

through the pressing controversies of his own day, are clearly exhibited. Two quotations may serve to bring this out. "Hobbes . . . is not arguing for one form of government more than for another. He prefers monarchy; but his special point is that in every form, monarchistic, aristocratic, or democratic, there must be a 'sovereign'—an ultimate, supreme, and single authority. Men, he says, admit the claim of a popular State to 'absolute dominion,' but object to the claim of a king, though he has the same power and is not more likely, for reasons given, to abuse it. The doctrine which he really opposes is that of a 'mixed government'" (p. 198). "Hobbes's dislike to popular rule may be due in part to a certain intellectual difficulty. A sovereign must needs be a unit. But Hobbes is not comfortable with abstractions, or with so vague a body as the sovereign in a complex political system. He likes to have a king—a concrete, tangible individual in whom his principles may be incarnated. This prevents him from recognizing one development of his theory which none the less was implied from the first. He perceives with perfect clearness and asserts in the most vigorous way that the division of sovereignty was the real weakness of the English system. His prejudices lead him to throw the whole blame upon the popular leaders. But a man of science should see that it is little to the purpose to blame individuals. Their discontent is a fact: a philosophical reformer should aim not at denouncing the symptoms, but at removing the causes of discord. It was clearly hopeless to persuade either side that it was in the wrong; but he might have tried to give an impartial diagnosis of the disease. He might then have admitted that the true solution might be, not to give the power of the purse to the king, but to give the power of the sword to the parliament. If he had contemplated that proposition, he might have foreseen (I do not mean that any human being could wholly have foreseen) that his theory would apply to a radically changed order" (p. 203).

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An Examination of the Rationalistic Attitude. GUSTAV SPILLER. *The International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1904. Pp. 488-496.

The average rationalist is so impressed by the evils of superstition that he decries emotion and will, forgetting that his own appeal in behalf of reason is evidently directed to the emotions of his hearers. Reason itself arises only to meet the demands of our complex practical needs and must be at all times the instrument of these. The love of reason is only one of the many justifiable passions of the soul. The rationalist is usually concrete and negative, advocating, not the pure love of reason in all its manifestations, but the abolition of unreason as embodied in some supernatural religious system, forgetting that the destruction of this but leaves the field open to the host of equally objectionable naturalistic quacks and medicine-men. When 'it is no more the gods who are believed to protect us, it is an endless number of systems of diet, exercise and what not.' Moreover, life is far too complex to permit of action based only upon rationally

proved certainties. Indeed, the very creation of our rational systems is a matter of subjective selection and interest. "We may agree consequently that the Pragmatist and the defender of Faith are justified in so far as they insist that one may reasonably revere other things than knowledge, . . . and the Rationalist will be justified in so far as he contends that life's complexity and the diversity of men's wants make it imperative that the reason shall be called in to investigate and to decide upon the many diverging claims put forward."

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. September, 1904. Vol XIII, No. 5. *The Infinite New and Old* (pp. 497-513): J. A. LEIGHTON.—Royce Dedekind Russell and Cantor are wrong in thinking that the infinite defined as a completely self-representative system is any less potential than the infinite defined as a quantity greater than any assignable quantity. There is no demonstration of the actuality of either the old or new infinite. The infinite may indeed exist as the positive and individual limit of the various indefinitely continuable series of experience which, however, in themselves only prove that there is a certain element of self-transcendency in our consciousness. *On the Categories of Aristotle* (pp. 514-528): ISAAC HUSIK.—The author cites numerous passages from Aristotle's works as evidence for the conclusion that "the treatise of the Categories is closely related to that of the Topics, . . . that it was written before the latter and serves as a basis for it upon which it builds, very often going beyond the Categories. This applies to the first nine chapters properly called Categories in the same measure as to the *Postpraedicamenta* . . . Ergo, the whole work is genuine, and its peculiar character is to be explained on the ground of its being one of the earliest attempts of Aristotle." *Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association* (pp. 529-540): ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, SECRETARY.—To the secretary's account of the generally successful nature of the meeting are appended abstracts of the papers presented by Messrs. Ogden, Hinman, Ellwood, Lloyd, Stuart, Lovejoy and Johnson. Discussions: *The physical and the Psychical* (pp. 541-546): H. HEATH BAWDEN.—The author defends his theory of the psychical against the charges of inconsistency and ambiguity brought by Miss Andrus in the preceding number of the *Philosophical Review*. *Professor Bakewell on the Ego* (pp. 546-552): C. A. STRONG.—The author here discusses Professor Bakewell's criticism (published in the preceding number of the *Philosophical Review*) of his view of the Ego and adduces further reasons in support of that view. *Professor Strong on the Passing Thought* (pp. 552-559): C. M. BAKEWELL.—The author defends his previous contention that Professor Strong's view of the Ego is abstract and inadequate. Reviews of Books: Alfred Russell Wallace,