

vidual belongs. And from this point of view alone it would be a matter of interest to compare observations.

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DISCUSSION

TWO ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL VALUE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN METAPHYSIC

THE doctrine which I wish to illustrate admits that psychology and metaphysic represent distinguishable points of view in philosophy, and asserts that their distinctness must be kept in mind in the treatment of either. It maintains, however, that such a relation exists between the two as permits psychology to play the important rôle of furnishing clues to metaphysic for the statement and solution of its problems. As an example of the difficulties into which metaphysic inevitably runs through failure to adequately appreciate the methodological value of psychology, I shall take Mr. F. H. Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality.' On the other hand, Professor Royce's article, in the March (1904) number of the *Philosophical Review*, furnishes a good illustration of a misapprehension which is likely to arise as to the outcome of a philosophy employing psychology in the determination of its metaphysical insight, if the distinction between the view-points of the two disciplines be not clearly recognized.

The controlling conception of Mr. Bradley's essay both as to method and problems is to be found, I believe, in Chapter XV., entitled 'Thought and Reality.' Having concluded, as the outcome of the criticism embodied in the first part of his volume, that reality must, ultimately, be interpreted in terms of experience, having defined experience, carefully, in an objective manner, *i. e.*, as the common denominator of all things real, and having, by this means, freed his theory from possible subjective idealistic and solipsistic misconstruction (pp. 145-146), Mr. Bradley proceeds to the investigation of the part played by thought in experience. To the methods and results formulated in this analysis he constantly returns in the remaining sections of the book. What, then, is thought, and how is it related to reality? In answer to this question Mr. Bradley distinguishes three fundamental phases of experience. First, there is sensibility with its potentially infinite but totally undefined content. Second, experience reflectively mediated and defined in determinate but abstract and fragmentary existences and contents. Third, an all-inclusive absolute experience in which all possible characteriza-

tion in terms of existence and content is exhausted in an immediate reality which transcends the reflective form. Thought occupies, accordingly, a mediating position between reality conceived as immediate but undefined experience and reality conceived as immediate and exhaustively defined experience. The metaphysical bearing of this conviction appears in Mr. Bradley's treatment of truth and reality. To both there are degrees varying indefinitely from the merest transformation of sensibility to the all comprehensiveness of the absolute. In each we must accordingly distinguish a proximate and an ultimate form. Truth, as proximate, consists of the fragmentary existences and contents in which the discrepancy of finite ideas to reality is embodied. As ultimate, truth consists in the essential harmony of idea and reality in the absolute unity where all discrepancy is overcome. Reality taken in its proximate form turns out to be appearance. Everything is real but not everything is self-consistent and able to stand on its own foundation. Whatever leads beyonds itself, by way of either internal or external complement, is appearance. Its value and standing, as reality, are determined by the amount of transformation or complement it must undergo before it could become self-consistent and independent. True or ultimate reality consists in an all-inclusive absolute experience which unifies and brings to rest, in an immediate way, all finite strivings by way of ideas and appearances. Taking truth and reality together, as results mediated by a single process, we are brought to the following conclusion. Thought is a reflective endeavor to exhaust and to reconstruct ideally the richness of sensibility. On its analytic side this process gives rise to a system of existences or differences: as synthesis it produces a system of unifying relations or meaning. The differences and relations, however, transcend themselves both in principle and in detail. The more we discriminate, the more we find there is to discriminate: the more we coordinate, the more complex the relationships appear. Furthermore, existence and content collide as such, and demand a larger whole in which they may be included and their mutual discrepancies set aside.

Consequently, a two-fold difficulty awaits Mr. Bradley's system in its final result. First, it provides no criterion for the discrimination of truth from falsity in the fabrication of ideas. According to it, the standard of validity for proximate truth is to be found in ultimate truth. Proximate truth consists in the partial correspondence of finite ideas with infinite truth; proximate error in the lack of correspondence between the two. But in the nature of the case, the comparison of finite idea with infinite truth is impossible. The inevitableness of this result as to his method in general, Mr.

Bradley perceives, and hastens to counteract, by bringing forward a practical criterion for the evaluation of ideas. Harmony and discrepancy furnish a working basis sufficient to the needs of relative truth. Wherever ideas harmonize there is consistency, unity, truth; wherever they collide there is inconsistency, discrepancy, error. This departure from his strict doctrine does not advantage Mr. Bradley much, however, for when we examine into the nature of harmony and discrepancy, we soon discover that they are formal principles, and depend ultimately upon a positive character in ideas determined and validated some other way. Thus even relative truth must be denied to the fabrications of thought on Mr. Bradley's basis, and the conclusion reached that reflection is diseased through-out.

