

fessor James has neglected just that kind which Mr. Bradley emphasizes. It is not difficult to understand how we are coerced by past habits of thought ingrained in our nature. But except as we can discover the source of determination in the present or past structure of experience, what real meaning is there to the claim that experience guides itself? In sense perception, in particular, the difficulty will continue to be raised, just because there is in experience, unless taken in some esoteric sense, nothing to explain the insistence of this, and its independence of our will. Experience may determine the form in which I am to see a lion in the path, but what in experience brings the lion there? Neither does the conception of *implicit* truth seem in such a case to have any application.

In another point Professor James seems to me to overlook the force of Mr. Bradley's contention. And the reason is that he leans too heavily upon the new logic of science. But does science, with its utilitarian end, really exhaust the whole value of the knowing experience? Is not the 'love of truth' in the old-fashioned sense too vital a thing to be dismissed summarily? At any rate, when the reality in question is of a *personal* sort—and in connection with the religious experience this might conceivably become of central importance for our view of reality—is not the idea of personal *communion* essential in knowledge? And does not this involve the actual mirroring of the nature of the real being we know, as something quite over and above the mere problem of getting a result for ourselves?

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The Heart of Mr. Spencer's Ethics. FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS. *The International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1904. Pp. 496-499.

The formulation of a system of scientific ethics was the crowning achievement of Mr. Spencer's intellectual career and the heart of that system was its ideal of social and industrial peace. In a conversation with the writer of this article, Mr. Spencer, in 1896, stated that it was one of the greatest disappointments of his life that the world had reverted to the militarism which it ought to have outgrown. Nevertheless, according to his own principles, such a relapse must necessarily occur whenever a stronger race comes into contact with a weaker, the warfare continuing until stable equilibrium is again reached by the conquest or transformation of the latter. Mr. Spencer's inability to reconcile himself to this necessary process is evidence 'of the intensity of his abhorrence of all aggression.' Yet this equilibration will not inevitably take the form of an extermination of the weak but more and more the energies of the strong will transform the weak in humane ways, above all by economic stimulation and educational uplifting.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOCIOLOGIE. September, 1904, Band XXVII., Heft III. *Der Einfluss der Dunkelheit auf das Seelenleben des Menschen*

(pp. 255-279): C. M. GIESSLER. — Under the influence of darkness the psychical activities of man revert to those of earlier stages of his development. Logical thinking and moral judgment tend to disappear. Processes are slower and demand more effort; while the content lacks scope and energy. *Die Grundlage des Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteils* (pp. 280-317): E. v. HARTMANN. — Much confusion results from supposing probability to be a mean between truth and error; whereas it is merely a mean between certainty and uncertainty. Philosophy has fallen into the extremes of dogmatism and scepticism because she has failed to distinguish between the probable and the possible and problematic. The concept of probability is attained from the apportionment of the certainty of a 'total' judgment between the members of the disjunction. And the fundamental problem is to state the character of cases of equal probability. This is here done. *Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung. III.* (pp. 318-339): P. BARTH. — Education everywhere has for its object solidarity rather than individuality. This is exemplified more fully than is commonly supposed by the education of the Greek and Roman youth. Gymnastic was for war, music for the social religion. Aristotle, but not Plato, insisted on the worth of individual development. Roman education was left to the family but had for its end the state. *Besprechungen* (pp. 340-360): E. DURR, *Über die Grenzen der Gewissheit*: NATH. O. WEINIGER, *Geschlecht und Character*; and *Über die letzten Dinge*: NATH. A. B. HAUSCHMANN, *B. Palissy, der Künstler*: RENNER. Dessoir u. Menzer, *Philosophisches Lesebuch*: RENNER. E. SCHRADER, *Zur Grundlegung der psychologie des Urteils*: RENNER. G. PORTIG, *Die Grundzüge der Monistischen und dualistischen Weltanschauung*: RENNER. K. WARMUTH, *Wissen und Glauben bei Pascal*: RENNER. T. J. de BOER, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*: RENNER. M. ETINGER, *Untersuchungen über die Bedeutung der Deszendenztheorie für die Psychologie*: SCHALLMAYER. M. W. SHINN, *The Biography of a Baby*: KRUEGER. O. LIEBMANN, *Gedanken und Tatsachen*: KRUEGER. *Philosophische Zeitschriften. Bibliographie. Notiz.*

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NOTES AND NEWS

WE reprint from the London *Times* of October 29 the following account of the commemoration of the bicentenary of the death of John Locke by the British Academy:

A special meeting of the British Academy was held on October 28, 1904, at the room of the Society of Antiquaries, Burlington House, to commemorate the bicentenary of the death of John Locke, who died at Oates, in Essex, on October 28, 1704. Dr. Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, presided.

Mr. I. Gollancz, secretary, read a letter from Lord Reay, president of the Academy, regretting that he was not well enough to travel from Scotland to attend the meeting.

The chairman said that when the Academy decided to celebrate the bicentenary of Locke's death they all thought it appropriate that the veteran philosopher, Professor Campbell Fraser, should be asked to deliver an address. Unfortunately the professor, owing to his old age and indifferent health, was unable to be present; but he had sent a paper, which would be read by the secretary.

Mr. Gollancz then read Professor Campbell Fraser's address, which was entitled 'John Locke as a Factor in Modern Thought.' The 'Instauratio' of Bacon and the 'Essay on the Human Understanding' of Locke were the most memorable works in English philosophy. The splendid vision of Bacon embraced exhaustive unification of knowledge as within the reach of a future age. The 'Essay' of Locke seemed to throw cold water on the sanguine conception of Bacon, and made him ready to resist the faith that human understanding could ever compass the ideal which inspired the 'Instauratio.' Instead of its expectation of complete intellectual empire, Locke announced that his sober purpose was to investigate the inevitable boundary of human knowledge, and the probabilities on which we have to rest when absolute knowledge was necessarily unattainable. The vain endeavors of philosophers in the past warned Locke of the need of a humbler ideal. Beginning at the wrong end, they took for granted, without preliminary criticism of possibilities, that the infinite extent of being was the possible intellectual possession of the mind of man. But we have no need to complain of the necessary limitation of our knowledge, if we could have what served all human purposes. At any rate, according to Locke, our intellectual empire must be finally measured by experience. In that all our knowledge was founded, and from that it all derived itself. The task of the philosopher was to analyze experience; at least, that