

## 1. MOORE'S PARADOX AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION<sup>1</sup>

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**ABSTRACT.** The author discusses solutions to Moore's Paradox by Moore and Wittgenstein and then offers one of his own: 'I believe that *P*' and 'not-*P*' can both be true but nonetheless are not *epistemically compatible*; that is, it is logically impossible simultaneously to have sufficient evidence to justify assertions of each. The author then argues that similar transgressions are committed by other "paradoxical" utterances whose paradoxicality cannot be explained by the Moore or Wittgenstein solutions and also that this provides a technique that can be useful in studying the epistemic requirements for justified assertion.

What is known as Moore's Paradox involves utterances of the form 'I believe that *P*, but not-*P*', for example:

(1) I believe it is raining, but it is not raining.<sup>2</sup>

Utterances of this form are plainly absurd, but the problem is to say just what is wrong with them.<sup>3</sup>

Two possible responses to this problem can be rejected from the start. First, sentences of the form of (1) are not linguistically meaningless. This is shown by the fact that (1) occurs as a component of such meaningful sentences as 'It could be that I believe it is raining but it is not raining' and 'If I believe it is raining but it is not raining, then I have a mistaken belief about the weather'. Indeed, if (1) were meaningless, it is hard to see how, when I believe it is raining, I could entertain the hypothesis that I am mistaken. For to do so would just be to imagine that I believe it is raining but it is not raining. So an utterance of (1) is not faulty because it is the utterance of a linguistically meaningless sentence.

Likewise, though it seems that one who asserts (1) contradicts himself, the sentence itself does not in the strict sense express a contradiction. For both of its conjuncts can be true together; it can be true both that I believe it is raining and that it is not raining. We must, therefore, look for some other linguistic transgression that will explain what is wrong with utterances of this form.

In sections I and II below I shall begin by discussing two noted lines of solution to Moore's Paradox, one which was proposed by Moore himself and another which I think can be drawn from remarks on the paradox made by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Then in section III I shall present a third solution to the paradox of my own and, in connection with it, discuss certain questions about the epistemic justification of utterances. I should emphasize that I do not believe the solution to the paradox I shall offer must be taken as a competitor of the earlier solutions I discuss. There is no reason why there cannot be more than one thing wrong with assertions of the form of (1). However, I believe that the solution I offer does have an advantage of generality: it can explain what is wrong with paradoxical utterances of a number of different forms that cannot be explained with the devices used in the earlier solutions. Also, I think that it provides us with a technique that can be of some help in studying certain questions of epistemology.

### I.

Moore's own solution to his paradox<sup>4</sup> was based on the claim that one who asserts a proposition 'not-*P*' implies that she does not believe that *P*. Thus, if someone asserted (1), she would imply that she does not believe it is raining while she said that she does believe it is raining, and this would clearly be improper. The sense of implication Moore had in mind here, of course, was not logical implication. Neither the fact that it is not raining nor the fact that a given speaker asserts it is not raining will logically imply that the speaker or anyone else does not believe it is raining. However, Moore held that there is a sense of 'imply' in which one making an assertion can be said to imply that something is the case if she knows her assertion will lead listeners to believe it is the case, and in this sense one who says that it is not raining can be said to imply that she does not believe it is raining.

I think there is a difficulty with Moore's argument, however. Implications of the sort Moore has in mind can readily be cancelled; that is, by enclosing statements in the right linguistic contexts, speakers can often prevent listeners from drawing conclusions from them they otherwise would draw. Thus, if, when going out, I say that I am leaving my umbrella and say no more, I will likely imply in Moore's sense that I do not believe it is raining. For it is likely I will know that my remark will lead listeners to think I do not believe it is raining, since they would expect me to take my umbrella if I did think it was. But notice that this implication will be cancelled if I add that I enjoy walking unprotected in the rain or will use the umbrella I have in the car. And nothing could cancel an implication that I do not believe it is raining more directly than an outright assertion that I do believe it is raining. For surely if I add that I believe it is raining, listeners can no longer be expected to take my remark as evidence that I do not. Thus, though I think one who says 'It is not raining' by itself would imply in Moore's sense that she does not believe it is raining, I do not believe one would make this implication by asserting 'It is not raining' in the context of an assertion of (1). In fact, if someone asserted (1) to you, though you likely would be led to conclude any of a number of things about her, I doubt that you would be led to conclude that she did not believe it is raining. You would not know what to think about her beliefs. It is false, then, that in the context of (1) an assertion that it is not raining