The second difficulty may be stated as follows. Even though truth could be relatively determined, and the appropriate degrees of reality made out for each appearance, we should still have to face the final result, that in the absolute, every truth and every appearance is so transformed and complemented as to lose its own distinctive character. The absolute contains every appearance, but in such a manner as to possess in itself a quality inaccessible to reflective thought. How then, we may ask, is the amount of transformation requisite to the determination of the comparative values of appearances to be made out? Without such determination higher and lower can, in fact, mean nothing. We have now seen, if our interpretation be correct, that Mr. Bradley's metaphysic ends in a veritable cul-de-sac, and that the root of the difficulty is his conviction as to the character and function of thought. The analysis which led up to his conviction, he conceives to be essentially logical, and the resulting metaphysical difficulties to be inherent. As a matter of fact, his metaphysical insight is conditioned by a psychological result with reference to the nature and function of ideas. Given his views of images and ideas as psychic events, and it is not difficult to trace their determining influence upon the logical *existence* and *content*, or the metaphysical *immediate* and *reflective* phases of activity, which play the controlling parts in his system.

For Mr. Bradley, the primary form of mental activity is a species of 'undifferentiated sensory continuum' in which event succeeds event without any interruption to the continuity of the activity, or any awareness of the discreteness which the successive events exhibit. Into this continuity discreteness creeps as the expression of unknown conditions. The effect is two-fold. The continuity of psychic events is broken up into a series of discordant factors, and a response is called forth on the part of the psychic process as a whole by way of reorganization. The discordant factors are what we know as

images, their attempted reorganization into a stable whole, what we know as ideas. The psychic origin of thought, consequently, is to be found in the diremption of the original sensory continuum and its objective in the reestablishment of a continuum like unto the first. Inasmuch, however, as new factors are constantly being discriminated, the hope of reaching the goal of a completely unified experience seems unattainable. It remains, therefore, as an ideal which guides the progressive development of thought.

The logical outcome of this psychological conviction is the contention that the development of the subject and predicate of the finite judgment exhibits the general forms through which we become aware of the features of the all-inclusive judgment or completely organized meaning which constitutes the true objective and ideal of thought. Metaphysically, we have traced its influence in the conception of thought as the mediator of varying degrees of truth and reality lying between an undifferentiated sensibility, upon the one hand, and a completely differentiated absolute experience, upon the other.

If, then, it be true that, despite Mr. Bradley's warnings to others, the cast of his own metaphysical doctrine has been fundamentally influenced by his psychological convictions, it may also be true, that the clue to the solution of his difficulties may be found in psychology. With this in mind, we shall, *first*, replace his psychological analysis of the nature and function of thought by another which seems more true to fact, and, *second*, enquire what metaphysical value this insight has.

Briefly stated this conception is—thought is the form of reaction which any moment of experience exhibits in stimulating, predicting and realizing a further moment of experience. This process may be regarded from two points of view: first, as a set of factors coordinated in effecting a specific result, second, as the single experience to whose realization the factors are coordinated. For example, I judge that a piece of paper is before me. The activity of seeing stimulates a further set of experiences (memory images) which react into it after such a manner as to project in my mental view an anticipation of the experiences of touching, seeing, etc., possible to be realized through the active cooperation of experiences of movement as to arms, fingers, eyes, etc. The test of the validity of my judgment and the objectivity of my supposed knowledge consists, in the nature of the case, in the possibility or impossibility of realizing the specified experiences as anticipated. This result holds whether the moment of experience be relatively simple or complex. At one moment, my activities may be concentrated in a very narrow focus, at another, their sweep may be broad. In either case, knowl-

edge exhibits its method and function in the transformation of one moment of experience into another.

The essential differences of this conception of thought from that of Mr. Bradley are two: (1) The objective of ideas is not a whole which lies outside the range of the momentary needs and activities of psychic life, but one so specified and defined as to be capable of attainment. (2) The test of the validity of conceptions, consequently, lies within and not without their function: it is material and not formal.

