

words and mechanical puzzle; — .062 for mathematics and ingenuity, and — .160 for mechanical and ingenuity.

The following are the correlations of each test with the other eight tests:

Limerick629
Poem575
Directions525
Absurdity499
Logic493
Words366
Mathematics325
Ingenuity285
Mechanical puzzle210

The limerick and poem lead. Mathematics stands low in the scale as a representative of ingenious capacity and probably involves a relatively independent trait. The mechanical and ingenuity puzzles on account of their concreteness are not so likely to correlate well with the other tests, which involve mostly ideational processes.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Sul Pragmatismo; Saggi e Ricerche. GIOVANNI PAPINI. Milano: Libreria Editrice Milanese. 1913. Pp. xii + 163.

Giovanni Papini, the aggressive philosopher of Florence, has already been introduced to the readers of this review by William James¹ and Professor Bush.² Since James's article the cause of pragmatism in Italy has sustained several losses. The pragmatist periodical, *Leonardo*, which Papini edited, was discontinued in 1907; of its contributors, Vailati passed away (1909), Prezzolini joined the ranks of the idealists, and Calderoni is no longer productive (p. ix). Our author intimates that he, too, has lost some of his former convictions (p. vii). His book, a collection of essays³ written for the greater part in 1905-06, does not constitute a systematic, still less a complete study of pragmatism. It is nevertheless interesting, mainly because of the personality of its author, a dilettante philo-

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 337-341.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. IV., pages 369-371.

³ The essays contained in this volume, including those reviewed by Professors James and Bush, are the following: "Death and Resurrection of Philosophy," "The Unique and the Diverse," "From Man to God," "Introduction to Pragmatism," "Pragmatism Straightened Out" ("Il Pragmatismo messo in Ordine"), "We Need Not Be Monists," "Will and Knowledge," "Acting Without Feeling and Feeling Without Acting," "The Will to Believe," "Pragmatism and the Political Parties," "Truths for Truth" ("Le verità per la Verità").

opher and writer of short stories, who, although he occasionally breaks through open doors or affects a cryptic style of utterance, more often evinces a keen power of grasping the import of theories and a subtle psychological sense. He has, by the way, written his philosophical autobiography, "Un Uomo Finito."

Our author is an extreme pluralist. Conceiving philosophy as an instrument for man's appropriation of the universe, he sees in the pursuit of the particular or concrete the most direct means of getting at reality (p. 36). Metaphysics, on the contrary, interposes between it and ourselves the screen of general concepts. Since thoroughgoing pluralism is anti-metaphysical, and absolute monism is unintelligible, metaphysics must take refuge in dualism "because it offers the maximum of generality combined with the minimum of comprehension" (p. 27). All the metaphysical systems are mere variations of this proposition: "the universe represents the result of the constant and universal opposition of the classical and the romantic principles, of the unique and the diverse" (p. 32). The intellectual development of Europe continually shows the "classical," *i. e.*, the universal, unitary, and passive, in conflict with the "romantic" principle which includes everything personal, particular, active.

Pragmatism is an attitude destined to give the death-blow to the traditional universalist and inert philosophy. It is not itself a philosophy (p. 69) and is not capable of definition: abhorring simplistic explanations it does not presume to hold one formula or theory as a final solution of all the complexities and perplexities of life. Despite the numerical diversity of pragmatist theories there is a common trait present in all, *viz.*, the recognition of the variable in human aims and activities, the "unstiffening of theories and beliefs." Pragmatism thus presents an attitude of "armed neutrality" with regard to the great questions which agitate mankind, and may be compared to a hotel-lobby (*teoria corridoio*) for the hospitality it gives to divergent pursuits and totally different personalities. Above all pragmatism tends to strengthen our grasp on life and develop all our potentialities. It appeals to our vital instincts and also to sentiments of pessimism and haughtiness. The practical people and the utopians are peculiarly inclined to pragmatism.

One may recognize three varieties of pragmatist theories. One group is concerned with the relation of the particular and the general (Peirce); another selects some particular end and frames theories and modes of representation adapted to it (for instance, Mach's economy of thought, esthetic instincts, satisfaction of curiosity); a third division deals with the culture of faith (*pistica*) and considers the origin of belief and its effect on truth, reality, and conduct. The unity of these three groups is given by their common end, namely, activity, which presupposes the power of prevision and is therefore dependent on the constitution of the exact sciences, *i. e.*, convenient and verifiable information. "From induction to the will to believe there is a continuity which is given by the sole end: the aspiration to activity (Wille zur Macht)" (p. 81). "Prevision being the typical and fundamental content of all knowledge," "the modifica-

tions which the prevision of certain of our capacities of modifying things imposes upon certain other previsions," in other words, the influence of our activity on our knowledge, is one of the fundamental questions of pragmatism. We can trace this influence in our belief in the reality of things we act upon (G. Pikler); in the distinction of primary and secondary qualities; in the preference shown by the sciences to certain hypotheses capable of prevision and verification, for instance, the economic interpretation of history. In short, "Not only knowledge is power, but also power is knowledge."

