

M. Lemaitre notes that the scholastic dispute between nominalists and realists was, in his belief, entirely 'endophasique,' and that the nominalists were of the articulatory-motor type, the realists were visuels, and conceptualists were auditory.

Incidentally many examples of synæsthesia and of number forms are described.

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La Finalité en Biologie. E. GOBLOT. *Revue Philosophique*, July, 1904, pp. 24-37.

This is one of several contributions by the author bearing upon the same subject. The present article was called forth by a letter from M. Chas. Richet, which had been appended to another of the author's recent papers. Richet there formulates two great laws, to which, he holds, all living things conform: (1) an 'effort toward life,' and (2) 'progress in the manifestations of life.' Goblot rejects both of these generalizations. He admits, as he is bound to do, a general advance in the degree of organic complexity, but denies the existence of *progress* in the sense of an advance toward a goal which may be said to be *better*. Relative to the needs of a species or an individual, this or that thing may be regarded as good or bad, but such terms are purely relative, and can not be applied to the living world as a whole.

The scientist can not escape, however, from 'finalistic' conceptions, which he employs unconsciously, even while rejecting them in theory. But it is the 'providential teleology, the anthropocentric and anthropomorphic teleology, the vitalistic teleology' which he rejects as anti-scientific. Thus, 'la mauvaise finalité chasse la bonne.' No scientist would admit that the eye was 'made for seeing,' but he says correctly that vision is the reason for the eye's existence. "If vision explains itself by the structure of the eye, the structure of the eye explains itself also by vision, and this explanation is precisely what the student seeks when he investigates the how and the why of organic evolution." Again, it is the existence of finality which gives to physiology its place as an independent science, for 'function is a finalistic idea.'

Final causes, according to Goblot, 'should not be sought above and beyond the facts,' but in the series of phenomena itself. 'Final causes,' if the term may be employed at all, are *efficient causes*. In considering the variation of a species of organisms, he would designate as a final cause 'a series of circumstances such that the species would perish if it were not transformed.' These circumstances 'are, indeed, efficient causes, but they are also final causes, since the relation of fitness between them and the character in question is the reason for their efficiency.' Many of the transformations which take place in the organic world can not, however, be regarded as manifestations of finality, *i.e.*, such as are non-adaptive.

It will be seen that the author has concerned himself mainly with *defining* finality as he chooses to employ the term. From the biologist's

standpoint, I should say that Goblot had not succeeded in throwing much light upon the subject. It is not so much definitions that we need in this field at present as it is facts, and these facts are being investigated by the modern 'experimental' school of biology. Is it or is it not true that living matter in general simulates intelligent choice in its power to respond adaptively to conditions which are foreign to individual and racial experience? Are there or are there not organic structures of purely 'prophetic' significance? Is the course of evolution governed in the main by environmental conditions, or is it determined by innate tendencies to vary in particular directions? These are real problems to be solved by the accumulation of facts.

The author's comparison between the operations of human intelligence and those of natural selection is interesting, though by no means novel.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1904. Vol. XV., No. 1. *The Bias of Patriotism* (pp. 1-27): ALFRED JORDAN.—Preference for one's country is justifiable just so long as it does not conflict with the equally justifiable preference of other men for their countries. *Moral Instruction in Schools* (pp. 28-47): HERBERT M. THOMPSON.—Contains interesting examples of the author's secular method of teaching morals to children, and an arraignment of the current attempts to base ethical truth upon theological dogmas. *Music and Morality* (pp. 48-63): HALBERT H. BRITAN.—Music is of no direct value in developing the moral nature but by its elevating effect upon the emotions it serves indirectly to increase moral efficiency. *Truth and Imagination in Religion* (pp. 64-82): RALPH BARTON PERRY.—Between those who regard religion as purely subjective and those who believe it to be essentially bound up with theoretical dogmas the author takes up a middle position. Religion does involve an objective or ontological reference, but that reference is practical rather than theoretical. So long as reality is such as to vindicate our religious attitudes it matters not at all as to its particular constitution. *Human Pre-existence* (pp. 83-95): J. ELLIS MCTAGGART.—It is difficult to believe in life after death unless we believe also in life before birth. In view of the stock of aptitudes and tendencies possessed by each individual at the time of his birth the author feels it reasonable to assume a pre-existent life for their acquirement. That such inborn traits may be due to inheritance is a view which the author apparently does not consider worthy of mention. The lack of memory of our past lives is regarded as the main difficulty, though not an insuperable one. *A Japanese View of American Trade Unionism* (pp. 96-108): HORIO ITO.—Economic issues are still obscured by the doctrine of natural rights. The right to one's job no less than the right to buy labor in the cheapest market are valid only in so far