All seeing is believing" we do not mean that seeing is just believing and nothing more. Seeing is always believing but also something additional. But what?

Might we say, "Seeing is always conscious or non-conscious belief + the presence of a visible object?" Since the doxastic theories that I mean to be attacking have as one of their chief aims the refutation of the claim that there is an object given in sense perception, we shall not want, in the present context, to say "+ the presence of a visible object." But "+" what, then? We do not want to land back in the sightlessness of SST and NST. Perhaps this will have to do: "+ visualness." That is, we might maintain that when one sees with one's eyes there is present *visualness*, which, being nothing more determinate, cannot itself be an object; thus, cannot be the *object given* of traditional theory. As for the phenomenological appearance of there being objects in our visual field we might, deprived of objects given, explain their existence in this way: the beliefs co-existent with visualness form the latter into objects, just as fear at night can form the blackness surrounding us into objects: witches, hobgoblins, etc.

It seems to me that this formulation of seeing would adhere with the objectives of the doxastic theories in question, while serving to meet the objections raised above against SST and NST. Hence, we might not unfairly interpret "All seeing is believing" as follows: in the standard version, "All seeing is non-conscious belief + visualness" (henceforth, "standard weak theory" or SWT) and in the non-standard version, "All seeing is conscious belief + visualness" (or NWT, for short).

ARGUMENTS AGAINST SWT AND NWT

As I indicated in my previous brief sketch of whys and hows, I am particularly interested in summoning as my witnesses against doxas-

tic theory of perception arguments that seem to militate with equal force against my particular account of seeing without believing (henceforth, SWB for short). For this reason, I shall not deal with many sorts of objections to SWT or NWT that in a purely critical review would deserve a hearing. For instance, it is arguable that in the case of SWT we shall have to assume that perceivers possess innately all the dispositions involved in every different case of seeing, e.g., my seeing this tree versus my seeing that tree; and in the case of NWT, we shall have to assume that perceivers possess innately all the conscious beliefs involved in every different case of seeing, e.g., my seeing this tree versus my seeing that tree. For if there is no particular given in sense-perception, our beliefs, whether conscious or non-conscious, cannot be derived from our perceivings; and how else, then, do we possess them except innately? But this onerous commitment of SWT and NWT is not one that affects or attaches to SWB. All that needs to be considered innate, according to SWB, is the ability to see.

What will prove to be a grave challenge to SWB is to account for the defeasibility of seeing; that is, the fact that having sincerely claimed to see a tree, for example, one may later be forced to deny that one had seen a tree and assert that one only thought one had. This is also a problem for SWT and NWT; indeed, as we shall discover, an insuperable one. So a part of my "why" will consist in what might be called "the problem of defeasibility."

Another part will consist in the problem of Pyrrhonic Skepticism. No one, I should agree with Hume, can be a convinced Pyrrhonic skeptic. And that is not just because our natures will not let us but (here I disagree with Hume) because the truth will not let us. As this part of my "why," I shall want to argue that SWT and NWT commit us to Pyrrhonic Skepticism while SWB does not.

SWT AND THE DEFEASIBILITY PROBLEM

In two ways SWT seems to prove incapable of accounting for the fact that, as illustrated in argument A itself, having sincerely claimed to see a tree we may later rightly admit that we did not see a tree; we only thought we had (this is what I refer to as our seeing's being defeasible).

Suppose I claim at time₁ to see a tree: this means, according to SWT, that at time₁ I am evincing a disposition which is in effect my belief that there is a tree and that there is (or was) present to my consciousness visualness (whatever exactly that is). Can I be mistaken that visualness is present to my consciousness? Presumably, no more than I might think I was seeing when I was in fact hearing. If there is no given tree--if seeing a tree is, aside from the presence of indeterminate visualness, merely a disposition, e.g., to say, "I see a tree" and I say, "I see a tree," can I be mistaken in saying "I see a tree"? How can that be when the tree seen is constituted in effect by my disposition to say "I see a tree"? But suppose at time₂ I say, "I did not see a tree at time₁"? But would my saying this at time₂ actually show that I was mistaken at time₁ in saying "I see a tree"? Would it show that I had not seen a tree, remembering that seeing the tree was just having visualness present and a disposition to behave in certain ways, e.g., to say, "I see a tree"? The case cannot be compared to the case where, as or-

dinarily understood, having a disposition to sneeze, I say, "I am going to sneeze" and say, "I was mistaken; I am not going to sneeze." For, as ordinarily understood, the sneeze occurs as something given in hearing or otherwise or it does not. Imagine, though, that the heard sneeze is conceived as essentially a belief and that as a disposition to behave. Then, having that disposition (along with an indeterminate auditory experience) I did indefeasibly sneeze!

It might also be pointed out that according to SWT my seeing a tree is simply the presence of visualness plus a belief, whether conscious or unconscious does not matter. The point is: a sincere claim to believe that P is not defeasible. For example, if I now, at time₁, claim that I believe that P, and my claim is sincerely made, nothing that subsequently occurs can alter the fact that at time₁ I believed that P. Thus, by the present theory, my sincere claim to see a tree can no more be mistaken or later denied than my sincere claim that I believe there is a tree. What is sauce for the one is sauce for the other.

I grant: I am here operating with a conception of belief that antedates and remains untouched by certain psychoanalytic theory. Influenced by the latter, we might be led to say, e.g., at time₁, "I believe that my father is a kind person," and at time₂, "I see now that I was wrong to say I believed he was a kind person. I really believed no such thing." The possibility of such defeasible belief patently rests, however, on the supposition of there being perceptual givens. Only then can there be perceptual non-givens; and thus, a "myself" that was existent but of which I was not aware, to which I can predicate as my own, beliefs contrary to those I sincerely avowed. In that it denies a perceptual given, except for something as indeterminate as mere visualness, SWT has to treat belief as indefeasible.

NWT AND THE DEFEASIBILITY PROBLEM

If my seeing a tree at time₁ is a set of conscious beliefs + the presence of visualness then, in effect, my seeing a tree at time₁ consists of my consciously believing various things at time₁ + the presence of visualness. If visualness is present I know it is in the same way that I know that I am seeing and not hearing. If I have a conscious belief I know what my conscious belief is. For example, it would be incoherent for me to say that I had a conscious belief but I did not know what my conscious belief was. Thus, according to NWT, if I see a tree at time₁ I know that I do. But then it follows that I can have no title to later claim that I did not see a tree at time₁; I only thought I had. Hence, NWT, like SWT, fails to account for the defeasibility of seeing claims.