will lead listeners to assume the speaker does not believe it is raining. And so it is false in this context that the speaker will imply in Moore's sense that she does not believe it is raining.

Moore's solution thus fails as it stands. However, the solution is close to a second that I think is more successful. A speaker might naturally be said to imply that she believes what she says.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, one who says it is not raining will imply that she believes it is not raining, and one who says she believes it is raining will imply that she believes that she believes it is raining and thus, barring the possibility of extreme confusion about her own beliefs, that she does believe it is raining. But then, one who asserts (1) will imply that she has contradictory beliefs and, thus, is in an untoward--and some might think impossible--state of mind. Let me call this the *contradictory belief* line of solution to Moore's Paradox.<sup>6</sup>

The contradictory belief solution, I think, successfully shows that a speaker cannot assert (1) unless she either is lying, has contradictory beliefs, or, perhaps, is badly confused about what she believes. And since any of these states would be untoward, it succeeds in showing that (1) could only be asserted by someone in an untoward state. However, in spite of this, there are drawbacks to the solution. For one thing, it is rather inelegant. It shows us that one who asserts (1) must be in one untoward state or another, but it does not tell us exactly in what untoward state she must be, nor even whether it is psychologically or morally untoward. More importantly, it does not seem that the fact that one who asserted (1) would have to be in one of the untoward states above is sufficient to explain why an assertion of (1) under normal circumstances would be so plainly absurd. Consider, for example:

(2) I have contradictory beliefs.

One who asserted (2) would state outright, and not merely imply, that she had contradictory beliefs. Also, as with (1), it is impossible for one to assert (2) without either having contradictory beliefs, lying, or being confused about the state of her beliefs. However, though some philosophers might think no one ever has contradictory beliefs or even that no one could think she did unless she suffered from a conceptual confusion, an assertion of (2) surely would not be patently absurd, as one of the form of (1) normally would be. Indeed, it might well be true.

Again, a patient in psychotherapy might tell her therapist:

(3) My problem is that I think people are constantly judging my behavior, though, of course, they are not.

Such an assertion actually has the form of (1), and no doubt one who asserted it would have either to be lying, suffering from contradictory beliefs about how others regard her, or conceptually confused about the nature of belief. Nonetheless, intelligent, fluent, and sober-minded (though, perhaps, neurotic) speakers of English do say things like (3) after due consideration, while no one ever would assert (1) seriously. I think, therefore, that an adequate solution to Moore's Paradox should be able to show us a linguistic or logical transgression committed by one asserting (1) under normal circumstances but not by one asserting (3) while in therapy.

## II.

I believe we can draw from Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore's Paradox in Part II, Section X of his *Philosophical Investigations*<sup>7</sup> a solution that does meet this condition. My primary concern here, however, will be with the solution as I present it and not with the historical question of whether Wittgenstein really held to it, for as I shall discuss below, there is reason to think Wittgenstein would not have accepted the full solution as I present it. On the solution I have in mind, in the normal case when one says 'I believe it is raining' her utterance is used not to report the state of her mind--to say that among her beliefs is the belief it is raining--but to say something about the weather. That is, when one says 'I believe that *P*' in the normal case, she actually is asserting that *P*, though her assertion is a hesitant one, as opposed to the 'straight-out' assertion one would make by saying simply '*P*' with no further qualification. And therefore, if someone asserts (1), she makes a hesitant assertion that it is raining, while straight-out asserting that it is not raining and so, on balance, asserts (albeit hesitantly) a contradiction. Let me call this the *hesitant assertion* line of solution to Moore's Paradox.

