

underlies the fact which he refers to as mechanical substitution that the latter can even be truthfully called substitution. Without the common meaning factor in the two reaction systems in question, one of these could not even be *thought of* as substituted for the other. In other words, in the very act of denying the functioning of the conscious factors in behavior, Professor Watson is unwittingly assuming it.

PEARL HUNTER WEBER.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A History of English Philosophy. W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge Press. 1920. Pp. xvi + 380.

Professor Sorley, of Cambridge University, has long been known to students of British philosophy for his stimulating chapters in *The Cambridge History of English Literature*. His new book, just published by the Cambridge Press, is a collection of those chapters, and thus makes readily available to students of philosophy and to the general reading public what was formerly somewhat difficult to find and quite expensive to possess. Professor Sorley's book is easily the best history ever written of British philosophy.

It is surprising, in comparing the book with the original chapters in *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, to find how few changes, how little revision, were needed to make isolated and detached chapters fit smoothly and integrally into a united and continuous account of the development over three centuries of a body of national thought. It is only occasionally that the most careful reader would detect the threads by which the original pieces of work are held together, and in no case are these threads in the least objectionable. The more important changes which Professor Sorley has introduced into his history as it appears in book form may be briefly pointed out. A new chapter on the Cambridge Platonists is included, as that group of writers had been treated by a different author in *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, and Culverwel and Glanvill are now included happily among the Platonists instead of in the section on "Hobbes and Contemporary Philosophy." The accounts of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, of Richard Cumberland, of Sergeant, and especially of Thomas Reid and his school have been expanded; and for the first time, brief accounts of Zachary Mayne, of Bosanquet, of Laurie, and of James Ward have been added. Thomas Brown is fortunately rescued from his former misleading classification with James Mill and Ricardo among the Utilitarians, and put where he belongs in the Scottish School. A very able criticism of Locke's *Essay* has been further developed in

two additional paragraphs (pp. 115–116), in which Locke's two different approaches to the analysis of experience, the epistemological and the ontological, are effectively contrasted. Finally a brief, and purely formal, retrospect has been appended.

In connection with such a history as that which Professor Sorley has given us, covering a period of three crowded centuries within the limits of three hundred pages, one would be indeed surprised not to find occasional views with which one could not fully agree. I find, however, exceedingly few such cases, and only two of these cases are important enough to be here noted. First, I can not but wonder why Bentham is charged with having "disregarded the personal equation," with not allowing "for the difference of individual susceptibilities"; for Bentham devoted an excellent chapter in his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Chapter VI.) to a consideration of just such variances of personal sensitivity and idiosyncrasy. Secondly, I would object to the wholly subjectivistic interpretation of Hume, which, however much in accord with the traditional account of Hume, is rather imposed upon than derived from the first three parts of Book I. of the *Treatise*. Professor Sorley is not as subjectivistic in his handling of Hume in his book as he was in *The Cambridge History of English Literature*; for whereas he formerly spoke of the law of association as accounting for the grouping of *mental contents*, he now speaks of it as accounting for the grouping of *mental phenomena*. There is a gain for objectivity in the substitution of *phenomena* for *contents*; but I should wish to see the qualifying adjective *mental* entirely removed. In the first three parts of Book I. of the *Treatise*, Hume uses the words *impression* and *object* so interchangeably that he gives no indication of the later treatment of the epistemological problem of the relation of impressions within the mind to things outside the mind. Of course in the last part of Book I. of the *Treatise* Hume did become more epistemological and subjectivistic, and in the *Enquiry* he is frankly dominated by that conception of the problem of knowledge. Yet Professor Sorley seems to join the great mass of commentators on Hume in reading back into Hume's originally quite naïve empiricism the full skepticism of his later sophisticated viewpoint, even in reading back into Hume's whole philosophy, which aimed to abandon abstractions and to oppose the curious current attempt to ontologize scientific concepts, the Kantian and post-Kantian understanding of impressions as mental states. I would not wish to indicate that I desire to go to the other extreme and to deny that Hume becomes increasingly subjective and skeptical, that is, increasingly epistemological, as the weariness of sustained analysis leads him from fresh and close observation of experienced facts and relations to a sort of