SWT AND NWT AND PYRRHONIC SKEPTICISM

Although, looked at from one angle, as above, SWT and NWT would seem to oppose skepticism (for if claims to seeing, according to each, are indefeasible, it may look as if no basis for a skeptical argument remains), looked at from another angle both support Pyrrhonic Skepticism unequivocally. According to both SWT and NWT my seeing a tree essentially resolves into my believing there is a tree. Now should I say in a visual context, "I believe there is a tree," I am not entitled at the same

time to say, "I see a tree;" I am only entitled to say, "I think I see a tree" or "Perhaps I see a tree." But if I am entitled only to say "I think I see a tree" I am not entitled to say, "There is for certain a tree." How, then, am I to conclude that there is indeed a tree? Every attempt to use my senses can only conclude in another "I think I see" (or "I think I hear" or "I think I touch"). Thus, I might say, "I think I see branches," but my thinking I see branches does not allow me to conclude that there are branches and therefore a tree.

It would appear, therefore, that with respect to Pyrrhonic Skepticism SWT and NWT are, ironically, very much like the standard sense-data theories they mean to replace under the banners of anti-skepticism. The latter provide an indefeasible sensory claim, "I seem to see a tree" or "I sense a red sense-datum" or "I am appeared to redly," but one that never permits us to claim knowledge of an external world, as in "I see a tree." This familiar outcome of standard sense-data theories may help explain how it is that from one angle, which enjoins only a subjective account, "I believe this" or "I believe that," SWT and NWT seem to oppose Pyrrhonic Skepticism, when from another, which enjoins an objective or intersubjective account, "There is this" or "There is that," they seem to embrace it. If one wished to be malicious one might say: they oppose Pyrrhonic Skepticism where it does not matter (for what can it matter if one does possess a solipsistically circumscribed knowledge, were that possible) and where it does matter--with respect to knowledge of an intersubjective or external world--they embrace it. With such friends, one might then maliciously add, who needs enemies?

THE PYRRHONIC ENTAILMENT OF A'S PREMISES

At the commencement of this paper I proposed that, though they seemed to be mere truisms, the premises of A, like its conclusion, contain implications that make their denial incumbent upon us. My particular charge is that they also, like SWT and NWT, commit us to Pyrrhonic Skepticism. It is especially important for our purposes to pinpoint the main engine of this commitment of theirs. I want, therefore, to consider in some depth the claim made in the first three sentences of A. This amounts to the seeming truism that when I initially say that I see a tree I presuppose the existence of the tree.

Such seeing has been termed "veridical seeing." This has sometimes been called the "strong sense of 'see'" and philosophers opposed to skepticism have sometimes argued that this strong sense of "see," that is, veridical seeing, is the word's primary or basic sense and that, being in consequence presupposed by "deceptive senses" of "see," it provides a Cartesian foundation for a knowledge of an external world; for (they have argued) if deceptive seeing presupposes veridical seeing, we have to veridically see before we can deceptively see and hence must already have a knowledge of of an external world. Thus, by taking veridical seeing as basic seeing, we escape Pyrrhonic Skepticism.

But is veridical seeing, taken as basic seeing, really the answer to Pyrrhonic Skepticism? Far from its being that, it is, I think it can be shown, one of the chief, if not the chief, progenitors of that Gorgon-faced monstrosity.

Let us suppose that at time₁ we claim to veridically see a tree. Entailed by this claim is the claim that the tree exists. If it turns out that the tree averred to be seen does not exist then we have not (veridically) seen a tree. We are therefore logically permitted to ask at time₁, "Do we know that the tree averred to be seen in fact exists?" Indeed, it now has to seem of the greatest moment that we ask and answer this question. The fate of an external world balances on our answer. But given that veridical seeing is basic seeing the only answer that it seems possible to make is the melancholy one that we cannot know that the tree exists; for to say that we know that it does because we see it, which is certainly the best reply we can make, begs the very question at issue. Thus, not being in a position to know that we do veridically see, yet seeming to veridically see, we are reduced to having to grant that at time₁ we are entitled only to say that we seem to see a tree or that we have an experience of seeing a tree. According to our present reasoning, though, our seeing at any other particular time can be no more than a seeming to see. The question therefore arises, "How can we ever arrive at a certain claim to veridically see when our grounds for confirming such a claim can only be more seeming to sees (or seeming to hears or seeming to touch)?" Ostensibly, the answer has to be, "We cannot."

If I say, for example, "I seem to see a man in the distance," and later can only say, "I seem to see a human face," I have not as yet entitled myself to say, "I see a man." It may possibly be that seeming-to-sees predictively tying in with other seeming-to-sees make it more and more probable that we veridically see but like Achilles' increments of distance traversed in Zeno's paradox which never get him to the tortoise these increments of seeming-to-sees can never reach with certainty the external world of veridical seeing. In fact, in view of the infinite number of possible past, present, and future seeming-to-sees that theoretically have to be taken into account, except that we interject the supposition of an initial probability or some other purely *ad hoc* levering device, we shall not even be able to increase probabilities. Indeed, even probability vanishes, since one number placed over infinity provides no greater ratio than any other placed over infinity.

It will be recognized that these skeptical conclusions that issue from the initial premise of argument A that veridical seeing is basic seeing are the very same that have haunted from the beginning philosophy's attempted description of perception. Yet, contrary to what these philosophical conclusions tell us our seeing a tree is not, save in exceptional circumstances, a problematic seeing; nor can we in actuality make ourselves believe that it is. We still say, when not theorizing, "I see a tree"--not, "I probably see a tree" or "I seem to see a tree" or "I have an experience of seeing a tree." We still, moreover, disallow claims of seeing; but we could never do so on the basis of problematic seeings. Suppose at time₁ I say, "I seem to see a snake" and at time₂ I can only say, "I seem to see a stick": do I now possess the title for saying, "I was wrong at time₁; what I saw was a stick?" Surely not.

Can we possibly want to give up the practice of disallowing claims of veridically seeing? I doubt very much that we can; for let us try: we shall find that we shall have to pretend that a stick we took for a snake was not a stick but a snake, our original claim of seeing a snake not any longer being subject to dismissal; but that, among innumerable other things of the same sort, is something we neither can in fact pre-

tend nor want to pretend. Above all, however, we cannot give up this practice because of any solicitation on the part of A, since, in bold face, A itself appeals in its premises to the very same practice. But in doing that and yet forcing upon us only problematic seeings A would seem to argue in this fashion: X (i.e., "The practice of disallowing claims of seeing is legitimate"), therefore, not-X. But one cannot coherently argue, X, therefore, not-X. Obviously, something must be hay-wire in A. But what?

