Mystical Solidarities: Ali Shariati and the Act of Translation

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ABSTRACT: This introduction frames the special issue titled “Mystical Solidarities: Ali Shariati and the Act of Translation.” Drawing from insights across the collection’s essays, it foregrounds a notion of translation as a transformative act, anchored in Shariati’s mystical ontology, that fosters and sustains anticolonial solidarities. To illustrate, we explore differences and affinities between Shariati and Frantz Fanon with regard to truth-telling, translation, alienation, and subjectivity. The comparison reveals a generative distinction in Shariati’s thought between cultural and existential alienation, “translated intellectuals” and the act of translation. The distinction creates grounds for a vision of anticolonial solidarity responsive to circumstances in postrevolutionary Iran, a vision that reaches beyond the postcolonial state.

KEYWORDS: Ali Shariati, Frantz Fanon, solidarity, mysticism, translation, alienation

What is the salience of the ineffable for a politics of solidarity? This special forum offers six engagements with Ali Shariati’s speeches and writings, which together address the question. Intervening in a range of fields, from political theory to religious studies, continental philosophy, art, comparative literature, and intellectual history, the essays collected here foreground the parts of Shariati’s voluminous collected works that discuss mysticism alongside his efforts to forge a vision for Third World solidarity. Shariati’s reflections...
on mysticism, it is to be shown, venture an aspiration for political solidarity beyond Iran and Islam.

The activity that brings these threads together is translation. Fittingly, the idea for the special section arose from a collective experience of translating Shariati. Each contributor produced a translation of one text, hitherto untranslated in English, for a separate forthcoming volume that we co-edited. For this special section, we invited the contributors to address the substance of the text they translated in light of the act of translation, a phrase we use to describe, first, the literal experience of translating from one language to another and, second, a mode of communication at odds with literalism. The act of translation so defined signals the transmission of an experience. It differs from a pretense to convey words or information passively from one register to another, and it bears a striking resemblance to what Shariati, in a different context, describes as mysticism. As we see it, the act of translation summarizes Shariati’s distinct social and political notion of mysticism, his comparative approach to aesthetics and poesis, and, further still, his theory of anti- and decolonial solidarity.

This introductory essay offers a conceptual map for reading the special section as a whole. Our contribution to the collection recasts Shariati’s biography through the perspective of his work as a translator, which, in turn, begets a reassessment of Shariati’s status in debates about the current dismal trajectory of post-revolutionary politics in Iran. It also suggests an approach to decolonization rooted in the circumstances of post-revolutionary Iran, one that may be critical of state-sponsored claims to bear the mantle of anti-imperialism globally and yet still invested in decolonization as a horizon. The following explores the suggested global dimensions of these debates in conversation with and as an introduction to the other five contributors’ remarkably novel readings of Shariati’s oeuvre.

On Account of Alienation

Translation can seem anathema to anticolonial thought and its aspirations for decolonization. To the extent that colonization works through language, it would appear that translation, an invariably linguistic practice, cannot forge a viable path to liberation. The earliest writings by Frantz Fanon, the most prominent theorist of anti- and decolonial theory and a key interlocutor for Shariati, propose dodging language altogether: with poetry and theater, the body and open-ended questions (Fanon 2008, 198–205). Faced with the vicissitudes of the Algerian war for liberation and postcolonial governance on the African continent, Fanon’s later works pursue a different set of possibilities, locating cultural production in the ongoing struggle for liberation (Fanon 1965,
Truth be told, the two tendencies and two projected Fanons share more in common than this schematic divide suggests (Gordon 1995, 9). Shariati, who rarely appears in conversations about postcolonial theory without some mention of Fanon, artfully brings the tendencies together, making a compelling case for cultural production en route to decolonization—translation included.

Shariati situated his thought in an anticolonial trajectory shared with the likes of Fanon, Aimé Césaire, Jomo Kenyatta, and Julius Nyerere. When it comes to Shariati and Fanon, however, much has been lost in translation. Cynical readers dismiss Shariati as derivative. He is summarily described as Iran’s Fanon, a compelling orator who parroted someone else’s ideas in a manner palatable to local audiences. Others credit Shariati for translating Fanon’s 1961 book *The Wretched of the Earth* from French into Persian. This false impression, oft repeated as lore, was fostered by the placement of Shariati’s name in the text’s by-line to hide the actual translator’s identity and eventually made its way into tracts of scholarly repute (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi 2020).

