

independent critic, and the opposition to Kant's extreme rigorism is wholly in keeping with Schiller's own development. That Schiller's attitude "makes an advance upon the Kantian position, that this advance . . . consists in a fuller recognition of the desiderative side of man's nature, all this must be the broad result of an unbiased reading of the writings of Schiller" (p. 118).

While the difficulty of establishing a single unambiguous ethical doctrine out of the different writings of Schiller's post-Kantian period must be admitted, a critical reading of these writings leads the author to assume an independent development of Schiller's esthetic morality in which Kant's dualism between inclination and duty is reconciled. Schiller recognized two distinct kinds of valuation of human conduct—the moral and the esthetic—and only in the complete fusion of the ethical and the artistic standards does Schiller's view of beautiful morality consist. "*Inclination to duty*,—that is the heart of Schiller's ethics, and the gist of his criticism of Kantian rigorism" (p. 127). "The conduct flowing from the harmonious activity of all man's powers Schiller calls beautiful conduct (*die schöne Sittlichkeit*), and the soul thus at one with itself, the beautiful soul (*die schöne Seele*)" (p. 131).

Schiller's independent philosophical views centered mainly around ethical and esthetic problems. It is in his view of beautiful morality as a synthesis of the natural and spiritual demands that his originality consists. Metaphysical ideas, in so far as such can at all be seriously ascribed to him, "did not constitute a clear development upon those of Kant, as did his ethical and esthetic theories" (p. 159). The question whether Schiller should—in his metaphysical views—be classed with Kant or rather with the post-Kantians is an interesting one. The author holds that metaphysically Schiller is to be identified with Kant.

It may well be that the philosophy of Schiller was far from being so well founded in his own mind. But a student of the genesis of any philosophy must always endeavor to understand its author—to use a Kantian phrase—*besser als er sich selbst verstand*.

The student of Schiller will find the extensive bibliography at the end of the book very helpful. It is regrettable, however, that an index has been omitted.

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## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. February, 1912. *L'antesignano del neotomismo in Italia* (Gaetano Sanseverino) (pp. 1-19): DOMENICO LANNA. — A study of the life and work of the father of Italian Neo-Scholasticism, Gaetano Sanseverino. *La verità ontologica e la verità logica secondo il Card. Mercier* (pp. 20-30): A. MASNOVO. — The foundation of ontological truth is not in the human intellect, as Cardinal Mercier teaches, but in the Divine Mind. *Univocità od analogia?* (pp. 31-61): G. M. PETAZZI, S.J. — The concept of being, when applied to God

and creatures, is analogical. The univocal character of the concept, credited to Duns Scotus by Belmont, although absurd as understood by the latter, is perfectly logical in Scotus himself, and in agreement with the Thomistic teaching. *Lo studio sperimentale del pensiero e della volontà* (pp. 62-72): A. GEMELLI. — The recent studies made in psychological laboratories show that purely experimental psychology is insufficient and must be completed by metaphysics. *Sigieri di Brabante e le fonti della filosofia di Dante* (pp. 73-90): BRUNO NARDI. — The theological and psychological doctrines of Dante are not purely Thomistic, as has been so often maintained, but reveal the influence of Neo-Platonism and Averroism. *Note e discussioni. Tribuna libera. Analisi d'opere.* H. HÖFFDING, *La pensée humaine, ses formes et ses problèmes*: L. NECCHI. — A Fouillée, *La pensée et les nouvelles écoles anti-intellectualistes*: L. BIANCHI. P. Natorp, *Philosophie. Ihr Problem und ihre Probleme*: B. C. GIACHETTI, *La fantasia*: A. GALLI. A Michotte et C. Ransy, *Contribution à l'étude de la mémoire logique*: A. GALLI. T. V. MOORE, *The Process of Abstraction. An Experimental Study*: A. GEMELLI. Ed. Claparède, *Psicologia del fanciullo e pedagogia sperimentale*: M. BRUSADELLI. O. Renz, *Die Synderesis nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin*: B. NARDI. S. Deploige, *Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie*: G. TREDICI. M. d'Herbigny, *Un Newman Russe. Vladimir Soloviev*: V. ZABUGHIN. Th. Cremer, *Le problème religieux dans la Philosophie de l'Action*. G. M. PETAZZ. *Note bibliografiche. Notiziario. Sommario ideologico.*