OUR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND OUR ELABORATION OF SWB (SEEING WITHOUT BELIEVING)

I want to suggest that A itself is not so much the source of our troubles as the subject matter over which it operates. This subject matter, the human condition of seeing, is shot through with so many specious appearances and complicating factors that almost any attempt to get clear descriptively as to what its actual structures are is bound to result in failure. But if this contention is correct, how can we possibly proceed?

The examination of the human condition of seeing is a part of philosophical anthropology. If philosophical anthropology cannot provide the answer we want perhaps (let me propose) philosophical zoology can. At least (let me propose) an excursion into philosophical zoology may help us put certain elements of the human condition of seeing in their right place and order and so allow us, by further judicious interpolations, to discern what is going on in A that should not be going on. The consideration that prompts some optimism in this regard is that in brute animals a simpler condition of seeing ought to obtain than obtains in the case of human beings. But though a simpler sort of seeing it should still undeniably be seeing; for, after all, brute animals are as primitive as flies and beetles see and see just as well as ourselves. One hardly supposes, though, that such animals entertain, for example, experienced beliefs. Thus, one complicating factor would be missing from our subject matter.

In addition, being in part brute animals ourselves, witness the fact that our older brains, the paleomammalian and reptilian, still function in their own terms,⁵ it may well be that we share in the kind of seeing that brute animals engage in. If, then, we can achieve some success in describing the simpler condition of seeing in brute animals, we might be able to transpose our results to the more complicated human condition and so work out the latter's actual structure. This likelihood, it seems to me, justifies the zoological excursion that I now mean to undertake. Instead, however, of dealing with flies and beetles I recommend that we select as our subject of examination a particular dog, Towser. For one thing, we are more intimately acquainted with dogs than with flies and beetles. For another, a dog is close enough to us in its physiology and repertoires to allow us to make comparisons with a confidence that we might not be able to sustain in the case of flies and beetles.

Let us, then, substitute the seeing of our dog, Towser, in place of our own human seeing in the following kind of circumstance upon which Argument A palpably rests: at time₁ a person claims to see a tree but at time₂, approaching what he thought was a tree, he finds no tree and

so asserts that, though he had believed he saw a tree at time₁, he actually had not. For instance, at time₁, Towser is barking at a wall in just the way that she barks at cats. We opine that she is hallucinating the experience of seeing cats. At time₂, having run over to the wall, she has ceased barking. We say that she has discovered her mistake.

But from Towser's own perspective was there a mistake? Was there an "I was deceived"? If there were, Towser would have to know what it was to be deceived, but neither when barking at the wall nor in her later silence does she tender us any grounds whatsoever for thinking that she suspects she has been deceived or that she knows what it is to be deceived. For example, in her silence she does not shake her head wonderingly or look at us as if asking for an explanation. She merely stops barking and sets off on new and unassociated interests. She lies down on the rug or flops on a chair or goes to the door to be let out.

To go by all the evidence we have, therefore, Towser does not herself veridically see or deceptively see. Towser simply sees. Seeing cats on a wall and seeing cats in the yard are all of one piece; what we might call "primitive seeing" or "seeing_p". This is a seeing which is not either veridical or hallucinatory or delusory or some other form of deceptive seeing. It contains no such epistemic divisions within itself. Thus, it is not an "experience of seeing" or a "seeming to see," since to say these things is already to import the distinction between veridical and deceptive forms of seeing. Our contention is that this seeing_p is the kind of seeing that flies and beetles, as well as Towser, engage in.

A further aspect of Towser's seeing_p is that it is not infused with or accompanied by beliefs. In what immediately follows I shall restrict this claim to conscious or experienced beliefs (henceforth, believing_e or beliefs_e); that is to say, the sort of experience which we express or denote by the word "belief" that consists in something like the assentive entertainment of one proposition as opposed to another, as when I now believe that it will rain tomorrow as opposed to that it will not rain tomorrow. It will help us to sort things out in their right order and place by initially restricting our claim and its supporting considerations in this way. Later, on the basis of our findings concerning seeing_p and believing_e, I shall first propose the possibility that seeing_p intrinsically involves dispositional beliefs, or belief construed as a disposition, and secondly, refute that contention.⁶

For the present, then, I shall limit my contentions to the claim that, because Towser does not entertain propositions or their use-equivalent counterparts (for example, whatever a deaf person, knowing no language, entertains when having a conscious belief), she does not believe_e. Thus, when she saw_p cats on the wall she saw without believing_e that there were cats. I am being perhaps somewhat dogmatic on this score. But if we suppose that Towser can believe_e we shall have to suppose, contrary to evident fact, that she would be aware of the distinction between veridical and deceptive seeing and, being aware of it, make use of it; for, if in seeing cats on a wall she believed there existed cats on the wall, she could also, on finding that there were no cats, believe there had not been any and thus conclude that she had been deceived. In addition, if we suppose that Towser can believe_e what is to prevent us from supposing that flies and beetles and even small mites entertain experienced beliefs and yet surely we shall not

want to do that. We should then open the flood-gate of humanizing every brute and insect and that is surely as ridiculous as treating them all as being nothing but machines or robots.⁷

Finally, we shall want to take note of the following fact. When Towser sees_p, she sometimes acts in a certain way with respect to what is seen. For instance, if Towser sees_p a bone under the sofa, she moves in the direction of the bone: call this motion, M. Now this motion, , which in the case of Towser is occasioned solely by an instance of seeing_p, can, in the case of a human being, be occasioned solely by an instance of believing_e. Thus, a person might believe_e that there was a bone under the sofa and because of that belief but not because of seeing the bone he might move in the direction of the bone. Given M, it might therefore seem to us that there had to be a belief_e. What the case of Towser shows is that this is not so. For as we have previously pointed out, to go by the best evidence, her seeing is not accompanied by any believing_e.

Thus, inserting Towser's condition of seeing into our schema of time₁ and time₂, we have something like this: at time₁ Towser sees_p cats on a wall (thus sees cats without having the belief_e that there are cats), which occasions M₁, her barking; at time₂, Towser sees_p a blank wall instead of cats (thus, sees a wall without having either the belief_e that there is a wall or the belief_e that there are no cats), which occasions M₂, her ceasing to bark. This, and nothing more, is what comprises Towser's comparatively simple seeing at any time as her seeing exists in its own right uninterpreted by human outsiders.