The hesitant assertion solution nicely explains why one who asserts (1) seems to contradict herself. For though sentence (1) itself is not a contradiction, one who asserted it would be using it to assert, or give it to be believed, both that it was raining and that it was not raining. Likewise, this solution can be used to explain why the assertion of (3) discussed above would not be improper, while an assertion of (1) in answer to a question about the weather would be. For a patient stating (3) to a therapist would be using the assertion 'I think people are constantly judging my behavior' simply as a report of her beliefs. She would not be using it to claim even hesitantly that people indeed are so judging her, and therefore, one who correctly understood her would take her to be stating unequivocally that people were not constantly judging her behavior, though also that she had the mistaken belief that they were.

Or, at any rate, this seems to me the correct explanation of these utterances. I should note, however, that Wittgenstein almost surely would have disagreed with my remarks about (3). For if I understand him correctly, in the section I am discussing he both held that one cannot meaningfully say about herself that she has a false belief<sup>8</sup> and argued that one who says 'I believe such-and-such' simply is asserting such-and-such and is not also asserting that she believes such-and-such. Wittgenstein, I think, intended his discussion of Moore's Paradox to bolster his views about private language,<sup>9</sup> in particular, to provide additional evidence for his account of why what pass for first-person attributions of mental states are incorrigible, even though, on his view, we do not have a special insight into our mental states that allows us to know what they are and which, in principle, others cannot have.

As I understand him, Wittgenstein's general view on the matter was that what we take to be first-person reports of mental states normally are not reports at all but rather *expressions* of the states in question.<sup>10</sup> Thus, when I say, for example, 'I am happy', 'I am in pain', or 'I believe it is raining', I am paradoxically not actually saying that I have the relevant state, and therefore the fact that my statement cannot be corrected, if my sincerity is not challenged, does not show that I

know in a special way that I have it. Instead, when I say such a thing, my remark should be taken as an expression of the appropriate state, and the remark cannot be corrected, because the disposition to make it is itself one of the criteria for having that state.

However, if this is true, then Wittgenstein should want to hold that, in normal circumstances at least, when one says 'I believe it is raining' she is expressing (or, if lying, is pretending to express) the belief that it is raining and is *not* saying about herself that she has the belief. And I think Wittgenstein believed this view was supported by a consideration of Moore's Paradox, partly because it leads to a satisfying explanation of the paradox, the hesitant assertion solution, and partly for another reason: because he thought that if one did report that she had a belief, she could sensibly add that the belief was false, but one cannot sensibly add 'but it is not raining' after saying 'I believe it is raining'. However, this, I think, would lead Wittgenstein to disagree with my claim that in a psychiatrist's office utterance (3) would not have the paradoxical air of (1) because there, if I said 'I think people are constantly judging my behavior', my utterance would have only a reporting function and would not be used actually to say that people were constantly judging one's behavior.

The problem here is not, I think, that Wittgenstein would not grant that utterances of the form 'I think that *P*' sometimes can be used with a reporting and not an asserting function, for utterances can, of course, be put to non-standard uses in special circumstances.<sup>11</sup> But on Wittgenstein's general view of mind, one has no special knowledge of her mental states that would guarantee the truth of an honest report she made of them and that in principle others could not have. And so, if I made a report to my therapist that I believed others are constantly judging my behavior, it would in principle have to be open to the sorts of challenges that could be raised against a claim by another that I had that belief. However, I think it is clear that in the context of (3), as in most others, my utterance 'I think people are constantly judging my behavior' would be immune to many of these challenges. It would not, of course, be immune to all possible challenge. I might, for example, be challenged on grounds of dishonesty, or on grounds of conceptual confusion. In particular, I might be accused of mistaking a standing belief in abeyance at the moment for an occurrent one. But I think that as a matter of principle my remark could not be criticized--as a report by any other that I had the belief in question could be--on the ground that I did not have sufficient behavioral evidence to justify it, or on other such grounds of insufficient evidence. And so, as far as I can see, Wittgenstein could not agree with me that in the context of (3) my remark, 'I think people are constantly judging my behavior', would be a report and not an assertion without abandoning many of his views on the philosophy of mind.