Yet another prevalent and similarly dubious legend claims Shariati and Fanon exchanged letters—this despite no extant evidence of a correspondence apart from two passing remarks made by Shariati himself (Shariati 1362/1983, 169–71; Shariati 1363/1984–1985, 6–7). An anthology of Fanon’s unpublished papers titled *Écrits sur l’aliénation et la liberté* has reproduced one such statement word-for-word and credited Ehsan Shariati, Ali Shariati’s son, with translating the statement from Persian into French (Fanon 2015, 542). The anthology’s English language translation notably omits the translator credit (Fanon 2018, 667–9). Less careful readers who have reviewed and referenced *Alienation and Freedom* have simply taken for granted that the letter exchange took place.

The assumption and how easily it circulates reveal a broader misunderstanding of the interpretive approach shared between Shariati and Fanon. Consider the reputed terms of debate: Shariati says he sent Fanon a letter that argued for religion as a platform to organize and develop national unity. Fanon’s reported disagreement with Shariati’s proposal resembles a trope Fanon articulated in *The Wretched of the Earth*. The chapters on national consciousness and national culture argue that intellectual appeals to a distant past do not correspond with the ever-changing lived experiences and visionary insights of a colonized people actively engaged in a struggle to end the conditions of their domination (Fanon 2004, 144, 159–63, 168). One of Fanon’s alleged letters similarly rejects Islamic traditions as a basis for revolutionary action. Shariati makes use of this alleged letter to deliver a modernist corrective: true Islam, he maintains, is an active and lived reality opposed to petrified custom (Shariati...
1362/1983, 169–71). Shariati’s representation of Islam thus satisfies the principle of movement that animates Fanon’s description of the people, the rural masses, the peasantry—in short, the process of anticolonial revolution.

More often than not, depictions of Shariati in terms legible for contemporary intellectual historians lose sight of this principle. (The point arguably holds true for representations of Fanon as well.) The assumption that Shariati’s claims of a letter exchange are empirically true overlooks his penchant to deliberately play the part of an unreliable narrator. As we discuss at length in our essay, Shariati regularly invented characters and fictional moments of exchange to prove a point. These performances enact what Fanon, in *L’An V de la révolution Algérienne*, called a “true lie” (Fanon 1965, 87). Fanon famously describes Algerian peasants listening to jammed radio broadcasts for news of guerrilla resistance to French settler colonial rule. Unable to receive a clear signal, peasants took to telling fantastical stories about the guerrillas’ feats, a lie. Telling that lie conscripted peasants in a growing uprising against the French settlers. It put to practice a deeply held, previously constrained set of beliefs that aligned the peasant with a changing state of affairs, one marked by the inevitable demise of the French settler presence, a truth. Fanon’s dialectical writing style captures the spirit of these “true lies,” their malleability. As his narratives unfold, circumstances change, and positions and protagonists change significance in turn. Shariati, too, adopts an ethos of becoming, mimicking the Algerian peasant in his performances, his “true lies.” (Shariati, it is to be noted, claims to have worked on a translation of *L’An V* (Shariati 1362/1983, 169).) Given these affinities, it is nothing short of ironic to claim one such performance as indicative of Shariati’s differences with Fanon.

Further, related affinities with Fanon revolve around a shared critique of cultural alienation. Fanon excoriates the national bourgeoisie in postcolonial contexts: “It has learned by heart what it has read in the manuals of the West and subtly transforms itself not into a replica of Europe but rather its caricature” (Fanon 2004, 119). Shariati delivers a similar critique of “translated intellectuals,” who blindly adopt ideas from Europe without regard to the specific situation or socio-political circumstances pertaining in Pahlavi Iran. Just as Fanon offered a personal account of his own trials and tribulations while battling an inherited colonial mindset in *Black Skin, White Masks*, so too does Shariati in his *Kavir* [*The Desert*]. Naveed Mansoori’s contribution to this special issue reconstructs Shariati’s autobiographical account in *Kavir* of a childhood robbed by ethno-nationalist schooling. The story, which Shariati locates at the heart of his identity, portrays the long, institutionalized reach of cultural alienation in Pahlavi Iran.
Unsurprisingly, Shariati and Fanon both argued for “a return to self” as a way to remedy cultural alienation. The status of that “return” has been the subject of considerable debate in Iranian Studies, the disciplinary locus where Shariati’s works have (thus far) been examined. Critics denounce references to a “return” as “nativism” and hence a troubling ideological precursor to the Islamic Republic. Others, by contrast, point to the influence that fellow Third Worldist intellectuals exerted on Shariati, most notably Césaire and Fanon, who imagined the self of a prospective “return” living and acting in the present (Davari 2014; Saffari 2017, 21–6, 140–42). Along with Mansoori, Atefeh Akbari Shahmirzadi and Seema Golestaneh’s interventions elaborate this insight. Each addresses debates about a “return to self” and does so in conversation with Shariati’s mysticism.