It is, of course, not only possible but almost inevitable that a human audience will humanize Towser's seeing, as when it says that Towser thought she saw cats on the wall but was hallucinating; but while it cannot be denied that this description is true, for its truth-conditions, e.g., Towser barked at a wall as if there were cats on it but there were not any cats on it, are fulfilled, it has to be also realized that these truth-conditions are our spectator's reconstruction of events on the basis of our human ability to entertain experienced beliefs, and these reconstructions are not a part of Towser's own primitive seeing. What confuses the issue, among other things, is that as human beings we are going to constantly impose the language and structure of our human seeing upon Towser's seeing_p. This superimposition is all the more natural since we can arrive at Towser's seeing_p only by a process of what might be called "theoretic de-construction;" we are not a direct party to Towser's seeing_p.

Insofar as we ourselves, though, are brute animals, do we not directly experience seeings_p and hence possess an experiential and not a merely theoretic ground for our postulation of Towser's seeing_p? This, as we shall discover, is a question that lacks the simple answer that it might appear to have. But before we deal with either it or a resolution of argument A we shall want to segregate for purposes of explanatory comparison the following two advances in repertoire and content that characterize the human condition of seeing as contrasted with the brute animal's, given that our account of the latter is essentially correct. One of these is the embodiment in our human vision of a distinction between veridical and hallucinatory or other deceiving forms of seeing. The second, which is inextricably involved in the former, is the embodiment of belief; for in order to suppose we veridically see we have to believe

that what we see exists; and in order to suppose that we deceptively see, we have to believe that what we see does not exist.

It hardly needs saying that these are not the only such advances in repertoire and content that characterize the human as opposed to the brute condition of seeing. Conceptualization, for example, is another. Thus, unlike Towser presumably, a human being can see a cat as a species of animal; that is, as a cat versus *squirrel*, *dog*, etc. The two advances I have mentioned, however, are the only ones that need be incorporated in the present investigation and are thus the only ones that I shall. And for that reason, and because each represents a progression in visual sophistication, we might term the human condition of seeing, as embodying them, sophisticated seeing or *seeings*. In short, by "*seeings*," we shall simply mean seeing embodying the veridical/deceptive distinction and some belief.

Now as thinking is something different in kind from mere habit it might strike us that *seeings* is something different in kind from seeing. And to the extent that theoretic content and criteria can and do phenomenologically impregnate our observations this impression no doubt contains some phenomenological appearance of truth. The perception of a goal kicked in football makes, for example, a different impression on us from that made by seeing a ball merely kicked between two up-rights. What we see seems to be different. Yet, were we to learn that a game had not been in progress--that the kick between the up-rights was just for fun--we should not want to claim that what we had then seen with our eyes was different from what we saw now, another ball being kicked through the up-rights and its being known to us that it was being kicked merely in fun. Similarly: though the presence of beliefs and logical criteria in *seeings* as contrasted with seeing, may endow the former with a phenomenologically different appearance or aspect from the latter, our *seeings*, as actual seeing with our eyes, is, I want to maintain, and it will be important to maintain, no different intrinsically from our seeing. And this, it seems to me, is as much as proved by the skeptic's being able to successfully argue that there is no intrinsic difference between veridical seeing, *qua* seeing, and deceptive forms of seeing as such. The implication of there being no intrinsic difference between the two is that it is extraneous facts which determine whether a particular instance of seeing is veridical or deceptive seeing and that seeing itself is just that: in other words, seeing.

But, then, just what are veridical and deceptive seeing? They are, I should like to say, a sort of logical or theoretical construct "out of" *seeings*. When our *seeings*, for reasons that will be dealt with, demand an interpretive superstructure, we supply one by introducing a logical fiction which posits the existence of belief from some past seeing, and in terms of that belief, a distinction between veridical and deceptive seeing, which themselves involve actual beliefs. Thus, roughly speaking, *seeings* is merely seeing, construed in terms of a logical invention deriving from the human capacity, as opposed to a brute animal's, to entertain beliefs.

How this logical superstructure gets applied might be illustrated as follows. I am asked by a practical joker if I see a rabbit in the cage a little distance in front of me--not enough distance to occasion, however, any hesitation in answering on my part. I say, yes, I see a rabbit. Go closer, I am told, and see if you still see one. I still see

one. I move closer to the cage when, lo and behold, all I see is an empty cage. I then say, "I don't know what happened. I must have been hallucinating. I thought I saw a rabbit but I have to confess I didn't." The practical joker then asks, "Are you sure you weren't lying when you said you saw a rabbit?" I reply, "Oh, not at all. I absolutely believed there was a rabbit in the cage." But now the practical joker, with a great laugh, reveals to me that there is a curtain with a spring that, faster than the eye could see, was released when I approached the cage, hiding the rabbit from my view but doing so without my being able to detect what had happened. The rabbit, he points gleefully, is still in the cage. I then say, "So, I really did see a rabbit after all. I was not having a hallucination or some such thing."

In reviewing this sequence of seeings and claims, we shall want to postulate, in accordance with our account's dictates, these instances of seeings_p: at time *a*, when I first said, "Yes, I see a rabbit," my seeing a rabbit; at time *b*, my subsequent seeing an empty cage; and at time *c*, my finally seeing a curtain with a spring and behind the curtain a rabbit. We shall similarly want to postulate as instances of seeing_s the following: at time *b*, when I withdrew my claim at time *a* of seeing (now, seeing_s or veridically seeing) a rabbit and replaced it with the admission of having deceptively seen (hence, seeing_s) at time *a* a rabbit (because, clearly, what visually occurred at time *b* did not conform to what should have, had my assertion at time *a* constituted a claim of veridical seeing). In the same way, at time *c*, I re-asserted my claim at time *a* of seeing (now seeing_s or veridically seeing) a rabbit and threw out my admission at time *b* of deceptively seeing or seeing_s a rabbit (because what visually occurred at time *c* conformed with what should have occurred, had my assertion at time *a* constituted a claim of veridical seeing or seeing_s, and with a refutation of my admission at time of deceptively (hence, seeing_s) seeing a rabbit. Thus, generalizing, we might say: where there is an instance of seeing_p, *Y*, which conflicts with what would have been the belief_e-claims of a previous instance of seeing_p, *X*, had *X* been an instance of veridical seeing (which, in temporal fact, it was not), then *X* is construed as an instance of deceptive seeing, e.g., an instance of hallucinatory seeing. On the other hand, if *Y* conforms to those belief_e-claims, then *X* is construed as an instance of veridical seeing. Palpably, therefore, *veridical seeing* and *deceptive seeing* are theoretical or logical constructions out of primitive seeings, operating to sort out, in terms of coherency, relations that would implicatively obtain between primitive seeings were they (but they are not) sophisticated seeings, i.e., veridical/deceptive seeings, possessing belief_e-claims.

