

less have formed the environment."<sup>50</sup> And again: "The perfect induction of physical science, based upon each and all of its countless successes in every department of physics and chemistry, conclusively proves that the whole process of cosmic evolution from its earliest conceivable state to the present is pure mechanism."<sup>51</sup>

EDWIN B. HOLT.

---

## THE IDEALITY OF VALUES

### I

I SHALL take as my starting-point the pragmatic premise that all values are functional, that they are relevant to the particular instances or the concrete conditions in which they are employed—yes, more than that, they are not only relevant, but they are determined by these particular instances or by these concrete conditions. John Dewey has brought out so forcibly and clearly in his *Essays in Experimental Logic* that values are relative, that they are subject to the empirical, that further elaboration can hardly be necessary. However, for those who are not yet oriented in the method that Pragmatism uses to establish values and standards and criterions I shall briefly cover the position of Mr. Dewey, confining myself solely to the problem of determining values, for it is the analysis of the problem of values with which we are concerned.

Values are dynamic, evolutionary and changeable. Above all values are practical. Dewey says, "a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical judgment, a judgment about the doing of something."<sup>51</sup> The value of an act or of a condition is wholly determined by the criterion of the individual experience. Does the act or condition fit into this experience; if so, it has a value for the individual which is both real and genuine. The interpretation of these values is wholly from the standpoint of the individual: he is the loser or gainer thereby, and it is he who should be the supreme judge of the value, of the fact, or of the condition. Value originates and thrives through the actual experience of the individual, and it is only as acts or conditions fit into the mass of experience that their value can be determined: "value has its seat necessarily in human nature. . . . Value is a content of nature, having its roots in her conditions and its life in her force."<sup>52</sup>

Take, for instance, such a proposition as this: Shall I go out this afternoon to play a game of golf? Before I can answer this ques-

<sup>50</sup> *Phil. Rev.*, 1916, XXV., p. 265.

<sup>51</sup> *Fitness*, p. 304.

<sup>1</sup> Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 358.

<sup>2</sup> Kallen: *Creative Intelligence*, p. 412.

tion I must make a judgment of valuation; I must decide whether the pleasure or the benefit that I shall derive from a game of golf will be of more value to me than that time spent in study, or in an after-dinner nap, or in attending a lecture, *etc.* It is I only who can determine what the value of a game of golf is in my experience. A certain expert might compute the value of the game from the standpoint of enjoyment, or from the physical benefit that it might have for me, but the valuation process, the consideration of the various factors of my experience which must determine my judgment, can only be done by myself. The value of the game of golf for me will depend entirely on the circumstances I am surrounded by.

This valuation process is more than just an appreciation of the game. If there is to be a value judgment there must be mingled the elements of conflict and of desire and of past experience and of imagery. No mere appreciation or a pleasurable or beneficial reaction to the proposition can be considered as a judgment of value. "Actually there do not seem to be any grounds for regarding appreciation as anything but an intentional or enhanced or intensified experience of an object. . . . Either appreciation means just an intensified experience or it means a kind of criticism, and then it falls within the sphere of ordinary judgment differing in being applied to a work of art instead of to some other subject matter. The same mode of analysis may be applied to the older but cognate term 'intuition.' The terms 'acquaintance' and 'familiarity' and 'recognition' are full of like pitfalls of ambiguity."<sup>3</sup> A judgment of value, we see, is something more involved and more complex than just a state of appreciation.

Neither do we judge a value when we call a thing good. That involves recognition of the act and the immediate reaction of the agent to the said act in a pleasurable or enjoyable fashion. To give a judgment of value of an act or object it is necessary that all the factors of experience and the future effect or consequences of that act or object upon individual experience be taken into consideration. No mere instinctive or habitual reaction to an act or object can be entertained as a judgment of value. "To *find* a thing good is to attribute or impute nothing to it. It is just to do something to it. But to consider *whether* it is good and how good it is, is to ask how it, *as if acted upon*, will operate in promoting a course of action. Hence the great contrast which may exist between a good or an immediate experience and an evaluated or judged good."<sup>4</sup> It is not only the experience, but the process of withholding judgment until reflection has taken place upon the character and form of that good

<sup>3</sup> Dewey: *loc. cit.*, p. 352.