These are new avenues for research, previously unconsidered, that shed light on Shariati’s thought and, more generally, on conceptions of decolonization. They notably add to Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi’s discussion of Shariati’s thought in terms of a “mystical modernity” shared with European critical theorists writing in the aftermath of the First World War. Ghamari-Tabrizi identifies, in particular, a conceptual symmetry between Shariati and Walter Benjamin, on account of which Shariati’s notion of “return to self” looks to the past to locate an “emergency break” that could momentarily halt the linear, teleological course of historical progress. Human emancipation thus acquires a mystical dimension, not in the sense of a “separation from materialism” but “in the sense proposed by Michel Foucault in his discussion of the Iranian revolution: transformation into a person who, prior to the process of transformation, did not appear within us” (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2021, our translation). The emphasis here, as in Fanon, is on the process and activity of change itself.

To wit, unlike Fanon, Shariati considered a broader experience of alienation characteristic of the human condition as defined from an Islamic perspective. We refer to this experience, with considerable qualification, as existential alienation. As is well known, Fanon’s framework for interpreting colonization stretches the core notion in Sartrean existentialism that existence precedes essence and joins it with phenomenology to account for the “lived experience” of Blackness. More accurately, Fanon epitomized an Africana existentialist tradition that preceded Sartre and posed questions of existence in response to situated realities conditioned by the question of Blackness (Gordon 1995, 14; 2000, 4, 9–12, 31–6). Speaking in response to anti-Black racism, Fanon grounded his analysis in an understanding of colonization as a total project. Alienation, here, follows from cultural production such that language itself determines membership in and exclusion from humanity, reproducing
the terms of order by relegating Black people to a “zone of non-being.” Shariati engaged Sartrean existentialism with careful and sustained consideration, translating Sartre and his ideas into Persian. Echoing Fanon and the broader Africana existential tradition, however, Shariati developed a philosophy of existence rooted in his own situated reality. He thus adopted a distinct approach to colonization, and so he described the challenge facing Iranian Muslims as disfiguration and hence non-totalizing. Right or wrong (and it certainly leaves much to be desired, considering the many overlaps between Islamic history and experiences of Blackness), Shariati’s approach seems to pursue a distinct concept of the existential.

Leili Adibfar’s contribution reconstructs the conceptual parameters and psychic dimensions of this existential alienation. For Shariati, pain, angst, anxiety, and alienation arise from a condition of dual existence reserved for human beings. What he proposes extends a foundational principle in Islam—the notion that human beings, unlike angels or the natural world, are not just manifestations of God’s command (amr) but also the spirit of God’s command (ruh min al-amr) (Rahman 2002, 34). The human is both materialist and idealist, “a combination of clay [gel] and spirit [ruh].” Adibfar demonstrates continuities shared between Shariati’s premises, based as they were on religion and Islam, and similar formulations in modern European romanticism and existentialism. Important differences notwithstanding, the remedy in either case proves to be artistic production—recourse to a higher order ideal to address a fundamentally fraught but potentially transformative material condition of duality.