I have been using subjunctives: "relations that would implicatively obtain between primitive seeings were they (but they are not) sophisticated seeings," and so on; and these now need an explanation.

As I am construing things, human beings, when not reflecting, when no doubt or question has intruded, when they are going about whatever they are going about in uninterrupted, habitual ways, see_p. These human seeings_p, exactly like Towser's, do not embody the veridical/deceptive distinction and hence, though they may be accompanied by accidental beliefs_e (for instance, seeing_p a car arrive I may exclaim, "I believe that Tom has arrived"), they do not embody and cannot embody the particular belief_e that there exists what is seen. That is, my seeing_p a tree does not and cannot embody the belief_e that there exists that tree, since if it did it would not be seeing_p but seeing_s. This par-

ticular belief_e belonging to the veridical/deceptive distinction I shall term "belief_{ev}" (belief_e of veridicalness). According to our contentions, then, a human seeing_p will not embody the veridical/deceptive distinction or the belief_{ev}, though it may (but need not) be accompanied by some accidental belief_e.

When, however, sequences of seeings_p (or other sensory perceptions_p) laid down in past experience and practice as habits are ruptured or disordered, or when the visual situation is so ambiguous as to trigger conflicting engagements of habits, or when philosophical reflection intrudes with its inherently meta-level doubts and disruptions, a change from seeing_p to seeings_s is contextually called for and, quite as naturally and condignly as we raise our feet to climb stairs, we make the change. What happens when we do is very much like what happens when, in Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms,⁸ one paradigm is replaced by another.

Say that at time₁ we see_p X (some object). Say that at time₂ we see_s X. We then reinterpret what took place at time₁ in terms of the theoretic construction comprising the superstructure of seeings_s. To that extent, what happens is like what happens when one Kuhnian paradigm is replaced by another. But there is this important difference. While seeings_s is something like a theoretic or logical construction, seeing_p is not. Seeing_p is simply seeing as it is *per se*. Thus, what actually happened at time₁ was seeing_p; not something interpreted as seeing_p. Thus, at time₁ no belief_{ev} in fact occurred. Our talking as if there were at that time the occurrence of a belief_{ev} (as when we say that we had not lied; we had believed there was a tree) is a logical fiction of sorts; the same sort of logical fiction as when we refer to Tower as having believed (or, better, thought) there were cats on the wall or having not really seen cats but only thought she had; hence, our use of countrary-to-fact subjunctives.

My claim, then, is that not only is human seeing sometimes seeing_p, but basically it is seeing_p, seeings_s being logical constructions out of seeings_p. The nature of what has gone wrong in argument A according to our contention follows almost immediately. What has gone wrong in argument A, as illustrated in its first three sentences, is that seeings_s has tacitly been adopted as basic human seeing.⁹ From this putting an epistemic cart before its epistemic horse arises, I would maintain, both the specter of Pyrrhonism and the companion problem of the indefeasibility of SWT and NWT. But these contentions of ours, it is clear, can convince no one if our theory of seeing, SWB, makes no better headway across the same terrain. But if it does, then it would seem clear that our present charges are vindicated. So let us now see if it does or does not.

As we previously indicated, when one takes seeings_s as basic seeing and hence takes basic seeing as already containing the veridical/deceptive distinction, one will have to abstract as the common denominator of veridical and deceptive seeing a seeing that, borrowing its status from the doubt or ambiguity that forces upon us the veridical/deceptive distinction, falls short of veridical seeing: for example, "seemings to see." Given this short-fall, as it might be called, Pyrrhonism has to triumph. Every case of seeing is, by definition, now infected with doubt.

But what entrance can Pyrrhonism make into seeing_p? Seeing_p does not contain the veridical/deceptive distinction. Thus, it suggests no common denominator falling on the side of doubt, as any common denominator of veridical and deceptive seeing will have to; indeed, it suggests nothing like a common denominator at all.

Seeing_p contains no belief_{ev}. Thus, belief cannot inject its own intrinsic doubt into seeing_p's blood-stream (as it were). And containing no belief, it cannot be a locus for confirmation or disconfirmation. Presented such a bare, smooth surface how is Pyrrhonism to take argumentative hold? As a concrete example will show, it is not able to.

For instance, we see_p a tree; next, we see_p (on approaching) its branches. The latter instance of seeing_p is not a confirmation of the former instance of seeing, as it would be were the first construed as veridical seeing or seeings_s. It is not a confirmation because no belief_{ev}, which alone would allow a confirmation, attaches to our seeings_p and thus to our seeing_p a tree; no more than to Towser's seeing_p cats on a wall or seeing_p no cats on the same wall. But by the same token--because these seeings_p are just seeings and nothing more or less--they can confirm or disconfirm claims to veridical seeings or seeings_s without impugning their own right to do so. And it is precisely on this rational foundation that we proceed in practice. Thus, the question arising as to whether what I see in the distance is a man or a small tree--in short, my seeing being forced into the mold of seeing_r--I determine, on going forward and seeing_p a human face, that it is a man and not a tree; and there the matter ends.

Just one puzzle, perhaps, remains over to be disposed of. We surely do not want to maintain that seeing_p is without any commitment to the existence of objects. Just too plainly, brute animals, acting on what they see_p, conform their behavior to reality, and so do we. But how can seeing_p commit us to the existence of objects except that it contain a belief_{ev}? The answer, I think, is something like this. Let us again abbreviate the motions, trains of habit, and so on, that are occasioned by and connected with an instance of seeing_p by the letter, 'M'. Since M constitutes what would in the case of an instance of seeings_s be occasioned by the belief_{ev} one can say that, even though no question of existence or non-existence of its object pertains to an instance of seeing_p, nor any thought of existence, its occasioning of M commits us to the existence of the object willy-nilly. Thus, brute animals, and human beings while seeing_p, act quite as they would were they seeings_s and knew that their seeing was veridical, even though they are not engaging in these intellectualizations of seeing.