<sup>4</sup> Dewey: *loc. cit.*, p. 359.

as it will affect the experience of the agent in the future as well as in the present, that constitutes a genuine judgment of value in the full sense of the word.

Value, in Pragmatism, then, is plural: it is a series of values, a constant ebb and flow which varies with the varying functions to which it belongs. There is nothing stationary or static about it, but each different function has a different value for every individual. These values are determined by the way these acts or objects fit into the general experience of the individual who is to be the judge of their value. This evaluation process consists of careful weighing and considering of facts, taking into account not only the immediate experience, but reflecting upon what the effect of the act upon the future or distant experience may or will be. Valuation, then, may be classed as a way or mode of knowing, for a judgment of value presupposes a knowledge of the relation between the act or object that is to be experienced and the environment. Dewey says: "It is first asserted (or assumed) that all experiences of good are modes of knowing: that good is a term of a proposition. Then when experience forces home the immense difference between evaluation as a critical process . . . and ordinary experience of good and evil, appeal is made to the difference between direct apprehension and indirect or inferential knowledge, and 'appreciation' is called in to play the convenient rôle of an immediate cognitive apprehension."<sup>5</sup> The value, then, is inseparably bound up with the act or object. Every act or object must be judged by itself separately; one can not treat them *en bloc*.

## II

While it is true that the pragmatic test is the only test that we admit for determining values, yet it is not heresy for me to attempt to analyze what these values are after they are determined—what their content and quality may be. If we judge an act or an object good we are assigning a certain quality of goodness to it which makes that act an act of value. Just what is meant when we value an act or object as good? What do we mean by good? In a conversation quite recently with the writer, Professor A. W. Moore made the statement that *all* values, even in Pragmatism, must be ideal. What is meant by referring to a value as ideal? It shall be my task here to attempt an explanation of that.

When we speak of an act or object as good, and when we proceed to classify it according to its degree or quantity of goodness, we are using a standard for our judgments which needs an explanation. Where do we get this standard by which we assign degrees and dif-

<sup>5</sup> Dewey: *loc. cit.*, p. 353.

ferences of values to acts and objects? Clearly, it can not be *a priori*, nor can it be just given. We may have, for instance, two acts which after the judgment of evaluation we pronounce good. This does not mean that both are coordinate and equal as regards the quality or quantity of their goodness. Both acts may be beneficial to us in either our present experience, or, as we surmise, in our future experience, but this does not at all mean that both acts will benefit us equally. We most decidedly have a scale which we use for our evaluation, and the question of how we arrive at this scale is the question with which we are concerned in this paper. Do we compare our values with each other, or are there ideal values with which we compare them?

Professor A. W. Moore in his book *Pragmatism and its Critics* says as follows: "As for 'the blind leading the blind,' the evolutionist believes that it is just by this process of mutual leading—whatever the agents involved in it—that light and sight are *created*. And when the absolutist again asks, 'Leading where?' the evolutionist's answer still is, In the direction of the ideal worked out in and by the social process [which the individual undergoes] in order precisely to *give itself* a direction—a 'where.'"<sup>6</sup> Here we must look for our standard of values, in the social process which the individual undergoes. In the constant demand upon him that he judge various acts and objects for their value, he, as it were, projects himself through this process and makes the quality and content of his values ideal. The constant process of weighing and balancing known values and the constant reconstruction which takes place in regard to these values tend to establish a general type of values whose content must necessarily be ideal.

Values for humanity must always be permanent and ideal. The good must always be good; it can never become neutral, if it is to be considered as a value. Humanity always builds up a working hypothesis for the ideality and superiority of its values; its belief in the eternal quality of the functions which it uses for the purpose of evaluation rises supremely triumphant from the world of experiences. Values would lose their value if they lost their ideality. Theories could not replace values here, for, in order to have theories which would suffice to replace values, values themselves would have to be existent. "Aristotle's description of the self-sufficiency of theory is possible only for a life wherein theory had already earned this self-sufficiency as practise, in a life, that is, which is itself an art, organized by the application of value-forms to its existent psychophysical processes in such a way that its existence incarnates the