If, next, we enquire into the origin of knowledge, we find its source in the fact that psychic experience is in constant process of transformation. What Mr. Bradley takes to be a misfortune of psychic states, is really their normal condition. A pure, undifferentiated continuum there appears to be none, but rather a process, in which forms of coordinated experiences tend constantly to take on other forms. In thought this process is consciously controlled. And what is meant by the words 'consciously controlled' is, that, in the function of knowledge, experience is able to predict and to direct the character of the transformations which it undergoes. These transformations exhibit two general forms: first, those in which the psychic moments utilize idea-instruments already fashioned and adjusted to the realization of specific experiences; second, those in which psychic instruments are constructed to meet the demands of novel situations. And the second of these forms appears to be the more fundamental; consequently, knowledge may be said to arise out of an inherent tendency of psychic activities to differentiate novel situations. The presence of these novel situations constitutes the problem of knowledge. Their resolution into factors and results consciously controlled, is its objective. We may emphasize this latter point by noting an objection which might be brought against this point of view. It might be contended that, on the analysis given above, thought arises out of a coordination which, by that fact, must lie and continue to lie outside the range of thought. Such a contention would involve a misconception of the whole point of view. The relation of thought to the coordination out of which it arises, is such as to turn that coordination inside out, and to bring to light its innermost character. Furthermore, this thought enters into the coordination so intimately as to make it anew into a whole whose nature is definitely forecast both in general and in detail. This essential feature of thought is marked, psychologically, by the fact, that, in reflection, the tendency toward differentiation in the psychic process itself becomes self-conscious, and constitutes the possibility of the free expansion of psychic life in intelligently controlled action. This transformation of experience into a self-conscious process

through the constructive activity of thought we shall find to be of essential value in the metaphysical reconstruction to which we now turn.

In indicating the metaphysical value of our psychological analysis of thought, I shall take for granted the general standpoint of objective idealism as formulated by Mr. Bradley. Everything that can be called real is, at bottom, a form of experience. And experience must not be regarded as subjective idealism and solipsism regard it, but as the common denominator and constituent of all things real. Of it, subjective and objective are alike real forms, and the distinction of subject and object is not one, which, as a limit, is brought to knowledge, but rather one which, objective as it is, is developed in and through the process of knowledge. Assuming this general standpoint, we shall endeavor to indicate briefly the gains made for metaphysical method by our previous psychological analysis. First, we are enabled to appreciate the true objective of knowledge. It does not consist, as Mr. Bradley supposes, in an all-inclusive experience into which the passing moment may potentially be transformed, but in the determination of the character of the further experience into which and the conditions through which, respectively, any given moment of experience may be transformed. This holds true whether we regard the moment of experience as all-inclusive or as some fleeting factor within it. In other words, knowledge would mean just the same thing for an absolute as it does for the finite. The fact that an inclusive experience is complex, and the fleeting factor simple, makes no difference so far as the function and validity of knowledge are concerned. In either case, this objective of knowledge consists in the projection of a new situation for realization, and its validity lies in the accomplishment of the aim. Second, for this view, the dualism of idea and fact is overcome, and Mr. Bradley's various problems are set aside. We no longer deal with a whole of reality which lies beyond the determination of knowledge, but with one whose nature it is the function of knowledge both to determine and to construct. Every idea, therefore, which reaches its aim, and the various ideals which embody, in an organized way, the tested conceptions of men, are true of the innermost natures of the specific forms of reality which they profess to mediate. Third, the distinction of relative from absolute truth must vanish. The question of adequacy in ideas is not one pertaining to comparison by way of correspondence and complexity between finite and infinite conceptions. It is one of efficiency in realizing experiences desired. Fourth, the origin of knowledge consists, ultimately, in the fact that reality differentiates, but does so in such wise that its transformations are consciously controlled. This tendency towards differ-

entiation must be regarded as constitutional. The significance of this result is that the differentiation of new situations within the process of reality becomes the limit of ideas instead of the reverse being true. The upshot of the matter is that in the one case we are enabled to conceive of reality as continually and continuously differentiating and that in the other the exhaustive character of the closed system of ideas imposes a limit of such a character as to force the dilemma—either the system of ideas is not eternally realized in fact or if eternally realized there is no room for change and the world of events. Fifth, in knowledge, reality becomes conscious of its own character and method. Consequently for the conception of a blind pressure toward change we must substitute a constantly differentiating but controlling purpose. If, then, we view reality as an all-inclusive experience, we rise to the conception of a process which inherently takes on new forms, in which, however, these forms are not the expression of haphazard change but of change intelligently mediated in every detail and as a whole. The process, accordingly, must be defined as essentially purposeful or self-conscious. And we may delay here a moment longer in order to emphasize a point of distinction from Mr. Bradley. Because finite ideas, according to his theory, have their objective in a whole which if attained would engulf and transform them, he was forced to conceive the self-consciousness of the finite process as something which must also be amended and over-ridden in reality. On the other hand inasmuch as we have found that ideas maintain their identity with reality by actively constructing it we must hold that for knowledge self-consciousness can never be transcended, but must ever be emphasized.