The distinction between “translated intellectuals” and the act of translation in Shariati’s thought parallels the one between cultural and existential alienation. While Shariati disparages “translated intellectuals” who perpetuate cultural alienation, the act of translation plays a necessary, remedial role in his broader proposals for a dis-alienated self. This act does not register in most taxonomies as translation at all, and yet it recalls the rhetoricity needed for Third World solidarity in cultural translation. “Language,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes, “is not everything. It is only a vital clue to where the self loses its boundaries. . . . Logic allows us to jump from word to word by means of clearly indicated connections. Rhetoric must work in the silence between and around words in order to see what works and how much” (Spivak 2012, 313–14). The act of translation lives in that silence. It is not a replica, much less a caricature, but rather an activity that operates on the order of a “true lie.” A kind of translation, it is to embody the spirit of a message more than capture its literal words or a literalist passage of information.
Our contribution to this collection recounts Shariati’s various (and varied) activities with translation over the course of his intellectual career. If Fanon writes a bildungsroman about the anticolonial intellectual alongside the trials and tribulations of national consciousness, we chart the development of Shariati’s self-consciousness through translation, showing how his activities as a translator played a constitutive role at each stage of his thought. The remaining contributions bring this dynamic to life. They explore the spirit of Shariati’s intellectual biography, from Mansoori’s reconstruction of Shariati’s changing autobiographical accounts to Akbari Shahmirzadi and Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi’s in-depth analyses of Shariati’s method and, finally, Adibfar and Golestaneh’s formulations of existential alienation.

The Act of Translation and a “Return to Self”

While Shariati did not in fact translate The Wretched of the Earth, his engagements with Fanon nevertheless performed translation, according to Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, who argues that Shariati’s statements on Third World solidarity should be read both for their perlocutionary content and their illocutionary effects. Sadeghi-Boroujerdi illustrates this point with reference to a late 1960s lecture titled “Some of the Pioneers of the Return to Self in the Third World,” where Shariati pronounced the value of intercontinental solidarity and introduced “a pantheon and emerging canon of anticolonial resistance and postcolonial experiments in state-building.” Through its “explicitly performative dimension,” the lecture worked to “expand the imaginations of [Shariati’s] audience,” projecting a shared community beyond the ethno-nationalist one that, as Mansoori notes, marred Shariati’s formative experiences in Pahlavi Iran. This “exercise in translation” hinges on a lack of specificity, which, on the one hand, makes possible an imagined community greater than the nation-state but, on the other, contains a “virtual clue” to the “eventual unraveling” of Third World solidarity. In the final analysis, Sadeghi-Boroujerdi argues, Shariati draws a simplistic picture of a Third World bloc uniformly facing a shared condition of exploitation vis-a-vis the capitalist colonial world. On account of this picture, he was able to craft a far-reaching vision of Third World solidarity. The same picture overlooks significant economic disparities that, as later history shows, would render sustained intercontinental solidarity impossible.

Golestaneh interprets these less-than-specific “exercises in translation” through Shariati’s mystical tendencies. Responding to a thread in our contribution, Golestaneh asks after practices meant to capture and relay “the ‘spirit’ [ruh] of a piece over a translation that favors a more technically obvious reproduction.” Spirit, here, refers to the hidden, formless, and indescribable expe-
riental dimensions of a text, the impressions it leaves “beyond the language that comprises it.” Difficult enough to convey in its original idiom, the task appears insurmountable across linguistic registers, each of which are “empty shells” that must be shed. The challenge of translation accordingly resembles the impossible union with God aspired to by Sufis, who persist in their pursuit notwithstanding insurmountable odds. For Golestaneh, the path itself—the process, the exercise, the performance—creates proximity to divinity and, in Shariati’s case, to conveying shared meaning, to fostering anticolonial solidarity, to liberation.

We might paraphrase this insight in terms of a “return to self,” a theme that recurs across the special section. The act of translation does not pretend to create a perfect union with the other, be it the existential other signified by divinity or the cultural other conventionally associated with translation, rather attempts to forge these essentially unstable unions serve to reconstitute the self. A return to self is, in other words, a transformation of self (Ghamari-Tabarzi 2021). The lack of specificity in Shariati’s iteration of the concept affords the slippage we attribute to his performative acts of translation. On account of its imprecision, it creates grounds for solidarity across difference. That same lack of specificity opens a window onto the specific, and specifically mystical, dimensions of his thought. Here, the reader would be right to suspect a contradictory impulse. We view that impulse to be a generative tension, characteristic of Shariati’s theory of action and encapsulated by his discussion of “return.” We call it mystical solidarities.

