

itself an inadequate expression of the law of synthetic thought. It indeed makes clear, which was not true of the old formulation, the fact that difference, even if outright, is always in terms of identity; but like the law of identity, it fails to express the even more important truth, that all identity must be predicated in terms of difference.

In like manner, the law of excluded middle is still a one-sided expression of real thought. Yet in the present formulation it makes clear not only the fact expressed by the old form, that the world of predication is completely dichotomizable, and in so far systematic, but the further important fact that in being thus exhaustively divisible into two, it still maintains its oneness of generic being throughout the two divisions.

It has, indeed, often enough been agreed that the three laws of thought are each insufficient to express the whole truth about thought. We should not, however, permit them to be so inadequately formulated that they keep effectively concealed all trace of thought that is real and fruitful. With the symbolization just given, it seems to the writer that the truth of the laws in their old forms is preserved, while there is added to this truth of *analysis* the all-important truth of *synthesis*.

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DISCUSSION

THE REALISM OF PRAGMATISM

PROFESSOR COLVIN in his instructive article on Subjective Idealism and Psychology,¹ lets drop this significant remark: "It is an extremely fascinating doctrine, this radical subjectivism, which becomes solipsism when interpreted in terms of the intellect, *and pragmatism when formulated in the categories of the will.*" The words I have italicized are significant because, thrown in incidentally and not in an argument *pro* or *con* as to pragmatism, they reveal what seems to be the general assumption. Accordingly this may offer a fit and uncontroversial opportunity for making a somewhat personal and dogmatic *Auseinandersetzung*.

Speaking of the matter only for myself, the presuppositions and tendencies of pragmatism are distinctly realistic; not idealistic in any sense in which idealism connotes or is connoted by the theory of knowledge. (Idealistic in the ethical sense is another matter, and one whose associations with epistemological idealism, aside from the accidents of history, are chiefly verbal.) Pragma-

¹ 'Is Subjective Idealism a Necessary Point of View for Psychology?' this JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 9, April 27, 1905, p. 225.

tism believes that in knowledge as a fact, an accomplished matter, things are 'representative of one another,' to employ Woodbridge's happy, because correct, phrase.² Ideas, sensations, mental states, are, in their cognitive significance, media of so adjusting things to one another, that they *become* representative of one another. When this is accomplished, they drop out;³ and things are present to the agent in the most naïvely realistic fashion. 'States of consciousness' refer to *getting* knowledge; to the situation when things as objective fail us; have, so to speak, gone back on us; when accordingly we neither have them to know nor yet to *know with*. It is in this situation, and only in this situation, that 'states of consciousness' exist or have meaning, cognitively speaking. And if I put in the phrase, 'cognitively speaking,' it is only to take account of the emotions; and with reference to the emotions the significant point is that they also arise and function in problematic situations; in situations whose objective determination or character is not known, not presented.

Instrumentalism is thus thoroughly realistic as to the objective or fulfilling conditions of knowledge. States of consciousness, sensations and ideas as cognitive, exist as tools, bridges, cues, functions—whatever one pleases—to affect a realistic presentation of things, in which there are no intervening states of consciousness as veils, or representatives. Known things, as known, are direct presentations in the most diaphanous medium conceivable. And if getting knowledge, as distinct from having it, involves representatives, pragmatism carries with it a reinterpretation, and a realistic interpretation, of 'states of consciousness' *as* representations. They are practically or effectively, not transcendently, representative. They represent in the sense in which a signature, for legal purposes, represents a real person in a contract; or as money, for economic purposes, represents beefsteak or a night's lodging. They are symbols, in short, and are known and used as such.

Knowledge, even *getting* knowledge, must rest on facts, or things. But the need of truth, of cognitively assured things, means once more that such things are *not* present—just as the beefsteak is not eating, in the situation in which money stands for it. Things in problematic situations must operate through representatives, ministerial agents, through psychical things, which, *for the purpose in hand and for that only*, stand for and thus accomplish what things would accomplish—viz., mutually realistic significance—if they were only there. Psychical things are thus themselves real-

² See *Science*, N. S., Vol. XX., p. 587; and this JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 5, March 2, 1905, p. 119.

