

of individual liberty, and of Stoicism. *The Present Attitude* (pp. 449-461): F. CARREL.—Civilization has not advanced as far as we might expect in four thousand years. *Book Reviews*. Henri Bergson, *L'Évolution Créatrice*: MARY HUSBAND. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*: A. E. TAYLOR. B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*: J. S. MACKENZIE. Nathaniel Schmidt, *The Messages of the Ports*: C. H. JOY. Thomas C. Hall, *History of Ethics Within Organized Christianity*: E. G. HOLLANDS. G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*: J. E. MCTAGGART. Gino Dallari, *Il Nuovo Contrattualismo nella Filosofia Sociale e Giuridica*: J. WHITTAKER. Robert C. Brooks, *Corruption in American Politics and Life*: J. H. TUFTS. Charles Zueblin, *Democracy and the Overman*: G. S. PATTON. F. Müller-Lyer, *Der Sinn des Lebens und die Wissenschaft*: W. J. ROBERTS. J. H. HARLEY, *The New Social Democracy*: W. J. ROBERTS. Achille Loria, *Contemporary Social Problems*: W. J. ROBERTS. B. Seebohm Tree, *Unemployment: a Social Study*: O. P. ECKHARD. F. J. Gould, *Youth's Noble Task*: M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD. J. S. KNOWLSON, *England's Need in Education*: M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD. Margaret McMillan, *The Child and the State*: M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD. William Boyd, *The Educational Theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau*: RICHARD SMITH. *A Correction*, The Editors.

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NOTES AND NEWS

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR COHEN

TO THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS:

In Professor Lovejoy's careful review of Professor Perry's book¹ there occurs a statement which is so important for present-day discussion, and yet so readily settled on its own merits, that it seems to me well worthy of separate attention. It is the following:

(1) "The relativity of secondary qualities is taken by science as an evidence of their subjectivity, (2) because otherwise you would apparently be compelled, self-contradictorily, to assert of one and the same object that it 'really' and in itself is at the same moment long and short, square and oblong, hot and cold, red and gray, and so on."

¹ This JOURNAL, Volume IX., page 675.

I have inserted the numbers because I wish to separate the statement of fact from the reason assigned for it, and to challenge both.

(1) Is there a science which actually treats secondary qualities as subjective? It is true that certain philosophic mechanists like Galileo or Descartes have so expressed themselves, but surely the science of optics does not use the category of subjectivity to explain why the same object does appear long and short, square and oblong, etc. The straight stick, for instance, appears bent when partly immersed in water, not because of the nature of consciousness, but because of the mathematical properties of light rays. So physiologic psychology explains the fact that the same object appears both hot and cold, not by the nature of consciousness, but by the differences in the physical or physiologic sensorium.

(2) The assumption that the same object can not "really and in itself" "at the same moment" be "long and short," etc., seems to me a most unwarranted assumption. The same line may and does "really and in itself," at the same moment, subtend an angle of 45° from one point, and 23° from another without involving any self-contradiction—no more, at least, than Professor Lovejoy when he has his face to the north and his back to the south.

I call attention to these two points because the prevalent impression that consciousness is necessary in order to explain the facts of illusion seems to me to rest on demonstrably false logic. Indeed to resort to consciousness as an explanation of the fact of error or hallucination, is precisely the same kind of a procedure as to invoke the faculty of memory to explain the fact that some of us forget things so readily. Memory and consciousness are both very important facts; but the former will not explain to us why some things are forgotten rather than remembered, and the latter will not explain why some beliefs or judgments are false rather than true.

Respectfully yours,

MORRIS R. COHEN.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
December 9, 1912.

ACCORDING to previous announcement the American Philosophical Association met at Columbia University on December 26 to 28. The President of the University received the members of the Association at the presidential residence on Thursday evening. The annual smoker was held in the Graduates' Room in the Hall of Philosophy on Friday evening. The final session was held at the College of the City of New York, where the members were entertained at luncheon by the College. Officers for the ensuing year were elected as follows: president, Professor E. B. McGilvary, of the University of Wisconsin; vice-president, Professor H. A. Overstreet, of the College of the City of New York; secretary, Professor E. G. Spaulding, of Princeton University; new members of the Executive Committee, Professor J. E. Creighton, of Cornell University, and Professor Mary W. Calkins, of Wellesley College.