

temper and in its destructive results as Professor Armstrong conceives it to have been. The Sophists certainly did repudiate the old metaphysics and doubt the possibility of metaphysics, but they seemed to be impelled by a strong desire to study facts; how else shall we explain the eagerness with which they investigated problems ranging all the way from the government of a state to the art of cooking? Gomperz in his 'Griechische Denker' gives us a picture of the period called Sophistic which does not quite fit the description of it as thoroughly sceptical, and makes one feel just a little doubtful of the traditional conceptions of that age. We are also apt to forget, in contrasting different eras of this kind, that, after all, all periods are more or less transitional, that they are all more or less progressive, that the spirit of reflection and criticism is never absolutely stifled. This thought is brought home to closer students of mediæval philosophy. We are so apt to believe that the Middle Ages were scholastic through and through, and that the spirit of criticism and opposition suddenly broke forth, whereas we can hear the mutterings of dissent almost from the very beginning. Think of the philosophical, theological and political heresies, think of the pantheists, the mystics, the nominalists, the sceptics, the thinkers interested in the study of nature, of the early Middle Ages, and you will see that the Renaissance and Reformation did not suddenly drop down from the skies. Of course, it must be confessed that the elements of opposition were embryonic at first, and that they had to struggle for the mastery, but they were there none the less. It must also be noted that the eighteenth century is not essentially an expression of the spirit that denies, but dogmatic, rationalistic, optimistic and cocksure. The Leibnizo-Wolffian philosophy, the common-sense thinkers, the 'Populärphilosophie,' with their cocksure proofs of the existence of God, and their dogmatic metaphysics, do not seem to me to fit in very well with an age of negation and decay, and yet they belong to the eighteenth century as well as the materialists, who, by the way, are equally cocksure.

But whatever doubts one may have with respect to certain theories advanced in Professor Armstrong's book, one can not help but regard it as a thoughtful and stimulating contribution to philosophy.

FRANK THILLY

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

The Finite in Spinoza. E. RITCHIE. *Philosophical Review*, January, 1904, pp. 16-29.

Hegel claims that Spinoza's system is an 'Acosmism' as it maintains the exclusive reality of God so strenuously as to relegate the phenomenal world to the illusory and unreal. Of course Spinoza asserts the entire dependence of the mode and its relativity to substance, hence the reality of things of experience can only be retained by regarding them as independent of substance. But if substance or God is equivalent to existence, by the very dogma of the relativity of mode is asserted the reality of the individual and of the world made up of individuals. A fuller account of the relation between the particular and the universal

in existence is to be found in some rather obscure elements in Spinoza's system of thought. His use of the scholastic expressions 'natura naturans' and 'natura naturata' shows that he accepts no duality between the real and the phenomenal, for to make these two natures numerically distinct would be to upset his fundamental dogma that God, nature, the 'ens absolute infinitum' is one. To conceive of God as inactive is impossible, it might seem then that we must regard 'natura naturata' as a merely illusory and deceptive presentation of reality—giving us an *apparently* passive universe, which does not in fact exist. But nature, taken as the totality of manifestations and as the effect of which God ('natura naturans') is the cause, is not something apart from God, something undivine, unreal; it is the same being presented as the *resultant* of its own force. The results are real, not illusory; an activity without real results would itself be non-real. The same fact is regarded in new connections, just as 'force' and 'matter' are not separable 'things,' but two ways of envisaging the physical universe. In the earliest formulation of Spinoza's philosophy we have the distinct assertion of things produced immediately by God as identical with infinite modes. In the 'Tractatus de intellectus emendatione' are these same 'creatures immediately produced by God' under the names 'fixed and eternal things,' 'physical things' or 'real entities,' yet these are not the innumerable mutable things, since the last only give us what are external or unessential properties. The language as to these 'singular things' which are yet 'like universals to us' is obscure. There is no correlation here with the Platonic ideas; Spinoza undoubtedly has in view the double manifestation of reality as existence moving in space and the same existence conditioned by mental activity. Epistemologically we must know physical things, objects moving in space, before we know them as reflections in consciousness. A schematic tabulation of Spinoza's exposition of God's being in relation to the physical world shows that the physical universe as a whole, 'facies totius universi,' is the totality of matter as subject to the laws of motion. It is, *as a whole*, permanent and infinite, but is made up of an infinite number of finite and mutable facts. Doctor Ritchie concludes that the dualism which differentiates between an Absolute, as an intrinsic and independent reality, and a phenomenal world of manifold appearance having no intrinsic reality is wholly foreign and adverse to Spinoza's ontology.

I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. May, 1904. Vol. XIII., No. 3. *On Mechanical Explanation* (pp. 265-283): E. H. SINGER, JR. — A science should be classified according to its 'dimensions.' The dimensions of mechanics are mass, length and time. Any science whose dimensions can be reduced to these or functions of these (*e. g.*, me-