a priori speculation upon the possibilities of knowledge at all. But I would insist that Hume begins with merely a thoroughly empirical programme, that he at first simply identifies reality with what men as a matter of fact do experience (instead of with hidden substances and essences and powers), that he has no dualism between what is perceived and what is really there, that only as his thought develops he begins to introduce a psychological and epistemological treatment of the content of perception, to make impressions subjective states, and thus to arrive at a skepticism concerning the real world in place of naïve acceptance of the real world as given in experience. Hence, just as Professor Sorley so admirably pointed out, the dual approach to the treatment of experience in Locke, so I would like to recognize another, though different, dualism in Hume. Indeed does any writer consistently maintain and seriously believe the epistemological proposition that the objects of his mind in thinking are nothing beyond his own subjective states?

A more general criticism of Professor Sorley's book arises from a consideration of method, of the proper fashion in which to connect up technical philosophy with the other aspects of a national life and culture. Professor Sorley tells us that he will not write a history of philosophy as a long criticism of other men's ideas from his own standpoint (a method into which even so brilliant an historical critic as Sir Leslie Stephen only too often lapsed), but that he will write his history from the standpoint of the successive philosophers with whom he deals (p. v). And he succeeds most remarkably, giving the historical and literary background of certain ideas, including most illuminating accounts of the life and times of the more important figures, sympathetically adopting the point of view of the age dealt with. But none the less, I remain unsatisfied with Professor Sorley's history. It is written by a professional philosopher, by one who makes it his business to deal in ideas and is interested in ideas for their own sake. He deals with the background in order to throw light on the prevailing ideas, but does not use the ideas to clarify our understanding of the age in which the ideas were operative. He relates philosophy to general literature (as the appearance of his book as chapters in *The Cambridge History of English Literature* would lead us to expect), but does not relate it intimately enough to the multifarious business of life in England. The fact that Locke was driven to write the *Essay* because of problems in morality and revealed religion is not used to relate Locke to the deistic movement, to Newtonian science, to the Cambridge Platonists; and the connection of Locke's *Essay* to the *Treatises of Government* and to the *Letters for Toleration* is not noted, is evidently not supposed to exist. There is no comment upon the fundamental interest in morals

which drove Hume to take up the epistemological problem and to write Book I. of the *Treatise* as an introduction to his discussion of morals and to his intended further discussion of politics and "criticism." Hobbes, the tutor of kings, Locke, the friend of statesmen, Hume, the historian and dabbler in politics, are not treated as any less academic figures than Hutcheson, Reid, and Hamilton who occupied chairs of philosophy and wrote as experts in artificial inherited problems. Thus much of the peculiar glory of the British tradition in philosophy, a glory which no other branch of modern philosophy equally shares, is lost sight of. Thus one finds in Professor Sorley's volume no mention of the theories of James I., no sketch of the work of Newton and Charles Darwin, no realization of the significance of Blackstone and Burke. And thus philosophy is rather a delightful and refined object of study than a way of living and a guide in practical affairs. Perhaps it is too much to hope for so many things in so brief a volume as that which Professor Sorley has given us. But surely the larger contacts of philosophy should be constantly alluded to, should be emphasized as important. It is just because Professor Sorley has done the finest work in the history of British philosophy of any living critic that I am disappointed in not finding even more in his book. He has given us a book which represents the most masterly and scholarly method in philosophy as philosophy has been treated during the past two generations as a branch of the academic curriculum; but he does not lead us on to a more helpful reconstruction of our methods of teaching philosophy as a wide and deep reflection upon the affairs of men, a reflection which is guided and determined in its course by the outstanding figures, but which is only as vital as it becomes incorporated in the contemporary life of humanity.

In conclusion, I desire to point out the splendid comparative table and bibliographies which Professor Sorley appends to his book. The former relates English philosophy to current advances in other fields and to world events, and thus constitutes the basis for the kind of a history of philosophy which I have indicated as desirable. The latter is, as those who have used *The Cambridge History of English Literature* already know, a full, elaborate, and reliable piece of work, which will serve as guide to a thorough knowledge of the sources of British philosophy and to the main secondary works about British philosophy. Indeed no part of Professor Sorley's book will prove of more value to the student who wishes to go on to a first-hand acquaintance with the most important writings in British philosophy.

STERLING P. LAMPRECHT.