

As for Dr. Caird's masterly treatment of Plato and Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists, it goes without saying that no one can afford to miss his fine critical exposition of these masters of those who know. He treats fully of the development of the idealism of Plato, whom he calls 'the first systematic theologian,' who yet failed to attain a full reconciliation of the opposite lines of mysticism and dualism. He gives a chapter on Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul and idea of God. He shows how the severe critic of Plato, Aristotle, is a most faithful disciple, but holds that he is ultimately more dualistic than Plato himself. This is, at least, disputable.

His last chapter, on 'The Influence of Greek Philosophy upon Christian Theology,' will be read with deep interest. Profound as the influence was, Dr. Caird declines to see it to be a secularization of the Christian faith. Greek philosophy supplied the necessary form for the work of reflective thought upon the Christian consciousness that gave the Church its theology. But yet Dr. Caird thinks it brought the bane of dualism into Christian thought and deepened the gulf between the human and the divine. This seems like a far-fetched cause, when the cause is so near at hand—immanent in the Christian consciousness itself. In this chapter, too, one sees that Dr. Caird regards Neo-Platonism as the logical development of Greek philosophy. This at least will open the question for another estimate of philosophy and for a different reading of the development of Greek philosophy and Christian theology. It seems to me to vitiate the view of philosophy as a progressive way of the spirit of man to the spirit of God.

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*Rationality and Belief.* A. K. ROGERS. *The Philosophical Review*, January, 1904, pp. 30-50.

This article attempts 'an adjustment of the relative claims of the logical and extra-logical factors in belief.' The discussion starts with a definition of reality as being 'at bottom a postulate of the will.' At the foundation of all belief lie our active needs. What satisfies our needs is real; if it can be used as a means for doing something that our nature impels us to do, we believe in it. All else remains in the form of mere floating images. But further, to give full objectivity to what we feel as real there must occur some clogging of the smooth functioning of things. This brings out the consciousness of the distinction between means and end, and thus the separation between self and the world arises. A further development from the same cause is the distinction between the objective thing and sensation. Finally social contrasts help to bring out the consciousness of our ends, and social agreements develop the distinction between the illusory and the real.

The practical inference from this postulate character of all reality is that spiritual values, which we also believe in on the basis of practical needs, have as much right as have our beliefs in the facts of physical life.

Now if reality is a postulate, then emotion, which is feeling directed

towards some object, can give us reality. And since the writer holds that emotional demands are more obviously the ground of conviction in respect to spiritual facts than are demands of the will, he seeks to defend emotion against the suspicion that it is a disturbing element in the search for truth. In the first place, taking the coarser emotions, which result when instinctive activities are checked, their very tumultuousness reveals how deep-seated and organic their corresponding instincts are and therefore tends to validate the satisfactions of those instincts. In the second place, taking the deeper and steadier emotions, which are not organic sensations, their pressure lifts human activity from the level of the habitual and automatic into full consciousness, and therefore their right to furnish us reality can not be challenged.

The logical factor in belief comes in because we can not, after all, believe what we desire to. Desires conflict, and the realities they give us would annihilate each other without the logical test of reality as umpire. The logical test is consistency. If reality is a postulate, then we can ultimately believe only in that which gives harmonious expression to our active needs as a whole. This consistency required for belief is in the ideally complete experience a practical consistency, but at any given time it would have to be intellectual consistency.

The writer's treatment of emotional postulates is suggestive, and the logical faculty seems to be satisfactorily dove-tailed into the doctrines of the primacy of the will. But the query arises whether the word reality has not been used in two senses. The reason why the writer says that 'reality is a postulate' is that it is the '*insistence*' of a need that lends reality to what would otherwise be a mere floating image. But he is not willing to say 'that the truth which an act accepts is really created by the act.' He speaks of 'the larger reality beyond us' and of the fact that our acts 'presuppose a certain determinate system of reality' which they do not make. In short, he can not surrender the representative theory of knowledge. But the present reviewer questions whether such reservations do not imply the use of logical grounds for belief in a way different from that set forth in the article, which would throw the problem of their adjustment to the extra-logical factors open again.

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*The Participation of the Eye Movements in the Visual Perception of Motion.* RAYMOND DODGE. *The Psychological Review*, January, 1904, pp. 1-14.

This paper is, for the most part, a theoretical discussion of visual perception of motion. The author lays aside introspective evidence as unreliable; he presents some new material, but his arguments are based largely upon the results of experiments reported in his earlier papers. In the experiments in which he perceived the perforations in a revolving disk stand still during the interval in which the eye was moved for a short distance in the direction of rotation, and in the last quarter of the swing of a pendulum where it was found that the eye in pursuing the