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. February, 1912. *L'énergétique et la théorie scolastique* (pp. 5-41): D. NYS. — The new science of energetics presents great advantages over the mechanical conception of the universe. The monism which is professed by some of its defenders is, however, incompatible with the principles of the new science and ought to be rejected. *Les théories politiques dans les écrits de L. Lessius* (pp. 42-85): V. BRANTS. — An exposition of the political theories of the famous Jesuit Leonard Lessius (1554-1623). *Le néo-dogmatisme* (pp. 86-115): L. DU ROUSSAUX. — The type of neo-dogmatism born among certain Scholastics from the influence of Kantian criticism is decidedly inferior to the old traditional dogmatism. *L'éthique et la pédagogie morale de Fr. W. Foerster* (pp. 116-132): F. DE HOVRE. — Förster's system of ethics borrows some elements from the philosophy of Nietzsche, as well as from the naturalistic and socialistic conceptions. It is, however, much more logical than these systems, of which Förster skilfully points out the weak points. *Comptes rendus.* Th. Ruyssen, *Schopenhauer*: F. PALHORIÈS. G. Rensi, *Il genio etico ed altri Saggi*: F. PALHORIÈS. L. Perego, *L'idealismo etico di Fichte e il socialismo contemporaneo*: F. PALHORIÈS. G. Calo, *Fatti e Problemi del mondo educativo*: F. PALHORIÈS. J. Rogues de Fursac, *L'avarice. Essai de psychologie morbide*: G. LEGRAND. J. Lottin, *Quetelet, statisticien et sociologue*: M. DE WULF. O. Willmann, *Didactiek als vormingsleer*: A. MANSION. E. Rolfes, *Aristoteles' Nikomachische Ethik*: A. MANSION. R. Eisler, *Philosophen-Lexicon, Leben, Werke und Lehren der Denker*: M. DE WULF.

- J. Segond, *Cournot et la psychologie vitaliste*: J. LOTTIN. E. Rolfes, *Die Wahrheit des Glaubens durch gründliche Beweise ins Licht gestellt*: MOUSTIERS. *Sommaire idéologique des ouvrages et Revues de Philosophie*.
- Seth, James. *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1912. Pp. xi + 372. \$1.50.
- Sommerville, D. M. J. *Bibliography of Non-Euclidean Geometry, including the Theory of Parallels, the Foundations of Geometry, and Space of  $n$ -dimensions*. London: Harrison and Sons. Pp. xii + 404. 10s.

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NOTES AND NEWS

A GROUP of European professors distinguished in philosophy and science has issued an appeal to all who are interested in promoting the scientific spirit in philosophy. They explain their undertaking as follows:

“There has long been felt the need of a philosophy which should grow in a natural manner out of the facts and problems of natural science. The mechanical view of nature no longer satisfies this need. Let any one recall the “Ignorabimus” of Du Bois Reymond and the various attempts to relate mechanical and psychological processes by means of neovitalistic concepts, attempts of physicists as well as of biologists. The current philosophy, of Kantian origin for the most part, or with strongly Kantian emphasis, is impotent here, because it directs its inquiries without any deep appreciation of the need in question, because it treats of problems scarcely intelligible to any one who comes to them from the natural science of to-day, and because it is usually not able to go far enough into the questions of natural science.

To be sure, there has grown up from the soil of natural science itself a strictly empirical and positivistic point of view quite indifferent to metaphysical speculation and to so-called critical, transcendental doctrines. Its principles are however not yet accepted in their essential meanings and systematic relations throughout considerable scientific circles. They are even completely misunderstood by distinguished scientists as they are by most of the influential philosophers.

On the other hand the particular sciences find themselves forced to consider problems of even greater generality so that they take on of themselves a philosophical character. Mathematics advances to higher and higher abstractions. Geometry, in its deductive development, is freeing itself from all intuition after overcoming the limits of the Euclidean conception of space. In the theory of groups it has reached a positive treatment of the concept of infinity, once a purely negative idea, and it faces now the question of its differentiation from logic. Physics has been made to include more and more remote fields of research. Optics and all the phenomena of radiation have been brought under the concepts of electromagnetic theory, and physics has now before it the question, how far can mechanics be interpreted in terms of electromagnetism? In the theory