

a are cases of b ," or "all cases in which p is true are cases in which q is true,"—hence, finally " p implies q ." But the implication relation—when " p implies q " means " q can be inferred from p "—fails to be analogous to the relation of class inclusion in more ways than have yet been noticed. Many of the above theorems can be interpreted as propositions in the algebra of classes, and when so construed become intelligible and true. Most of them will then be disclosed as results of the two conventions, (1) the zero or empty class is contained in every class, and (2) every class is contained in the universe of discourse. These are the exact analogues of (1) a false proposition implies any proposition, and (2) a true proposition is implied by any proposition. In order successfully to symbolize valid inference, the algebra of implication needs radical revision.

The consequences of this difference between the "implies" of the algebra and the "implies" of valid inference are most serious. Not only does the calculus of implication contain false theorems, but all its theorems are *not proved*. For the theorems are implied by the postulates in the sense of "implies" which the system uses. The postulates have not been shown to imply any of the theorems except in this arbitrary sense. Hence, *it has not been demonstrated* that the theorems *can be inferred from* the postulates, even if all the postulates are granted. The assumptions, *e. g.*, of "Principia Mathematica," imply the theorems in the same sense that a false proposition implies anything, or the first half of any of the above theorems implies the last half. The postulates of the "Principia" imply the "consequences" thereafter set down in exactly the same fashion that "Socrates was a solar myth" implies "All triangles have two or more sides."

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Meaning of God in Human Experience: A Philosophic Study of Religion. WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1912.

This is an interesting and important book. It is interesting because of its subject, for it deals with the central theme both of philosophy and religion, the meaning of God in human experience. It is interesting because of its method, for it is at all points the work of a fresh, original thinker, dealing at first hand with his subject, and bringing to each question which he faces at once a wide knowledge and an open mind. It is interesting, finally, because of its conclusion, for the line which the author's thought follows leads him away from the beaten track of contem-

porary philosophy and brings him to a position which, if not unique, is at least unusual.

The book, it may be said at the outset, is not an easy one to read. This is due in part to the style, which is singularly uneven, now suggesting Carlyle in the ornateness of its rhetoric, and again speaking the sober and exact language of science. A greater difficulty is the lack of a clear and concise summary of the writer's argument. In the discussion of isolated points, interesting and fruitful as they are, one is not always conscious of their bearing upon the central theme. This is particularly true when Professor Hocking assumes the rôle of expositor. He enters so intelligently into his opponents' thought and states their arguments with such inner sympathy that one finds oneself more than once on the point of yielding assent to some position, only to find his guide shifting his ground and beginning to argue on the other side.

But these difficulties lie on the surface. The reader who follows Professor Hocking to the end will find himself richly repaid. The author deals with real questions. He brings to their discussion not only adequate technical knowledge, but personal graces of the spirit. He is a philosopher who is also religious, and he writes with the glow and fervor which true religion always produces in those who experience it. He describes religion from the inside, not from the outside, telling us what it means to the men who have it and never seeking to discredit their witness or to transform it, as has so often been done in discussions of the philosophy of religion, into something so different that they themselves would not recognize it. At the same time he knows his philosophy and brings to the interpretation of his subject that wide acquaintance with the thought of the past which is essential to progress in knowledge. The book abounds in wise insights aptly expressed. Not in many years have we read a book which lends itself so rewardingly to quotation. We would be glad to illustrate this in detail did space permit.

In his preface the author defines his purpose and briefly indicates his own philosophical position. He takes his departure from the general dissatisfaction with the older idealistic treatments of religion which has led so many in our day to seek a positive groundwork for their faith elsewhere. In the lack of clarity to which this effort has thus far led he finds the sufficient warrant for his study. The book inquires "what in terms of experience its God means and has meant to mankind, and it proposes by aid of the labors of all coworkers, critics and criticized alike, to find the foundations of this religion, whether within reason or beyond" (VII.). In other words, what is proposed is a rational study of religion in order to determine whether or no religion be in its essence rational.

