

The scientific agnosticism of Mr. Wells is current, but he supplements it by some criticisms of logic that are used in a fresh and suggestive way. His acceptance of 'objective facts' without criticism of their constitution and meaning is naïve. On the whole, his view seems largely negative; so much so that he seems scarcely justified in regarding it as pragmatism, although it is big with possibilities in that direction.

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*Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen. Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und der Sinn des Übermenschen, Eine kritische Untersuchung.* OSCAR EWALD. Berlin, Ernst Hofmann & Co., 1903. 141 pp.

There are two classes of books concerning the doctrines of any given thinker: those that do and those that do not presuppose on the part of the reader a knowledge of the subject in question. The present monograph belongs to the first class; it can hardly fail to be of value to anyone already familiar with Nietzsche's writings, it is practically useless as an introduction to them. There is much criticism but little exposition and the former is essentially constructive. What Nietzsche himself may have thought is subordinated to what in the author's opinion consistency and the logical consequences of his ideas demanded that he should think. The special doctrines chosen for consideration are the Overman and the Eternal Recurrence. These are represented as at first sight contradictory, in that the one posits constant development, the other constant return to previous stages. The final interpretation reconciles the seeming conflict by giving a symbolic meaning to both doctrines, of which the Recurrence thus becomes the esoteric form of the Overman. Both are ideals proposed to the will, not as some hard and fast product of future evolution, but as the formal end set for individual endeavor. The meaning of life as embodied in the Overman is no definite achievement but the constant readiness to surpass the man; and even more than the Overman the Eternal Recurrence is a symbol, never to be regarded in the light of actual physical events. The greatest possible test of the active will is the readiness to regard its activity as altogether limitless. Complete affirmation of life wills not merely for to-day but for countless ages without the shadow of change, nay, looks upon itself as altogether outside of time. This interpretation is not the usual one and Herr Ewald, while maintaining that it is based upon Nietzsche's writings, points out himself the many passages that contradict it; but in a study of philosophy rather than of a philosopher such a rejection of unsuitable portions of the text is admissible. The result might perhaps be regarded as a contribution to the prevailing voluntaristic philosophy, and, viewed from this aspect, has the merit of approaching the subject from a fresh standpoint. Its chief excellence as a Nietzsche-commentary is, in the reviewer's opinion, the energy with which all affinity between Nietzsche and Darwin is denied. In spite of the widespread tendency to regard Nietzsche's theories as the extension and application of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest, such an interpretation is based upon

a misunderstanding of Nietzsche's most cherished convictions, and is perhaps itself due to the prevalence of a semi-Darwinian standpoint, which tends to regard all evolutionary theories as necessarily of the prevailing biological type.

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*Nietzsches Philosophie.* DR. ARTHUR DREWS. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1904. Pp. viii + 561.

Five hundred and fifty pages seem a good many to be devoted to Nietzsche by a man who regards his value as consisting chiefly in the warning he affords against false methods in philosophy. Dr. Drews finds Nietzsche's writings stimulating and full of clever bits of observation and reflection, but with no systematic basis that will stand against criticism. He gives an unusually detailed account of Nietzsche's views, following strictly the chronological order and dwelling at some length upon the corresponding events of Nietzsche's life. The criticism is altogether from the standpoint of Dr. Drews' own conviction that every philosophy based upon the equation of consciousness and being is foredoomed to failure. Nietzsche, accordingly, is treated as the logical result of such attempts to dispense with the absolute. Endeavoring to embody his particular interpretation of *cogito ergo sum* in both his life and his philosophy, Nietzsche showed that its inevitable consequences are inconsistency in the one field and madness in the other.

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## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. August, 1904, Vol. 29, No. 8. *Morale et Biologie* (pp. 113-135): D. PARODI. - Largely a criticism of Metchnikoff's 'Études sur la nature humaine.' Its view of science is optimistic, but not its presentation of nature. The present century commences to emphasize the discords, not the harmonies of nature. Man, in particular, is displayed as an example of poor adaptation to natural conditions. Metchnikoff gratuitously asserts a normal duration of life; he can not really make clear what a death instinct is; he misunderstands the basis of the fear of death. Neither biology nor sociology really suffices to establish the ends of human life. *Le sourire; étude psychophysiologique* (2e et dernier article) (pp. 136-151): G. DUMAS. - The development of the smile is to be explained on lines of economy of effort. It is most highly developed among the Japanese. All forms of the smile are compounds of the smile of pleasure and of the laughing smile; *e. g.*, the bitter, the defiant, the disdainful and the resigned smile. It is the laughing smile that is the source of the finer shades of expression in these various forms. The mechanical explanation of these developments is to be preferred to the psychological. *La logique du discours musical* (pp. 152-161): P. LANDERMY. - The philosophy of music has been despised thus far