Voluntary action is defined after Calderoni as "that change of objects among whose causes are found also our beliefs." Belief does not act directly on reality as was held by James; it does not "create its own verification, but merely gives an impulse toward activity, which is the true modifier of reality," James's "will to believe" might be called the "eulogy of risk" since he taught "that the risk of an active choice is preferable to the passive, but implicit choice of skeptic and agnostic inaction" (p. 135). It adds greatly to James's credit to have been the first to recognize the necessity of adventure and plasticity in philosophy. The reciprocal relations of our actions and beliefs give Sig. Papini the opportunity to write an interesting chapter of concrete psychology (eighth essay).

The tenth applies pragmatist principles to the classification of the Italian political parties. That country is blessed with no less than eight (Catholics, Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, Republicans, Socialists, Demochristians, and Anarchists). To accept their political creeds at face value would be an act of unpardonable naïveté, because one and the same slogan may bear a great variety of interpretations and conversely, widely different theories may lead in practise to the same attitude: the socialists, for example, are as intolerant as any ultra-reactionary as soon as they come into power. A pragmatist classification is not the dupe of words. It cuts across every political division and separates the men of action from the mere theorists and sluggards. As for theoretical differences of opinion, only one is significant in practise, namely, the conception of the state's rôle. This classification, therefore, leaves only four active parties: the Clericals and the Socialists on the side of the state's rights and the Liberals and Anarchists on the opposite side. These parties are distinguished from one another by their concern for the welfare of different classes and also by the varying degree of power which they are willing to concede the state.

In his earlier essays Sig. Papini evinced somewhat occult tendencies which required of the reader a good deal of will to believe before he would decide to take them seriously. These leanings are, however, abandoned in the subsequent essays. The last essay on "Truths for Truth," which is dated 1911 and outdistances the others by at least five years, bears witness to a conciliatory and frankly eclectic view of philosophy and metaphysics. The gist of his argument is as follows: The history of philosophy, the great laboratory in which philosophy is making, does not reveal a hopeless conflict of opinions as would appear on superficial observation.

If we institute a critical inventory of the philosophical systems, problems, and solutions, discarding the meaningless and bringing together the redundant or fragmentary, we shall obtain an essential agreement, although the relative prominence of certain principles varies with the different systems. If philosophy is at all to reflect the complexity of life, we must be reconciled to a multiplicity of ends and a corresponding diversity of theories. Although the era of great discoveries in philosophy is past, "possible or imaginary" metaphysics may still be attempted in response to certain artistic, moral, religious, or practical needs.

This philosophy, Sig. Papini rightly observes, is different from both positivism and the eclecticism of Leibniz, Hegel, and Cousin, in that it does not set a single value as the measure of all truths. His attitude presents, I think, many analogies to that of Renan and has its roots in the artistic need of a sympathetic interpretation of all the aspects of life. It can hardly claim for itself the name of pragmatism if, instead of conceiving pragmatism as a general tendency or attitude, we limit its scope to a definite theory of truth.

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The Socialized Conscience. J. H. COFFIN. Baltimore: Warwick & York, Inc. 1913. Pp. viii + 247.

This book, intended for use as a text-book of ethics, is provided with Questions and Topics for Further Study, and reading-references—to such books as Dewey's and Tuft's "Ethics" (twenty questions and references), Wright's "Self-Realization," Rauschenbusch's two books, Nearing's "Social Adjustment," Hadley's "Standards of Public Morality." Its purpose is to emphasize topics "not ordinarily discussed in books on ethics. But after all, these and their kind are the vital things of life, and they furnish the common every-day questions of morality; they are therefore the things which most need discussion in books on ethics" (p. 74). "To the practical minded student . . . traditional ethics seems to offer little in the way of suggestion for the solution of many of our newly created moral problems. To him the discussions often seem formal and abstract" (Preface).

The gist of this book can be gathered from the following quotations: "It is only half a truth to say that morality is a personal affair; the other half is that personality is a social affair. The influence of nearly all of the ethical theories of the past tends to emphasize the *self-realization*; this is because these theories have been based chiefly upon the assumed principle of individualism. But we must keep constantly before us the social nature of morality, and bear in mind that moral theory, to be adequate to present needs, must be socialized" (pp. 62-3). "In summary we may say that the supreme moral end is the *realization of the social self*, or *socialized personality*, and the moral criterion by which conduct is to be evaluated and directed is the *socialized conscience*. . . . The one common factor that is needed in the solution of the social, political, educational, and religious problems of the present day is a re-enlightened and resensitized consci-