

when I am conscious of one image I am totally unconscious, for a very brief time, of course, of anything else, impression or image.

WILFRID LAY.

AMAGANSETT, N. Y.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Introductory Study of Ethics. WARNER FITE. Longmans, Green and Co., 1903. Pp. xi + 383.

Professor Fite's work is apparently the outgrowth of a clear appreciation of the antinomy in ethics between idealism and hedonism: 'There seems to be a contradiction between moral ideals and the condition of practical attainment' (p. 277); between 'progress and happiness' (p. 327); between 'a constant strain toward the future' and a basing of efforts upon the 'immediate and actual state of things'; between 'a constant contempt for the present' and an 'actual enjoyment.' 'We must not only live in the expectation of a future good, but we 'must enjoy each period of life while it is here' (p. 327). "Progress considered alone commands us to aim directly at perfection without regard to the pain and struggle involved in the effort or to the possibilities of more immediate good which may be thereby sacrificed. . . . Do not stop to realize and enjoy, but press constantly on" (p. 328). "We find in ourselves two opposing tendencies, the one urging us to the practice of a higher and more perfect type of humanity, the other calling upon us to make ourselves happy and comfortable in the conditions of life as we find them" (p. 29).

The making of the fact of this moral problem clear is one of the chief endeavors and also one of the chief merits of the book. In regard to the solution Professor Fite is not so confident. "Now a complete solution of the moral problem is, according to my view, quite out of the question. . . . It is a mere empty statement to say, with popular philosophy, that the two sides of the problem are but 'the two sides of a shield,' or with Fechner, that they are related as convex to concave and are hence necessarily harmonious. . . . The assertion of harmony conveys no information. . . . But in the absence of a completely consistent system, and of a completely satisfactory solution of the moral problem, we may still, I believe, through a critical adjustment of the claims of the alternative theories, construct a reasonably satisfactory working hypothesis, such as will enable us to define our general attitude toward the different elements in the moral situation. It is such an adjustment that I have in mind in the remaining four chapters—a working hypothesis rather than a final solution" (p. 288). Professor Fite, therefore, is looking for a compromise. "We have to admit that there is a difference between the degree of attainment required for the greatest progress and that required for the greatest enjoyment of happiness. And since the requirements of a moral life include both progress and happiness" (a point which, as we shall see,

Professor Fite 'assumes') "any course that we may take will be of necessity a compromise. We have then to determine what sort of a compromise best meets the demands of both" (p. 331).

"The difficulty with the hedonistic calculation may be expressed by saying that the result does not fully cover what common sense understands by duty" (p. 154). "The hedonistic definition of the individual and his interests is obviously imperfect, and for this reason it can not serve all the purposes of a calculation of social relations. But, while imperfect, it furnishes, nevertheless, a useful method for the settlement of important practical problems" (p. 155). "It must be remembered that to a large extent hedonism furnishes the theoretical basis upon which commerce is carried on, laws made, government administered, and claims settled in courts of equity" (p. 156). "The hedonistic theory of social duties is approximately valid . . . for the region extending from the lower to the middle ranges of the moral scale" (p. 140). "The idealist offers certainly a more satisfactory account of the higher morality and of the point of view of more cultivated and conscientious men" (p. 261).

In a compromise there is a call for common sense rather than for a rigorous establishment and application of principles. The application of common sense in ethics is well carried out in the last chapter, which treats of the problems of government, of property, of honesty, etc.

There are, however, pages in which Professor Fite endeavors to give more than a compromise between accepting one's life as a means and accepting it as an end. "From the theoretical standpoint we are compelled by a necessity of our thought to assume that our world is ultimately a unity" (p. 287). "This *a priori* possibility of reconciliation is confirmed, as I shall endeavor to show, by an analysis of the opposing conceptions" (p. 290). "It will be remembered that hedonism was described as a clear but incomplete view, idealism as a more comprehensive but relatively obscure view" (p. 289). "When we attempt to make hedonistic conceptions comprehensive, we find that they acquire an idealistic meaning or at any rate if not a perfectly clear meaning, an idealistic flavor; and when we attempt to make idealistic conceptions clear, they acquire in a similar manner a hedonistic meaning" (p. 290). This seeking for a harmony takes him into what he terms the field of metaphysics and of evolution. One of the considerations which leads him to believe in a reconciliation without being satisfied with a mere compromise is that mechanism when elaborated approaches consciousness (purposiveness), and consciousness when analyzed becomes mechanical 'so that the conceptions of a world determined by mechanical forces and of a world determined by reason or consciousness are not logically contradictory but only empirically irreconcilable' (p. 325). "If we conceive the range of activity of any machine to be sufficiently extended to equal that of a human being we shall necessarily think of that machine as conscious" (p. 291). "And when we have to do with an activity so vastly complex and adaptable as that of a higher animal or human being the association of consciousness with the activity is no longer merely involuntary but inevitable and necessary. In a word, an activity thus adaptable becomes

