

be perpetuated in subsequent perceptions mediated by the same sensory complex. "Moreover, one often has a mass of imperfect, fragmentary, and unclassified perceptions which, when subsequently joined together in terms of experience, present conclusions that are distorted representations of the original stimuli."

"In the process of learning, then," the writer concludes, "the vital factors are the manner in which the stimuli are presented to the senses and the attitude of the subject at the time of their presentation. It is more important to organize the stimuli in their presentation than to organize subsequently perceptions of chaotic stimuli. Therefore the true aim of education should be to teach the child to study rather than to recite."

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Dernières Pensées. H. POINCARÉ. Paris: Flammarion. 1913. Pp. 258.

This volume, published posthumously, contains a number of miscellaneous papers which M. Poincaré had intended to bring together as the fourth volume of his contributions to the philosophy of science. Its content is partly new and partly old. To the latter material belong chapters four and five, which review and complete the author's attacks, incorporated in the second part of "Science and Method," upon the Cantorians, as represented by Russell and Hilbert; chapters two and three, which carry on the analysis of space and geometry begun in Part II. of "Science and Hypothesis," and continued through Part II. of the "Value of Science" and the first chapter of the second part of "Science and Method"; and, perhaps, chapter seven, on "Les Rapports de la Matière et de l'Ether," which is closely related to the second part of "Science and Method." However, M. Poincaré is always worth while when he repeats himself, for his mind never stands still and, for him, repeated issues are issues refined and subtilized to such a degree that it is not always easy to reduce them to their prototypes.

Of the new essays, chapter one, "L'évolution des Lois," justifies the scientist in refusing to entertain the hypothesis indicated by its title; chapter six, "L'hypothèse des Quanta," discusses a momentous physical hypothesis of Planck and develops from it an astounding suggestion of a discontinuous universe contradicting absolutely the scholastic adage *Natura non fecit saltus*; and chapters eight and nine give us our only glimpse of the author's moral philosophy.

Except for the cosmological implications of the "Quanta," the most noteworthy moments of the book are the assertion of the mutual dependence of logic and psychology (p. 139), and the definition of M. Poincaré's method in language frankly pragmatic, culminating (p. 146) in his first explicit acceptance of the term. Later he identified pragmatism with idealism as opposed to the Cantorian realism. This passage will furnish a real problem to commentators on Poincaré's philosophy, for while his

idealism is expressed in orthodox Berkeleian language (pp. 158-9), the whole analysis of the relation of thoughts and things in his previous writings is hard to identify with this position.

The essays concerning morality, chapters eight and nine, are unfortunately too brief to do more than define roughly the scientist's reaction upon the relation of science and morals, but there is a suggestion here of the same estheticism that controlled the account of creative imagination in "Science and Method" as the dominant factor in a moral situation. That we shall not be led further by him in this direction is by no means the least loss philosophy has sustained in the untimely death of Henri Poincaré.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. January, 1914. *Über Herbarts Lehre von intelligiblem Raum* (pp. 129-171): BRANISLAV PETRONIEVICS. — Herbart's doctrine of intelligible space is presented and criticized from the points of view of its own incompleteness and of its bearing upon the construction of a real discrete space. Herbart could attribute no objectivity in the usual sense to the intelligible space. His position here and that of his successors is given. The fundamental interests of Herbart which the doctrine of intelligible space served are treated in some detail. *Die Entstehung des stoischen Moralprinzips* (pp. 171-188): GOTTFRIED BOHENBLUST. — The Stoic teaching is rooted in Heraclitus; and the emphasis on self control and conformity to the All is to be considered practically an emphasis on equivalents. Sources are cited and later Stoic development treated. *Zur Geschichte der Skepsis. I. Franciscus Sanchez* (pp. 188-223): A. CORALNIK. — The Portuguese Jew Sanchez (1552-1632) is treated as a type of the skeptic in natural science, of which there are examples from Sextus Empiricus to Boutroux, Mach, and Russell. Sanchez attacked Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning and said, "Why do you constantly talk of conclusions and not of things?" Science is the complete knowledge of things, and that is not attainable. Sanchez never investigated the concept of causality, and, in so far, is more a nominalist than a skeptic. He was caught in the terms and ideas of Scholasticism; yet in his emphasis on the use of the senses he was modern. *Das System Benedetto Croces* (pp. 223-235): ECKART V. SYDOW. — A condensed presentation of Croce's fundamental position on concepts, with the chief points of his views on the nature of Esthetics, Logic, Economics, and Ethics. This division of the disciplines indicates the four possible categories—the beautiful, the true, the useful, and the good. *Rezensionen. Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie. Zeitschriftenschau.*