Having thus defined his problem, the author proceeds to indicate his point of view, which is mystical as distinct from idealistic or pragmatic. His mysticism is not indeed the negative mysticism which is world-denying, not the "mysticism of mantic and theurgy, mysticism of supernatural exploit, seeking short-cut to personal goods" (XVIII.); rather the mysticism which is implicit in all experience, the mysticism "which lends to life that value which is beyond reach of fact, and that creativity which is

beyond the docility of reason; which neither denies nor is denied by the results of idealism or the practical works of life, but supplements both, and constitutes the essential standpoint of religion" (XVIII.). This mysticism of experience the author further defines by contrast to idealism, on the one hand, and pragmatism, on the other. The weakness of idealism he holds to be its failure to do justice "to the particular and the historical in religion, to the authoritative and the wholly superpersonal" (XI.). Just because it tries to bring everything under one all-embracing category it does not do justice to the actual realities of life. It can not give us an authoritative object existing over against us, commanding the allegiance of the will. It shows, in short, "no adequate comprehension of the attitude of worship" (XI.). Pragmatism, on the other hand, is simply "idealism become more subjective, freedom less bound by authority" (XV.). Useful in pointing out something wrong, it must leave the work of discovering what is right to be done by other means. It may indeed serve as a useful guide to action; it can not point for us the way of truth. For knowledge deals with that which is given, and is impossible without ultimates. The trouble with pragmatism is not that it is empirical, but that it is not empirical enough. "An ultimate empiricism, a deference to what is given, not makable, just in these regions of the supersensible and the supernatural, is an attitude wholly necessary to human dignity and to true religion. Far less than absolute idealism is positive pragmatism (radically taken) capable of worship" (XVII.).

What is sought then in the book is a rational defense of religion which shall vindicate for the religious man what he has always believed himself to find in his religion, first-hand contact with an authoritative object immediately known as the most real and certain of facts.

The book falls into six divisions. The first deals with religion as seen in its effects; the second, with religious feeling and religious theory; the third, with the need of God; the fourth, with the knowledge of God; the fifth, with worship and the mystics; the sixth, with the fruits of religion. It is not possible to follow the course of the argument in detail, and we shall have time only to comment briefly upon the points which seem to us most important. These are, first, the author's conception of the nature of religion; secondly, his view of the place of idea in religion; thirdly, his view of the meaning of the God idea; and finally, his grounds for believing that such a being as God really exists.

Before beginning our comment in detail a word may be said of the order followed. The philosophical discussion which fills Parts II. to IV. is introduced and followed by chapters which describe religion as a fact of experience. We can not but feel that this separation is unfortunate. The materials from which the author draws his conception of religion as an observed fact are not marshaled in any one place, with the result that the reader is often left in doubt as to the ground of the conclusion drawn. The discussion of worship and the mystical experience, as well as of the prophetic consciousness, and other fruits of religion, are really presuppositions of the argument rather than its consequences, and the force of the presentation would have been augmented if all the material dealing with

religion could have been grouped together at the outset. As it is, one has the feeling of a certain abstractness and *a priori* character in the theoretical discussion which is not really justified.

Taking up in detail the four points referred to, we begin with the author's view of religion. His analysis of the religious experience leads him to note the following three characteristics: In the first place, it involves a fearless and original valuation of things. It is an experience of individual freedom and creativity over against one's environment. In the second place, it is an experience of necessity. The fresh and original judgments of religion seem to the man who possesses them to be not merely his own individual creation, but due to an inner necessity to which he can not but yield. And finally, the religious attitude assumes for the man who has it a certain universal character. What is valid for him he believes to be valid also for all men everywhere. The note of authority is the note of all genuine religion. In these characteristics of combined freedom, necessity, and universality, we have revealed the distinctive nature of religion as an experience, namely, its "present possession of the distant sources of worth and certainty" (p. 31). We may indeed define religion as "the present attainment in a single experience of those objects which in the course of nature are reached only at the end of infinite progression. Religion is anticipated attainment" (p. 31).

