

problem beyond these discussed. When any neural path in sleep gets into sufficient activity to arouse the depressed activity of the higher centers (*B*-paths), we get the same sort of consciousizing process that we do in waking hours, minimally intense. Between the consciousizing processes of deep sleep and that of any waking moment the difference is one of degree only.

There are, from our point of view "states (or better, processes) of consciousness, as such," if we agree to mean consciousizing processes as yet unaware of themselves. One may indeed *sense a pain*, but not directly. The thing actually sensed, in our phraseology, is the nervous impulse released by the pain-dealing stimulant. Consciousness, or mind, is not made up of "colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and the like," nor yet is it made up of the physiological counterparts of auditory, visual, and olfactory objects, but the mind is the sum-total of the reactions, or awareness, on the part of processes *B*, *C*, *D*, etc., of processes *A*, *B*, *C*, etc., respectively, just prior; these latter processes themselves being aroused by actual objects in the world, or neural memories of such objects (images).

Professor Woodbridge is quite right. Introspection does not disclose the existence of sensations (primary consciousizing processes). It never can in the nature of the case. It can disclose, as he affirms, only the existence of things sensed, or more strictly phrased, of neural paths that stand for red, and sweet, and pain, which we subsequently project as objects.

As psychologists we shall hold to the term sensation, and other terms of its ilk, since we can justify their existence as *Eigenartigen*, even while we disbelieve the naïve view usually taken of them; and also for the further reason that they offer the simplest classification of data that otherwise, being personal and individual, scarcely could be classified in understandable common categories. A sensation of red for me is different, undoubtedly, from a sensation of red for you. But of necessity we agree, for the sake of our discipline, mutually to overlook the divergencies, and talk about red in pragmatic fashion, only correcting our "sense-reports" to harmonize them with practical demands.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Problem of Religion. EMIL CARL WILM. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1912. Pp. xii + 240.

Historic idealism has to its undoubted credit certain major demonstrations as against a crudely material or mechanical view of the world. If one wished a plain statement of these salient achievements so far as they

subserve religious faith, this book could be recommended to him. It is not controversial in the contemporary sense, and all subtler critical issues are intentionally deferred in the interest of simplicity.

The "problem of religion" reduces, for the author, to a question of theory: "the only valid source of religious truth is philosophy." The contributions of social tradition and of intuition to religious knowledge receive scant recognition in comparison, for example, with their place in Royce's "The Sources of Religious Insight." Philosophy as here understood summarily excludes revelation or authority in any historic sense. On the other hand, philosophy does not dispute the field of knowledge with causal explanation: the author does not feel called upon to find chinks of incompetence in scientific methods to make room for his metaphysics.

After the causes, the interpretations. In the chapters on "Optimism and Pessimism" and "The Shadow of Death," we find that this interpretative process tends to become a rather tentative weighing of probabilities and prospects. Here the spirit of classic idealism is decidedly relinquished in favor of more experimental modes of thought, and even an occasional confessed reliance on temperament for the form which belief assumes. There are no certainties. The prophet represents not the stern assurances of religion, but its appeal to imagination, its poetic sentiment. "Thus does all our philosophy end in a minor chord, leaving us with a vague sense of uneasiness, mingled with a prevailing mood of strength and hope." One could wish that philosophy need not end here.

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NOTES AND NEWS

The title of Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin's paper read at the meeting of the New York Branch of the American Psychological Association in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences, on December 24, was incorrectly announced. The subject of her paper was "The Newly Discovered Dichromatic Color Sense of Bees, and Some of Its Logical Implications."

Dr. John Pickett Turner, instructor in philosophy at the College of the City of New York, has been made assistant professor of philosophy in that institution. Dr. Turner was formerly assistant professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt University.

The Herbert Spencer lecture was delivered at Oxford University by Professor C. Lloyd Morgan, F.R.S., professor of psychology in the University of Bristol, on Friday, November 7. The subject of his lecture was "Spencer's Philosophy of Science."

Professor Etienne Boutroux, of the University of Paris, and the Hon. Bertrand Russell have been appointed Woodward lecturers at Yale University.