In this vein, Akbari Shahmirzadi’s essay paints a compelling portrait of the act of translation as “return” through Shariati’s discussion of Dante. Shariati adopted and adapted Dante’s *Divine Comedy* for a short essay titled “Divine Tragedy,” which, unlike Dante’s narrative, is marked by the impossibility of a sustained union with God. Akbari Shahmirzadi reads Shariati’s essay from a worldly perspective, peering beyond the words on the page to both authors’ respective situations and the interpretive traditions that inspired them. Shariati recited Dante’s story in a manner suited for a Muslim Iranian audience. While responsive to Shariati’s contemporary circumstances, this refiguration of *Divine Comedy* was not an arbitrary or whimsical exercise unrelated to the original but rather entailed a recovery of a past systematically denied in canonical interpretations. Shariati thus departs from prevalent readings of Dante as narrowly European, demonstrating the Italian’s sustained conversations with Muslim traditions and influences. Shariati engages instead in a “comparative literary praxis” that poses “an alternative to the Eurocentric formation of Comparative Literature.” His refiguration of *Divine Comedy* as “Divine Tragedy” is
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a recovery of Dante’s contemporary circumstances and his situated position. Phrased differently, Shariati’s literary praxis takes a trope in Dante’s work—the virtues of harboring distance and cultivating intimacy at once—and reiterates it as an approach to reading Dante. This is neither a simple act of poiesis, the postulation of something new, nor, for that matter, a simple repetition. By virtue of its performance and activity, it constitutes instead a “return.” Akbari Shahmirzadi’s essay thus names Shariati’s method.

The special section similarly sketches a portrait of the “self” to which a “return” aspires. For Golestaneh, speaking of mysticism, the attempt to create a union with the other is valuable insofar as the act itself creates proximity to the other. Whether the other is a foreigner or God, whether the attempt is an act of linguistic translation or a Sufi ritual, or whether the act is meant to remedy cultural or existential alienation—in any case, union with the other is not a station at which one arrives. Shades of divinity appear in action, through movement, and as becoming. The self appears unmoored as a result, a site of unceasing change. In this manner, acts of translation mirror ethical practices of mysticism. Encounters with parts of a text that remain untranslatable, where the delivery of meaning falls out of reach, mimic practices that aspire to unification with God.

The kind of mysticism on offer, however, defies conventional expectations. “For Shariati,” Golestaneh writes, “the transformation of the self is a political project as much as it is a personal one.” Distinct from other (notably, clerical) figures in modern Iran, who combined mystical and political thought to project models of ideal leadership, Shariati “saw the revolutionary potential when all people master esoteric knowledge and an ethos of becoming.” Mansoori’s contribution links this ethos to the variable quality of popular sovereignty, turning to a second iteration of Shariati’s autobiography, written on the occasion of Ashura in 1971, where Shariati recasts his personal history in conjunction with the history of “the people.” His attendant theory of popular sovereignty does not dissolve an individual into a collective but pursues instead a third position, of what Mansoori calls “a collaborator in a people’s coming-of-age.”

Once more, we are privy to a discussion of Shariati’s activity, of his performance and his method, in this case of the “counter-pedagogy” he developed to reconstitute himself. If conventional ethical accounts presume an individual removed from society or, at most, an individual striving to achieve such separation, Shariati’s “counter-pedagogy” proposes an “autodidactic method” premised on “collective subjectivity,” “collapsing the distinction between solitary learning and learning in the company of others.” The mourning rituals around
Ashura, Mansoori concludes, are “a public school orchestrated by a collective instructor where no single individual had mastery over the curriculum.”

The Situation

That Shariati grounds mysticism in popular sovereignty contravenes the charge, levied against him by dissident intellectuals in post-revolutionary Iran, that he fails to appreciate the concrete, ever-changing socio-historical circumstances shaping political life. Our essay stages a conversation between Shariati and one of the most sophisticated purveyors of this charge in Morad Farhadpour. A decorated translator, critical theorist, and essayist, Farhadpour’s theory of “thought/translation” arises from a critique of cultural politics in the Islamic Republic. For Farhadpour, all translation depends on the translator’s situation. Reflecting on the situation of translators in Iran specifically, he argues that all thought in Iran is translated thought. Shariati’s notion of a return to self is said to prefigure post-revolutionary state discourse about anti-imperialism, projecting an authentic self at odds with the general situation in modern Iran, not to mention the “post-reformist” terrain characteristic of politics in recent years. Contra Farhadpour’s characterization of Shariati, we show how Shariati’s practices of translation and his related notion of a “return to self,” rooted as it is in mysticism, in fact prefigure Farhadpour’s concept of “thought/translation.”