This does not mean that the religious man is satisfied to accept his environment as it is. On the contrary, the singular thing about religion is that this experience of possession on the part of the person who has it proves to be a spur to activity. The more intense the personal religious experience, the more marked its effects in society. Religious men in every age have been creators, alterers, turners of the world upside down. Indeed, if one were to seek for a single word which would describe religion, considered as an objective fact in history, it would be the word, creativity. Religion, apparently often without independent content of its own, has been the source of fruitful activity in every sphere of human interest.

This is signally illustrated by the mystical experience, that type of religious life which is commonly regarded as most anti-social and individualistic. Mysticism, Professor Hocking defines as "a way of dealing with God, having cognitive and other fruit, affecting first the mystic's own being and then his thinking, affording him thereby answers to prayer which he can distinguish from the results of his own reflection" (p. 355). It is not, at least since the Pseudo-Dionysius it has not meant to be, a "rival theology," but rather "an experimental wisdom, having its own methods and its own audacious intention of meeting Deity face to face" (p. 355). Mysticism begins with a heightened consciousness of self, a feeling of dissatisfaction with all the relative satisfactions afforded by life as it is. It involves a withdrawal into self, that in solitude the hungry soul may renew its life by contact with the ultimate reality. Herein lies its negative and world-denying character. But the mystic does not stop here; at least, not ordinarily, or in the person of his best representatives. Rather does he turn back to the world, in order that he may live out the new insight which he has thus attained. In actual ex-

perience the mystics have been anything but solitaires. They have been men of affairs, active, resourceful, creative. In their own personal experience they have discovered a profound psychological truth, the truth, namely, that in order to insure the most effective social activity one must from time to time withdraw into oneself for renewal through contact with the primal founts of being. This law of alternation, which Professor Hocking discusses at length in Chapter XXVIII., and of which he finds many illustrations in human experience, is at once the explanation and the justification of worship. To it are due those familiar social fruits of religion, such as prophecy, inspiration, and the like, which he discusses at length in his concluding chapters.

The second point of interest in the book is the author's discussion of the place of idea in religion. How far, he asks, is the current tendency to depreciate the intellectual content of religion justified? How far can we adequately define religion in terms of feeling or of will? How far may we regard the God idea as a by-product which is negligible for the purposes of explaining the origin of religion and accounting for its function?

Professor Hocking answers all these questions in the negative. To him idea is of the very essence of religion because it is implicit in the nature of the religious experience itself. The religious experience is a metaphysical experience in the sense of being an experience of contact with reality. As such it involves an intellectual element which can not be ignored without destroying the experience itself.

The section in which Professor Hocking maintains this thesis contains the freshest and most original work in the book. It is an illuminating discussion of the psychology of feeling in its relation to idea. He discusses the various theories which treat the two in their independence and shows their inadequacy. It is impossible to isolate idea from feeling, for ideas come into existence through our interest in reality. Love of truth is itself a passion rooted in the nature of man, existing in and for itself (p. 123), and conversely feeling never exists by itself, but is always a mark of unstable equilibrium. Feeling is only another name for our search for the idea. Religion, then, is quite in the right in insisting upon dogma. Dogma is only our way of expressing our conviction that in religion we deal with reality, and reality of a necessary and eternal nature. This is why pragmatism, however useful it may be as a guide to truth, can never satisfy us as an ultimate philosophy. "As mature persons we can worship only that which we are compelled to worship. . . . Unless God is that being for whom the soul is inescapably destined by the eternal nature of things, the worship of God will get no sufficient hold on the human heart" (p. 152).

The conclusion, then, to which the author comes in his preliminary study of the nature of religion is this: that "we can not find a footing for religion in feeling, but must look for valid religious ideas. And these ideas are not to be taken at liberty, nor deduced from the conception of any necessary purpose. We are to seek the truth of religion obediently in experience as something which is established in independence of our finite wills" (p. 155).

