

tial unity.' (2) 'The relation of subject and object in experience can not be adequately expressed in terms of cause and effect.' Parallelism, *e. g.*, shows that 'the relation of body and mind is no external and occasional relation of two separate entities, but is so close and intimate . . . that it can not be adequately described by the mechanical notion of action and interaction.' (3) 'The mind is not one particular thing separated from other things, but as a true individual it contains within itself the principle of universality.' This is 'shown by the fact that it is able in one indivisible act [reason] to differentiate itself from things and to relate them to the unity of its own life.' III. The standpoint of special sciences views experience as a collection of things to be observed and operated upon externally. Philosophy deals with experience from an internal point of view, as we actually live it; and this, indeed, is what makes philosophy preeminently the science of experience. IV. The philosopher's business is, on this view, to interpret experience, give appraisements of our various ideals—rational, ethical, esthetic—and discover the categories that will preserve truth and harmonize the ideals. Necessarily the process is teleological, with the world regarded as an instrument for the realization of ends. This is not subjectivism—the 'hard discipline of the real world' prevents that—but at the same time it subordinates the real to the ideal, the whole significance of facts in experience being due to conscious selection of them. The necessity for the subordination of the real to the ideal springs from the fact that subject and object as functions are not coordinate. Functions 'imply a central unity which is something more than the mere togetherness of parts. . . . The fact of functional relationship implies the existence of an inner pervading identity running through the parts. In experience this principle of identity comes to consciousness of itself by distinguishing itself from the objects in which its nature is expressed and embodied. And in this act of discrimination and recognition there is to be found the central principle in the light of which the whole process of experience gains significance and the possibility of interpretation.' Hence, 'to give a philosophical interpretation of experience is to show its relation to the ideals and purposes of a rational self-consciousness.'

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*Les éléments et l'évolution de la moralité.* M. MAUXION. *Revue Philosophique*, July and August, 1903, pp. 1-29 and 150-180.

Professor Mauxion finds the present time peculiarly without a well-based morality. Approving the reduction of morality to a factual basis, he sees danger in identifying morality with sociality and in finding the basis of individual morality in social morality. It is a gratuitous hypothesis, he says, to regard society as an actual organism, because individuals are not fixed like cells and, moreover, have an independent value. The social organism theory would necessitate the recognition of groups or castes as in India and also does violence to the classification of sciences, reducing sociology to biology. Social and moral progress differ as much as scientific and esthetic.

The study of morality, however, must not go to the other extreme of the individual, *a priori*, building up what is right without regard to circumstances. Hence we will regard it from the evolutionary (genetic) standpoint.

But how speak of progress without some conception of a good to start with? He answers that the conception of the good is composed of two factors, intelligence and sensibility. Progress in the former consists in more perfectly conforming thought to reality, and in the latter, is a grasping of the harmony of things by the heart instead of the reasoning. Hence progress in morality is an increasing sympathy with the rhythms of the universe.

A more careful analysis of the idea of the good gives three elements: (1) esthetic order, the self-directed duties especially, or the individual perfection; (2) logical order, including proportion; (3) sympathetic or altruistic order, whether active or passive.

These three elements, though instinctively blended, are distinct. They vary independently in respect to periods and races, and excite different emotions in us when we contemplate them.

Having found the elements, we now proceed to trace their evolution.

1. *Esthetic Order*.—Among men admiration of stature and strength came first, then courage, prudence, patience, strength of soul, wisdom, stoic indifference, asceticism, good-will. The goal will be to harmonize all these ideals.

2. *Evolution of the Element of Logical Order*.—This element, though imposing itself with incomparable force, is nevertheless dominated as to its development by the preceding element. Primitive man was not better than the modern man, as though the eighteenth century, nor was he absolutely ferocious, as said Hobbes. Within the tribe there would generally be peace. A few because of greater strength would obtain more prey and booty, and as this *proportionality* of means and influence became a *custom* the idea of justice would be founded. What had been would be regarded as what ought to be. This idea of justice would receive further definition when the rewards of an expedition would be divided proportionately. Here would come in the esthetic element, the particular form of proportion being determined by the stage of evolution which the esthetic element had reached. Virtue then determined rewards. A future life was postulated by some when facts seemed to do too great violence to the idea of justice. Others, like the Stoics, found the proportionality not destroyed by circumstances, provided man retained his ego.

The idea of justice appears in time to have a different basis from that of proportionality and men speak of a person's right to his life, his liberty, property, etc. Some would give utility as a basis for this, and others fellow-feeling. But originally there was no regard for man as an individual, quite the contrary. How, then, has it come about that proportionality was transformed into equality? Many causes—the endeavor of the highest to make all below equal; the natural tendency of the higher classes to degenerate; above all, the change in the esthetic

element and the corresponding increase in the sympathetic element. Such esthetic ideals as patience, wisdom, stoicism, asceticism and good-will were strong factors in changing proportionality into equality. Equality, however, does not give an idea of justice according to facts, so that our ideal must be a more exact proportionalism.

3. *Evolution of the Sympathetic Element.*—This element is rather independent of the two preceding, but influences them. The love of animals for persons and places shows that sympathy can not be, as Schopenhauer thought, reduced to physiological love. The basis of sympathy is in the spontaneous tendency of similar organisms to enter into harmony; that is to say, in the instinct of imitation. Similarity begets attachment, and *vice versa*. Passive love progresses with the physiological and mental development. Not so is it with active love.

The first stages of sympathy come when men wandering together in groups experience the same dangers and hopes. This instinctive element is fortified by reflection and common interests, and still more when the domiciles are fixed, giving patriotism. The patriarchal family developed out of promiscuity, when one man would be strong enough to retain his own wife or wives as he did his arms. The family associations were very strong factors in developing the sense of sympathy and solidarity. Out of it grew pity, then benevolence and charity.

Professor Mauxion thinks that this account of the genesis of morality makes unnecessary the chimeras of an absolute good or of a categorical imperative or of inherent personal rights, and avoids much of the mystery and confusion with which the subject of ethics is filled; the idea of solidarity and harmony will supplant that of interest.

By way of comment on Professor Mauxion's article we may venture to say that all will welcome the treatment of ethics from the genetic standpoint. If it be objected that the sense of harmony which he gives as the basis for the evolution of morality in the present particular direction is too weak an ethical motive, it may be answered that he makes out a strong case for custom as giving force to this motive.

That in his primary analysis he is obliged to distinguish between grasping the harmony with the mind and grasping it with the heart, is not so much his fault as it is the fault of psychology, which has not yet seriously grappled with the place and the origin of the value element in experience.

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#### JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE MONIST. January, 1904. Vol. XIV., No. 2. *Primitive Rome* (pp. 161-176): G. SERGI.—'The problem . . . is to determine who were the founders of Rome.' The author concludes that 'Rome was founded under the influence of the Mediterranean civilization and especially of the Etruscan . . . and of ethnic elements already mingled. . . . The Aryans gave only the language.' *Ants and some other Insects* (concluded, pp. 177-193): AUGUST FOREL.—On the basis of evidence ad-