We must now turn to a very brief consideration of what I believe to be Professor Royce's misconception of pragmatism. Perhaps the term is ill advised. If pragmatism can not possibly mean more than Professor Royce says it does, then a more truthful label should be devised for the so-called pragmatists. And so far as the label is concerned, I am not aware that, on this side of the water at least, it was self-imposed by the representatives of the way of thinking under consideration. However this may be, it appears to me that the label is not so opprobrious, if a few distinctions be kept in mind. And at this point, perhaps, I should say that I hold no brief for any man's point of view other than my own. I may have failed entirely to understand what the pragmatists have been aiming at, and I certainly do not care to burden any one but myself with what I have formulated above. This, however, I must say, that, whether for good or for bad, I have conceived myself to be working on lines similar to those followed by the pragmatists or instrumentalists, and

that unless I have been thinking entirely beside the mark, the conception of pragmatism given by Professor Royce is not adequate to the movement assailed. Speaking bluntly, he has demolished a man of straw, and this for the reason that he has failed to keep in mind the distinction between the psychological and the metaphysical viewpoints. Moreover, I do not mean that, for his own philosophy, Professor Royce fails to make the distinction; simply that, in his criticism of pragmatism, he does not credit its exponents with the distinction. Doubtless for an objective idealism which takes on pragmatic form, the distinction is more than usually difficult to make and to maintain. But so far as I can see, the instrumentalists have made and maintained it. I am the more sure of this inasmuch as it is easier to perceive the distinction as made by another, than to make it oneself, as I must now attempt to do.

For the idealist, reality is constituted as experience. But experience may be viewed from many points and have many different values correspondingly. For us the main points of distinction are those between a psychological and a metaphysical treatment of experience. *By psychology*, experience is investigated in the immediacy of its concrete fleeting moments as these reconstitute themselves in novel situations, and are examined without regard to the more permanent values which are exhibited by the process that mediates them. *By metaphysic*, on the other hand, experience is taken in a more permanent sense, as the common denominator and ultimate factor in all forms of reality, be their character or value what it may. So taken, experience is essentially objective, and the values which attach to it in knowledge must be taken as equally objective. Hence, when the pragmatist maintains that knowledge provides the conscious method or formula for transforming experience, he is not called upon to limit the result to inner or 'subjective' experience so-called. Such a contention fails to see that all distinctions (and among them the varying forms of subject-object reality) fall within the objective movement of experience, and are dependent for their origin and maintenance upon the objective function of knowledge. The critic of the pragmatic idealist appears to be full of the conviction that the pragmatist must set up psychic experience as a sort of entity, and must then confine knowledge within the magic limits of psychical insufficiency. He fails to see that experience, as psychic, is a form which it assumes only in and through the knowledge process. How, then, the pragmatist can fairly be accused of limiting reality to one of the factors which exist within its own complex movement is somewhat difficult to see.

Another objection which Professor Royce makes to pragmatism may be formulated in the question: How can ideas arising in differ-

ent minds have a common value and an objective basis? In answer to this, it may be contended that the pragmatist does not deny the complexity of the objective process of experience, or the presence within it of self-conscious factors. For each of these, the truth of its knowledge must consist in the attainment of its aims. Inasmuch, however, as all are organically related within a single process, the results attained under similar conditions must have a common value. Furthermore, this result does not necessitate that either the process or the ideas which intelligently direct its transformations should be static or eternally fixed.

We may conclude, therefore, that although psychology and metaphysics represent differing points of view in philosophy, none the less, their relations are such that, while inevitable confusion must result from a failure to keep their distinctness in mind, nevertheless, if we turn distinction into separation, and refuse to advantage ourselves of psychology in determining our metaphysical insight, we are sure, on the other hand, to suffer shipwreck.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Der Neo-Idealismus unserer Tage; ein Beitrag zur Genesis philosophischer Systeme. LUDWIG STEIN. *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, August, 1903.

The justification for reviewing this article at this rather late date is that in the dilemma as to the nature of thinking in which the author places himself a sort of philosophical text is furnished. The title is attractive, but one finds no hatchet marks for guidance through the philosophical woods, and gladly emerges into the clear white light of the final page. As for argument, the article is a kinetoscopic presentation with a well-marked 'flicker.'

This dramatist of the Hedda Gabbler of the sciences, neo-idealism, wishes to portray this 'psychogenesis' as consisting in the determination of the historical appearance of the categories of 'substance,' 'quality,' 'state' and 'relation' *by their logical relationship*. Each age *thinks* the same problems from the view-point of one of these. The concept used by 'the thinking of to-day' is that of relation, since 'to think is to relate,' whence idealism and phenomenalism, and *vice versa*. So for the Greeks it was 'substance,' for the Middle Ages the 'eternal qualities,' and later the 'state' of rest or motion.

The text-serving dilemma, then, is: *either* thinking is *always to relate*, and it is possible to *relate* in different terms, viz., of substance, of relation, etc., *i. e.*, these are symbols for specific relations between *things*, a knowledge of which is given by a specific thinking, relating, activity; *or*, at one time to think is to 'relate,' at another, to 'substantialize,' etc., so