So we are led to the third point to be noticed, the significance of the God idea. Leaving open for the moment the question of the reality of God, what must God be if he is to do for us what religion requires? Three things at least. In the first place, he must unify our world; secondly, he must furnish us with an absolute standard; and finally, he must be "intimate infallible associate, present in all experience, as that by which we too may firmly conceive that experience from the outside" (p. 224). He must be one, not indeed in the sense of a bare abstract monism, but as supplying that principle of unity that is necessary to a rational optimism, a unity consistent, to be sure, with a relative pluralism, requiring it indeed in order to account for the evil of which we have practical experience, but never elevating this evil to a level with itself, always regarding it as the transitory, the subordinate, that which is ultimately to be overcome. God, then, for religion will be "an individual reality not ourselves, which makes for rightness and which actually accomplishes rightness when left to its own working" (p. 177).

Again, God must be the Absolute, not in the sense of excluding the relative that we know in experience, but as providing the standard by which it is to be judged. So conceived, the Absolute is the most indispensable of all conceptions, to which we are led on purely pragmatic grounds. For action is not interested solely in making differences. It is interested rather "in making improvement, or, in other words, change in a situation which itself is permanent" (p. 186). The very conception of improvement implies a standard, and so brings us face to face with the Absolute. God, then, must be for us a unifying principle and an absolute standard, but above all he must be that intimate personal friend that religion has always affirmed him to be and that the experience of religious men has shown him to be in fact.

At this point the author faces the crux of every religious philosophy, the problem of evil. He considers the ancient dilemma, which Professor McTaggart has recently revived in his book, "Some Dogmas of Religion." Either God can control evil and does not, in which case he is not good, or he would, but can not, in which case he is not God. The author points out that the fallacy in this dilemma lies in regarding evil as something complete in itself apart from its relations; whereas, the characteristic feature of the religious life has been that it has never been willing to accept this conclusion. Religion has never denied the fact of evil. Rather has it intensified it in manifold ways. But it has insisted that evil is not the last word of evil (p. 218). There is a meaning behind evil, a purpose working itself out through it, which makes it worth all it costs, and God as the great Other who gives the key to this meaning is the power by which this transmutation of values is wrought.

From definition we pass to proof. Granting that we have correctly described what religion seeks in its God, how do we know that such a being exists in fact? Here Professor Hocking's answer is very simple. We know God just as we know any other object, by first-hand experience (p. 229). Not indeed that the consciousness of God is everywhere and always explicit, but that even in the simplest religious feeling we have al-

ready implicitly present "idea masses prepared beforehand in some more elemental experience" (p. 233), which in time develop into the great concept we call God. It is not that we come to the God idea at some particular stage of our experience, still less that we reason from this experience to the idea, but that we discover on reflection that which has always been present implicitly from the first. Our knowledge of God here stands on the same basis with all other knowledge, notably with our knowledge of our fellowmen. Indeed, Professor Hocking argues at length to prove that we could not know other persons at all if it were not for this prior possession of a knowledge of God as the standard by which real personal existence is to be tested. In this respect all three of the fundamental objects of our knowledge, God, nature, and our fellowmen, stand on the same level. They are not independent objects of knowledge, but each is involved in and with the others, and our consciousness of the reality of any one stands and falls with our consciousness of the reality of the others. Nature is known to us as real because it is the object of common knowledge by other selves. Selves are known to us as real because they are fellow knowers of a real nature; and nature and other selves are both alike known as real because there is implicitly present in our knowledge of each that great other self whom we call God. From the beginning "God is immediately known, and permanently known, as the other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating me" (p. 297).