Whether or not I have been correct, though, in the views I have attributed to Wittgenstein in the last four paragraphs, I think those views must to a large extent be mistaken. For I think that one who says 'I believe that *P*' is asserting that she believes that *P*, though that in addition she normally is using her assertion to express hesitantly her belief that *P*. And I think it is only when 'I believe that *P*' has this latter function that an assertion of the form of (1) is so clearly absurd. In support of my view, I might note two things. First, if someone says 'I believe that *P*', we can respond 'That's not true' as a way of charg-

ing her with a lie; that is, as a way of saying it is not true that she has the beliefs she says she has. But if 'I believe that *P*' were used to assert only that *P*, albeit with hesitance, then, it seems, one who responded 'That's not true' would be saying that *P* is not true.

More importantly, I do not believe the account of first person utterances I have attributed to Wittgenstein, even if true, could explain away our special knowledge of our own mental states, and thus we lose our motive to accept the account, if (as it is) it is counter-intuitive. For suppose that in my presence someone says of me in the third person that I have a certain belief, and someone else denies it. Then I know which of the two is right in a way and with a certainty with which neither of them can know it.<sup>12</sup> And if I now say that one of them is right, then my remark--though a judgment about a third-person report of my mental state and not a mere expression of the state--seemingly cannot be challenged except on grounds of dishonesty. I believe, then, that we cannot easily escape the common-sense view that we have a special insight into at least some of the contents of our minds.

### III.

In spite of these disagreements with Wittgenstein, I think that in normal circumstances 'I believe that *P*' is, as he claimed, used to make a hesitant assertion that *P* and, therefore, that the hesitant solution to Moore's Paradox succeeds. However, I also believe that utterances of the form of (1) have an additional untoward feature which they share with utterances of several other forms, and it is this feature that I shall discuss in this final section.

If someone is asked whether a proposition *P* is true and wishes to answer in the affirmative, she may choose from a number of responses. She may, for example, say simply that yes, *P* is true or, more cautiously, that she believes *P* is true or, still more cautiously, that she guesses that or has a hunch that *P*. Each of these responses would be an assertion or, as I shall call it, an *affirmation* that *P* in this sense: The speaker would be wrong (in having made the response) if *P* turned out to be false. In this respect affirmations that *P* differ from certain other responses that would tend to indicate that *P*, for example, that it is very likely that *P* or that the speaker has such-and-such strong evidence for *P*. For, of course, it could be that *P* is very likely or that the speaker does have strong evidence for *P*, even if it turns out that *P* is false.

Which affirmation of *P* one should make, if one is going to affirm that *P*, depends, I think, on two things: how strong her grounds are for *P* and how cautious the circumstances in which she makes her affirmation demand that she should be. Obviously, one generally needs stronger evidence to be justified in saying '*P*' than in saying 'I believe that *P*', and stronger evidence to be justified in saying 'I believe that *P*' than in saying 'My guess is that *P*'. But the strength of evidence one needs to be justified in making any particular affirmation, I think, is not fixed once and for all. Rather, we must adjust our affirmations to the standards of caution that fit the circumstances, and are appropriate for the purposes, for which we are speaking. If you ask me when a certain lecture will be given, because you are considering going, I will say '8:00 p.m.' if that is what the calendar in the school paper

said, but if you ask because you are the speaker, I will answer that I think it starts at 8:00 p.m. but that the calendar sometimes gets it wrong. Roughly, I think one can assert that  $P$  straight-out only when the chances that not- $P$  are *negligible*; that is, when they can be *neglected for the purposes at hand*.