But here may not dispositional theory of belief interject the following claim; namely, that in linking seeings_p to behavior that could be described as implying the existence of the objects seen we have confirmed the standard weak doxastic theory, which maintains that seeing intrinsically involves believing as dispositionally interpreted? For, if in primitive seeing we postulate a seeing accompanied by instinctive or habitual behavior, M, which, from a sophisticated standpoint gets interpreted as, "the thing seen exists," is that not to say that, where belief is dispositionally interpreted, e.g., as M, seeing_p X is believing that X exists?

Now, from our sophisticated human perspective, we might very well, where, e.g., Towser runs toward a visually distant object wagging her tail and we are not sure of the object's identity, aver that Towser "believes" that what she sees is her master. But if this behavior be supposed to constitute Towser's having a belief herself, then Towser has, in its proper meaning, the belief that the visually distant object is her master. But then Towser would undoubtedly engage in *seeings*, which all the best evidence argues that she does not. Hence, it follows that not only is Towser's *seeing*, not infused with beliefs, but it is not construable, even where accompanied by M, as a manifestation of dispositional belief. Thus, even were, counterfactually, *seeings*, always accompanied by some M, that would not confirm the claims of SWT (standard weak doxastic theory).

Returning, then, to the problem of Pyrrhonic skepticism: I have been arguing so far that in taking *seeings* and, in particular, veridical *seeing*, to be basic *seeing* we are ineluctably forced to embrace the claims of Pyrrhonic skepticism concerning our knowledge of an external world and that *seeing*, taken by itself, resists skeptical penetration or manipulation and therefore, where conjoined with *seeings*, permits absolute confirmations and disconfirmations; for example, of "I *see*_s a man in the distance." In addition, I have argued that *seeings*, when accompanied by M, amount, behavior-wise, to what would be our behavior were we to know that the object of the corresponding *seeing* existed. From these contentions it might possibly be inferred that what I am maintaining is that by taking *seeing* to be basic *seeing* we invalidate the claims of Pyrrhonic skepticism concerning our knowledge of an external world and validate the claim that we know the existence of an external world. That, however, would be a misunderstanding of what we have accomplished and not accomplished.

In taking veridical *seeing* to be basic *seeing*, we "subjectivize" (let it be called) every instance of *seeing* and thus generate the conception of a subjective world versus an objective or external world: so much I agree to and have previously argued. But in taking *seeing* to be basic *seeing*, we neither generate the conception of a subjective world nor that of an objective/external world. All that we do is to allow perceptual claims like, "I *see*_s a man in the distance," to be unequivocally confirmed or disconfirmed. In short, by taking *seeings* to be basic *seeing*, we simply end up in the position of pre-analytic or pre-philosophical ordinary understanding in which both the conception of a purely subjective world and the conception of an external world are notable for their absence. Within the compass of that understanding what are confirmed or disconfirmed in the way of perceptual claims are merely claims to *see*_s one particular object versus another, e.g., a stick and not a snake, or not to have *seen*_s some particular object, not claims to directly see or not see, to know or not know of the existence of, material objects or an external world.

Only in the following way might this pre-philosophical position in which we find ourselves, when taking *seeing* to be basic *seeing*, be used as a philosophical invalidation of Pyrrhonic skepticism concerning our knowledge of an external world. We might insist, on its basis, that references to an external world and material objects perceived or not perceived are all *ab initio* nonsensical or some such thing and that all we are entitled meaningfully to claim is, for instance, that what we see is a stick and not a snake. Except for the move of taking veridical

seeing as basic seeing, we should, though, leave untouched the various arguments and legerdemains of the philosophical skeptic which purport to show that what we see are merely representations of external objects or so-called sense-data, and so on; for instance, his arguments from illusion, his time-lapse arguments, his reification of perceptual perspectives. One might take the high-handed approach of dismissing these other moves and arguments as outright mistakes. Clearly, however, that is not a very satisfying approach. One wants to know what has gone wrong in particular or what is particularly illegitimate in these other arguments and moves; and concerning these further questions, our conception of seeing without believing has, so far as I can make out, nothing to say. Certainly, this would be the case with respect to the skeptic's "scientific" arguments, e.g., his arguments from time-lapse. But whatever philosophical *uses* might be made of our conception of seeing without believing it should be emphasized that the intention of this paper was what was originally stated to be its intention; namely, to show that the doxastic theory of seeing plunges us into various difficulties and that a conception of seeing without believing can be formulated which does not plunge us into those difficulties. We have seen how it does not plunge us into Pyrrhonic skepticism. It remains for us to show, therefore, that it does not disallow what we called defeasibility.

We have already outlined how *seeing_s*'s claims to veridicalness are confirmed and disconfirmed through *seeing_p*. Our theory certainly allows for such defeasibility with no trouble. But we can move the problem back a step. Take our original seeing at time *a* of a rabbit in the practical joker's cage. Now let us suppose that, unlike the original story, in this case there is no rabbit in the cage at time *a*; unbeknownst to us a holographic image of a rabbit has been projected into the cage. At time *b* the practical joker shows us how he has tricked us, leading us to assert that at time *a* we had believed we had seen a rabbit but we actually had not. Call this denial "D" for short. Now D is ostensibly true. It would seem, therefore, that our claim at time *a* to see_p a rabbit was false and therefore shown to be defeasible; yet, our theory insists that we did see_p a rabbit at time *a* and hence it seems to say that a claim to see_p is not defeasible whereas demonstrably it is. In short, our theory seems to be as impaled on this point as the doxastic theory.

As a first step in removing this apparent sticking point in our theory, let us review what, precisely, it has to say about seeing at times *a* and *b*.¹⁰ It says, admittedly, that our seeing at time *a* is a *seeing_p*. It contends that at time *b* we have opted for understanding our seeing at time *a* in terms of a *seeing_s* or the veridical/deceptive distinction. Because, though, we are now at time *b* interpreting our seeing at time *a* in terms of the veridical/deceptive distinction it does not follow that the interpretation took place at time *a* and that therefore at time *a* there occurred, not a *seeing_p* but a *seeing_s*. Indeed, it can be shown that any such supposition is preposterous and untenable. For by the same argument we could claim that all our purported *seeing_p* in the past were *seeing_s* and not *seeing_p*. For given any past seeing, we are liberty to ask, "Was it a veridical seeing?" If nothing else gives us this license, our philosophical enterprise does. Indeed, as we shall note later, philosophical reflection almost inexorably inclines us to. But if all our past *seeing_s* were *seeing_s* instead of merely being interpreted as if they had been *seeing_s* it would follow that every moment of our past *seeing_s* was accompanied by or contained a belief_v. Thus, constantly,

for the last twenty minutes I was entertaining one experienced belief after another! But on the face of it I neither was nor could have been so occupied by experienced beliefs.