If we ask more in detail how we come to the consciousness of this mysterious presence Professor Hocking can give us no clear answer. "Through no historical retracings shall we discover the silent entrance into nature of that presence" (p. 234). Shall we say that we rise to the thought of God from the sense of mystery which primitive man feels face to face with the phenomena of nature and of human life? But before man can feel mystery God must be there already. There is all the difference in the world between the sense of ignorance and the sense of mystery. "The former means, I know not; the latter means, I know not, but it is known" (p. 236). If then we wish to describe "the original source" of the knowledge of God we should have to say that it is "an experience of not being alone in knowing the world, and especially the world of nature. In such an experience—if there be such—would be contained all the possibilities for harm and for good which religion has exhibited" (p. 236).

Holding such views, it is not strange that the one argument for God's existence which has weight for the author is the ontological argument. This to him is not a syllogism of formal logic, but simply a report of experience. It is our way of telling what we actually find in our own experience and trusting the processes which make that report as valid witnesses. If we were to put it in logical form we should have to say, not "I have an idea of God, therefore God exists," but "I have an idea of God, therefore I have an experience of God" (p. 314). In our knowledge of God idea and experience belong together. We could not have the first without the second. In the course of our experience, to be sure, the idea is further developed and gains richness of content from many different sources, but its essential elements are present from the first. The fact that

we have it at all is our guarantee that in religion we are dealing with a reality as real as any of which it is possible for us to conceive.

So much by way of exposition. A word of final estimate. I have spoken of the author's thought as leading him away from the beaten track of contemporary philosophy and bringing him to a position which if not unique is at least unusual. It is none the less true that the book is symptomatic of a certain tendency in current thinking. It springs from the same impulse which has given birth to modern realism, the desire to get away from abstractions and artificialities and to recover contact with the real world as given to us in experience. The originality of Professor Hocking's treatment is found in his insistence upon the fact that the most certain things in experience are not the physical objects that we call things, but those centers of conscious rational activity that we call persons. What he reaches—to use his own words—is “a supernatural realism, or a social realism, or more truly a realism of the Absolute not far removed from absolute idealism” (p. 290). God and the self, or rather the society of selves—these for him constitute the ultimate realities.

We believe that this reminder is timely. It is high time that we realized that no psychology of religion can be scientific which ignores the meaning of religious experience to the man who has it. Writing as a psychologist for psychologists Professor Hocking shows us what this experience implies, and behold, it is metaphysical through and through. Accepting the pragmatist test of usefulness as a clue to reality, he applies it to the object of religious faith and shows that the qualities of inevitableness and finality in the older definitions of God against which pragmatism protests are essential to its adequate functioning in religion. In this we believe that he is entirely right, and in his emphasis upon the pragmatic value of the Absolute for religion will be found the chief merit of the book.

When we pass from this general thesis to the details of the treatment we find ourselves now and again raising a query. Is the God whom we find thus given in experience adequately defined? Admitting that Professor Hocking is right in making place in his definition for the attributes of unity and absoluteness has he done equal justice to other elements which have been central, we will not say in the idea simply, but in the experience of God. One hears little of the qualities of justice and of love which have played so great a part in historic religion. The ethical experience with its consciousness of sin and its sense of brotherhood, is given little or no place either in establishing faith in God or in determining the content of the God idea. One gains the impression as one reads that however much may have entered into the content of the God idea through the great ethical religions it is after all negligible compared with those more general elements which are common to the ethical religions with the natural religions which they have replaced. More than once we hear Professor Hocking saying that it is more certain to the religious man *that* God is than *what* he is (p. 296 *cf.*, p. 317), or using such sentences as this: “In finding God simply existent we find him both good and righteous in his activity, and the condition of so finding him is that

he himself remains above the contrasts of good and evil" (p. 332). Such language in its abstract and *a priori* character is suspiciously suggestive of the absolute idealism which the author repudiates. What has become, one is tempted to ask, of the radical empiricism of which so much was made at the outset? Wherein does the author's attitude toward the concrete and historic in religion differ from, let us say, that of Hegel?