Now when 'I believe that  $P$ ' is being used to affirm that  $P$ , assertions of the form 'I believe that  $P$ , but not- $P$ ' have the following untoward feature: they are *epistemically unjustifiable*; that is, the conditions they would have to meet to be epistemically justified are ones that it is logically impossible to meet. For to be justified in asserting 'I believe that  $P$ ' as an affirmation that  $P$ , one's evidence must favor ' $P$ ' over 'not- $P$ ', while to be justified in asserting 'not- $P$ ' straight-out, one's evidence must greatly favor 'not- $P$ ' over ' $P$ '.<sup>13</sup> However, it is logically impossible that one's evidence should do both.<sup>14</sup> The fact that assertions of this form are epistemically unjustifiable would, I think, by itself be sufficient to account for their evident absurdity. Further, assertions of this form are by no means alone in being unjustifiable. Consider, for example:

(4) It is raining, but it probably is not raining.

or

(5) I believe it is raining, but it probably is not raining.

Assertions (4) (5) both seem intuitively to have the same sort of absurdity had by (1), and both are epistemically unjustifiable. For to be justified in asserting either that it is raining or that one thinks it is raining in a way that affirms that it is raining, one's evidence must favor 'It is raining' over 'It is not raining', while to be justified in saying 'It probably is not raining', one's evidence must do the opposite. Notice, however, the absurdity of (4) and (5) could be accounted for along the lines of neither the contradictory belief nor the the hesitant assertion solutions to Moore's Paradox. For though one who says either 'It is raining' or 'I believe it is raining', intended in the normal way, affirms that it is raining, one who says 'It is probably not raining' neither implies that she believes it is not raining nor affirms that it is not raining.<sup>15</sup>

I would like to suggest that utterances that have the sort of absurdity exhibited by (1), (4), and (5) almost always are epistemically unjustifiable and also that epistemically unjustifiable utterances always will strike us as absurd when the source of their unjustifiability is not too subtle to detect. And if I am right here, I believe the study of this sort of absurdity should prove a useful one in epistemology.

Most commonly today students of epistemic justification focus their attention on the justification of beliefs. However, the epistemic justification of utterances is also a valuable field of study, and one way to approach it is to consider which statements can and which cannot be jointly asserted. Let me say that two or more assertions are *epistemically compatible* when there are possible circumstances under which one would be epistemically justified in asserting the two together, and *epistemically incompatible* when there are no such circumstances, that is, when their joint assertion is epistemically unjustifiable. Then if I am correct, we can use absurdity of the sort found in Moore's Paradox as a

test for epistemic incompatibility, and this, I believe, can prove a useful technique.

I have claimed that certain statements are absurd because they are epistemically unjustifiable, but in doing so I do not want to suggest that epistemically unjustifiable utterances cannot be absurd for other reasons as well.<sup>16</sup> In fact, I have already claimed that an assertion of (1) in normal circumstances would be absurd, not only because it would be epistemically unjustifiable, but also because it would be a hesitant assertion of a contradiction. There are many possible linguistic transgressions, and some utterances commit more than one. So it should not be surprising that some epistemically unjustifiable utterances are also improper on other counts. In fact, many different sorts of utterances are epistemically unjustifiable. Assertions of outright contradictions, for example, can never be justified, because it is impossible that one's evidence should strongly favor both a proposition over its negation and its negation over it. On the other hand, many epistemically unjustifiable utterances are not contradictions [e.g., (1), (4), and (5) above], and in some cases (as with 'I know it is raining, but it might not be raining') it is not clear whether an unjustifiable utterance is a contradiction or not. What is important, I think, is that epistemic unjustifiability is itself a significant kind of linguistic absurdity.