ipso facto a conscious activity" (p. 294). "It appears, then, that there is no ultimate contradiction between the mechanical and teleological views of human life. A mechanism with the high degree of organization shown in human life must necessarily be conceived as conscious" (p. 295).

Professor Fite himself states the natural objection to this view: "Let your machine be never so complex, it is still nothing but a machine, and consciousness never so simple is still consciousness"; and he meets it merely by a reaffirmation of his belief. "This it seems to me is the crucial point of the argument. . . . When we take these structural modifications into account we find, as it seems to me, not only that we can conceive a mechanical object to think, but that it becomes inconceivable that a mechanical object of so high a degree of complexity should not think" (p. 292). "As a machine becomes more complex as a whole and more adaptable to varying conditions, it becomes also more complex and adaptable—in other words more *sensitive*—in its individual parts" (p. 293).

Passing from the mutual approach of mechanicalism and consciousness as an indication that we can expect between hedonism and idealism not only a compromise but also a harmony, Professor Fite finds as a second indication, the fact that happiness and self-realization mutually approach; as a third, that the egoism of the older political economy when developed approaches the altruism of the humanitarian, so that 'both alternatives' (of hedonism and idealism) 'must be used as regulative hypotheses.'

In Chapter XVII. evolution, defined as 'a constant process of reorganization, looking to a wider range of activity' (p. 308) is also brought forward to point to a real reconciliation between idealism and hedonism. Evolution, however, merely points to the reconciliation, and does not bring it about for the ideal changes as fast as realization is achieved. The conflict is indeed a necessary factor in life (p. 318). "In thus insisting on the positive character of the moral conflict the view presented here differs both from the optimistic view (Professor Dewey's for instance) which regards the moral conflict as a mere appearance, and from the pessimistic, which regards it as a hopeless contradiction" (p. 319). The question marks which come up in reading these quotations are evidences of Professor Fite's candor and of the suggestiveness of the book. We might indeed ask whether with *nirvana* for an ideal, or the *Verneinung des Willens*, we could believe in a reconciliation with hedonism. When we find him 'assuming that the world progresses' (p. 326), we might ask whether a psychological definition of the good might not be of help in his discussion. Another question might arise regarding his position on determinism when in this part of the discussion we find him identifying mechanicalism and determinism with hedonism, while earlier in the book (p. 104) hedonism stands for contingency as expressed in the Lamarckian theory of evolution.

Perhaps, however, we have already given a wrong idea of the book by bringing into undue prominence those points which, for one to whom the book is not an introduction to ethics, are the more interesting. An

important feature of the book is the exposition of the hedonistic and idealistic systems in ethics from the standpoint (1) of their principles, (2) of their goal or purpose, (3) of social theory and (4) of philosophy. In this connection special mention should be made of the clearness of style and of the unusual excellence of the paragraphing. A few quotations may indicate some of the points brought out.

1. As to principles: "The Hedonist's theory of conduct is based upon the fact that happiness and freedom from pain constitute ultimately our sole object of desire" (p. 38). His method 'is that of quantitative comparison or calculation' where there is a 'fixed' 'objective standard' which may be 'expressed in terms of simple units' (p. 40 ff.). Stuart Mill's contention that the measurement is not 'by quantity alone but also by quality' is not valid (p. 52 ff.). Idealism, on the other hand, is based either upon 'perceptual,' 'esthetic' or 'dogmatic intuitionism,' or upon 'rationalism' (Kantian practical philosophy), or else upon 'self-realization.'