But how can it be both necessarily true that we saw_p a rabbit at time *a* rather than saw_s a rabbit, as we have just demonstrated and as our theory contends, and yet false that we did, as *D* with apparent conclusiveness seemingly proclaims at time *b*? What *D*, though, actually denies is that we veridically saw a rabbit at time *a*; it does not really say anything about seeing_p; for *D* issues from the paradigm of the veridical/deceptive distinction which was adopted at time *b* only and seeing_p is not an element of this paradigm though, to be sure, the positings of veridical and deceptive seeing that issue from it are adjudicated in terms of seeings_p. Only thus, we have seen, is Pyrrhonism eluded. Yet, if seeing_p is not an element of the seeings_s paradigm how can seeings_p be relevant to any such adjudication?

First of all, seeing_p is not, it will be remembered, a logical construction, according to our theory. Thus, in the case of seeings_p and seeings_s we are not confronted with two paradigms that are not on speaking terms with one another. Only seeings_s is a logical construction or the creature of a paradigm, and even as such it is still, *qua* seeing, a seeing_p. Thus, although, admittedly, the veridical/deceptive paradigm colors, as it were, all seeing in the hues of seeings_s this does not mean that seeings_p are somehow inaccessible, cut off from contact. How can they be when seeings_s are logical constructions out of seeings_p; in short, are still seeings? Rather, the scenario goes as follows. When I claim to be veridically seeing a tree I anticipate, it is true, some further veridical seeing--for example, the veridical seeing of some branches if I move forward. I move forward. I see_p some branches. I avow, "I did see (veridically see) a tree after all." This seeing_p of some branches, which was not an anticipated seeing of mine, that being a veridical seeing, nonetheless is relevant to the latter and the parent claim's "I see (veridically) a tree," in that the latter, for all their logical superstructure, are at bottom seeings_p. In addition, this seeing_p of some branches, in contrast to the anticipated seeings_s of some branches, is free of any doubt or question. In short, if there is a "strong sense" of the word "see," it applies, not to veridical seeing, but seeing_p. Hence, being the look-alike of the anticipated seeings_s of some branches but a logically stronger seeing (being free of doubt or question) our seeing_p of some branches is able to adjudicate the claims of our seeings_s--to confirm and disconfirm them--although remaining unmentioned and unREFERRED to by *D* or the other claims entertained within the veridical/deceptive paradigm. By these logical means, *D* is able to say nothing about seeing_p and so be true without falsifying our theory's claim that at time *a* we saw_p a rabbit.

According to our theory, however, *D* is the avowal at time *b* that we believed at time *a* that we were veridically seeing a rabbit and actually did not. But isn't this construal, then, a falsehood since we in fact at time *a* did not claim to see_s a rabbit but only to see_p a rabbit?

So much is true and so much we have already maintained: *D* does issue from a logical fiction of sorts and itself is one of sorts. It would only stand as a falsehood, however, if what it asserted was that our seeing at time *a* was not a seeing_p and this is not what it asserts. Its construal at time *b* of our seeing_p at time *a* as a veridical seeing or

seeing_s must rather be understood, not as reflecting on our claim at time *a* to see_p a rabbit, but on the viability of our remaining at the non-theoretic level of seeings_p at time *b* in view of certain disruptions of habitual trains of seeings_p and their connected conflicting Ms. Because of the latter and because of our human capacity to believe_e and so bring coherency into an otherwise mere melee of conflicting habits we have opted at time *b* to abandon one way of proceeding, namely, seeing_p, for another, namely, seeings_s. In this sense seeing_p can be said to be defeasible: as a viable way of continuing to behave and understand. And this is what, actually, D proclaims or announces: it announces, not that we did not see_p at time *a* but that we have had to replace seeing_p by seeings_s in order to make coherent what was becoming incoherent. Another way of putting the matter is to say that what is defeasible is our proceeding without recourse to theoretic constructions. We can do so in most circumstances but in some, in order to retain coherency, we have to resort to theoretic constructions or logical fictions.

This is what is being announced when we say, "I did not actually see a rabbit at time *a*; I only believed I did." Properly understood, the "I only believed I did" does not function descriptively here, as saying that we believed_{ev} at time *a*; it functions only logically, to usher in and insist on the seeings_s paradigm with its beliefs_{ev}. And this is how our "I did not actually see a rabbit at time *a*" also functions.

This would all, I think, appear unexceptional and trite were it not for certain prejudices and illusions that our philosophizing can impose on our understanding. Though in D our assertion that at time *a* we believed there was a rabbit functions in fact in the purely logical way described, because the word "believe" conveys a use-epiphenomenal picture of "belief_e", we can gratuitously transpose this picture from time *b* to time *a*. When we view D from the abstracted, *a*-temporal perspective of our philosophical reflections, which are not actually immersed in a passage of time from *a* to *b*, it is especially tempting to make the transportation. Once made, it has to seem to us that our seeing_p at time *a* was in fact a seeings_s. We are also able as philosophers to pose at any time the question whether what we see exists or not and so end up turning every seeing_p into a seeings_s. Nothing prevents us from gratuitously asking the question; indeed, because the question can be asked and because, as philosophers, we ask questions as part of our very enterprise we are more apt than not to unreflectingly do so and hence again turn our seeings_p into seeings_s. These transpositions that we are sorely tempted to make as philosophers all militate in favor of the doxastic contention, giving it a semblance of phenomenological confirmation.

It was in recognition of these strong philosophical impulses and the deceptions they can impose on us that I previously expressed some doubt that we would find in our own experiences neatly extractable instances of seeings_p to support our purely theoretical inference that brute animals see in the way that we have described as seeing_p. The harder we try to ascertain just what our experienced seeing is the more likely it is that we shall ask all the questions and assume all the attitudes that automatically invest it with the theoretical superstructure of seeing_s and the veridical/deceptive distinction.

