

receives is evident from the recent increase in periodical literature of the second order, namely, discussions, appreciations, résumés, which are to be found in the current philosophical magazines, especially in those which, like the *Revue Thomiste* and the *Néo-scolastique*, are specially devoted to the study of the philosophy of the schools. In a subsequent article an account will be given of the most important of these recent studies.

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NOTE ON THE IDEA OF A 'MORAL SENSE' IN BRITISH
THOUGHT PRIOR TO SHAFTESBURY¹

THE ethical problems of the seventeenth century were stated mainly in terms of rights and duties. Natural rights and laws of nature were familiar to the readers of Hobbes, Cumberland, and Locke. The moralists of the eighteenth century, for the most part, consider rather the instincts and sentiments. The first expression of the new attitude is usually attributed to Shaftesbury. But while Shaftesbury and his more systematic follower, Hutcheson, deserve credit for the extended formulation and development of the doctrines of moral sense and benevolent instincts, we find distinct statements of the essence of the doctrine and even of the technical term in at least two divines, Tillotson and Barrow. The transition by which an old concept is made to do duty for a new idea has an interesting illustration in Tillotson's definition of the term 'Light of Nature.' This term with Descartes had borne the meaning of discernment or intellectual recognition. With Cumberland and Locke reason was a corresponding principle. But Tillotson, in sermon 101, defined 'Light of Nature' as 'a natural instinct, by which I mean a secret impression upon the minds of men, whereby they are naturally carried to approve some things as good and fit, and to dislike other things as having a native evil and deformity in them.' Here the 'light' is affirmed to be an 'instinct,' and if the phrase 'approve as good' may seem to imply a judgment which has a rational element, the term 'dislike' is purely a term of feeling; while the word 'deformity' naturally suggests the æsthetic qualities which play so large a part later. The transfer of the moral categories to the realm of feeling is thus well on its way.

Much more explicit statements are found in Barrow, whose sermons were published in 1685; and these statements take on

¹ Read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Princeton, December 30, 1903.

additional interest from the fact that Shaftesbury was acquainted with this author and speaks of him with esteem in his 'Letters of a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the University.' The important points in Shaftesbury's account of human nature are: (1) His championship of a social 'herding' instinct; (2) his claim that happiness depends upon having the generous affections strong, and that to have the private affections too strong is to be miserable; (3) the immediacy of the approval or disapproval which we pass on moral acts. This immediate approval is made analogous to the æsthetic feeling, or sometimes to the sensuous reactions of smell and taste. All these doctrines are explicitly stated by Barrow. The first appears in the following from sermon 62: "Nature implanted in our constitution a love for society and aversion from solitude . . . a generosity innate to serve the public and promote the benefit of society." One of the two aspects of the second doctrine is contained in this sentence from the same sermon: "Even a true regard to our own private good will engage us not inordinately to pursue self-interest."

The third doctrine, that of immediate approval by a 'sense,' is stated in the following, and from the fact that the passage is found in at least two sermons (26 and 28), the doctrine was evidently a favorite with its author: "The practice of benignity, of courtesy, of elemency, at first sight, without any discursive reflection, doth obtain approbation and applause from us; being no less grateful and amiable to the mind than beauty to our eyes, harmony to our ears, fragrance to our smell and sweetness to our palate; and to the same mental sense, malignity, cruelty, harshness, all kinds of uncharitable dealing, are very disgustful and loathsome."

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DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR PIERCE ON SPACE PERCEPTION

I CAN not understand Professor Pierce's allusion to what he supposes has been established since 1897, unless it means to refer to the discussion between Professor Stratton and myself that year on the problem of 'upright vision' in the *Psychological Review*. But if he assumes that my article meant to deny that it is a problem of vision he has wholly mistaken it. It was my main purpose to show in that paper that whatever tactual 'uprightness' may exist, there is also a visual 'uprightness' which is convertible with the inversion