2. As to goal or purpose: To the evolutionary hedonist 'pleasures are the requisites for survival'; hence the preservation of life is the purpose; and although Spencer argues for measurement of life in terms of breadth, 'we must conclude that the only criterion which a hedonist may consistently adopt for the measurement of the quantity of life is that of length' (p. 68). On the other hand, the rationalistic idealist is indifferent to the ends attained by his conduct, provided only that his conduct be self-consistent.' But 'the introduction of the conception of purpose' makes 'the idealistic theory' . . . also 'an evolutionary theory' (p. 207), where personality is emphasized and the goal is 'the realization of the purpose implied in the capacities of one's nature' (p. 197).

3. From the standpoint of social theory: "According to the later hedonists, my immediate motive for considering the welfare of society is a feeling of sympathy with the aims of my fellow men. . . . The original (and still the real) motive is that of self interest" (p. 78). According to the idealistic view, "a completely developed individual—one in whom all latent capacities had been brought to actual expression—would be completely identical with the self or mind of society. If Peter and Paul were completely self-conscious their interests and their selves would be absolutely harmonious and identical; they would be no longer two persons, but one" (p. 214). "The individual in the idealistic sense is the organized expression of special functions and capacities" (p. 219). "Briefly expressed the idealistic society is an organism" (p. 220).

4. As a system of philosophy: The hedonist's standpoint is that of external observation; "the idealistic standpoint is the standpoint of self-consciousness" (p. 228). The hedonist's method of definition and his criterion of reality is that of physical science; "the idealistic method is the teleological method which explains the peculiarities of objects by reference to their purpose as distinct from the method of exact science which explains them by reference to their mechanical structure" (p. 228). "The hedonist's psychology is that of the associational school" (p. 97). The

hedonist 'chooses as his type of human activity that which is relatively automatic' (p. 231). The idealist's view is that of the 'apperceptionists' (p. 231); he 'chooses the process of deliberation and voluntary decision as his type of mental fact' (p. 230). In biology hedonism holds to 'the Lamarckian side' (p. 104), while idealism accounts for evolution as a result of 'the constitution of the germ plasm,' the school of Weismann (p. 235). In cosmology hedonism in its more extreme aspects 'affirms that consciousness as such has no real existence' (p. 108). "The idealist, to the extent that he is similarly rigorous, goes equally far in the opposite direction" (p. 239), and holds consciousness to be 'finally the one principle determining the activities of the world as a whole' (p. 240).

The first thirty pages of the book, where the introductory material is frequently thrown into the form of questions, serves well the double purpose of indicating the later treatment and of stimulating interest.

GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

Kants Lehre vom Glauben. Eine Preisschrift der Krugstiftung der Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Von ERNST SÄNGER, Ph.D. Mit einem Geleitwort von Professor Dr. HANS VAHINGER. Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1903. Pp. xii + 170.

This monograph is a painstaking and thorough study of the Kantian doctrine of faith from the sources in Kant's own writings, which are exhaustively investigated in their whole extent, beginning with the pre-critical treatises and ending with the letters. The aim of the author is purely expository. Hence he confines himself to the historical method of treatment, offering here and there only so much of interpretation as may serve to bring out the development and the meaning of the Kantian positions, and by way of criticism admitting none but criticism of that 'immanent' sort which springs from the accurate statement of the various formulations of the original doctrine. Dr. Sängers work, therefore, is rather a compilation than a substantive discussion of Kant's moral philosophy, but a compilation of a very exact and valuable kind. If he has not endeavored to contribute to the movements of vital importance which have followed from the effort of Kant to furnish morals and religion with a new and impregnable foundation, he has successfully accomplished his more modest purpose of completely and precisely exhibiting the classical passages in which the Kantian theory found its original expression. So that his results constitute an invaluable aid to the many who still are seeking, now to estimate the doctrine of practical reason at its real worth, now to utilize the views which Kant defended as the basis of their own conclusions. The importance of inquiries of this type is further indicated by the very suggestive 'Geleitwort' of Professor Vaihinger, to whom also Dr. Sängers is indebted for the idea of his own work.

The account of Kant's doctrine falls naturally into three sections, of which the second, 'The Doctrine in the Critical Writings,' is by far the most important. In comparison with this, the first section, 'The Doctrine in the Pre-Critical Writings,' called for no more than a brief dis-