In other words, we recover Farhadpour’s theory of “thought/translation” from the situated prejudices that cloud readings of Shariati in post-revolutionary Iran. Similar prejudices appear among Iranian critics who take for granted the Islamic Republic’s version of decolonization and, acting on the basis of their own localized challenge to state power, proceed to dismiss global aspirations for decolonization elsewhere. This claim to specificity poses an obstacle to solidarity. Ironically, the claim perpetuates the self-other divisions that a critic like Farhadpour rejects when he describes translation as a process that undoes the self. A similar insistence on the specificity of the situation in Iran leads cynics to reject appeals for Third Worldist solidarity because they are trumpeted by the state. Where attempts to project discreet divisions between pre- and post-revolutionary situations ignore significant continuities, we read for continuities between Shariati and Farhadpour and thus call for a reappraisal.

Well and good in the abstract, an emphasis on situated thought should entail situated analysis of thought itself. From this perspective, the special section raises unresolved, enduring questions about Shariati and the prospects for anti- and decolonial solidarity today. Sadeghi-Boroujerdi rightly locates Shariati’s idea of “a return to self” in its immediate historical context. Shariati
posits an unmoored image of the self, one linked to Third Worldism in direct response to the Pahlavi state and its ethno-nationalist cultural politics, which imagined Iranians as Aryans and, further, as never having been subjects of colonization because they were never formally colonized. Sadeghi-Boroujerdi’s further identification of an overly simplified political economy in Shariati’s proposals for Third World solidarity recalls Fanon, who depicts the “dead ends” that haunt Négritude, the nahda (“Arab renaissance”), and similar cultural approaches among colonized intellectuals. Detached from the objective problems of les damnés, the colonized intellectual cuts culture off from reality (Fanon 2004, 151–5). “To fight for national culture,” Fanon concludes, “first of all means fighting for the liberation of the nation, the tangible matrix from which culture can grow” (Fanon 2004, 168).

Fanon’s emphasis on the institution of a “tangible matrix” as a necessary precondition for cultural production raises questions about the framework adopted here. Are we misguided to search for Third World solidarity among cultural remedies to alienation? Doesn’t the act of translation demand situated analysis, recalling the fight for a “tangible matrix from which culture can grow” as its precondition? Or is it the case that reflections situated in Iran, a place where all thought is translated thought, demand revisions to theories of decolonization? Can we translate anticolonial, Third World, and decolonial solidarities as mystical solidarities? Should we?

To venture a response, we build on Sadeghi-Boroujerdi’s insight that different economic and political circumstances in the colonial periphery require nuanced and contingent approaches to decolonization. Sadeghi-Boroujerdi demonstrates the challenges that face projections of a united anti-imperialist front, especially, we might add, crude ones. Through a reconstruction of the problem in the 1960s and 1970s, the era when such projections seemed commonplace, his essay speaks indirectly to contemporary anxieties. Our contribution suggests that Shariati’s mystical and ever evasive concept of the self parts from visions of decolonization practiced in post-revolutionary Iran—the kinds of visions against which critics like Farhadpour emphasize specificity and ultimately relinquish aspirations for Global South solidarity. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, the Iranian state pursued a Cultural Revolution designed to implement a “tangible matrix” from which indigenized knowledge production could grow. It conscripted Shariati’s references to a “return to self” to justify its actions. When read exclusively in conversation with Fanon, Shariati’s lack of specificity—his mystical tendencies—appears to be a shortcoming. When read in light of the situation in Iran, the somewhat intangible matrix implied by Shariati’s mystical tendencies serves to challenge reductive associ-
ations between Shariati and post-revolutionary state violence. Does that same somewhat intangible matrix afford a new concept of decolonization, one that responds to situated realities in Iran and in today’s similarly burdened postcolonial states?

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**ENDNOTES**

2. See also Lewis R. Gordon (2000, 29).
5. This method is most clearly on display in Fanon’s description of the transformations necessary for the development of national consciousness in *Wretched*. See Jane Anna Gordon (2014, 129–61). For a further articulation of Fanon’s method, vis-a-vis Hegel, see also Ato Sekyi-Otu (1996, 10–46).
6. A recent crop of writings has similarly focused attention on translation and cultural alienation among Iranian intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, Shariati included. Our intention is to build on this literature. See, e.g., Hamed Ghessimi (2019, 51–60). See also the abstract for Mina Khanlarzadeh (2020).
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9. For further elaboration of this point, see Davari (2014).

10 For an insightful but distinct discussion of translation and pedagogy in Shi’ism, see Milad Odabaei (2022, 281).

REFERENCES


