

that it altogether escapes our notice. Then we are likely to say that the stimuli from the environment, or their resultants, force our attention without any self-activity, and then the careless thinker speaks of the state as one of involuntary attention.

But it is clear, if our contention is justified, that, even where the forcefulness of the stimuli determining the emphasis is most extreme, there must be some element of efficiency arising out of the Self, which in some measure determines the special form in which the emphasis appears. This point will appear of importance in the next article of this series.

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DISCUSSION

ANSWER TO PROFESSOR PIERCE

THE experience described by Professor Pierce in the *JOURNAL* of July 21 is, I think, a common one, certainly with myself, and at least not unknown to several others, as it has been put on record by Professor Stout, in his 'Analytical Psychology, Vol. I., p. 247: "In some instances the sensation itself never enters into attentive consciousness at all. Thus, in walking along a street, a name may suddenly come into my mind, and I may at first be totally unable to account for its intrusion; but on looking around I find the name printed in large letters above a shop window or on an advertisement board. Now the name as it first occurred to me was not visualized, but internally heard and articulated. It follows that the visual experience must have influenced the flow of mental images, while itself remaining in the field of inattention." In a footnote on p. 248 he adds: "The following additional example was communicated to me by Professor MacKenzie as this work was going through the press: "An even more striking experience (which very often happens to me) occurs in glancing over a large page (especially the page of a newspaper). One often becomes aware of some word in such a case which one finds oneself repeating internally. On investigation it sometimes appears that there is no such word on the page, but that one part of it occurs at one part of the page and another part at another. Here one has not only received an impression, but made a combination without having attended to it."

I have a number of such combinations recorded, one of which is unique, as the letters are in reverse order. On July 7, 1904, I was reading 'The Story of the Plants,' by Grant Allen. Glancing over

page 115, I got an auditory image of the word 'tipsy' in the quality of my own voice, as I always do when I read or write. As the word was foreign to the matter, I was curious to see where it came from. I found the letters in reverse order, or rather in a somewhat circular form, near the margin at about the middle of the page, in these words:

.....in the
early spring

An example from my own introspection, showing translation from sight to smell, is as follows: On July 31, 1903, as I was reading a book, I was conscious of a strong odor of ink. I remembered two minutes later thinking to myself, but not in words, "It must be some 'old-house' smell which is like ink." (I have frequently been able to analyze smells into their constituents, *e. g.*, a pleasant odor into two very unlovely ones). I had this thought, and went on reading when suddenly I looked at the white table-cloth upon which I had laid my fountain pen. It had become rumpled so that the muslin touched the point of the pen. Ink had soaked out, so that a spot was made about the size of a twenty-five cent piece. I said above that I had become conscious of a smell of ink. This is not saying that I had a sensation of smell. I believe, indeed, that the information was given me through the eye. The ink spot was visible out of the corner of the right eye, and I believe, so to speak, that my eye told my nose and my nose told me! When I saw the spot consciously, I could not smell it until I put my nose to within three inches of it. The olfactory quality vanished immediately when the spot was regarded visually.

I could give many examples of translation from visual impression to auditory image. Indeed, it is my usual process in reading to myself, and differs from the striking cases mentioned by Professors Pierce and Stout only in the fact that the impression remained in their cases below the threshold of attentive consciousness until after the image was attended to. In my silent reading I have observed that the attention vacillates between the visual impression, the regular auditory word images and the visual images aroused by them, in such a way that it can frequently be said that the visual impression is below the threshold of consciousness. Viewed in this way, there seems to be no difference in kind, only one of degree, between the translations noted by myself and others, and the normal process of silent reading in my own case. In reading silently I am, and I feel sure that others also must be, conscious now of one and now of another impression or image, visual, auditory or what not, and that

when I am conscious of one image I am totally unconscious, for a very brief time, of course, of anything else, impression or image.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Introductory Study of Ethics. WARNER FITE. Longmans, Green and Co., 1903. Pp. xi + 383.

Professor Fite's work is apparently the outgrowth of a clear appreciation of the antinomy in ethics between idealism and hedonism: 'There seems to be a contradiction between moral ideals and the condition of practical attainment' (p. 277); between 'progress and happiness' (p. 327); between 'a constant strain toward the future' and a basing of efforts upon the 'immediate and actual state of things'; between 'a constant contempt for the present' and an 'actual enjoyment.' 'We must not only live in the expectation of a future good, but we 'must enjoy each period of life while it is here' (p. 327). "Progress considered alone commands us to aim directly at perfection without regard to the pain and struggle involved in the effort or to the possibilities of more immediate good which may be thereby sacrificed. . . . Do not stop to realize and enjoy, but press constantly on" (p. 328). "We find in ourselves two opposing tendencies, the one urging us to the practice of a higher and more perfect type of humanity, the other calling upon us to make ourselves happy and comfortable in the conditions of life as we find them" (p. 29).

The making of the fact of this moral problem clear is one of the chief endeavors and also one of the chief merits of the book. In regard to the solution Professor Fite is not so confident. "Now a complete solution of the moral problem is, according to my view, quite out of the question. . . . It is a mere empty statement to say, with popular philosophy, that the two sides of the problem are but 'the two sides of a shield,' or with Fechner, that they are related as convex to concave and are hence necessarily harmonious. . . . The assertion of harmony conveys no information. . . . But in the absence of a completely consistent system, and of a completely satisfactory solution of the moral problem, we may still, I believe, through a critical adjustment of the claims of the alternative theories, construct a reasonably satisfactory working hypothesis, such as will enable us to define our general attitude toward the different elements in the moral situation. It is such an adjustment that I have in mind in the remaining four chapters—a working hypothesis rather than a final solution" (p. 288). Professor Fite, therefore, is looking for a compromise. "We have to admit that there is a difference between the degree of attainment required for the greatest progress and that required for the greatest enjoyment of happiness. And since the requirements of a moral life include both progress and happiness" (a point which, as we shall see,