Two closely related epistemic injunctions governing statements are relevant here: Do not say what is false, and Do not make statements for which you do not have adequate grounds.<sup>17</sup> Of the two, the second is in some ways even more important than the first. For a violation of the first is only blameworthy if it is also a violation of the second, while a violation of the second is blameworthy even if by good fortune it is not a violation of the first. Logically contradictory utterances have the feature that the conditions they would have to meet not be in violation of the first of our injunctions are ones that it is logically impossible to meet. Epistemically unjustifiable utterances, on the other hand, are ones having the feature that the conditions they must meet not to violate the *second* injunction are ones that logically cannot be met. Both features seem to me to be sufficient to guarantee the absurdity of utterances having them.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The author would like to thank the *Archives'* referee of his paper for what he thought to be an extraordinarily careful and insightful reading as well as most helpful comments.

<sup>2</sup> See Moore's "Russell's 'Theory of Descriptions'" in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 175-6. Moore also discusses a second version of the Paradox--involving utterances of the form 'P, but I do not believe that P'--in P.A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1942), 542-3. I shall not discuss this version in the body of the paper. However, if one takes 'do not believe' to mean 'disbelieve', then the version reduces to the one I shall discuss. On the other hand, if, as was intended, 'I do not believe that P' there is taken to be the negation of 'I believe that P', then I think the version has an easy solution: If one says 'P, but I do not believe that P', either the first conjunct of one's statement is a lie, or the sec-

ond is false. That is, the statement cannot be both truly and honestly asserted.

For discussions of the Paradox see: A.M. MacIver, "Some Questions about 'Know' and 'Think'," *Analysis* V (1938), 74-83; A. Duncan-Jones, "Further Questions about 'Know' and 'Think'," *Analysis* V (1938), 74-83, A.M. MacIver, "Reply to Duncan-Jones," *Analysis* V (1938), 95-97; and Max Black, "Saying and Disbelieving," *Analysis* XIII (1952), 25-33. All are reprinted in Margaret MacDonald, ed., *Philosophy and Analysis* (Oxford: 1954). See also: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), II, x, 190-92; Jaakko Hintikka, *Knowledge and Belief* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1962), especially 64-76; John Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: 1969), 65, note 1; John Koethe, "A Note on Moore's Paradox," *Philosophical Studies* 34 (1978) 303-10; J.W. Williams, "Moore's Paradox: One or Two," *Analysis* 39 (1979), 141-42; and A.P. Martinich, "Conversational Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems," *Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1980) 215-28, especially 224-25.

<sup>3</sup> In fact I think the problem is a bit more complicated than this, for I shall argue that under special circumstances utterances of this form can be acceptable. Therefore the problem is to say just when they are improper as well as why they are so in those cases.

<sup>4</sup> See his "Russell's 'Theory of Descriptions'," *op. cit.*, 175-76.

<sup>5</sup> Moore explicitly defended this claim in his *Ethics* (London: Oxford, 1912), 125, reset (London: Oxford, 1947), 78, paper (London: Oxford, 1965), 52-53.

<sup>6</sup> The most common lines of solution to Moore's Paradox have been at least roughly along the lines of this one. For solutions depending in one way or another on the claim that one who asserts a proposition implies (or suggests or presupposes) that she believes it (or expresses her belief in it) see those by Black, Searle, Williams, and Martinich, *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> For further discussion of the paradox by Wittgenstein along these lines see his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), vol. II, 279-83 and 418-20.

<sup>8</sup> See *Philosophical Investigations*, especially p. 190.