We know, however, that the consequences of accepting the doxastic contention are conceptually disastrous and we know, at least circumstantially, that its postulations in argument A and its interpretation of D

have to be in error. Not all human seeing can possibly be seeing_s. Basic human seeing is seeing_p, however much our philosophical reflections may lead us astray here. To this extent the ordinary person or the philosopher when not philosophizing is better off than the philosopher philosophizing insofar as his access to the truth goes. For the ordinary person, immersed as he is in the passage of time from *a* to *b*, only introduces into his on-going seeings the theoretic superstructure of seeing_s when concretely caused to; and when he interprets *D* he does so without transposing the use-epiphenomenal picture of "I believed that I saw a rabbit" to time *a*.

On the other hand, immersed as he is in the passage of time from *a* to *b*, the ordinary person or the non-philosophizing philosopher has no possible means of distinguishing between what actually occurred at time *a*, namely seeing_p, from what is construed by the paradigm of seeing_s at time *b* as if it had been veridical seeing. One can only do that by standing outside times *a* and *b* as one can in one's philosophical reflections and by theoretic reconstruction work out the truth that there exists such a thing as seeing_p and that seeing_p is logically and chronologically prior to seeing_s. In short, what I am saying and one of the things that I think our examination of the present question argues for is that while the philosopher may be worse off than the ordinary person insofar as his access to the truth goes (being, as he is, subject to all kinds of deceiving impulses that the ordinary person is not subject to), he is not simply worse off, as many philosophers in this century have wanted to maintain; he can be better off too. He can lapse into falsehoods that no ordinary person will; but he can also arrive at truths that no ordinary person possibly can. I should maintain, for example, that our contention that basic human seeing is what we have described as seeing_p is one such truth, along with our contention that what goes wrong in argument *A* is that what we have described as seeing_s is substituted tacitly in place of seeing_p as basic human seeing.¹²

ENDNOTES

¹ Pragmatic and other mediate grounds are often advanced on behalf of doxastic theories of seeing. Thus, it is argued that only on a doxastic interpretation of seeing can the skeptic's arguments from illusion be met. I have dealt with this sort of ground elsewhere (see, this author, "An Examination of D.M. Armstrong's Theory of Perception," *APQ*, Vol. 1, no. 2, April 1964). In this paper I deal with what seem to be immediate grounds that can be advanced on behalf of a doxastic theory of seeing, comparable to the immediate grounds that standard sense-data theorists advance on behalf of their claim that what we directly perceive are sense-data but never material things themselves; for example, the argument from illusion. This is what I intend to be understood by "immediately show."

² The central part of this argument can be found in, George Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception*, Princeton University Press, 1971, 68-69.

³ Cf. Alvin I. Goldman, "Perceptual Objects," *Synthese*, Vol. 35, 1977, 274: "Are percepts *simply* sets of beliefs, as some philosophers maintain?" What I call "the strong theory" Goldman would presumably call "the *strongest* form of a doxastic view of percepts" (*Ibid.*, 278). A more important difference: Goldman's critique focuses upon difficulties incumbent upon the strong theory's attempt to "eliminate the sensuous or qualitative aspect of percepts" (*Ibid.*, 275); I have focused upon difficulties connected with *seeing* itself.

⁴ Those I shall call "standard doxastic theorists," e.g., Pitcher, want to interpret the term "belief" in a purely dispositional way; see, Pitcher, *op. cit.*, 150: "These perceptual states are to be construed as being dispositional ones; thus, to have a perceptual belief. . . is just to be disposed to act--or more generally, behave--in a certain variety of ways." Pitcher speaks of beliefs, so construed, as "unconscious beliefs" (my "non-conscious beliefs"). Because I do not want to debate the question whether or not beliefs should be dispositionally construed, I have accommodated my arguments to both the "unconscious beliefs" of standard doxastic theorists and the "conscious beliefs" (in this paper, my "experienced" beliefs) of non-standard doxastic theorists. This use of the term "standard" and "non-standard" is, of course, this author's own.

⁵ See, Paul D. MacLean, *A Triune Concept of the Brain and Behavior*, University of Toronto Press, 1973.

⁶ For independent considerations militating against attributing belief in any sense of the word to brute animals, see, this author, "Do Animals Propositionally Know? Do They Propositionally Believe?", *APQ*, Vol. 20, No. 2, April 1983, 149ff.

⁷ Once one lets in this camel's nose of the humanizing imagination ethology turns into "Tales of Peter Rabbit." At the other extreme one finds theorists treating animals solely in terms of purely physiological concepts, "unconscious" behavior, and so on. The golden mean, however, is--let us grant--hard to hit.

⁸ I have reference, of course, to Kuhn's treatment of scientific paradigms in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, 1970.

⁹ Not only are we initiating our talk in A in terms of *seeings*_s but our reiteration of "saying in truth" and "speaking in truth" reinforces our doing so. For we say that we are speaking the truth only where some doubt or ambiguity has intruded, calling for the abandonment of *seeings*_p and their replacement by *seeings*_s.

¹⁰ As a and b are construed in our revised story, not the original.

¹¹ By "use-epiphenomenal picture" I mean the sort of picture that words convey which meshes, in some primary use or uses, with use but which, in other uses, does not but still, exerting imaginative force, floats, as it were, in the background. Compare, for example, "The water boils in the kettle" and "His blood boils in his veins."

¹² The orientation of this paper led me, for the sake of continuity and economy, to treat *seeings*_s minus its usual component of conceptualization.

Thus, I have not discussed at any length the seeing of something as that something; e.g., seeing a tree as a tree. Left over, therefore, is the question: since seeing_p is not the seeing of something as that something, e.g., a tree as a tree, what can it possibly be like? How can it be anything but something chaotic and random? We can cite the fact, of course, that Towser, who only sees_p, sees and chases the cat; sees but does not chase the tree. What worries one philosophically is the question: What is that seeing_p of Towser's like 'from within'? Are there not, though, cases where a human being's seeing is not only not infused with conceptualization but could not conceivably be? Suppose I am climbing up a mountain-side which I neither have nor could have conceptualizations of? This particular contour; that one, and so on? Nonetheless, I see where I am going and distinguish between this un-conceptualized feature versus that with my eyes, and so on. This topic, and no doubt others that have been slighted in this paper, deserve more discussion than can be provided in a footnote. I should add that, as far as its author is concerned, if no one else, this paper has obtained a firmer grasp of its subject matter than it first had through some perceptive comments of Robert Turnbull.