<sup>6</sup> A. W. Moore: *Pragmatism and its Critics*, p. 278.

values it desiderates and the values perfect the existence that embodies them."<sup>7</sup> You can not theorize about such qualities as goodness or truth, *etc.* It is even very difficult to abstract them from their objects or actions for the purposes of analysis. You can discover the goodness or trueness of an object or act by applying it to the individual experience, past, present, and future, and you can only get your notion of goodness or trueness by experiencing objects or acts that are true or good. A notion of goodness or truth is based directly upon concrete experiences, but it does not stop here; it goes beyond. In order that a value may be a value in the true sense of the word, it must transcend any separate individual experience. An act or object may be evaluated as good by an individual, but it is "never so good but what it might be better," putting it into common parlance. Values are always ideal in themselves, and the value of an individual act or object is always contrasted with this ideal value. This desire for the permanentness of values is the underlying principle in the desire for immortality. The individual hopes for an eternal unchangeableness and steadfastness of those qualities which he has designated as values. "At bottom it means the assurance that the contents of value can not and will not be altered or destroyed, that their natures and relations to man do not undergo change."<sup>8</sup> In order that these values may be permanent and unchanging they must be ideal. We ascribe all kinds of desirable forms to these contents of values, forms which are in themselves ideal. To good, for example, we also ascribe beauty and wisdom. This is perhaps responsible for their one-time metaphysical designation. Unity, spirituality, and eternity were some of the forms which the contents of value received, and which they still receive, varying, of course, with the individual environment. What the ideal contents of these values are varies, as has been stated, according to the individual—his past experience and his present environment. The important phase in these values must be ideal if they are to be usable as designations for the functions of an act or an object, and it is the individual that makes them ideal. He does this by projecting himself by means of his past experience and his proficiency in rendering judgments of evaluation into the future, and establishes an ideal which serves his purpose and which is subject at any time to reconstruction. "The moral experience is not essentially and in its typical emergencies a recognition of values with a view to shaping one's course accordingly, but rather a determining or a *fixation* of values which shall serve for the time being, but be subject at all

<sup>7</sup> Kallen: *Creative Intelligence*, p. 460.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 428.

times to re-appraisal."<sup>9</sup> This reconstruction takes place when the individual attains to a fuller knowledge of ethical reality, when the present ideal qualities no longer satisfy and function: then a new ideal quality for the value becomes imperative and the individual by projecting himself establishes new forms, new qualities, new contents to his values which thereby become essentially ideal.

GERALD A. KATUIN.

CHICAGO, ILL.

---

#### REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*The Physical Basis of Heredity.* THOMAS HUNT MORGAN. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1919.

Biology has in recent years been tugging at the leading-strings that have tied it to the older descriptive method, and has made an effort to break loose and to walk in the ways of the experimental and exact sciences. This effort has been most strikingly successful in the field of heredity, where the research of the past twenty years has revealed definite mathematical laws and a physical mechanism by which these laws may be explained. A particular interest, therefore, attaches to the present volume, which gives an account of the work that has cleared up the question of heredity—a question that had previously been one of the most difficult and complex that biology has to deal with.

The work of Mendel in 1865 showed that there are in the organism discrete hereditary units which are transmitted in definite ways from generation to generation. Since the rediscovery of Mendel's laws in 1900, it has been found that the entire hereditary complex is a mosaic of such units. The hereditary factors are located in the chromosomes, which are small rod-shaped bodies in the cell nucleus; within each chromosome the factors are arranged in a linear series. The method of distribution of the factors can be summed up in several laws or generalizations of heredity, on the basis of which it is possible to predict with mathematical exactitude the results of any particular mating. These laws are, however, merely another way of stating that the hereditary factors are located in linear series in the chromosomes. Thus the laws of heredity, while experimentally established beyond question, may be derived as corollaries of the known biological mechanism by which the chromosomes are divided and distributed.

Conversely, from the behavior of the hereditary factors, it is possible to deduce the behavior of the chromosomes, and even to map out the topography of each chromosome and to show the relative loca-

<sup>9</sup> Dewey: *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 298.