<sup>9</sup> Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' is traditionally located in *Philosophical Investigations*, I 243-317. For an important recent discussion challenging some of the tradition, though, see Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

<sup>10</sup> The interpretation of Wittgenstein suggested in this paragraph is influenced by Norman Malcolm. See his "Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", *Philosophical Review*, LXIII (1954), 530-59, especially 537-43, and "Knowledge of Other Minds", *Journal of Philosophy*, LV (1958), 969-78, especially the closing paragraph. See also Kripke, *op. cit.*, 134-5. For passages in Wittgenstein supporting this interpretation, see *Philosophical Investigations* I 244, 256, 290, 404 as well as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) I 907 and II 3, 63, 169, 277-83, and 723-28.

<sup>11</sup> Wittgenstein *does* grant that there are circumstances under which one could say, 'It is raining and I don't believe it.' (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. 192). But it is relevant here that they are circumstances in which one could also say, 'Judging from what I say, *this* is what I believe' (Wittgenstein's italics). He does not have in mind a case, as I think the one in the psychotherapist's office is, where 'I believe that *P*' gives a report but remains (in some ways) epistemically privileged.

<sup>12</sup> I do not want to claim that we can never be unsure or mistaken about what we believe. In fact, I think it clear we can. But there certainly are some cases in which I would know who is right, and my remark that one is right could not be challenged on grounds of mistake, or at least not on grounds of the sort of mistake others could be accused of. This is even clearer in the case of other mental states, for example, pain. If I said someone was correct in saying I was in pain, I would be making a claim about her statement, and it is hard to see how my claim could be challenged on any grounds other than that of dishonesty or perhaps not understanding what had been said to me. But if this is so, it calls into question Wittgenstein's attempt to explain away the incorrigibility of first-person avowals of mental states by construing them merely as expressions of those states.

<sup>13</sup> When I speak of one's 'evidence' here I mean the word in the widest possible sense, to cover one's total grounds or degree of justification for a proposition, so that a person with very strong grounds for a mathematical proposition has a right to assert it straight-out, while a person with somewhat weaker grounds might have a right to assert it hesitantly but not straight-out. If we used 'evidence' in a narrower sense to cover only empirical or sensory evidence, of course, one normally could not speak of having 'evidence' at all for mathematical propositions (nor, perhaps, ones about one's mental states).

<sup>14</sup> For a similar solution--roughly, that one who is justified in asserting *P* must also be a position to assert 'I believe that *P*' and so cannot be in a position to assert 'I do not believe that *P*'--see Koethe, *op.cit.* Koethe's solution, however, is to the second form of Moore's Paradox (that involving utterances of the form '*P* but I do not believe that *P*') and cannot, as far as I know, be directly applied to utterances of the form of (1).

<sup>15</sup> I say one who says 'It is probably not raining' does not imply she believes it is not raining, because one can know that a proposition is *probably* true, and say that it is, without actually having the *belief* that it is. Thus, it is probable that it will not rain in New York City on July 4, 1997 (for it rains in New York on less than half the days in July), but do you actually believe that it will not? And one who very much hopes a proposition is true might refuse to believe it is false, even if she recognizes that it is probably false. Likewise, given the definition of affirmation earlier in this section, one who says 'It is probably not raining' does not *affirm* that it is not raining. For if it later turns out to have been raining, her claim that it was probable that it was not will not thereby be shown to have been wrong.

<sup>16</sup> This paragraph and the two that follow were prompted by correspondence from A.P. Martinich for which I am grateful.

<sup>17</sup> One might compare these with the ethical injunctions 'Do what is best' and 'Do what appears best given your evidence'.

I should also state that when I speak of 'adequate justification' for an affirmation I mean justification of whatever sort can be countenanced by the correct epistemology. If William James was correct, for example, in his famous controversy with W.K. Clifford, then one might be justified in holding a belief--perhaps even with sufficient confidence to assert it straight-out--for purely pragmatic reasons, even in cases where one's evidence, conventionally understood, counts against it. In such a case, though, one still will not be justified in asserting the proposition straight-out while she is simultaneously justified in saying it might be false. And, likewise, she will not be justified in saying she believes it true while she is justified in saying it probably is false; etc.