Nor is it only in connection with the content of the God idea that we find ourselves asking questions. In his statement of the grounds of belief Professor Hocking passes lightly over aspects of the religious experience which have seemed to many religious men of controlling importance. One may agree with him that the experience which the ontological argument seeks to express does really lie at the basis of every proof of God. We believe in God not because we can demonstrate his existence by logic, but because faith in him is so indissolubly associated with all the highest values of life that we simply can not conceive of life without him. But in experience this conviction never meets us alone, but always associated with other convictions, intellectual and moral, which clothe it with warmth and content. The God in whom faith rests is never (certainly never at first) the abstract "I am," of whom one can say only that "he is," but the God of strength or of wisdom, or of justice or of love, who has some message to give, some purpose to be fulfilled, some power to display. So the interests which underlie the cosmological, the teleological, and above all, the moral arguments, can never be divorced from the ontological, and the reasoning which (rightly as we believe) endeavors to rehabilitate the one must concern itself with the others also.

The difficulty into which Professor Hocking has fallen at this point is due, we can not but feel, to his failure adequately to estimate, or, at all events, to use the contribution of history to religion. In spite of all that is said about the importance of idea for religion the content of religious belief is lightly touched on, and the difference which separates the historic types of religion dismissed as irrelevant. For Professor Hocking, as for Professor James, the mystic is the typically religious man, and the distinctive contributions of ethics to religion minimized, if not altogether overlooked.

But we would not end upon a note of criticism. We believe Professor Hocking has a real message to the religious thought of our day. We know no book which more adequately diagnoses the weakness of the present religious situation or more clearly points out the needed remedy. We need a philosophy which shall combine the firm grasp of idealism upon the necessary and abiding elements in religion with the keen sense of the concrete and the historic, and above all, the strong ethical interest which characterizes pragmatism. We need a philosophy which shall bring to the study of the religious experience that sober common sense, that respect for fact as fact which gives our new realism its all but religious quality, without making our experience of physical objects our exclusive standard of reality. We need, in short, a philosophy which shall make personality in the sense in which we know it in ourselves, and which is presupposed in the great spiritual experiences of mankind, the most real

thing in the world, the standard by which everything that deserves to be called reality must be tested. Professor Hocking has pointed out this need; he has made a distinct contribution toward meeting it. We trust that his book may lead others to move still farther along the path which he has pointed out.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1912. *Consciousness and Object* (633-640): FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE. — Replies to a former criticism of Professor Thilly. Maintains and further explains the soundness of the two assertions that consciousness marks the difference between an object and the consciousness of the object, and that consciousness has no efficiency. *Implication and Existence in Logic* (pp. 641-665): CHRISTINE LADD-FRANKLIN. — Sets forth the objections to making the phrase, "*p* implies *q*," used by symbolic logicians, typical of pure mathematics. Illustrates the misconceptions arising from following unwarily M. Bertrand Russell by a criticism of Professor Mamin's article, "The Existential Proposition." *Henri Bergson: Personalist* (pp. 666-675): MARY WHITON CALKINS. — A protest against current misinterpretations of Bergson's teaching. "He is claimed, or criticized, as pragmatist or temporalist when, as a matter of fact, he is first and foremost a personalist and idealist of the renaissance spiritualistic school." *Reviews of Books* (pp. 676-700): George Malcolm Stratton, *Psychology of the Religious Life*: GEORGE ALBERT COE. R. M. Wenley, *Kant and his Philosophical Revolution*: ERNEST ALBEE. James Seth, *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*: GEORGE H. SABINE. Borden Parker Bowne, *Kant and Spencer: A Critical Exposition*: EDGAR L. HINMAN. V. Brochard, *Études de Philosophie Ancienne et de Philosophie Moderne*: G. S. BRETTE. *Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

Allan, Archibald. *Space and Personality*. London: Oliver and Burd. 1913. Pp. xxv + 607.

Walter, Herbert E. *Genetics; An Introduction to the Study of Heredity*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xiv + 272. \$1.50.

Weaver, Edward E. *Mind and Health*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xv + 500. \$2.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association will meet in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences, on Monday, April 28, at