³ The sense in which their value remains will be spoken of later.

istically conceived; they can be described and identified in biological and physiological terms, in terms (with adequate science) of chemico-physical correspondents.⁴ Psychologically, they are themselves literal emotions and felt impulses. Moreover, they are realistically conditioned from the genetic side. Their origin as existences can be stated and must be stated in terms of adjustments and maladjustments among habits, biological functions.⁵ The reproach that has been brought against 'pragmatism' of utilizing biological evolutionary data, might, it would seem, at least have preserved it from the reproach of subjectivism.

In short, the point that the critics of pragmatism have missed with a surprising unanimity, is that in giving a reinterpretation of the nature and function of knowledge, pragmatism gives necessarily a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of all the cognitive machinery—sensations, ideas, concepts, etc.; one which inevitably tends to take these things in a much more literal and physically realistic fashion than is current. What pragmatism takes from idealism is just and only *empiricism*. That, to it, is the real lesson of the subjectivism which has held sway since the time of Descartes and Locke. This lesson learned, we can think freely and naïvely in terms of things—because things are no longer entities in a world set over against another world called 'mind' or 'consciousness,' with some sort of mysterious ontological tie between them. Again, pragmatism has learned that the true meaning of subjectivism is just *anti-dualism*. Hence philosophy can enter again into the realistic thought and conversation of common sense and science, where dualisms are just dualities, distinctions having an instrumental and practical, but not ultimate, metaphysical worth; or rather, having metaphysical worth in a practical and experimental sense, not in that of indicating a radical existential cleavage in the nature of things.

I speak only for myself, but in giving my hearty assent to what Professor James has said about the nature of truth (see this JOURNAL, p. 118, Vol. II.), I venture to express the hope that he also conceives the matter in some such way as I have suggested. Certainly it is the obvious deduction from his denial of the existence

⁴This possibility of objective statement is, I take it, the meaning of the psychophysical parallelism—if it has any meaning. There is no sense that I am aware of in which their description is to be limited to brain terms rather than to chemical terms, or to terms of changes among extra-organic objects, or to terms of changes among social objects, persons. The point is simply that psychical changes do correspond to changes in reality.

⁵Pragmatism would thus deny absolutely that psychology rests upon the idealistic presupposition. The psychologist has the same naïve right to things and bodies as has the geologist or zoologist.

of consciousness. It is the witness borne by Professor Mead in his *Definition of the Psychical*. It is what I had supposed to be the only possible outcome of my essays in the *Contributions to Logical Theory*—though I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness to conversations with Professor Woodbridge, as well as to his published articles, for making me aware of the full force of their realistic implications.

In conclusion, I wish to say a word upon the ethical idealism involved. Speaking from the cognitive standpoint, it is difficult to conceive of anything stranger, more curious, more wholly unanticipated, than that certain things—emotions, sensations—which are biologically conditioned as to their origin, should become bearers of the transformation of things into things mutually representative or significant of one another. But such is the empirical fact. It demonstrates that while ideas, states of consciousness, drop out in our assured esthetic, intellectual and practical transactions with things, leaving a face-to-face or realistic situation, yet their worth, their value, remains in the significance which things have gained as representative of one another. *The increments of meaning which things are constantly taking on is as much the product of psychical existences, as the added significance of words is the result of their use in propositions, i. e., with a context.* They are the media of effecting the transformation of conflicting, unsatisfactory, and consequently fragmentarily significant situations, into situations where things are surely and reciprocally (in an all-around way) significant of one another. Hence the free, the indeterminate, the growing, the potential factor in reality. Meaning, significance is never just pre-determined. It is always hanging upon the operation of the psychical, of the peculiarly individual. *Hence morality: the recognition of responsibility for the use of the psychical, as the ultimate determiner of the ways in which the world of all (you and me) who live among things grows in significance.* It is because the psychical is, cognitively, realistic, that morality has an empirically real sanction and yet an ideal bearing of infinite import. It never gets in the way of things of knowledge to obstruct or pervert; but its prior operations control what things become representative of one another, and hence the experienced meaning, or value, of those things.

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